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Abstract
This thesis examines the public policy process. It explores the role of and 
relation between three concepts considered important in defining and shaping the 
making of policies: policy networks, evidence-use and policy transfer. It does this 
through examining a high profile and controversial area of public policy: the debate 
about sex offender community notification that resulted from the abduction and 
murder of eight-year-old Sarah Payne by a convicted sex offender in the summer of 
2000. A case study methodology is employed, which includes interviews with key 
players and extensive documentary analysis.
The study finds that none of the main concepts for understanding policy networks - 
iron triangles, issue networks, policy communities and advocacy coalitions - provide 
sufficient characterisation of the policy network involved in the 2000 community 
notification debate. Areas that these concepts do not fully address include the degree 
of choice participants have in getting involved in a policy network, the causes and 
processes of alliance building between network participants and the importance, 
characteristics and impact of organisational as well as personal links.
Practitioner knowledge emerges as a major influence in policy making with different 
forms of evidence entering the policy debate in a strategic way - that is to support an 
argument. Factors that explain the influence of research evidence are its 
comprehensiveness, its perceived value for future policy debates on the same topic 
and the assumed integrity of the evidence-provider.
The existing concept of lesson-drawing is found to focus too much on cases in which 
policy transfer has taken place. It is necessary to develop the concept further to 
explain situations in which lessons are drawn but where the idea of transferring a 
policy is dismissed. Finally, lesson-drawing is not limited to the substance of policies 
and practices but also includes lessons about tactics and processes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Despite a wealth of literature on policy making our knowledge and 
understanding of the policy process is still incomplete (see for example Dror 1989; 
Parsons 1995; Goodin 1996). Three concepts are considered to be important in 
defining and shaping the modern policy process: policy networks, evidence-use and 
policy transfer (see for example Marsden and Lin 1982; Pappi and Henning 1998; 
Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; Davies, Nutley et al. 2000b; Howlett 2002; Bourn 2003). 
However, to date each of these concepts tends to have been considered in isolation 
from the other two. This thesis explores their respective roles within the policy 
process and how they interact with one another. It does so by examining a high profile 
and controversial area of public policy: the notification of a community that they have 
a sex offender living within their midst (sex offender community notification). The 
thesis considers the specific debate about this that occurred in the wake of the 
abduction and murder of eight-year old Sarah Payne by a convicted sex offender in 
the summer of 2000.
This introductory chapter first of all explains why policy networks, evidence-use and 
policy transfer are considered important for understanding the policy process before 
moving on to address the reasons for choosing sex offender community notification as 
the specific area for studying these concepts and their interaction. An overview is 
provided of other research which has analysed the Sarah Payne case, particularly 
where the focus has been on policy-related issues. Finally, an outline of the thesis’ 
structure is provided.
Why Policy Networks, Evidence-Use and Policy Transfer?
Since at least the 1970s, an increasing complexity in the way government is 
organised and society is governed has been notable (Kenis and Schneider 1991; Pappi 
and Henning 1998; Pal 2002). The key features of this development have been an 
increasing number of players within the policy arena, partly arising out of an
- 1 -
increasing reliance on non-governmental players to assist in the formulation and 
implementation of policies, a division of labour, ‘sectoralization’ and ‘functional 
differentiation’ (Kenis and Schneider 1991; Pappi and Henning 1998). This 
phenomenon has led to the claim that the idea of networks within the policy arena is 
now more important than ever before (Pal 2002).
The concept of policy networks highlights the relationships between the actors 
involved in both policy formulation and implementation (Gray 1995; McCool 1990; 
Hanks 2000), and researchers are increasingly paying special attention to alliances as 
a tool used by interest groups to influence the policy process (Heany 2001). Because 
of its portable nature, the idea of policy networks can be applied to any area of public 
interest (John 1999), making it an ideal framework for any policy researcher’s tool­
box. .
There have been lengthy and not always fruitful debates about the precise role played 
by the policy networks concept. While some authors appear to argue that the concept 
amounts to nothing more than some sort of metaphor (Dowding 1995), others 
maintain that policy networks exist, not only as a model, but as a real influence on the 
formulation of policy (Potters and Sloof 1996), acting as ‘links’ amongst the actors in 
the policy field (John 1999; Lovseth 2000). Overall, the policy network concept has 
become increasingly accepted as an analytical tool (Heany 2001a). Even those who 
were strong critics in the past now argue that exploring the networks involved in the 
policy process is important in both analysing policy formulation and policy 
implementation (Dowding 2000). .
Along with the increasing number of actors within the policy arena, knowledge - 
especially of an expert and scientific kind, as well as information in general - has 
started to play an ever-more prominent role: ‘ Whitehall research is on a roll' (Walker 
24 January 2000) and ‘[i]n Whitehall corridors the buzz is “evidence”' (Walker 15 
February 2000).
While ‘evidence-based policy making’ (EBPM) is a relatively new catchphrase, the 
underlying notion of research commissioned by and conducted for the British 
Government goes back to at least Victorian times (Bulmer 1978; Finch 1986; Grayson
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and Gomersall 2003). After a climax of interest in social research for government in 
the 1960s (Bulmer 1978), a failure to deliver the social changes hoped for led to a 
decline of social science’s standing within the policy process during the 1980s (Finch 
1986; Buhner 1986c; Bogenschneider, Olson et al. 2000). This trend of distancing 
from and frequent dismissal of much social scientific research by government 
continued into the 1990s (Nutley and Webb 2000; Duke 2001).
Although policy makers slowly started to play ‘the research card’ (Duke 2001) again 
from around 1990, with both policymakers and academics becoming increasingly 
interested in both the theory and practice underlying evidence-based policy making 
(Amann 2000), the renaissance of research in policy making has been most prominent 
since the election of the Labour Party in 1997 (Nutley and Webb 2000). The idea of 
evidence-based policy making emerged alongside the trend to reform and modernize 
government (Duke 2001), and it has been an integral part of the Blair governments of 
1997 and 2001 (Davies 2004). This new dawn for research evidence within the policy 
process is reflected in slogans like 'what counts is what works' in official publications 
such as the White Paper Modernising Government and its follow-up Professional 
Policy Making for the 21st Century (Nutley and Webb 2000).
However, evidence-based policy making has developed in different ways within the 
various sectors of policy making. Unlike, for example, the health care sector where 
the idea of basing practice and policy on evidence has been established for a relatively 
long time (Davies and Nutley 1999), a more cautious approach to embracing 
evidence-based policy making has been evident within the criminal justice sector. 
People working in this area have been rather careful about claiming specialist 
knowledge when discussing ‘what works’ in criminal justice. This can partly be 
understood in light of the varied role science has played within the criminal justice 
sector in the past (Nutley and Davies 2000). This ranges from a positive outlook 
which assumed that offenders could be treated and reformed, which developed out of 
the work of Cesare Lombroso (Crow 2001), to the ‘nothing works’ school of the mid- 
1970s as exemplified in the works of Martinson (1974) and Brody (1976) (for further 
information see the histories of criminal justice approaches provided in Cavadino and 
Dignan 1997; Cavadino, Crow et al. 1999; Crow 2001). However, over the last few 
years of the 20th Century, driven by a renewed interest in evidence on what works in
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criminal justice, various windows of opportunity for evidence to make a contribution 
to policy started to arise (Nutley and Davies 2000).
Although it is questionable whether research and evidence were ever as far apart from 
the policy process as some advocates of the new evidence-based approach have tried 
to imply (Clarence 2002), the dominant and central role given to evidence in modern 
policy making does stand out and marks a departure from the more moderate stance 
occupied by evidence within the policy process during the recent past (Grayson and 
Gomersall 2003). The major difference is that in a departure from opinion-based 
policy making, the making of policy and actual practice should now be based 
explicitly on the best evidence available (Grayson and Gomersall 2003). Similar to the 
approach taken in Victorian times the perception is once again that better knowledge 
and understanding will lead to better policies so that ‘[ajfter long years of rejection 
and straitened budgets, happy days are here again for researchers in the social 
sciences' (Walker 15 February 2000). In order to arrive at evidence-based policy 
making government requires a wide range of internal and external partnerships. These 
include research institutes, think tanks, professional associations and other civil 
society organisations (Blagescu and Young 2005), which links this approach back to 
the idea of policy networks.
The third and final concept, policy transfer, addresses another prominent trend that 
has arisen out of the changing nature of the policy arena. As a result of increased 
economic integration and globalisation, accompanied by legal restraints and a 
decrease in states’ sovereignty, different countries have started to experience 
comparable domestic pressures (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; Hoberg 2001). Along 
with this, a change in the mindset of politicians has taken place. Increasingly, 
politicians have started to realize that transferring policies can be an important tool in 
modern politics since it assists in dealing with the increased speed of change and the 
enormous level of pressure present in the policy process (Dolowitz, Green wold et al. 
1999; Smith, Baston et al. 2002). Looking at policies and procedures that other 
countries have put into place to address potentially similar problems can serve as a 
‘shortcut to problem solving’. This prevents wasting time and resources on 
reinventing the wheel (Newmark 2002). This trend has been enhanced by faster and 
easier communication between policy-makers of different countries (Dolowitz and
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Marsh 2000). It is likely that a tendency to look abroad for solutions to domestic 
problems will become more prominent in future. One of the main reasons for this 
trend, which connects this concept to evidence-use, is the increasing interest in 
evidence-based policy advice amongst politicians (Pierson 2003) combined with the 
mounting pressure to come up with ‘quick-fix solutions5 (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996).
Within the UK an interest in other countries’ approaches to policy and the 
applicability of such tactics to the UK became increasingly popular under the 
Conservatives led by Thatcher. If anything, the present Labour Government has 
intensified this trend (Dolowitz, Greenwold et al. 1999; King and Wickham-Jones 
1999; Pierson 2003). Looking abroad for political inspiration is now being promoted 
and actively pursued, as is again illustrated inside the Cabinet Office’s Professional 
Policy Making for the 21st Century and the Government’s Modernising Government 
documents (Dolowitz 2003).
The important role played by policy transfer in the modern policy process is 
underlined by the publication of a range of ‘guidelines’ and ‘checklists’ for politicians 
who engage in or think about policy transfer. Such publications outline key issues that 
should be borne in mind by anybody involved in the drawing of lessons (see for 
example Mossberger and Wolman 2001; Rose 2001; Dolowitz 2003).
Having outlined the relevance of policy networks, evidence-use and policy transfer 
for understanding the modern policy process, the next section addresses the question 
of why sex offender community notification is an appropriate policy arena for 
researching the role and interaction of these three concepts.
The Choice of Sex Offender Community Notification as the 
Research Area
In order to study policy networks, evidence-use and policy transfer, it was 
necessary to identify an area where evidence could have played a role in the policy 
process, where policy transfer might have taken place and where a network of people 
and agencies would have been involved. Additionally, it was envisaged that
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concentrating on a high profile policy area would be useful. First of all, due to a 
broader public interest in a high profile policy area widespread media-coverage is 
more likely. Consequently, the amount of data available in the public domain would 
be larger than in policy areas with a lower profile. Secondly, as a result of public 
interest and media inquiry the actions and views of participants in a high profile 
policy area, as well as any competing interests, might be more clearly identifiable.
The domain of criminal justice policy seemed likely to contain a specific policy area 
which fulfilled all of these criteria. It is certainly a high profile policy area because 
crime, or more precisely the fear of crime, sells (Sussman 1997) - it attracts the 
attention of news readers and viewers and has been used to sell newspapers (Benyon 
and Edwards 1997) and political parties (see for example Labour 1997).
There is a large body of ‘folk knowledge’ in the criminal justice field, which is 
reinforced and distorted by contributions from media reports of crime, docu-dramas 
and crime fiction. This fosters some stereotypical views about what works best in 
addressing crime and dealing with criminals (Tilley and Laycock 2000a) and some 
examples are provided in Table 1.1. However, despite the undoubted influence of this 
folk knowledge, there has been much interest in the use of research evidence in 
formulating criminal justice policies over the last few years (ibid.). These different 
and potentially clashing sources of ‘knowledge’ and ‘evidence’ provide an ideal 
environment for studying evidence-use in the formulation of policies.
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Table 1.1: A Selection of ‘Folk-Knowledge’ in Relation to Criminal 
Justice
• Offenders are uncommon and substantially different from the rest of us;
• ‘Lightening does not strike twice’ for most victims;
• An increase in numbers of police officers will produce a commensurate 
reduction in crime levels;
• The more severe the punishment the lower the crime levels
• Crime levels can only be reduced by tackling the ‘root causes’ of 
criminality
(Taken from Tilley and Laycock 2000a, p 214)
The criminal justice field is also a good area for the study of policy transfer. From the 
1990s there has been an increasing tendency for British policymakers to look abroad, 
especially to the US, for inspiration in relation to criminal justice and penal policies 
(see for example Jones and Newburn 2002; Jones and Newburn 2002b). Although it is 
not always possible to establish a direct link between North American and British 
criminal justice policies, policy transfer seems to have taken place in relation to the 
privatisation of correction services (prisons), ‘zero-tolerance’ policing and mandatory 
minimum sentencing, also known as ‘three strikes and you are out’ (Jones and 
Newburn 2002).
Finally, the criminal justice area provides the appropriate opportunity to study the role 
of policy networks. There is a range of statutory agencies, professional groups and 
other lobby and interest groups operating in this area. The non-statutory bodies 
include organisations such as the National Association for the Care and Resettlement 
of Offenders (NACRO), the Lucy Faithful Foundation, and the National Society for 
the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC). Such groups are an integral part of 
policy networks and the media’s interest in this policy area seemed likely to add 
another dimension to interest group participation.
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Having identified criminal justice as the broad area of interest, the next step was to 
identify a particular aspect of this field for detailed examination. Policies relating to 
sex offenders were identified as an area within the wider criminal justice domain 
where the study of policy networks, evidence-use and policy transfer would be 
especially apt. The hatred of sex offenders as a group is unequalled by popular 
attitudes to any other kind of offender (Sampson 1994). Consequently, both policies 
and procedures relating to such offenders are often not so much based on evidence, 
but driven by and grounded in public outcries following highly publicised sex 
offences (CSOM 2001). There is, however, some research evidence about effective 
ways of managing sex offenders (see for example Beech, Erikson et al. 2001; Beech, 
Fisher et al. 1998; Grubin and Thornton 1994; Grubin 1998; Maguire, Kemshall et al. 
2001) and instances of policy transfer in this area have also been documented (see for 
example Hebenton and Thomas 1997; McAlinden 1999).
Originally the intention was to focus on the Sex Offenders Act 1997, which led to the 
establishment of a sex offender register in the UK. Others had already commented 
that the measures introduced by this Act seem to have been driven by a political 
agenda rather than being based on effective practice (see for example Soothill and 
Francis 1998; McAlinden 1999). The establishment of national sex offender registers 
was also high on the policy agenda in countries such as Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand and the US, which offered the opportunity to study policy transfer and 
lesson-drawing.
Despite this early promise, it soon became clear that studying the policy process 
around the formulation of the Sex Offender Act 1997 would be too difficult to pursue 
within the time and resources available for this thesis. One major obstacle was 
identifying and gaining access to most of the key players involved in the formulation 
of the Act. Secondly, unearthing documentary information about the policy process, 
other than that provided in official Home Office publications and the House of 
Commons and House of Lords Hansards, proved difficult. Consequently it was 
decided to focus attention on an even more specific and more recent policy 
development.
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During an initial review of the literature on sexual offender policies, an event which 
emerged as an auspicious area for researching the role of policy networks, evidence- 
use and policy transfer was the case of Sarah Payne and the related debate about sex 
offender community notification. While the issue of whether UK communities should 
be notified about sex offenders living within their locality has been a recurring bone 
of contention in sex offender policy, particularly since the establishment of the 
national sex offender register, Sarah Payne’s death in 2000 led to one of the most 
sustained media campaigns for the introduction of such arrangements in the UK.
This campaign was particularly interesting because in many respects it mirrored a 
campaign in the US which had led to nation-wide compulsory community 
notification. Pressure was exerted on the British Government to go down the same 
route but, although at various points during the campaign it publicly appeared as if the 
campaign was succeeding in its quest, in the end the Government decided against 
such action. Instead, it introduced various other measures aimed at strengthening 
existing legislation on sex offenders. Given that public opinion appeared to favour 
blanket community notification and a general election was likely in the following 
year, the question arose as to why the Government decided against US-style 
community notification measures (Jones and Newburn 2002b).
Thus, the events surrounding the abduction and murder of Sarah Payne were 
considered to provide an appropriate opportunity to examine the role of policy 
networks, evidence-use and policy transfer. First, there existed a variety of evidence 
on sex offenders, the nature of sexual offences and ways of addressing such crimes. 
Second, there was pressure for policy transfer from the US to the UK and, although 
this did not materialise, it offered the opportunity to examine the transfer process. 
Third, from an initial examination of newspaper reports on the Sarah Payne case, it 
was clear that various groups, such as the police and probation services and several 
children’s charities were involved in the policy debate and that a network of players 
could be identified.
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Existing Literature on the Sarah Payne Case
The case of Sarah Payne has often been cited as an example of a moral panic 
about sex offenders and it has also served as a backdrop against which some policy 
outcomes, such as the introduction of Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements 
(MAPPAs) or the effectiveness of community notification, are discussed (see for 
example Pawson 2001; Grange 2003; Lieb 2003; Matravers 2003b).
The events that followed Sarah Payne’s abduction and murder have been used as a 
basis for a variety of discussions. The public’s response to the media’s campaign is 
used by Bell (2002) to conduct a feminist analysis of the role in which women are 
positioned within contemporary political rationalities. Drury (2002) also focuses on 
public reaction and uses the case to explore crowd identity and discourses about 
crowds. Lawler (2002), concentrating on the riots that took place at the time in 
Paulsgrove, analyses how this was represented within the press. Moving away from 
these very specific analyses, Silverman and Wilson (2002) use the case for a more 
wide-ranging criminological examination of paedophilia, the media and society. 
Finally, Jones and Newburn (2002b) cite the debate about sex offender community 
notification that arose at the time as an example of the tendency to import criminal 
justice policies from the US, although in this case policy transfer did not occur. They 
point out that there were ‘ certain important forms of “political resistance”'’ to this 
policy transfer (Jones and Newburn 2002b, p 191), but, they do not examine the 
nature of and underlying reasons for the resistance in more detail. Some aspects of 
this resistance are touched upon by Silverman and Wilson, but their focus is on 
addressing how communities can be made safer places for children rather than on the 
role played by interest groups and evidence within the policy debate.
This thesis, therefore, builds on the work by Jones and Newburn. By using the 
concepts of policy networks, evidence-use and policy transfer it examines the forms 
of resistance that occurred to blanket sex offender community notification, the 
underlying reasons for such resistance and the way in which it expressed itself. As 
such it enhances understanding about why, despite similarities in ‘policy rhetoric’ and 
‘policy style’ on sex offender community notification in the US and the UK (Jones 
and Newburn 2002b), the resulting legislation in the two countries has differed.
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Structure of the Thesis
The main arguments and evidence of this thesis are contained within seven 
further chapters, which are supplemented by six appendices providing additional 
background material. Chapter 2 critically appraises the existing literature on policy 
networks, evidence-based policy making and policy transfer. The main concepts and 
debates in each of these areas are examined.
Chapter 3 uses the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 to define a framework of research 
questions for the thesis. It discusses the methodology that was applied in order to 
explore these questions - a single-case study using documentary analysis and elite 
interviews - and evaluates this methodological approach. The chapter also discusses 
the way in which the research was carried out and provides detailed information on 
the protocol used for presenting the case study material.
The events that occurred in the summer of 2000 are the subject of Chapter 4. 
Following a brief outline of the Sarah Payne case and an exploration of the policy 
context within which this took place, the chapter considers the policy-related events 
that followed. Firstly, the origin and launch of the News of the World's campaign for 
the introduction of US-style sex offender community notification to the UK are 
explored. Secondly, there is an analysis of the impact this campaign had on those 
working in the areas of sex offender management and victim protection. This is 
followed by a discussion of the various reactions and attempts at channelling the 
ensuing debate. The fourth and final section of the chapter outlines the way in which 
both the debate on community notification and the campaign by the News of the 
World and Sarah’s parents have developed over the last few years.
In Chapter 5, the policy network that emerged in 2000 around the community 
notification debate is examined in detail. Attention is paid to how the various players 
got involved in this debate and the actions they took. Furthermore, the chapter 
provides insights into the various links that existed between the organisations and 
individuals involved. This raises a number of questions about how such links might 
have impacted on the debate.
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The issues of evidence and lesson-drawing are the topics of Chapter 6. The various 
types of evidence used in the discussion surrounding the News of the Worlds 
campaign for community notification are examined, as is the evidence-base that was 
available from the American context. The awareness of the wider international 
knowledge-base on community notification by members of the UK policy network is 
also addressed in this chapter.
Chapter 7 takes the findings and insights of the case study and examines their 
conceptual and theoretical implications. The findings are related back to the existing 
literature on policy networks, evidence-use and lesson-drawing. The chapter goes on 
to consider the interaction of these concepts and how the nexus between them is best 
conceptualised and explored.
The final chapter of the thesis, Chapter 8, provides an overview of the thesis and the 
way in which it contributes to existing knowledge on the policy process. The study’s 
strengths and limitations are discussed and potential avenues for further research in 
this area are outlined.
Summary
This chapter has highlighted the important role of policy networks, evidence- 
use and policy transfer in understanding the modern policy process. In addition, it has 
discussed how the Sarah Payne case provides an appropriate policy arena for 
exploring these concepts in more detail.
The existing literature on the Sarah Payne case either focuses on the moral panic that 
arose from the News of the Worlds campaign to introduce blanket sex offender 
community notification or uses the case as a backdrop for discussing some of the 
resulting criminal justice policy changes. None of the existing studies explore in detail 
the policy process itself. Examining this process not only provides an opportunity to 
examine the role of networks, evidence-use and policy transfer in policy making, but 
also should increase our understanding of the very specific events that took place at 
the time.
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Chapter 2
Understanding the Policy Process: the existing 
literature on networks, evidence & policy transfer
Following on from Chapter 1, where the importance of policy networks, 
evidence-based policy making and policy transfer for understanding the modern 
policy process was outlined, this chapter critically reviews the key literature in each of 
these three areas. By doing so, a theoretical foundation on which the thesis is based is 
built. ‘
Policy Networks
Looking for the few who are powerful, we tend to overlook the many whose webs of 
influence provoke and guide the exercise of power
(Heclo 1978, p 102)
While the concept of policy networks has featured increasingly prominently 
within academic discourse and has gained widespread acceptance, a lack of agreement 
on the concept’s defining characteristics as regards the terminology, application and 
understanding of the network approach is notable. Assumptions about the ontological, 
epistemological and methodological standing of policy networks are diverse and 
range from positivistic traditions at one end to realists and interpretative ones at the 
other (Marsh and Smith 2001).
Frequently, the literature on policy networks not only seems to lack ‘a cogent 
underlying function and purpose' for the examination of policy networks (Hanks 
2000, p 2), but also appears to have become preoccupied with definitional disputes, 
conceptual ambiguities and a proliferation of typologies (Wolman 1992; Lovseth 
2000). As a result, a "Babylonian variety' of terms and applications within the field 
has emerged (Borzel 1998). The terminology ranges from ‘interest groups’, ‘political 
subsystems’ and ‘policy domains’ to ‘lobbies’, ‘pressure groups’ and ‘organized 
interests’, as is illustrated in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1: ‘A Babylonian Variety’: Different Terms for Policy
Networks
Term Scholar(s) Year
Policy Whirlpool Ernest S. Griffith 1939
Subsystem J. Leiper Freeman 1955
Triple Alliance Marver Bernstein 1958
Triangular Trading Patterns Theodore J. Lowi 1962
Subgovernment Douglas Cater 1964
Iron Triangle Theodore J. Lowi 1969
Issue Network Hugh Heclo 1978
Sloppy Large Hexagons Charles O.Jones 1982
Policy Communities A. Paul Pross 1986
Advocacy Coalitions Paul A. Sabatier 1987
Issue Niches William P. Browne 1990
Epistemic Communities Ernst B. Haas 1991
Policy Monopolies Baumgartner & Jones 1993
(Adapted and completed from Hanks 2000)
The danger of such mushrooming terminology within the area of policy networks is 
that the explanatory power of the concept can easily be inflated (Marin and Mayntz 
1991). This risk is especially prominent if there is no coherent school of thought, 
glossary of terms, or application. A large number of authors, if not most, only have a 
vague idea of what constitutes a policy network and often fail to state their nebulous 
assumptions or ideas (McCool 1990; Marsh 1998). It is thus not unheard of that two 
different authors while using the same term mean two completely different things or, 
vice versa, that two authors using different terms do actually refer to the same thing 
(Borzel 1998; Hanks 2000).
This problem is aggravated by the fact that different countries conceive of and use the 
policy network approach in different ways. There exist at least three different 
international schools of thought relating to policy networks: the American, the British 
and the European, the latter of which can again be subdivided into Dutch, French and 
German traditions (Marsh 1998; John 1999; Marsh and Smith 2000). Within this
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study the European understanding of policy networks as a new form of governance, 
that by way of its non-hierarchical co-ordination constitutes an alternative to markets 
and hierarchies (Borzel 1998; Marsh and Smith 2000), will not be addressed. Instead, 
the focus will be on the role policy networks, perceived as various kinds of 
relationships between interested groups and the state, play in the formulation and 
implementation of policies, an understanding that is put forward by the British and 
American approach to policy networks (Borzel 1998; Marsh and Smith 2000).
Despite the great variety of titles applied to policy networks it has been argued that 
they are more or less variations on four key types of metaphors: iron triangles, issue 
networks, policy communities and advocacy coalitions (Hanks 2000).
Iron Triangles
The origin of the idea of ‘iron triangles’ is difficult to identify (Freeman and 
Stevens 1987), especially in light of the fact that they have confusingly also been 
referred to as ‘networks’, ‘subgovernments’, ‘subsytems’ and ‘whirlpools’ within the 
literature (Browne and Paik 1993). However, it appears to be the case that the concept 
was originally mainly based on research into agricultural, water and public works 
policies (Heclo 1978). While the actual components that are nowadays thought of as 
constituting an iron triangle - interest groups, committees and an executive agency — 
appear to have been firstly identified by Cater in his examination of policy making in 
Washington’s ‘subgovernments’ (Cater 1964), the concept as such has become mainly 
associated with the work of Lowi. Lowi had initially identified ‘triangular trading 
patterns’ within the policy arena (Lowi 1962) and started to refer to the metaphorical 
concept of ‘iron triangles’ only in subsequent work, where he expanded on his 
original idea of‘triangular trading patterns’ (Lowi 1969).
Traditionally, it has been assumed that iron triangles are very stable tripartite 
arrangements which operate over a long period of time with little or no outside 
interference. In this respect they can be considered to be almost autonomous as 
regards their decision-making abilities (Thurber 1991). Iron triangles normally control 
a very narrow and small niche within the policy field (Heclo 1978) and the 
relationships amongst the small number of participants are assumed to be slow-
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changing and ‘mutually advantageous’ (McCool 1990). Although each member of the 
triangle receives some sort of benefit from the arrangement, benefits are not 
necessarily distributed equally (Nachamias and Rosenbloom 1980). Because of this 
benefit-focus, iron triangles most commonly appear in the case of distributive 
policies, with each side of the triangle supporting and complementing the other two 
(Jordan 1981).
The idea of iron triangles has been considered to be analytically useful in so far as it 
helps to simplify complex interactional arrangements. As a consequence, it has been 
widely referred to. However, academics have questioned the real-world applicability 
of the concept. First of all, it seems to be difficult to clearly identify the three key 
groups within iron triangles (Browne and Paik 1993). Secondly, the iron-like structure 
does not allow for a permeation of it from outside, nor does it account for any relation 
to the surrounding environment. Rather, the iron triangle appears to be some form of 
secluded insular arrangement detached from everything else (Stein and Bickes 1995). 
The major criticism of the iron triangle concept, however, has come from Heclo who 
has argued that the concept of iron triangles is 'not so much wrong as it is disastrously 
incomplete' (Heclo 1978, p 88). Iron triangles cannot take into account the huge level 
of complexity of the policy process. One of the major problems is that researchers are 
trying hard to identify the three major players while missing the interactions that take 
place within the broader networks of people who increasingly have an impact on 
government (Heclo 1978).
'Use of the iron triangle metaphor - even as a “straw man” - 
oversimplifies political relationships so badly as to hide the very 
consequential local influences in Congress and its network' (Browne and 
Paik 1993, p 1075).
Although there have been attempts to make the concept of iron triangles more 
inclusive by adding extra players, one problem with such modifications is that the 
defining nature of the concept is lost and the difference to some of the other concepts 
becomes less clear.
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Issue Networks
The concept of issue networks, which too has become known under a variety 
of terms (Heany 2001), was proposed by Heclo (1978) as a way of addressing the 
shortcomings he saw with iron triangles. Although the originality and conceptual 
contribution of this concept has been questioned in so far as all it appears to do is to 
change the label of an earlier concept, ‘whirlpools’, (Freeman and Stevens 1987), it is 
issue networks that have become widely known while the notion of ‘whirlpools’, even 
at the time of its first formulation, has never become a standard term in political 
science (Hanks 2000). While Heclo considers issue networks to be ‘'almost the reverse 
image in each respecf of iron triangles (Heclo 1978, p 102), other authors have 
argued that issue networks are ‘not discreetly different arrangements from iron 
triangles'1 (Jordan 1981, p 103). Instead, it has been claimed that all they account for 
are iron triangles with an increased number of participants, larger disaggregation of 
power, less predictable participants and both lower cohesion and homogeneity (Jordan 
1981).
The defining trait of an issue network is the large number of participants involved, 
ranging from individuals to huge interest groups. Issue networks operate at a 
multitude of levels and within issue networks the number of participants is in a 
permanent flux. As a result, no one is really in control of the issue agenda. Whereas 
involvement in iron triangles is mainly driven by materialistic reasons, it is assumed 
that the underlying reasons for participation in issue networks are emotional or 
intellectual factors, with members sharing a specific interest. Although on first 
impression this seems to imply that issue networks amount to little more than political 
movements, this is not the case. Policy goals are more specific in issue networks than 
in political movements, and while one defining trait of political movements is 
uncertainty about authority within the movement, in issue networks there is no 
tendency for anybody to obtain perceived or legitimate authority as to what represents 
the public will (Salisbury 1984).
Although the major advantage of issue networks appears to have been that the concept 
offered an alternative to iron triangles (McCool 1990), it has also drawn attention to 
important aspects of the policy process. First of all, it has highlighted that policy is
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made in communities, the structure, nature and stability of which all influence the 
policy process. Secondly, it has drawn attention to the permanent flux within such 
communities because of players moving in as well as out. Such changes lead to 
modifications in agendas, interests and linkages between various issues. Thirdly, the 
concept brings to light a more decentralized understanding of power with no one 
person being fully in charge (Heany 2001a).
Nonetheless, there are certain problems with issue networks as an analytical concept. 
It is incredibly difficult to identify a specific issue network since at any point in time 
only parts of the network might be active. Consequently, there is no clearly 
identifiable set of participants, links between participants might fade or be 
strengthened, and there are no clear-cut boundaries between governmental institutions 
and their environment. As Heclo (1978) himself recognised when trying to examine 
issue networks it is virtually impossible to state where a network leaves off and its 
environment starts. Issue networks are therefore "more like amorphous clouds than 
geometric designs" (Browne and Paik 1993, p 1055). As such they do not lend 
themselves to academic studies.
Although the idea of issue networks has been frequently quoted and accepted 
(McCool 1990; Heany 2001a), it appears to be the case that so far nobody has 
managed to identify a specific issue network (Hanks 2000). The most that seems to 
have been accomplished is to identify structures that display some of the features 
typical of issue networks (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).
Policy Communities
Initially, the idea of policy communities appears to have been a defence of 
pluralism against its critics and corporatist theory (Jordan 1981) and can be seen as a 
British re-production and duplication of the American concepts of iron triangles and 
issue networks (Jordan 1990). Some people, most prominently the authors of the 
study that put policy networks on the map within the UK, Richardson and Jordan 
(1979), have pointed out that at the time there was no direct application of American 
ideas to the British context but that the approach taken was simply a description of 
structures within British policy-making with a subsequent recognition of American
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precedents. Others, however, simply consider it to be a development of the US 
literature for Britain (Dowding 1995).
Leaving any such disputes aside, this combination of British and American schools of 
thought has had its own merits. While on the one hand policy communities follow the 
idea of issue networks by widening the number of participants, they also assume 
stable relationships that mirror the long-standing relationships within iron triangles, 
perceived as assisting in the negotiation process. Policy communities are thus a 
special case of stable networks (Jordan 1990), and, were one to draw a continuum of 
policy network concepts, policy communities would be placed somewhere between 
iron triangles and issue networks (Hanks 2000).
Within the literature policy communities are understood to be a sort of 'common 
culture and understanding' within specific policy domains as regards problems and 
decision-making processes (Dowding 1995, p 138). Some of these communities are 
'diverse and fragmented' while others are 'extremely closed and tightly knit' 
(Kingdon 1995, p 118). These communities are made up of specialists in any given 
policy area (ibid.) and if a new policy focus develops, sooner or later a new policy 
community will evolve around it (Jordan 1990). As a result, 'policy communities are 
swept by intellectual fads' (Kingdon 1995, p 127) so that the attention given to certain 
issues will fluctuate over time (ibid.). As the focus on one policy area becomes 
intellectually fatigued and routinised, other areas become more interesting.
One of the main difficulties with the idea of policy communities is the variety of ways 
in which it has been used. This makes it almost impossible to come up with a coherent 
picture (Campbell, Baskin et al. 1989; Anderson 1990; Rhodes 1990; Marsh and 
Rhodes 1992). For example Grant et al (1988) identify differentiation, specialisation 
and interaction as characteristics of policy communities, whereas Rhodes (1988) in 
his examination distinguishes between interests, membership, resources and 
horizontal and vertical interdependence. So, while in its original form the concept was 
'parsimonious and thought-provoking' it has been 'complicated and diluted' in 
subsequent work (Grant 1995, p 34). In order to come up with a more coherent 
picture, an attempt to extract the central assumptions has been made by Jordan, 
Maloney and McLaughlin (1992), which is outlined in Table 2.2. •
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Table 2.2: Central Assumptions of the Policy Community Model
1. Complexity in policy-making so that ‘policy emerges from a complicated 
interaction of parties, political groups, and bureaucrats’
2. Lack of state autonomy, given that the policy community idea is based on an 
exchange between bureaucrats and interests.
3. Segmentation so that ‘policies are made in sectors effectively restricted to 
those with an interest’
4. Civil servants are key policy-makers and develop mutual support relationships 
with pressure groups
5. Relations are based on mutual trust
6. There is an exchange-based relationship between civil servants and groups 
which encourage consensus-seeking
7. Order and routine decisions. ‘Both sides’ experience leads them to narrow 
their expectations to areas where accommodation is possible’
8. ‘Most of the content of policy communities discussion tends to be minor for 
society as a whole - but vital to participants’
9. Restricted consultation so that ‘a policy community can be seen as a 
mechanism for the assimilation of ‘legitimate’ competing values and the 
exclusion of those competing values deemed ‘illegitimate’
(Jordan, Maloney and McLaughlin, quoted in Grant 1995, pp 35-6)
More recently, the policy community approach has been dominated by the work of 
Rhodes (1988; 1990; 1992), who considers policy communities as only one sort of 
network amongst professional networks, intergovernmental networks, producer 
networks and issue networks, the defining characteristics of these being illustrated in 
Table 2.3.
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Table 2.3: Policy Community and Policy Network: the Rhodes
Model 1
Type of network Characteristics of network
Policy community/territorial community
Stability, highly restricted membership,
vertical interdependence, limited
horizontal articulation
Professional network
Stability, highly restricted membership,
vertical interdependence, limited
horizontal articulation, serves interest of
profession
Intergovernmental network
Limited membership, limited vertical
interdependence, extensive horizontal
articulation
Producer network
Fluctuating membership, limited vertical
interdependence, serves interest of
producer
Issue network
Unstable, large number of members,
limited vertical interdependence.
(Adapted from Rhodes 1990)
As is outlined in Table 2.4, the characteristics that distinguish a policy community 
from an issue network are the more restricted number of participants, high-quality 
interaction of all groups on all matters related to policy issues, and a dominance of 
economic or professional interests, with both values and membership persisting over a 
long period of time (Rhodes and Marsh 1992). However, these characteristics appear 
to be problematic. It is questionable whether high-quality interaction of all groups on 
all matters related to policy issues is even theoretically feasible and also whether it is 
possible to maintain the idea of stability over time (Richardson 2002). Additionally,
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the assumption that only people with some form of technical expertise can participate 
in policy communities does not seem to hold and a focus on mainly economic or 
professional interests is dubious (Hanks 2000), with the arising picture resembling an 
‘elite cartel" (Grant 1995, p 36) rather than a policy community.
Table 2.4: Policy Community and Policy Network: the Rhodes
Model II
Dimension Policy Community Issue Network
Network Membership
Number of Participants
Very limited number, some 
groups consciously 
excluded
Large
Type of interest
Economic and/or 
professional interests 
dominate
Encompasses range of 
affected interests
Network Integration
Frequency of interaction
Frequent, high-quality, 
interaction of all groups on 
all matters related to policy 
issues
Contacts fluctuate in 
frequency and intensity
Continuity
Membership, values, and 
outcomes persistent over 
time
Access fluctuates 
significantly
Consensus
All participants share basic 
values and accept the 
legitimacy of the outcome
Some agreement exists, 
but conflict is ever present
Network Resources
Distribution of resources 
(in network)
All participants have 
resources, basic 
relationship is an 
exchange relationship
Some participants may 
have resources, but they 
are limited, basic 
relationship is consultative
Internal distribution
Hierarchical, leaders can 
deliver members
Varied, variable 
distribution and capacity to 
regulate members
Power
There is a balance of 
power among members. 
Although one group may 
dominate, it must be a 
positive-sum game if 
community is to persist
Unequal powers, reflecting 
unequal resource and 
unequal access - zero- 
sum game
(Adapted from Marsh and Rhodes 1992)
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Advocacy Coalitions
In order to replace the traditional triangular approach to policy networks and 
the traditional idea of a stagist policy-cycle, according to which policies can be 
understood as a set of interdependent phases through which policies go over time 
(Dunn 1994)1, Sabatier, first with Pelkey and later with Jenkins-Smith, developed the 
idea of advocacy coalitions. These form part of a broader framework, the advocacy 
coalition framework (ACF), which is illustrated in Diagram 2.1 (Sabatier and Pelkey 
1987; Sabatier 1988; Sabatier 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).
According to the advocacy coalition framework, networks of policy makers, within 
this approach called policy subsystems, are made up of several competing advocacy 
coalitions, normally between two to four (Cairney 1997). Each of these coalitions 
consists of a variety of players, ranging from various governmental to private 
organisations, who share certain core beliefs. These core beliefs are of a fundamental 
normative and ontological nature and therefore not very susceptible to change. 
Advocacy coalitions will try to translate these core beliefs, which act like ‘glue’ to 
hold the advocacy coalition together (Sabatier 1993), into policies. In order to do so, 
they will apply various strategies, such as litigation, lobbying of elected officials, 
commissioning research or other ways of influencing opinions (Elliott and Schlaepfer 
2001b). However, opinions on these secondary, more pragmatic and instrumental, 
aspects of how to achieve the policy goal, may differ between various players within 
the same advocacy coalition and are open to change over time (Sabatier and Jenkins- 
Smith 1993).
As well as those players within the coalitions, the existence of another group of 
actors, the ‘policy-brokers’, is assumed. These brokers are considered to be people, 
such as high civil servants, whose concern it is to keep the level of political conflict 
within acceptable limits so that a ‘reasonable’ solution to a perceived problem is 
reached (Sabatier 1993). It appears that it will usually be difficult to distinguish 
between these brokers and ‘advocates’ since they are based on a continuum.
1 Some authors have questioned whether advocacy coalitions do actually break out of the policy cycle 
approach deLeon, P. (1999). The Stage Approach to the Policy Process - What Has It Done? Where Is 
It Going? Theories of the Policy Process. P. A. Sabatier. Boulder, Westview Press: 19-32.
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Diagram 2.1: Diagram of the Advocacy Coalition Framework
.T
‘V
i- y
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, p 224)
Outside the policy subsystem there are two factors that provide both resources and 
restraints for the actors within. First of all, there are relatively stable parameters that 
hardly change in the short-run, such as the basic distribution of the natural resources, 
basic attributes of the ‘problem’ area, basic legal structure and the fundamental socio­
cultural values and structures. Secondly, there are those aspects that are open to major 
changes in the short-run. These include changes in socio-economic conditions, public 
opinion, governing coalitions as well as policy decisions and impacts from other
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subsystems. It is these aspects which provide the main driving forces behind changes 
in policies (Sabatier 1993, pp 20-3).
Despite the fact that the ACF comes with a set of ‘testable’ hypotheses which have 
been tested through several case studies, the major criticism of this concept has been 
that it is mainly based on the American system and is consequently difficult to apply 
to any political system that does not correspond to American-style pluralism (Parsons 
1995, pp 200-3). Although an attempt at a ‘European’ version was published in 1998 
(Sabatier 1998), its usefulness is open for debate. Sabatier essentially appeared to ask 
European researchers to do their own work: 'The real task of European researchers is 
to develop falsifiable hypotheses based upon the ACF' (Sabatier 1998, p 121).
While several studies have tried to apply the concept to European structures, mainly 
the EU itself (see for example Radaelli 1999; Warleigh 2000; Elliott and Schlaepfer 
2001b; Weber and Christophersen 2002), questions have arisen about the framework’s 
applicability to an European context. For example, Warleigh (2000) concludes that 
'Sabatier’s model of the advocacy coalition ...appears unable entirely to encapsulate 
the entrepreneurial dynamics of EU decision-making'’ (p 237).
Other problems with this concept arise out of the notion of belief systems. First of all, 
the grouping of people according to beliefs rather than importance or influence is 
problematic. Secondly, the idea of core beliefs might not explain the reasons why 
groups form coalitions. Thirdly, core beliefs might not shape the day-to-day 
operations and actions of coalitions. Fourthly, the distinction between various levels 
of beliefs is awkward, and it will be virtually impossible to identify a coalition’s core 
beliefs (Cairney 1997). Fifthly, since no historical context is developed as part of the 
ACF which allows for an analysis of coalition formation (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
1993a), the development of a coalition’s core beliefs cannot be analysed (Watt 1997). 
Given this lack of historical context the ACF lends itself more to established policy 
networks (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993a), and thus does not really take into 
account how different topics can come onto the policy agenda. Finally, other 
prominent criticisms outlined by Parsons (1995) have addressed the distinction 
between ‘events’ and ‘stable parameters’. The question is how far the constraints and 
resources set for the policy subsystem by these two factors exist in a subsystem’s
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physical environment or if they are cognitive constructs within the individuals and 
organisations that make up the subsystem? In addition, there is an assumption that 
non-elites, such as members of the general public, have '‘neither the expertise, nor the 
time, nor the inclination to be active participants in a policy subsystem' (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1993, p 202).
Agenda-Setting within Policy Networks
As these concepts stand, none of them appears to account for the ways in 
which the agenda is set within a policy network. It is therefore useful to include some 
notion of this. In the past public policy researchers have often stressed the stable 
relationships within policy sectors with change being slow and incremental so that the 
whole process appears to be marked by ‘muddling through’ (see for example 
Lindblom 1959). However, more recently it has been noted that while such sometimes 
extremely stable arrangements can prevail for a long period of time, they are often 
disrupted by ‘short bursts of rapid change' (Baumgartner and Jones 1991, p 1044). 
This idea has to some degree been taken up by the idea of advocacy coalitions, when 
reference to outside forces that can provide impact for major changes is made. 
However, the remaining questions are: how can such changes come about; why do 
certain policy topics suddenly increase in prominence on the political agenda; and 
why by the same token, can interest suddenly ebb off (Baumgartner and Jones 2004)?
Within the literature there have been several attempts to examine ‘agenda setting’. 
The two most prominent ones appear to be Kingdon’s model of policy streams (1984) 
and Baumgartner and Jones’ (1991; 1993) punctuated equilibrium approach.
Baumgartner and Jones (1991; 1993) argue that policy issues have a wave-like 
developmental pattern; times during which a topic has a high status on the agenda are 
followed by a fading of the topic from the agenda which allows the newly arrived at 
arrangements to settle into more stable routines. These can then again last over a long 
period of time. There are three main reasons for such punctuations. First of all, 
punctuation can occur due to governmental change, where one party takes over from 
another and with it changes the preferences of and direction for policies. The second 
reason for the occurrence of punctuation in an existing equilibrium arises out of
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sudden dramatic external changes which destroys existing routines and brings new 
issues on the agenda. A third and final reason is the emergence of new ideas, either 
from within or outside the policy arena, and which once caught onto are unstoppable 
and thereby ‘hitting’ the political system (John 2004).
According to Kingdon (1984; 1995), the policy process can be understood in light of 
the way the policy agenda is set. He envisages this process to consist of four factors. 
The first three factors are ‘streams’ and include a problem, policy and political one. 
The ‘problem stream’ addresses those issues that are recognised as significant 
problems by policy makers and need to be addressed. The ‘political stream’ is made 
up of the wider political arena and incorporates the public mood, pressure groups, 
campaigns and election results and is the one that can be understood as setting the 
governmental agenda. The third stream, the ‘policy stream’, on the other hand deals 
with the generation of policy proposals. It is assumed that there is some sort of ‘policy 
primeval soup’ in which various proposals are floated, examined, discarded or revised 
before being floated again. This acts as a selection mechanism whereby only those 
proposals that can be seriously considered survive. While under normal circumstances 
these three streams operate largely independently of one another at critical points in 
time, the three streams will come together and a ‘policy window’ will open. This 
allows a crossover between these streams so that proposals for a solution become 
attached to a problem and can be pushed onto the decision agenda.
Evidence-based Policy Making
‘There is nothing a government hates more than to be well-informed; for it makes the 
process of arriving at decisions much more complicated and difficult’
John Maynard Keynes (quoted in Davies 2004, p 2)
While some governments might still rely on 'gut instincts, astrological charts 
or yesterday’s focus group' in the formulation of policies, in general, a tendency to 
look for evidence and place a premium on proof and demonstrable results when 
developing policies has been notable (Mulgan 2003, p 1). Two of the driving forces 
that have been identified as underlying this trend are societal and economic shifts 
towards a more systematic creation and usage of knowledge. Governments themselves
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have been strong advocates of knowledge and have played an active role in its 
dissemination. Along with governments’ tendency to put a high value on learning, 
understanding and awareness, citizens have become more educated, knowledgeable 
and confident (Mulgan 2003). In combination with easier access to information this 
means that citizens are less likely to accept governments that ignore available 
knowledge (ibid.). As a result, a departure from opinion-based policy making, where 
either evidence is used selectively or policies are based on the ideologies and opinions 
of individuals or groups, has been notable and the notion of evidence-based policy 
making has emerged (Davies 2004). The latter can be defined as an approach that
’'helps people make well informed decisions about policies, programmes 
and projects by putting the best available evidence from research at the 
heart of policy development and implementation* (Davies 2004, p 3).
The idea of rooting policies in evidence has ‘all the appeal of motherhood and apple 
pie' (Tilley and Laycock 2000a, p 213) and has experienced popularity throughout the 
Anglophile world, most prominently in the UK (Marston and Watts 2003). It has its 
origin in the concept of evidence-based practice which in turn arose out of the 
evidence-based medicine approach (Marston and Watts 2003). The latter had started 
around 1992. Being ‘problem based’, and taking a scientific discourse which 
combined the epistemologies of positivism and realism (Marks 2002), the underlying 
idea was to go through a process of ‘systematically finding, appraising and using 
research findings as the basis of clinical decisions' (Marston and Watts 2003, p 146). 
From acute medicine, this rationale first spread to other areas within health care 
before moving into the fields of education and social work (Marks 2002) and finally 
in to all areas addressing public services and policy (Black 2001).
When looking at the idea of evidence-based policy making one can easily get the 
impression that the aim of the approach is to maximise the impact that research has on 
policy making. However, the intention is to have policies that take good information 
and use it well. Other polices might be evidence-based but not necessarily in the 
desired way (Shaxson 2005). As there are several justified reasons to question the 
usefulness of an approach based on evidence, outlined in Table 2.5, the aim should be 
to optimise, rather than maximise the impact of evidence on policy making (Cookson 
2005).
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Table 2.5: Legitimate Reasons to Question the Practicality or 
Desirability of an Evidence-Based Approach
• Assembly of evidence may be too costly in relation to the likely benefits such 
evidence may yield
• There may be only one viable way to proceed, or there may be a universal 
consensus as to what needs to be done
• There may be political imperatives that override any objective evidence
• The research capacity needed to provide useful evidence may not be
available .
• The problem to be investigated may defy meaningful research scrutiny, 
perhaps because objectives are not clear, outcomes are impossible to 
measure, or technology is changing too rapidly
• There may be insuperable practical constraints to assembling useful 
evidence, such as fundamental ethical considerations
(Adapted from Davies, Nutley et al. 2000c, pp 352-3)
In light of terminological concerns regarding the notion of evidence-based policy 
making some authors have argued that it might be more appropriate to talk of 
evidence-informed or evidence-aware policies rather than evidence-based ones (see 
for example Nutley 2003b)2. Not only does such an approach address potential 
worries about the role and position attributed to evidence within the policy process, 
but it also opens up the possibility for analytical distinctions. Proceeding on this basis, 
Gray (2001) identifies five different analytical concepts regarding the relationship 
between policy and evidence: (1) evidence-ignorant policy - policy not even aware of 
relevant evidence; (2) evidence-aware policy - those aware of but not using evidence; 
(3) evidence-informed policy - policy considering but not substantially shaped by 
evidence; (4) evidence-influenced policy - policy changed in some identifiable way
2 . . . .Given that the term evidence-based policy making is the one that has become part of the academic
and policy lexicon, in this thesis the approach taken follows Nutley (2003b) who proposes to treat the 
notion of evidence-based policy making as a convenient shorthand for a process where evidence does 
and should compete with other forms of knowledge and other interests, rather than imbue it with more 
deterministic qualities (p 4).
-29-
by evidence; (5) evidence-led policy - policy that is for the greater part shaped and 
embedded in evidence about goals, options and outcomes (p 3).
Despite the fact that the notion of evidence-based policy making can be seen as 
intuitive and common sense logic (Marston and Watts 2003), it has been met with 
some scepticism. The ‘ cheap and easy' rhetoric often used by advocates of the 
approach can easily mask the 'expensive and difficult' reality when trying to apply it 
(Tilley and Laycock 2000a, p 213). Sceptics have considered the idea of evidence- 
based policy making as 'a profane arithmetic, a measuring of the unmeasurable, a 
science that does not add up' (Gray 2001, p 2), and, in light of the perception that it is 
hard to imagine that the making of policy can ever be entirely free of evidence, a 
‘sham’ (Perri 2002). The main areas of debate relate to the relationship between 
policy and science and the nature of‘evidence’.
Policy and Science
'The great scientists have all the qualities of the gods; they have ways of knowing 
things that we ordinary mortals could never acquire3
Adam Phillips, Big Science and Little White Lies
The relationship between policymakers and social scientists tends to change 
over time, between governments (Coleman 1991), and between various departments 
of the same government (Ginsburg and Gorostiaga 2001). It is always complex, and 
never easy (Stone 2001b), and has been described as resembling 'dancing in the dark' 
(Klemperer, Theisens et al. 2001, p 197). The dancing parties do not completely see 
each other, there are complex movements and the flow of the dance is influenced by 
the environment (ibid.).
On the one hand, social scientists who have demonstrated their competence in various 
functional roles within the public service, ranging from the more technical to the more 
policy-oriented ones (Leiserson 1965), assume that they can make important 
contributions to the formulation of policies and have felt for a long time that the 
information they provide is underutilized (Patton, Smith Grimes et al. 1977; Oh 1996; 
Neilson 2001). Policymakers on the other hand have the feeling that the information
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they receive from social scientists is unintelligible, esoteric, too theoretical, does not 
address the problems on the policy agenda and does not take into account the unique 
pressure for action placed upon policymakers (Oh 1996; Stone 2001).
Part of this frustration can be ascribed to the different analytical paradigms in which 
policymakers and researchers operate, outlined in Table 2.6. Such differences, paired 
with cultural and environmental variations, can lead to the creation of a gap between 
the research and policy communities in need of ‘bridging’ (Neilson 2001; Stone, 
Maxwell et al. 2001; Crewe and Young 2002; de Vibe, Hovland et al. 2002) and can 
present obstacles to research utilisation. Barriers to the uptake of research can exist on 
both the policy-demand and research-supply side or result from a combination 
thereof, as can be seen from Table 2.7.
While the research utilization literature has adopted the idea of two more or less 
distinct communities of policymakers and researchers as a central focus (Webber 
1986), the idea has been criticized for several reasons. The main criticisms are that it 
is built on stereotypical depictions of the two communities by presenting only the 
dominant portrayals of each culture, and the fact that it ignores the question of 
heterogeneity of membership in each group while overstating the extent to which 
individuals are members of only one of these two groups (Ginsburg and Gorostiaga 
2001). Any classification into such groups means that artificial polarized distinctions 
are created, and in-group differences are masked, as are between-group similarities 
(Garvin 2001). There is also the danger that by focusing on the need to ‘bridge’ any 
existing gaps this mindset is reinforced (Stone 2001b) and potentially so are the 
differences, resulting in a widening of the gap rather than a closing.
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Table 2.6: Differences in the Information Needs, Work Culture and
Writing Preferences of the two Communities of Researcher and 
Policymaker
Characteristics Researchers Policymakers
Information Needs
Kind of Information Focus on what we don’t know; prefer questions
Focus on what we do know; 
prefer answers
Level of Detail More detail on narrow topics
Comprehensive overviews 
which emphasize malleable 
factors policy can influence
Source of Data
Focus is representative samples 
that produce knowledge that can 
be generalized
Focus is often comparison of 
how a policymaker’s 
constituency stacks up to a 
similar city, county, state or 
region
Work Culture
Approach and Timing
Cautious; sceptical; tentative; 
reflective; progress in research 
can take years to achieve
Reactive; to enhance re­
election chances, must 
respond quickly in a fast paced 
environment; progress can 
occur within weeks
Criteria for Decision 
Making
Statistical probability; sound 
research methods and designs; 
publications in peer-reviewed 
journals
What is possible through 
negotiation and compromise; 
persuasive rhetoric and the 
single anecdote can be 
powerful
Views of Ambiguity 
and Complexity
Excited by ambiguity and 
complexity
Counterproductive to embrace 
complexity because you have 
to take firm positions on issues
Writing Preferences
Emphasis
An emphasis on sample, models 
and analysis to improve the 
quality of future research
Little attention to sample, 
methods and analysis, 
because scholars can be 
trusted to review only high- 
quality studies
Organization Building in a logical progression to the conclusions at the end
Placing the most important 
conclusions for policy at the 
beginning
Writing
in-depth discussions with 
discipline-specific terminology 
and technical graphs and *
illustrations
Concise, easy-to-read reports 
with accessible language, 
active voice, short sentences, 
frequent paragraphing and 
simple graphs and illustrations
(Adapted from Bogenschneider, Olson et al. 2000, p 334)
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Table 2.7: Problems on the Researcher’s and Policymaker’s Side 
affecting the Uptake of Research
Supply Side Problem
• Public goods problem, where there is an inadequate supply of policy relevant 
research
• Lack of access to research, data and analysis for both researchers and policy 
makers
• Poor policy comprehension of researchers towards both the policy process 
and how research might be relevant to this process
• Ineffective communication by researchers of their work
Demand Side Problem
• Ignorance of politicians or over-stretched bureaucrats about the existence of 
policy relevant research
• Tendency for anti-intellectualism in government that mitigates against the use 
of research in policy making while the policy process itself is riddled with fear 
of the critical power of ideas
• Governmental capacity - policymakers and leaders being dismissive, 
unresponsive or incapable of using research
• Politicisation of research. Research findings are easy to abuse, either through 
selective use, de-contextualisation, or misquotation
Supply and Demand Side Problems
• Social disconnection of both researchers and decision-makers from each 
other and from those who the research is about or intended for, to the extent 
that effective implementation is undermined
• Domains of research relevance, impact and influence - not simply a question 
of research having a direct policy impact, but one of broader patterns of 
socio-political, economic and cultural influence over long term
• Contested validity of knowledge(s), issues of censorship and control, and the 
question of ideology - question of power relations
• Validity of research, and problems relating to the question - what is 
knowable?
(Adapted from Stone 2001b, pp 7-10)
Given that a lot of social scientists expect their research to influence policymakers or 
practitioners (Neilson 2001), there have been various studies and articles addressing 
‘enemies’ of evidence-based policy making and exploring aspects that can improve 
the dialogue between researchers and policymakers and which might facilitate the 
uptake and use of research (see for example Chaplan 1977; Patton, Smith Grimes et 
al. 1977; Coleman 1991; Webber 1991; Garrett and Islam 1998; Leicester 1999; 
Bogenschneider, Olson et al. 2000; Tilley and Laycock 2000a; Ginsburg and 
Gorostiaga 2001; Stone 2001; Nutley, Walter et al. 2002; Nutley, Percy-Smith et al. 
2003; Davies 2004; Petticrew, Whitehead et al. 2004). In light of the diversity of the
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various areas of policy making and the players within them it is unwise to come up 
with too many notions about the conditions in which policymakers are likely to adopt 
research findings (Nutley, Davies et al. 2000). Differences in the authority and level 
of policy- and decision-makers, differences in the nature of policy questions under 
consideration and differences in issues, such as adoption versus implementation or 
decision versus action, all influence the degree to which evidence is used (Innvaer, 
Grunn et al. 2002). Nonetheless, a number of key points that facilitate the uptake of 
evidence have emerged and broadly speaking the following categories can be 
identified: (1) timing - the research is available at the right time; (2) relevance - the 
research relates to a specific environment and addresses an issue currently high up on 
the policy agenda; (3) clarity - the findings are unambiguous and have clear 
implications for action; (4) quality — the findings can be trusted and have been 
produced by an authoritative source; (5) political adeptness - the findings are 
consistent with national guidance and do not present a major challenge to existing 
policy; (6) personality - trust in and authority of the findings’ producer or supporter 
(Nutley, Davies et al. 2000; Percy-Smith, Burden et al. 2004).
In addition to the impact any paradigmatic differences can have on the influence and 
uptake of evidence within policy making, another important factor is the nature of the 
policy field itself. In general, three types of policy fields can be identified: stable 
policy fields; policy fields in a flux; and inherently novel policy fields (Mulgan 2003). 
Within stable policy fields a strong evidence-base has been established so that 
governments know approximately what to do. Any changes or improvements are 
usually of an incremental nature and good innovations spread rapidly through formal 
networks. Policy fields in flux, conversely, are those areas where policies that once 
worked are no longer adequate and there is a general understanding that things need to 
change. Although in such areas there is usually a greater deal of fertility and 
experimentation there is also disagreement over basic theoretical approaches, 
potential solutions and the overall knowledge-base is contested. The last category, 
inherently novel policy fields, is made up of those areas where, due to the genuine 
newness, the existence of a strong evidence-base is precluded. There will be limited, 
if any, understanding of what does and what does not work (Mulgan 2002; Mulgan 
2003). Because of the differences in the available knowledge-base it has been argued 
that it is only meaningful to speak of evidence-based policy making when referring to
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the first category: the one of stable policy fields. Otherwise, the best one can talk 
about is evidence-informed policy (Mulgan 2003).
Within the research-science relationship various models of research utilization have 
been proposed. While there does not seem to be as much of a theoretical underpinning 
as one would hope for, it is generally agreed within the literature that there are at least 
six different models of research utilization. All of these seem to have their origin in 
the works of Weiss (Weiss 1995b; Weiss 1972; Weiss 1977; Weiss 1986; Hanney, 
Gonzalez-Block et al. 2002). These six models can be classed under three broad 
headings (Ginsburg and Gorostiaga 2001):
1. Instrumental use of knowledge
2. Conceptual use of knowledge
3. Strategic use of knowledge • '
1. Instrumental Use of Knowledge
Classic/purist/knowledge-driven model
The classic model of research utilization has its origin in the natural sciences 
and assumes that there is a linear sequence of events, ranging from the production of 
knowledge to its application. It is the most venerable model in the literature and in its 
most extreme form would lead to the abdication of political choices (Young, Ashby et 
al. 2002). Given that for a lot of social scientists the intended result or expectation is 
to influence the policy maker (Neilson 2001), this model could be seen as the basis of 
social scientists’ ambitions. However, since the mid-1970s this model has been hotly 
contested. In addition to the assumed linearity, another problem is that it seems to 
assume a more or less positivistic understanding of science as created in the 19th and 
early 20th century. According to this picture, science consists of a universal rationality 
that is culture and politics-free, calling for a distanced and dispassionate value-free 
point of view. Thus, as far as possible, any ‘subjectivity’ is removed while at the same 
time the findings and finished products are ideally the ‘true’ representations of things, 
covered by ‘universal’ general laws (Ihde 2002). This perception of science does not 
seem to hold any longer.
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Problem-solving/engineering/policy-driven model
While the problem-solving model, similar to the knowledge-driven one,
follows a linear sequence, the steps involved are different. Its starting point can be 
found in the identification of a problem which in turn leads to a request by a policy 
maker for the identification and assessment of alternative solutions to this problem by 
scientists. Research therefore follows policy with policy issues shaping research 
priorities. Research can enter this process in two ways: firstly, by identifying pre­
existing research or secondly, the purposeful commissioning of the required research. 
The expectation is therefore that the research provides empirical evidence and 
conclusions that assist in solving a policy problem. The underlying assumption is that 
there is a consensus on the goal between the policy maker and the scientist. While this 
is the dominant image of research utilization, the actual number of such cases is small 
(Weiss 1986).
2. Conceptual Use of Knowledge
Interactive/social interaction model
According to this model, research is only one part of a complex process that 
also draws on experience, political insights, various pressures, social technologies and 
judgement. Consequently, all people involved in an issue amalgamate their talents, 
beliefs and understanding to clarify the situation (Donnison 1978; Ginsburg and 
Gorostiaga 2001). Instead of a linear process, the assumption is that the process 
consists of a set of interactions between researchers and policy makers, in turn 
exposing these two groups to their different worlds and needs. As such both research 
and policy are mutually influential; the boundaries between the two start to get blurred 
and it is impossible to discern who influences whom (Young, Ashby et al. 2002).
Enlightenment/percolation/limestone model
This is probably the way in which social science research enters the policy 
arena most frequently. Different concepts, theoretical perspectives and research 
findings percolate into society and shape the general thinking of decision makers in 
those subject areas that subsequently become relevant to specific decisions regarding 
policy and practice (Ginsburg and Gorostiaga 2001). It is important to note that there 
is no assumption that decision-makers will actively seek out social science research
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when faced with a policy issue. What is more, it is not even assumed that they are 
receptive to or actively aware of certain aspects of existing research. Instead, social 
science research functions more as a backdrop of ideas and orientations, ‘pre­
digested’ in so far as it has slowly percolated through to the policy maker and thus 
helps to ‘illuminate the landscape’ for the decision maker (Young, Ashby et al. 2002).
3. Strategic Use of Knowledge
Political Model
The political model considers research as ammunition to be used in the policy 
process. Policy makers draw upon research to support pre-determined positions they 
hold and use a very selective set of research that aids them to reach their goal. 
Research is considered to be a tool used to ‘neutralize opponents, convince waverers 
and bolster supporters" (Weiss 1977, p 14).
Tactical Model
Unlike the other models, the tactical model does not pay too much attention to 
the actual content of research. What is important here is the mere fact that research is 
being done or at least has been commissioned. Despite the fact that this can frequently 
be considered as a cynical tactic of postponement, in some cases the commissioning 
of research provides the political system with a ‘valuable breathing space" that helps 
to reduce the chances of irrational policy making (Hanney, Gonzalez-Block et al. 
2002, p 13).
The Notion of ‘Evidence’
In light of the fact that ‘[n]ot all research is evidence and not all evidence is 
research" (Cookson 2005, p 119) the evidence-based policy making school of thought 
faces two challenges. First of all, there is the highly contentious question as to how 
the notion of ‘evidence’ is to be understood (Marston and Watts 2003); secondly, 
given that even researchers do not necessarily produce information that qualifies as 
being good enough to serve as a basis for the formulation of sound policy (Davies, 
Nutley et al. 2000b), what can be considered as constituting ‘good’ evidence?
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Within the literature it is often assumed that the term ‘evidence’ is either self- 
explanatory, or is simply defined as 'the systematic appraisal and review of empirical 
research findings' (Marston and Watts 2003, p 144), 'information that is relevant to 
making a decision to commit to one policy or another or none, because it indicates the 
possible or probable benefits, risks, acceptability or status of a policy' (Perri 2002, p 
4) or, on a more popular level as 'research or special study that allows you to say if a, 
then b follows, or at least finds some correlation between a and b' (Walker 24 
January 2000). Consequently, the problem is that on the one hand almost any 
observation can count as evidence, while on the other it is assumed that scientific 
rules of proof are necessary for anything that is supposed to qualify as evidence. 
There are valid arguments for both points of view (Davies, Nutley et al. 2000; Davies, 
Nutley et al. 2000b).
According to the scientific approach, evidence is defined as a function of the quality 
of evidence and the assumption is that higher quality evidence should lead to higher 
quality decisions within the policy process (Dobrow, Goel et al. 2004). Consequently, 
as illustrated in Diagram 2.2, a hierarchy of evidence has been drawn up, particularly 
within the area of health care. At the top of the hierarchy one finds systematic reviews 
and meta-analyses which are assumed to represent the ‘gold-standard’, while the 
lower ranks are occupied by evidence perceived of as having a lesser ‘scientific’ 
nature, such as experts’ opinions.
Although this approach helps to illustrate the notion of different levels of evidence 
and tries to assess their quality, its applicability and appropriateness in the area of 
policy making is open for discussion (Schwartz and Rosen 2004). While within the 
field of medicine it might be possible to assign and group research findings according 
to these categories, in the more complex field of social science such an approach is 
unlikely to succeed (Boaz and Ashby 2003).
-38-
Diagram 2.2: A Hierarchy of Evidence
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Source: Canadian Task Force ori the Periodic Health Examination (1979)
(Boaz and Ashby 2003, p 6)
However, other, broader, attempts at defining evidence have problems too. Most 
importantly, one faces the danger of taking too encompassing an approach; almost any 
influence can be regarded as evidence. One important thing to bear in mind is that 
when talking about evidence the reference is not necessarily to research evidence, 
since other types of knowledge can potentially also lead to ‘reputable’ evidence 
(Nutley 2003). Even when talking about research evidence one has to remember that 
these can take several forms and shapes, such as attitudinal, ethical, economic, 
statistical, descriptive, or impact evidence (Davies 2004)
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Given these definitional difficulties and the impression that it is highly unlikely that 
one can reach an agreement as to what constitutes ‘proper’ evidence for any policy 
field (Humes and Bryce 2001), the way forward seems to be to consider a more fluid 
and emergent nature when defining evidence rather than a fixed and static one. This 
means, however, that any definition will be of a provisional nature and therefore is 
necessarily incomplete and inconclusive (Dobrow, Goel et al. 2004). Given that 
‘ nothing works all of the time and many things work some of the time' (Nutley 2003, p 
18) it might therefore be helpful to define evidence as a ‘systematic investigation 
towards increasing the sum of knowledge' (Davies, Nutley et al. 2000b, p 3). By 
following a definition along these lines, it means that the subjective aspect of 
evidence is being taken care of and refers to the state of knowledge given at a specific 
time and place, so that different perspectives can produce different explanations for 
the same decision outcome (Dobrow, Goel et al. 2004).
Policy Transfer
Along with the renewed interest in evidence-based policy making there has 
been a renaissance of comparative policy analysis since the early 1990s (deLeon and 
Resnick-Terry 1999b). This has been accompanied by a multiplication of 
terminology. When examining the development and flow of policies, authors are thus 
talking about ‘policy diffusion' (Walker 1969; Gray 1973), ‘policy convergence' 
(Bennet 1991), ‘lesson-drawing' (Rose 1993), ‘policy transfer' (Dolowitz and Marsh 
1996), ‘policy shopping' (Freeman quoted in Stone 2000), or more exotically 
‘systematically pinching ideas' (Schneider and Ingram 1988). Despite the fact that 
these terms are conceptually distinct they are often used interchangeably (Stone 
2000). The reason for this confusion is that the concepts cover overlapping areas and 
it is therefore difficult to draw a precise line between them.
Because of the ‘semantic uncertainty’ in this field (Freeman 1999) and the fact that 
recently there has been some scholarly competition regarding the standing of the 
various terms (Stone 2000), it would be desirable to have a more standardised 
theoretical framework for this area (Newmark 2002). As can be seen from Diagram 
2.3, attempts have been made to chart the key concepts on a continuum in order to 
clarify the different concepts’ positions within the field, starting off with the broadest
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at the top, policy diffusion, as a macro-level concept, and then proceeding down to 
ever more specific micro-concepts.
Diagram 2.3: Policy Diffusion Continuum
Diffusion
Policy Convergence
Policy T ransfer
Lesson Drawing
Structural
Failure Policy Inspiration Synthesis Hybridization Emulation
Development
Copying
(Newmark 2002, p 171)
While this continuum is helpful in providing a rough overview of the approximate 
standing of the different terms it neither caters for the conceptual and methodological 
differences inherent in the approaches, nor acknowledges that some of the concepts 
can operate at both macro- and micro-level. It is misleading in so far as it implies that, 
like a pyramid, each of the layers builds upon and encompasses the others. It can be 
argued that it would be better to envisage the field as consisting of three different 
strands of thinking: policy diffusion, policy convergence and policy transfer.
Policy Diffusion
Policy diffusion can be defined as fajny pattern of successive adoptions of a 
policy innovation’ (Eyestone 1977, p 441). On first sight it can therefore be 
misperceived as lesson-drawing. Some authors mistakenly use it synonymously with 
policy transfer (Kern, Kissling-Naef et al. 2001). It is assumed that policies literally 
‘diffuse’ or ‘percolate’ slowly as time proceeds (Stone 2000). As such, it is the most
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‘passive’ of the three concepts. While in general policy diffusion is considered to be a 
macro concept (Kern, Kissling-Naef et al. 2001), it can embrace both macro and 
micro levels. When applied to the macro level the concept’s focus will be on the 
broader field of public policy per se, while when applied to the micro level the 
spotlight will be on the diffusion of individual initiatives or technologies (Freeman 
1999).
Essentially, there are three models of policy diffusion. First of all, organisational 
diffusion examines the people and groups spreading policy through interaction, such 
as meetings, conferences or other networks. Geographical or regional diffusion tries to 
determine the impact of geography on the adoption of an innovation, while the third 
category, the internal determinant model, looks at political, economic and social 
characteristics in order to come up with predictions as to likely innovators/ adopters of 
policies (Newmark 2002), In all these cases, rather than focusing on the creation of 
new policies, the concern is to identify amongst the involved countries ‘patterns’ by 
which policies spread in respect to speed, structure and geography (Walker 1969). As 
such the study of policy diffusion can often be considered to be of an apolitical nature 
(Stone 2000). If present at all, the interest in substance or content of the policy in 
question is only marginal (Freeman 1999). Political dynamics that might be involved 
in the diffusion process are often ignored (Stone 2000). As a result, studies tend to be 
of a more technocratic character (Rose 1993), involving quantitative methods, a large 
number of cases and complex mathematical modelling (Newmark 2002).
Policy Convergence
Similar to policy diffusion, policy convergence is mainly a macro concept 
(Freeman 1999). When applied, the term is frequently used as being synonymous with 
‘similarity’ or ‘uniformity’ of policies. However, although referring to increasingly 
similar policies in different countries, in its correct application, the focus of policy 
convergence is on the temporal aspect of ‘becoming’ rather than ‘being’ (Bennett 
1991). The concept of policy convergence provides one important aspect completely 
ignored by policy diffusion. It acknowledges the possibility that similar policies can 
emerge due to similar structural pressures with or without any connection between 
different countries (Stone 2000). In other words, while policy convergence can
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emerge due to policy diffusion or transfer this is not a necessary requirement. 
Comparable policies might be arrived at independently by states due to corresponding 
circumstances, without awareness of other countries’ approaches.
In his review of the policy convergence literature, Bennett identified five possible 
forms of policy convergence, reproduced in Table 2.8: policy goals, content, 
instruments, outcomes and policy style. There is no clear cut-off point between these 
categories because they are highly interwoven. Although when seeing them as 
independent categories the impression might arise that the policy process is rational 
and linear, they help to organise one’s thinking (Bennett 1991).
Causes, other than comparable domestic circumstances that lead to a convergence of 
policies, can take a multitude of forms. The most prominent driving forces are 
emulation, penetration, harmonisation and convergence through the activities of 
political subsystems. In essence, emulation is the drawing of lessons from other 
countries which in turn can account for a convergence of policy content or 
instruments but not outcome or style. It can occur at any stage within the policy 
process. The opposite of emulation is penetration. In the case of penetration similarity 
is coerced by for example legal measures or constraints, and the work of international 
organisations. In between these two opposing concepts lies the idea of harmonization. 
Different states recognize their interdependence and try to avoid the costs and 
externalities involved in divergence. This is often the case when looking at 
international economic integration as is for example the case within the EU. The last 
aspect addresses convergence through the work of political subsystems on both 
national and transnational levels. This mirrors lesson-drawing in so far as that these 
political subsystems engage in a joint experience of learning about problems and 
reach a consensus on how to deal with them (Bennett 1991; Hoberg 2001).
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Table 2.8: Different Forms of Policy Convergence
Convergence of Policy Goals
Coming together of intent to deal
with common policy problems
Convergence of Policy Content
Coming together of the more formal
manifestation of government policy -
statutes, administrative rules,
regulations, court decisions etc
Convergence of Policy Instruments
Coming together of the institutional
tools available to administer policy,
whether regulatory, administrative or
judicial
Coming together of the results
Convergence of Policy Outcomes (positive, negative, ineffective) of
implementation
Convergence of Policy Style
Rather diffuse notion addressing the
process by which policy responses
are formulated (consensual or
conflictual, incremental or rational,
anticipatory or reactive, corporist or
pluralist etc)
(Bennett 1991, p 218)
Within the area of policy convergence important lessons can be drawn from 
organizational theory, especially when looking at the concept of institutional 
isomorphism (Radaelli 2000), the constraining process whereby organizations are 
forced to resemble other organisations facing similar environmental conditions 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983). The driving forces towards such homogenisation 
identified by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) are coercive isomorphism; similarities due 
to pressures exerted by key organizations or government; mimetic processes which 
lead to imitation as a result of uncertainty; and finally, normative pressures which 
stem from increasing professionalization. All of these have at their core the strive for
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legitimacy. The lesson to be drawn from this is that the focus of policy convergence 
should not merely be on effectiveness and efficiency but also on these legitimizing 
forces which are important when dealing with uncertainty (Radaelli 2000).
Policy Transfer
While some people have defined policy transfer as "a more specific form of 
policy diffusion accounting for only those cases where conscious knowledge of policy 
is used in policy development elsewhere' (Newmark 2002, p 171), the concept is 
analytically distinct from the previous two in so far as policy diffusion and 
convergence are descriptive categories which examine the subsequent adoption of and 
trends towards similar policies. Policy transfer on the other hand, while obviously 
inspired by the ideas of both policy convergence and policy diffusion (Freeman 1999), 
is based in both actions and actors. Initially, the concept developed out of a 
dissatisfaction with the process-over-substance approach of the previous two concepts 
as well as the need to address aspects ignored by them (Clark 1985). So, while within 
the policy convergence or diffusion approach actors might play a role in the various 
developments, within policy transfer political players occupy a more central role. Any 
transfer of policy involves the taking of strategic decisions by actors within and 
outside government (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; Stone 2000; Stone 2000b). The focus 
of studies within this field is mainly on the decision-making process according to 
which policies and practices travel between various political jurisdictions (Smith, 
Baston et al. 2002).
Generally, there is now a consensus to define the different forms of policy transfer in 
the words of Dolowitz and Marsh (Pierson 2003), who state that policy transfer can be 
understood as:
‘a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative 
arrangements, institutions etc. in one time and/or place is used in the 
development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in 
another time and/or place' (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, p 344).
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The area covered by this definition can be understood as a continuum with voluntary 
lesson-drawing lying at one end and direct coercive policy transfer on the other 
(Dolowitz and Marsh 2000), as illustrated in Diagram 2.4.
Diagram 2.4: From Lesson-Drawing to Coercive Transfer
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(Adapted from Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, p 13)
There is no clear cut-off point between the different categories and it is possible that 
in any transfer of policy one or more of them apply. Things that lend themselves to 
transfer include both positive and negative lessons, ideas and attitudes, ideologies and 
anything that falls under the heading of policies, such as policy goals, content, 
instruments, programmes or institutions (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000).
Most instances of policy transfer within the UK and other Western countries are of a 
voluntary nature (Kern, Kissling-Naef et al. 2001), so that within this context the term 
policy transfer can be used interchangeably with the notion of lesson-drawing. It is 
this idea of drawing lessons across time and/or space that will be referred to when 
talking about policy transfer in the remainder of the thesis.
As illustrated in Table 2.9, any policy can be transferred in varying degrees, ranging 
from a direct and complete transfer, a selective pick-and-mix of different ideas or 
programmes, to mere inspiration of policy change, with the final version of policy not 
actually drawing upon the original source (Rose 1993; Dolowitz and Marsh 2000).
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Table 2.9: Alternative Ways of Drawing a Lesson
Copying
Enacting more or less intact a
program already in effect in another
jurisdiction
Adaptation
Adjusting for contextual differences a
program already in effect in another
jurisdiction
Making a Hybrid
Combining elements of programs
from two different places
Synthesis
Combining familiar elements from
programs in a number of different
places to create a new program
Inspiration
Using programs elsewhere as an
intellectual stimulus to develop a
novel program
(Adapted from Rose 1993, p 30)
Note: Dolowitz and Marsh prefer to combine the related concepts of ‘making a hybrid’ and 
‘synthesis’ under the label of‘combinations’ (see Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; Dolowitz and 
Marsh 2000)
Independently of the degree of transfer, a certain level of awareness and information 
about the other countries’ programmes that are being looked at is required. Ideally, in 
any instance of lesson-drawing there should be three consecutive steps: awareness, 
assessment and application (Mossberger and Wolman 2001). The first step, 
awareness, also known as ‘search for information’ (Rose 1993), often follows 
dissatisfaction with an existing practice or policy. Such dissatisfaction can be 
triggered by evidence that something is not performing as required, politicians’ or 
experts’ values, changes within the socio-political environment not reflected in 
current policies or practices, and electoral competition; it can even be imported from 
abroad (Rose 1993, pp 60-1). This 'disequilibrium between aspirations and 
achievements'’ (Rose 1993, p 146) in turn leads to a desire amongst politicians to learn
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something new (Rose 1993). This desire for change is usually fuelled by the ‘threat of 
pain' if nothing is done rather than any potentially uncertain benefits (Rose 1993, p 
61) and can be reinforced by an acute loss of trust in the traditional sources of policy 
solutions (Pierson 2003, p 95). In addition to dissatisfaction, another force driving the 
search for solutions is uncertainty (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996) and the wish by 
politicians to overcome it.
Within the literature it is considered that the search for information can be across both 
time and space (Rose 1993). Based on the assumption that the process of gathering 
information is rational, it is assumed that the country’s own history is the obvious 
starting point for examining what the present can learn about what works and what 
should better be avoided (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996). Once the country’s own history 
of approaches to problems has been examined, the focus is changed to other countries. 
It is normally the case that the first ports of call are those countries that are perceived 
to be most similar, rather than those in close geographic proximity (Pierson 2003). 
Consequently, historically, the UK has looked towards Australia and the US3. Their 
similarity of culture, public service, legal practice, and especially language have 
traditionally tied Anglophone polities into a special ‘family of nations’ (Pierson 
2003). Although historically Labour had preferred to look at Scandinavian and 
German democrat programmes (Waltman et al quoted in Common 1998, pp 443-4), 
due to the strong ties between President Clinton and Blair the Labour Party has 
increasingly looked 'across the Atlantic for inspiration, not across the Channel' 
(Marquand p 20, quoted in Jones and Newburn 2002, p 98).
Once sufficient information has been gathered, or an awareness for another approach 
has arisen, it is time to evaluate the findings. Evaluation looks at the potential 
transferability of other programmes and has at least two aspects: political and 
technological evaluation. Political evaluation examines if something is consistent with 
the values, goals and aspirations of those evaluating or intending to transfer it. As
3 Although the relationship between the US and the UK is often given a ‘patina of great antiquity’ an 
active co-operation between the two countries has only existed since around 1940. A notable increase 
in interest in US policies and their potential applicability to the UK only started under the Conservative 
Government of Mrs Thatcher, partly due to Mrs Thatcher’s '-admiration for President Reagan’s brand 
of conservatism’  which in many ways resembled her own (Watt, D. (1986). Introduction: The Anglo- 
American Relationship. The 'Special Relationship1. Anglo-American Relations Since 1945. W. R. 
Louis and H. Bull. Oxford, Clarendon Press: 1-14., p 13).
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such it looks at the desirability of different policies. Technical evaluation on the other 
hand looks at the practicality and implementability. The concern is thus about the 
transferability and in how far things would work in the setting of those trying to 
transfer policies (Rose 1993). This leads to the four possible scenarios illustrated in 
Table 2.10.
Table 2.10: Desirability and Practicality of Transferring Policies
Desirability
Practicality
High
Low
High Low
Doubly desirable
Unwanted
technical solution
Siren call Doubly rejected
(Rose 1993, p 46)
Once a decision has been made as to the desirability and practicality of a policy, the 
final step of assessment is whether any of the information about the policy in another 
country is actually used in the decision process (Mossberger and Wolman 2001).
How to Study Policy Transfer?
Although policy transfer has become increasingly established empirically as 
an actual process (Pierson 2003), as a concept it is difficult to study. The greatest 
obstacle for the researcher is the problem of counterfactuals whereby it is assumed 
that because there is transnational similarity in a policy area, a transfer of policy has 
actually taken place (Bennett 1991; Jones and Newburn 2002). The difficulty is to 
demonstrate that developments in politics would not have occurred in any case, which 
ultimately is impossible to do (Jones and Newburn 2002). Consequently, the different 
categories of transfer are difficult to assign with any degree of certainty in cases other 
than a direct copying of a policy.
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The second major problem in trying to identify policy transfer addresses the opposite 
situation, namely the conclusion that since two countries have different policies, no 
policy transfer has taken place between them. However, in such cases, although there 
is no evident change in behaviour or adoption of a programme, policy transfer can 
have taken place if one of the countries has drawn negative lessons from examining 
another’s policy (Newmark 2002).
Both of these problems are reinforced by the fact that learning is usually of a limited 
and iterative nature so that it is often difficult to establish any direction of transfer 
(Pierson 2003), especially due to the sheer number of items that can be transferred and 
routes by which this can take place:
fPJolicy transfer does not require anything more than a vacation trip, a 
stroll along the internet, discussion at a conference, or even ideas gained 
through the interactions of a given policy network' (Dolowitz 2003, p 
102).
As Blanck pointed out when looking specifically at the influence of the US on the 
UK, the people involved in policy transfer often do not realize that transfer has taken 
place: ‘America does change people... hut in ways so subtle that it is hard to describe' 
(Blanck quoted by Smith, Baston et al. 2002, p 456).
The problems with the existing research literature in the area of policy transfer are 
several: the fact that it is undertheorised; that it is dominated by case studies that do 
not tell us enough about the circumstances in which policy transfer is likely to arise, 
who is likely to initiate it and for which reasons; the form policy transfer is likely to 
take; and the chances of it being successful. Additionally, a clear methodology for 
assessing the extent and shape of transfer is missing. Lots of the provided evidence is 
either anecdotal, circumstantial, or both (Pierson 2003).
In order to address these difficulties, it has been pointed out that it is important to take 
an interdisciplinary approach when looking at the transfer of policies (Radaelli 2000; 
Smith, Baston et al. 2002). Of special importance seems to be network analysis (Stone 
2000; Stone 2000b), which brings us back to the first area of literature outlined in this 
chapter. Applying a policy network perspective to this field assists in revealing the
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underlying dynamics of the processes involved and their impact on different policy 
sectors (Howlett and Ramesh 2002).
Summary
This chapter has reviewed the literature on the three key concepts that 
characterise the modern policy process: policy networks, evidence-based policy 
making and policy transfer. These concepts have had a long history and have featured 
prominently within political and academic discourses at various points in the past. 
After a long period of neglect, these concepts have only started to re-emerge as 
defining traits of policy making again since the early 1990s.
Despite a multitude of terminologies four key groups of policy networks can be 
identified: iron triangles, issue networks, policy communities and advopacy coalitions. 
When placing these concepts on a continuum, the notion of iron triangles is the most 
restrictive, consisting of only three groups of actors - interest groups, committees and 
an executive agency - while issue networks are the broadest, representing a more 
diffuse network of actors, whose composition changes significantly over time and 
from issue to issue, while both policy communities and advocacy coalitions are placed 
in between.
When looking at the use of evidence in the policy process several questions arise. 
First of all, what constitutes evidence, most importantly good evidence, and how do 
policymakers use evidence in the policy process? While three key .categories of 
research utilisation models have emerged - instrumental, conceptual and strategic use 
of knowledge - the nature of evidence is still contested. In light of the fact that too 
stringent or too lose a definition is obstructive it was decided to follow Davies, Nutley 
et al (2000b) and to opt for a more fluid definition considering evidence as a 
‘ systematic investigation towards increasing the sum of knowledge'.
Similar to policy networks, within the field of policy transfer a multitude of 
competing terms and definitions is evident. However, it is possible to identify three 
key concepts: policy diffusion - any pattern of successive adoptions of policy 
developments; policy convergence - the emergence of similar policies in different
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countries with or without any connection between them; and policy transfer - the 
process through which knowledge about developments in one area or time is used in 
another one.
Following on from this exploration of the literature, the next chapter considers the 
research questions and methodology used in order to examine the three concepts of 
policy networks, evidence and policy transfer in relation to the case of Sarah Payne 
and the British debate about sex offender community notification.
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Chapter 3
Research Questions and Methodology
fTJhe truth of what we observe lies less in things themselves, than in the mood of the 
observer ’ (Andrew Motion, The Invention of Dr Cake, p 88)
Within academia, it is frequently argued that the basic beliefs a researcher has 
about the world, also known as paradigm or worldview, will influence, if not 
determine, the way he or she sets out to conduct the research and thereby the chosen 
methodology (Hussey and Hussey 1997; Creswell 1998; Bowling 1997). Building on 
the work of Guba and Lincoln, Creswell (1998) argues that such a researcher’s 
paradigm consists of five categories of philosophical assumptions: ontological, 
epistemological, axiological, rhetorical and methodological. Ontological assumptions 
address the nature of reality; epistemological, the relationship between the researcher 
and that which is being researched; axiological, the question of values; and rhetorical 
and methodological, the questions relating to what makes up the language of research 
and what constitutes the precise nature of the research process.
Relating to these assumptions, two main paradigms have emerged within the social 
sciences. First of all, there is the ‘positivistic’ paradigm, also known as the 
‘quantitative’, ‘scientific’ or ‘traditionalist’ paradigm. Secondly, there is the 
‘phenomenological’ paradigm, which is also referred to as the ‘qualitative’, 
‘subjectivist’ or ‘interpretivist’ one (Hussey and Hussey 1997). The differences 
between these two paradigms in relation to the five philosophical categories are 
outlined in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1: Assumptions of the Two Main Paradigms
Assumption Question Positivist Interpretivist
Ontological What is the nature of reality?
Reality is objective 
and singular, apart 
from the 
researcher
Reality is 
subjective and 
multiple as seen 
by participants in a 
study
Epistemological
What is the 
relationship of the 
researcher to that 
researched?
Researcher is 
independent from 
that being 
researched
Researcher 
interacts with that 
being researched
Axiological What is the role of values?
Value-free and 
unbiased
Value-laden and 
biased
Rhetorical
What is the 
language of 
research?
Formal, based on 
set definitions, 
using an
impersonal voice 
and accepted 
quantitative words
Informal; Evolving 
decisions; 
Personal voice 
with the use of 
accepted
qualitative words
Methodological
What is the 
process of 
research?
Deductive process
Cause and effect
Static design - 
categories isolated 
before study
Context-free
Generalisations 
leading to 
prediction,
explanation and 
understanding
Accurate and 
reliable through 
validity and 
reliability
Inductive process
Mutual
simultaneous 
shaping of factors
Emerging design - 
categories 
identified during
research process
Context-bound
Patterns, theories 
developed for 
understanding
Accurate and 
reliable through 
verification
(Adapted from Hussey and Hussey 1997, p 48)
Although such an assumed paradigmatic division, which in this extreme form appears 
to be unique to the social sciences (Sechrest and Sidani 1995), can be traced back to
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the beginnings of the field with positivism represented by the works of Comte, 
Durkheim and Spencer on the one hand and phenomenology by the works of Weber, 
Goffman and Garfinkel on the other, the usefulness of such a strict distinction is 
doubtful. The two paradigms represent extreme cases, lying at opposing ends of a 
continuum with few people, if any, subscribing to them in their purest form (Hussey 
and Hussey 1997). In addition, the ability to come up with a clear-cut division 
between these two paradigms, especially in respect to methodology, has been 
questioned (Wilson and Natale 2001).
While the various perspectives a researcher holds about the five philosophical 
categories might provide some impetus regarding methodological choices, it appears 
that researchers are less rational and fixed in their choices than advocated by this 
point of view. Albeit looking mainly at examples from the 19th century, Bowler found 
that both the theoretical orientations and methodological choices of researchers are 
often based more on intuition or instinct with a subsequent philosophical defence 
instead of a priori principles (Bowler 2000). In addition, it seems that frequently 
scientists have one or two preferred methodological techniques when doing research, 
with the favourite techniques sometimes making up the sole tools used in their work 
(Berg 2004).
Each research method has its own advantages and disadvantages, so that no single 
method will always be the most useful one, and researchers should ideally be familiar 
with a variety of research methods (Denzin and Lincoln 2000). Indeed, the 
determining factor in methodological choices should not be a researcher’s paradigm 
or preferred technique, but the research question(s) or problem(s) under consideration. 
Rather than rushing from a problem area that has attracted a researcher’s interest 
towards an existing set of methods or a methodological repertoire that is considered to 
be orthodox, the approach that should be applied is to take a step back and assess for 
each piece of research which method or methods arise both logically and conceptually 
from the questions that are being asked (Westbrook 1994; Wilson and Natale 2001).
Following this approach, the remainder of the chapter is structured in the following 
way. First of all, the research questions are discussed. Thereafter, attention turns 
towards the case study approach which was considered to be the most appropriate
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methodology for exploring these questions. The chapter then goes on to describes how 
this research methodology was implemented. As part of this description the sources of 
evidence, documents and interviews are discussed. In the last section of this chapter 
the protocol used for writing up the case is outlined.
The Research Questions
As outlined in Chapter 1, the starting point for this research was an interest in 
understanding the role of policy networks, evidence-use and lesson-drawing within 
the complexity of the policy making process. From an initial scanning of the literature 
it emerged that it would be useful to consider this in light of the activities within a 
given policy sector, that of criminal justice, and more specifically, the field of policies 
relating to sexual offences.
In defining the focus of the research in this way, four broad research questions 
emerged: three relating to the three key concepts of networks, evidence and lesson­
drawing, and one overarching question asking how one could understand the nexus 
between these three concepts. In addition to the three concept-specific research 
questions, another set of more detailed points for inquiry was developed for each of 
the conceptual areas. This is illustrated in Table 3.2. These research questions in 
combination with the theoretical concepts that underlie them provide the theoretical 
lenses for this research.
The research approach that was deemed most suitable for these research questions 
was the case study approach. In the fields of policy network research and policy 
transfer the case study has emerged as an important and appropriate research design. 
Any policy network study is a highly complex and demanding task. Both network 
processes and context specificity will complicate such a study at all stages. In 
addition, both studies of policy networks and policy transfer need to be rich in detail 
regarding empirical and historical aspects (Smith, Baston et al. 2002). As a result, a 
case approach, and often only a single case study, is not only appropriate but also the 
only option (Halinen and Tornroos 2004).
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Table 3.2: Outline of General Research Questions
Level 1:
Core
Research
Question
How can we understand the nexus of 
networks, evidence and lesson-drawing in the 
policy process?
Level 2: 
Concept 
Specific Key 
Question
Level 3: 
Detailed 
Questions
Policy Networks: 
What are the key 
parameters of a 
policy network?
Evidence-Based
Policy Making:
How is evidence 
used within the 
policy process?
Lesson-Drawing: 
How are lessons 
drawn?
How did the 
network emerge?
What kind of 
evidence is used?
Where could any 
lessons have 
been drawn 
from?
What are the 
network’s 
characteristics?
Who used which 
type of evidence 
in what way and 
why?
What were the 
available 
lessons that 
could have been 
drawn?
What are the links 
within the network 
and to what extent, 
if any, do they 
impact on the 
network?
What other 
sources of 
influence did the 
evidence have to 
compete with?
Which lessons 
were actually 
drawn and what 
were the 
reasons for this?
In this research project the focus was to be the Sarah Payne case and in order to 
facilitate data collection a set of case-specific research questions, based on the 
detailed research questions which make up Level 3 in Table 3.2, was developed. 
These questions, provided in Table 3.3, were specific to the events surrounding the 
case of Sarah Payne and the issues that needed to be addressed when examining the 
policy process around this case. As such, the questions were designed to act as a 
guidance tool for the process of data collection.
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Table 3.3: Case-Specific Research Questions
What is the wider policy 
context within which the 
debate about sex 
offender community 
notification took place in 
the summer of 2000
What is the existing 
evidence-base 
regarding sex offender 
management?
What are the 
developments in other 
countries regarding sex 
offender community 
notification?
Who are the key players 
that are involved in the 
debate?
Does the evidence point 
into a specific policy 
direction?
What are the lessons 
that could have been 
drawn across time and 
space regarding sex 
offender community 
notification?
What were the reasons 
driving players’ 
involvement in the 
debate and which
position did they take?
What is the standing of 
evidence in the area of 
sex offender policy?
To which countries did 
people turn when 
looking for potential 
lessons?
How did players 
contribute to the 
debate?
What are the other 
sources of influence 
with which evidence had 
to compete?
Were any lessons 
drawn?
What were the 
connections between 
the key players and how 
did any such links 
impact on the policy 
debate?
Which evidence was 
taken up in the policy 
process and by whom? 
What were the reasons 
for this?
If any lessons were 
drawn, what were they 
and how did they
feature in the policy 
process?
Before talking more specifically about the implementation of the case study approach, 
the general methodological issues associated with case studies are discussed in the 
next section.
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The Case Study Approach
Case studies as a form of research have a long history, over the course of 
which the extent of their use has oscillated between intense use and disuse (Tellis 
1997). Throughout time the notion of case study has been applied in myriad ways 
with different understandings evident in different social science disciplines and 
amongst different researchers (Burton 2000). As a result, there is little agreement 
regarding the term’s precise meaning and terminological confusion prevails (Burton 
2000; Hammersley and Gomm 2000). Given that there is no standard usage of the 
concept of case study, one common misperception is that the notion of case study can 
be used synonymously with the idea of qualitative research in general or it is confused 
with other research methods, most prominently ‘ethnography’, ‘fieldwork’ or ‘life 
history’ (Dopson 2003). Another source of confusion that appears to exist within the 
literature is the question of whether the concept of case study should be understood in 
terms of a design or a method (Jones and Lyons 2004). Although it has been noted 
that authors frequently appear to simply use the term interchangeably (Jones and 
Lyons 2004), it helps to clarify that a case study is simultaneously a process of inquiry 
about a case as well as the product of that undertaking (Stake 2000). In order to avoid 
any confusion in the remainder of this chapter, unless reference is made to an instance 
of a case study and thereby ‘the product’, the term will be understood as a research 
strategy that incorporates a variety of measures to collect data (Lewis 2003; Yin 2003; 
Berg 2004). As such it can be defined as
‘<7 strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation 
of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context 
using multiple sources of evidence'' (Robson 1993, p 146).
The aim is to arrive at a holistic and in-depth understanding of the case under 
discussion (Snow and Trom 2002).
Within the literature different typologies of case studies have been put forward (see 
for example Robson 1993; Stake 2000; Jensen and Rodgers 2001; Yin 2003). Such 
categorization usually takes into account the number of cases included in the research, 
the time-frame covered, or the precise focus of the research, such as individuals or 
organisations. Another approach for classifying case studies has been put forward by 
Stake (1995; 2000) who distinguishes three categories which address the researcher’s
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intention underlying such a study. The first category identified is that of intrinsic case 
studies. The aim of such studies is to get a better and more detailed insight into one 
specific case. Secondly, there are instrumental case studies which try to provide 
insights into a specific issue or to redraw generalizations and thereby broaden our 
understanding beyond the actual case. Finally, there is the category of collective case 
studies, which refers to the use of several instrumental case studies. Here, the interest 
is less of an intrinsic nature, but it is assumed that by using several cases a better 
understanding about an even larger collection of cases can be made. Given that these 
categories are put forward as heuristic rather than determinative it will usually be the 
case that more than one of these categories can be identified within a piece of research 
(Stake 2000). This is also the situation in this research. As was highlighted in Chapter 
1, the interest in the events surrounding the case of Sarah Payne is of both an intrinsic 
and instrumental nature. On the one hand, the case as such is of interest in respect to 
its particular nature, while on the other hand it only plays a supportive role in trying to 
facilitate our understanding of the processes at work in the making of policy.
Although traditionally the case study approach has been associated most strongly with 
the social sciences (Tellis 1997), where it has been one of the most widely applied 
research designs (Burton 2000), it is now often considered to be the ‘weaker sibling’ 
of research approaches within this field (Snow and Trom 2002; Yin 2003). This image 
can partly be attributed to a lack of understanding amongst researchers as to what 
constitutes good case study research, with the result that the approach has often been 
applied poorly (Cutler 2004). In addition, when judged against stringent measures of 
quality, the case study approach usually fares badly.
In order to assess the quality of case studies along with that of other approaches, 
various indicators of quality have been used. These include the existence of an 
explicit theoretical or conceptual framework to guide the research; obvious flaws in 
the research; relevance of the findings to theory or practice; the importance of the 
topic and the overall quality of research (see for example Adams and White 1994). 
However, various problems arise from the use of such quality indices. These include 
an absence of agreement amongst authors as to what constitute the ‘correct’ indicators 
of quality to apply in the assessment of a study’s quality, that the use of identical 
criteria applied to the same set of studies has yielded inconsistent findings and that
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there is no internal validity within the criteria themselves. Finally, even studies that 
have become widely regarded within the academic domain do not satisfy the 
standards for quality (Jensen and Rodgers 2001). While methodological rigour is 
important, the assumption that a generic set of quality indicators is applicable to all 
methodologies seems to be erroneous. Instead, rigour should be ensured by individual 
assessment of studies (ibid.).
While this perceived lack of quality is one reason for the poor standing of the case 
study approach, the most severe criticism of the approach, however, has been the 
issue of generalizability. Traditionally, generalizations have been understood as 
context-free assertions of enduring value. Within science it is often assumed that there 
is a developmental progression in which generalizations will lead to laws, laws 
support theories, theories allow the deduction of hypotheses which will then provide 
the foundation for further work (Lincoln and Guba 2000b). Because the focus and 
interest in case study research is usually on particulars, and that the understanding is 
of a limited number of cases, such studies appear to provide a poor basis for any 
generalization (Stake 1995). As Lincoln and Guba (2000b) have pointed out, 'The 
only generalization is: there is no generalization' (p 27).
However, such a bleak characterization is unwarranted. Not only is the idea of 
generalizability contingent on the type of case study, but also on the way in which 
generalizability is perceived (Snow and Trom 2002). While there will always be a 
trade-off between particularity and generalizability, given that 'what all should [sic.] 
be said about a single case is quite different from what should be said about all cases' 
(Stake 2000, p 439), it seems to be important to distinguish between analytical and 
statistical generalization. While the latter is concerned with the enumeration of 
frequencies, the former deals with the expansion and generalization of theories and is 
the domain of the case study (Yin 2003).
Another approach has been put forward by Lincoln and Guba (2000) who argue that 
in light of contextual differences between different situations, generalizability as 
perceived in its traditional form cannot be achieved and it might therefore be better to 
refer to ‘transferability’ and ‘fittingness’ instead. Transferability is considered to be a 
direct function of fittingness, where the latter is defined as 'the degree of congruence
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between sending and receiving contexts' (p 40). Consequently, if there is sufficient 
congruence between two contexts, working hypotheses derived from one context may 
be applicable in another. As a result, it is necessary for any researcher to provide a 
large amount of substantial information about the context and the nature of the study. 
Although this is the responsibility of the researcher, due to the fact that the researcher 
cannot pre-conceive all the possible ways and situations in which other people might 
want to use his or her findings, it is the user’s own judgement if the reported content 
of the case study is applicable in those cases in which their application is intended 
(ibid.). Consequently, the ‘burden of proof for any generalizations made lies with the 
user rather than the original researcher (Gomm, Hammersley et al.' 2000b, p 100). As 
a result, this approach has been criticised on the basis that such measures appear to 
relax scientific requirements for the researcher by shifting responsibility to the reader 
or user of research (Gomm, Hammersley et al. 2000).
Rooted in the concerns about generalizability is the argument that unless one of the 
five rationales outlined in Table 3.4 underlies the work, a multiple-case approach is 
always analytically preferable. Such preoccupation with multiple-cases instead of 
single-cases is a recent phenomenon (Chetty 1996). Using multiple cases implies that 
the study is less vulnerable. Any analytical conclusion will have a broader basis and 
therefore be more powerful and reliable (Yin 2003). As a result, qualitative studies of 
single cases are often confined to the less prestigious area of verification-oriented 
research rather than the hypothesis-generating one, something which appears to be 
unjustified. The assumption that more cases are always preferable to one due to the 
assumed added ‘safety’ provided by greater numbers, is debatable and has been 
challenged within the literature in light of the fact that the traditional single-case study 
provides a far more coherent, credible and memorable story due to the level of depth 
it offers (Dyer jr. and Wilkins 1991). Stake (1995) has drawn attention to the fact that 
even in single cases some form of generalization takes place, albeit on a smaller scale. 
Certain inferences are drawn from patterns that emerge within a case and it is possible 
for people to learn a lot of things that are of a general nature from such single cases, a 
process to which he refers as ‘naturalistic generalization’. One single case can ‘score 
a clear knock-out over a theory' (Eckstein 2000, p 155) or, in the words of Gluckman 
‘one good case can illuminate the working of a social system in a way that a series of
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morphological statements cannot achieve' (Gluckman quoted in Mitchell 2000, p 
165).
Table 3.4: Five Rationales for Conducting a Single-Case Study
1. The case is a critical case in testing a well-formulated theory’s propositions.
2. One examines an extreme or unique case.
3. The case under study is a representative or typical case where the aim is to 
capture the circumstances and conditions of a common situation.
4. The case is a revelatory case where the opportunity arises to examine a 
hitherto unstudied phenomenon.
5. One does a longitudinal study where the same case is being examined over 
an extended period or at different points in time.
(adapted from Yin 2003 pp 40-2)
Some people have argued that case studies are most valuable in the area where their 
applicability has been questioned most severely, namely in the development of 
theories (Eisenhardt 1989; Eckstein 2000). The reasons for this are that due to the 
close link with empirical evidence, any theory that is developed on the basis of case 
study research has several important strengths. These include novelty, testability and 
empirical validity (Eisenhardt 1989, pp 548-9). Any case, if based on a proper 
theoretical foundation will allow the researcher to identify key operating principles. 
Any form of extrapolation from a case study is not so much dependent on the 
typicality or representativeness of the case but rather on ‘the cogency of the 
theoretical reasoning' that is being applied (Mitchell 2000, p 183). Given that the 
case study method has been found to be ‘a direct and satisfying way of adding and 
improving understanding' (Stake 2000b, p 25), most of the initial concerns with such 
an approach seem to be exaggerated. In addition, given the changing role of social 
science in light of societal complexity, which has seen a move away from its 
traditionally assumed role as ‘ answer-giver' to its more modern one of ‘question- 
framer', it might be that the single-case study approach would serve this new role at 
least as well, if not even better, than more traditional research approaches (Donmoyer 
2000).
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One possible solution that has been put forward in an attempt to overcome the 
concerns regarding the generalizability and quality of case study research and tap into 
the ‘intellectual gold’ that they offer, is to consider case studies cumulatively rather 
than looking at each study individually (Jensen and Rodgers 2001). Using meta­
analysis to analyse and pool the insights offered by case studies of different formats, 
designs and methodologies acknowledges the contribution made by individual studies 
while at the same time aiding in improving the general understanding of an area 
(Jensen and Rodgers 2001).
Implementation of the Case Study Approach
One major challenge for the researcher conducting policy network analysis is 
the question of how to delineate the network, thereby separating the network’s content 
and context from the wider arena (Aldrich 1982; Halinen and Tornroos 2004). As a 
result of the interconnectedness of players on organisational and personal levels, any 
network extends without limits so that the researcher will always face the problem of 
setting artificial boundaries. This can be done either a priori or by using the 
perceptions of those involved as a guide (Halinen and Tornroos 2004). In this thesis, 
the approach taken is a combination of these two notions.
As outlined in Chapter 1, after an initial exploration of various policy areas, it was 
decided to focus solely on that of criminal justice and more specifically on the 
question of community notification within the UK, thereby setting an a priori 
boundary to the policy network to be explored. The area covered by the research was 
then narrowed down further when it was decided to focus on the Sarah Payne case. In 
order to understand things in detail one needs to look in depth at a critical incident, 
and this case appeared to have acted as some form of ‘catalyst’ that brought things 
into focus within the area of sex offender policy and therefore as an ideal object for 
exploring the research interest. Although a boundary had thereby been placed around 
the policy network it was also decided to look at the broader context of sex offender 
legislation in which the case was situated, albeit not to the same level of detail. 
Secondly, along with the setting of a priori boundaries, the second delineating factor 
that was used within this study was the perception of those players that had been
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identified within this area as to who played a key role and was part of the network at 
the time.
Within the case study approach six main sources of evidence have been identified: 
documents, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant observations 
and physical artefacts (Yin 2003). Of these, elite interviews and documentary analysis 
have become the key sources within the study of policy networks, evidence-based 
policy making and policy transfer (see for example Rose 1973; Majone 1989; 
Goddard 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Duke 2001; Hanney, Gonzalez- 
Block et al. 2002; Jones and Newburn 2002; Pierson 2003).
Due to the complexity of the social world and the knowledge that no one method will 
provide all the facets of a study, some form of data triangulation is important. This use 
of multiple data collection techniques assumes that each method will reveal different 
aspects of the same case, which in turn leads to a more complete and accurate 
understanding of the object under consideration (Berg 2004).
Bearing these aspects in mind, interviews with key players and documentary analysis 
were chosen as the most appropriate research methods for this study. Documents are 
important for the exploration of the history of events, especially as a direct 
observation of the events was impossible (Ritchie 2003). Individual interviews on the 
other hand are extremely well suited to gain an in-depth understanding of the complex 
system processes at work. At the same time, they offer the chance for clarification and 
detailed understanding.
Documentary Analysis
In Anglo-Saxon cultures in particular, one of the biggest problems when 
working with textual documents is the perception other researchers have of them 
(Hughes 2000). It is often assumed that documents are too subjective, descriptive or 
arbitrary to aid scientific advancement (Plummer 1983). This assumption seems to be 
partially grounded in the idea that documents are mainly secondary sources of data. It 
is thereby assumed that they are inferior to primary ones, an idea which seems to be 
confused (Hughes 2000).
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Although documentary analysis is often considered to be a tool most suitable for the 
historian, linguist or anthropologist, with interviews and questionnaires better serving 
the interest of the sociologist, many of the latter discipline’s ‘founding fathers’, such 
as Marx and Engels, Durkheim or Weber, used documents heavily in their research 
and considered documentary analysis to be an important research tool (Scott 1990; 
Forster 1994; Macdonald 2001). This perception is shared within this research. In 
light of the fact that documents can provide the'researcher with a multiplicity of 
information relating to the way events are constructed and the underlying reasons 
thereof, documentary analysis can be considered to be an important tool, not only as 
part of a ‘first stab’, a literature review, or triangulation, but in its own right 
(Denscombe 1998; May 2001). Not only can documents act as potential goldmines 
when examining networks and changes therein (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993c, p 
240) but in general documents ‘pose considerably fewer problems than people as a 
source of data for social researchers'1 (Denscombe 1998, p 20).
Unfortunately, as a social science research method, documentary research is not well 
developed. Discussions of it are both sparse and patchy, especially when approaching 
documents from a qualitative stance. While there exists a discourse on how to 
approach and utilize quantitative content analysis of documents in research (see for 
example Hodson 1999) within the qualitative arena of the social sciences, any debate 
usually focuses on the kinds of documents the researcher might come across and the 
specific problems they present rather than their actual analysis (Platt 1981b).
Given the huge variety of textual documents that this research project encountered, it 
is useful to classify them according to authorship and access, as is illustrated in Table 
3.5.
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Table 3.5: Classification of Documents
Authorship
Official
Personal Non­
Governmental Governmental
Closed A E I
Access Restricted B F J
Open-archival C G K
Open-
published D H L
(Modified from Scott 1990, p 14)
Authorship refers to the origin of the document, while access addresses the 
availability of the documents to people other than the author. The authorship of a 
document can be either of a personal nature, which includes items such as diaries, 
address-books, calendars, personal correspondence and notes, etc. or of an official 
nature. Official authorship of documents is subdivided into documents produced by 
the government and those by non-governmental organisations. Closed documents are 
only available to a limited number of eligible people and no outsider can normally 
gain access. In the case of restricted documents, though, documents that are normally 
closed to the outsider can be accessed by special permission from insiders. In case of 
the other two categories, open-archival and open-published, documents can be 
consulted by anybody, the only difference being that open-published ones were 
produced specifically for public circulation, while the open-archival ones were not 
(Scott 1990).
As part of the case’s exploration, attempts were made to cover as broad a basis of 
documents as possible. In order to do so, an extensive search of archives and 
publications was carried out. The first step was to search for news that covered the 
events surrounding the case of Sarah Payne in order to arrive at a coherent picture of
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the developments and identify key players. This included a detailed examination of 
the news archives of the News of the World, The Times, The Guardian, The Daily 
Telegraph and the BBC as well as various online news sources.
At the same time the academic, practitioner and political debate surrounding sex 
offenders, sex offender registers and community notification, with a special focus on 
developments from around 1996, was explored. The starting point of the mid-1990s 
was chosen because it was then that the debate about sex offender registers and 
therewith the questions about public access to such information and community 
notification started to become increasingly prominent within Britain. The main 
sources for this were academic publications, research findings, guidelines and 
governmental publications on the topic. Examples include consultation papers, 
legislative texts and debates, guidelines on sex offender legislation and the Houses of 
Commons’ and Lords’ Hansard, as well as various press releases, briefing notes, 
internet sites and publicity material published by organisations and charities working 
in the area of sex offender management and victim protection.
The broader developments and debates regarding sex offender registers and 
community notification taking place in other Anglophone countries were also 
examined, looking at the countries’ equivalents of the UK sources. The main focus of 
this was on America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, all of which emerged as 
having experienced similar cases of ‘predatory paedophiles’ that led to outcries about 
sex offenders, and similar debates about community notification from the early 1990s 
onwards.
For the obvious reason that the more private a document is, the more difficult it is for 
the researcher to access it (Denscombe 1998), the majority of documents that were 
examined consisted of those openly available. However, it was possible to obtain 
some personal, non-governmental and governmental documents that fall into the 
categories ‘closed’ and ‘restricted’. While some of the documents were forwarded 
with the explicit request to ‘respect the fact that [these documents are] not for 
circulation or quotation’ and therefore cannot be referred to directly within this study, 
they provided some important insights and aided the understanding of the events that 
took place at the time. Simultaneously, however, it has been possible to access a
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variety of documents that fall into categories A, B, E, I and J of the above 
classification, where the supplier(s) of the documents did not ask for such restrictions. 
These documents include internal memoranda, notes and draft documents, as well as 
various pieces of correspondence between stakeholders. As a result, all categories of 
documents, although to various extents, were drawn upon in the research. This 
inclusion of multiple layers of documents allowed for an intricate examination of the 
case, since the various records reveal both public and backstage developments.
To illustrate this further, Table 3.6 maps the used documents against the categories 
outlined in Table 3.5. In order to maintain confidentiality, the precise details of the 
documents are not included. The nature of the precise classification of a lot of these 
documents is also open for debate. Consequently, the sub-classification has in this 
case been simplified and been subdivided into ‘open’ and ‘restricted’ accessibility on 
the one hand and ‘governmental’ and ‘non-governmental’ authorship on the other.
All the documents were analysed manually. Through an iterative process of in-depth 
reading and re-reading, themes and sub-themes within the documents were identified 
and avenues for further investigation singled out. The identified themes were then 
colour-coded and compiled within a number of categories addressing the research 
themes and questions.
Given that documents are shaped by the structure, agenda and activities of the 
organization and individuals producing them, it is important to bear in mind that they 
are not neutral sources of information. Within documentary research things must also 
be checked from a variety of angles (Macdonald 2001, p 208) and interviews can aid 
in revealing both the assumptions and the motives behind the documents (Goddard 
1993). The identification of such hidden agendas provides an important data source 
for this study. Consequently, in order to gain further understanding and to add to the 
insights gained from the documentary analysis, interviews with some of the key 
players within the policy network were arranged.
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Table 3.6: Kinds of Documents Accessed
Authorship
Non-governmental Governmental
Internal Memos & Files Internal Memos &
Dossiers of Evidence Files
Restricted Correspondence
Correspondence
Draft Documents &
Notes
Draft Documents &
Notes
Personal Files
Access
Press Releases &
Press Releases & 
Briefing Notes
Briefing Notes Hansards
Newspaper Archives Research Reports &
Open Research Reports & 
Findings
Other Relevant 
Publications
Findings
Relevant Legislation & 
Guidelines
Other Relevant 
Publications
Interviews
The interview is one of the most important sources in the collection of data for 
case studies (Yin 2003), and can provide useful insights when analysing the belief 
systems of individuals within the policy process and their relationship with other 
players (Goddard 1993). Interviews with ‘elite’ players provide important information
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since such people have a very singular view that can arise from their expertise, 
position or insights (Guba and Lincoln 1981).
Since each interviewee will have had a unique experience of, and position within the 
case, every interview will be different and of a unique nature, more like a 
conversation and characterized by a certain fluidity resulting from following leads and 
probes that arise during the interview (Guba and Lincoln 1981; Stake 1995; Yin 
2003). While this inherent flexibility and adaptability is a great advantage, it also 
presents one of the grave dangers, namely a potential failure to ask the right questions 
during the limited period of time for which the interview lasts. It is therefore useful 
for the researcher to have a strong plan of advance (Stake 1995). Bearing this in mind 
it was decided that a semi-structured approach to interviewing would be the most 
beneficial one in this study. The main areas that were discussed during the interviews 
focused on the topics addressed by the research questions as well as additional 
insights or knowledge a player might have as a result of occupying a certain position 
within the debate.
In order to identify the key players, two strategies were pursued. First of all, where 
people were mentioned directly in any of the public documents, attempts were made 
to track them down. In a lot of instances this proved to be difficult. Since the year 
2000 a number of those people had moved on from the positions they held at the time, 
had retired or fallen gravely ill. Consequently, contact details were not always readily 
available. However, by following up the last available lead and contacting other 
people within the organisations at which those people had had a position, attempts 
were made to overcome this problem. While most of the contacted organizations did 
not give out any individual’s contact details, usually quoting the Data Protection Act, 
they were happy, where known, to forward information on the study and the 
researcher’s contact details to the person in question, or to provide directions as to 
other avenues that might be worth pursuing.
In those cases where organizations or generic positions at an organization, rather than 
individuals, were identified, the organization was contacted directly in order to find 
out who would have been involved within the organization at the time. These leads 
were then followed up.
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In a few cases, contact details were readily available from the outset. Where possible, 
the initial contact regarding the interview was made by post, followed by an email or 
telephone call ten days later. In those instances where only email-addresses or 
telephone numbers were obtainable, these routes of contact were taken, the emails 
again being followed up by telephone or further emails.
Secondly, the study sought to identify other key players and organisations using a 
‘snowball system’. Those people that had been identified and contacted were asked to 
name anyone else they thought of as playing an important role at the time, and who 
they thought should be contacted for this study. The people identified in this way were 
then contacted following the above approach. This way of getting in touch with 
people proved to be the most useful one in so far as the reference through other 
individuals appeared to have a positive effect on the target contact. In addition, 
individuals also proved less reluctant than organisations to share contact details. The 
main problem, however, that could not be overcome as part of this research, was the 
identification of key civil servants involved within the Home Office. Despite 
continuous efforts and a number of contacts obtained through the ‘snowball system’, 
only one civil servant working within the Home Office and involved at the time could 
be contacted.
Overall twenty-one people were contacted who initially seemed to have played an 
important role at the time of the Sarah Payne case. Of these, fifteen emerged as having 
been directly involved and occupying key positions. Of those fifteen people, seven 
individuals were happy to be interviewed; three individuals, mainly from a 
governmental background, refused to participate; four people, two of whom also had a 
governmental background, failed to respond despite several follow-ups; and one 
person could not be interviewed due to serious illness. However, it was possible to 
obtain some information through the latter person’s colleagues.
In face-to-face interviews it is easier to establish rapport with the interviewee, pick up 
any non-verbal cues which can clarify the meaning of verbal responses and take notes. 
Furthermore, they allow for a more relaxed overall conversational style which in turn 
allows the provision of fuller opinions and disclosure of information (Robson 1993;
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Bowling 1997). Consequently, the aim was to conduct face-to-face interviews with 
the key people identified. This was deemed of special importance due to the 
controversial and emotional nature of the events as well as the high public profile of 
the policy area. However, it emerged that due to the position and resulting hectic 
schedules of one of the key stakeholders, a telephone interview rather than a face-to- 
face one was required. While this meant that potentially important non-verbal nuances 
for probing might have been lost and that the interview style was more towards the 
structured than the guided conversational end, with answers being potentially more 
focused and less rich, it was pragmatically decided that the benefits of conducting an 
interview with this person over the phone would outweigh the downsides of having no 
interview at all. While all other interviews were tape recorded in order to simplify the 
analysis, due to technical obstacles this was not possible in the case of the telephone 
interview.
The duration of the interviews varied between 50 minutes and three hours and the 
analysis of the interview material mirrored the manual approach taken in the analysis 
of the documents. Initially, the interviews were transcribed. The transcriptions were 
then used as a basis for highlighting the themes that emerged from repeat listening to 
the interview tapes and as a way to categorize the various points mentioned by the 
interviewees.
Although interviews have become a widely-used approach not only for studying the 
beliefs of elites but for gathering information of any kind, so much so that it is 
possible to speak of ‘The Interview Society' (Fontana and Frey 2000, p 646), their use 
is not without problems. Along with the everyday use of interviews has come the 
danger of routine and uncritical acceptance of an interview’s content. It is therefore 
often assumed that the answers provided paint a true and accurate picture of the 
respondents’ selves and lives (Fontana and Frey 2000).
However, while this is a dangerous assumption in general, it is especially so in the 
case of ‘elite’ interviews. Not only are there general problems associated with the 
reliance on memory for providing answers, but there is the inherent difficulty that it is 
possible for people to re-define situations retrospectively and for their answers to be 
influenced by the researcher, both of which can happen unknowingly (Goddard 1993).
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All information provided in an interview will have been ‘filtered’ through the 
interviewee’s point of view. Given that people are not similarly articulate and 
perceptive this will influence the kind of answers they give (Creswell 2003). 
Additionally, within policy-making it is likely that people will try to increase their 
own role, their responsibilities and the importance of these aspects in the overall 
process (Rose 1973, p 88). The interviewee might have his or her own hidden agenda 
and try to influence the interviewer iii one way or another. Consequently, it is 
generally advisable not to base research solely on interviews since such aspects can 
‘cripple' or ‘sabotage' it (Guba and Lincoln 1981, p 155). The one method that lends 
itself to counteract these problems is documentary analysis. Since documents are 
mainly ‘non-reactive' sources they provide an ideal complementary source to 
interviews and counteract any interviewer-bias (Young and Mills 1980, p 17).
As a result the combination of documentary analysis and elite interviews used within 
this research proved to be a very useful form of triangulation.
Presentation Protocol
The nature of the research topic necessitates some detailed explanation as to 
the presentation protocol applied when writing up the case study. First of all, due to 
the limited number of people involved in this policy network and the controversial 
nature of the topic, all interviews took place on an explicit basis of confidentiality and 
anonymity. As a result, throughout this thesis the names of those interviewed have 
been replaced with the generic parameter of ‘Interviewee #’, where ‘#’ is replaced 
with a number from 1 to 7 in the text. This number has been randomly assigned to 
each interviewee and does not have any significance or role in the text other than to 
enable the reader to distinguish between the different ‘voices’. In addition to this, 
quotes, where necessary, have been adjusted so as not to reveal the identity of the 
person making a specific statement.
A second issue that needed to be addressed when devising the protocol for writing up 
the case was the question of how to refer to the various documents accessed 
throughout the research process. First of all, there are those documents that are in the 
public domain and readily available. Examples include news stories and press
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releases, leaflets as well as organisational publications. All of these can be accessed 
by any interested party and the full bibliographic record is provided. Secondly, there 
are those documents which were forwarded with the specific request of non-inclusion. 
Again, these did not present any problems given that the issue of appropriate style of 
referencing did not arise; they could not and were not used in the writing up process.
It was the next categories of documents that presented the main problem. First of all, 
there are those documents which are not of a public nature such as pieces of 
correspondence, internal documents and personal files. The dilemma that arises from 
drawing on such sources is that on the one hand it is necessary to provide details of 
the documents used in order to show the integrity of the research and its findings as 
well as supporting any inferences made. At the same time, however, it has to be borne 
in mind that while these data formed part of the research and analysis they are not 
publicly accessible. In order to maintain this fine balance the following approach was 
chosen: in those cases in which documents are of a non-public nature the reference 
supplied in the text is the generic parameter of ‘Document where is replaced 
with a unique number that has been assigned to each document. However, in order to 
provide some further information on the kind of document referred to a short 
description of the nature of each document is given in Appendix 7. Given that all 
documents were assigned a number when they were obtained, i.e. independently of 
whether they were used in the end or not, the list provided does not show a continuous 
sequence of numbers. The same protocol has been applied to documents that would 
probably have been in the public domain at the time of the Sarah Payne case, such as 
various statements issued on behalf of individuals or organisations. The reasons why 
it was decided that they should be covered under the same rubric as those applied to 
confidential documents is that the precise extent of their public accessibility at the 
time cannot be determined, they are no longer widely available and in all cases were 
obtained within sets of documents that were not for wider public access.
Finally, throughout Chapters 4 to 6 reference is made to various news stories. The 
problem that presented itself was that on the one hand the precise date of publication 
rather than just the year of publication was of interest. At the same time, it was not 
always possible to identify the precise author of a story. Consequently, the style of 
referencing that has been adapted is that as far as possible the details of the author as
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well as the month, day and year of publication are provided in the text with further 
information being provided in the bibliography under the author’s name. In cases in 
which this was not possible, the month, day and year are provided in the text with 
further information listed alphabetically under the month in the Bibliography.
Summary
Despite any methodological preferences a researcher might have, it is 
important that any chosen research methodology links to the research questions that 
are being addressed. The overarching research question for this study is how we can 
understand the nexus of networks, evidence and lesson-drawing in the policy process. 
In the examination of policy networks, evidence-based policy making and policy 
transfer the main second-order research questions that arise address the nature of 
policy networks’ key parameters, the ways in which evidence is used within the 
policy process and how lessons are drawn.
In order to address these second-order questions and the more detailed questions that 
arise from them, a qualitative case study approach incorporating documentary analysis 
and interviews with key actors was considered to be the most appropriate research 
method. It allows for an in-depth examination and understanding of the topic under 
discussion. Due to the complexity of policy networks and the limited resources 
available to this study it is useful to concentrate on one single case.
With an increasing trend to become ‘more scientific’ one can find widespread 
criticism and concern within the social sciences about the usefulness of the case study 
approach, mainly in respect to the accumulation of knowledge. The negative image of 
case study research has been reinforced by poorly conducted research and the 
application of inappropriate measures of quality. Apprehensions about the approach 
are often exaggerated and unjustified. Case studies, even of a single-case nature, can 
provide ‘cumulative intellectual gold' (Jensen and Rodgers 2001).
Having outlined the key research questions and the methodology used to study these 
questions, as well as the protocol applied in the writing up of the case study, the 
following chapters turn to the case of Sarah Payne and the events surrounding the
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debate about a potential introduction of sex offender community notification in the 
UK. The next chapter explores the overall events and outcomes of the Sarah Payne 
case, while Chapters 5 and 6 specifically focus on the policy network, the evidence 
used and from where it was drawn.
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Chapter 4
The Case of Sarah Payne and the News of the World's 
Campaign for Sarah's Law
Chapter 3 discussed the research questions and methodology underlying this 
research and it is now time to turn to the case of Sarah Payne and the events that 
followed. In order to provide an understanding of the policy climate in which the 
events took place it is necessary to contextualise them within the broader 
developments in the area of sex offender management that had taken place in the UK 
during the 1990s. These are outlined at the beginning of the chapter with further, more 
detailed information being provided in Appendix 1. The case of Sarah Payne and the 
circumstances of Sarah’s abduction and murder are then outlined and following on 
from this, the News of the World's campaign, its impact and the various reactions to it 
are explored.
Policy Context
The last decade has been marked by a number of developments in the area of 
sex offender management and victim protection in the UK:
‘ If you look at any area ofpublic policy and compare it to public policy 
on sex offenders you’ll see that sex offenders [sic.] has moved further 
and faster than most other things in the last ten years' (Document 83).
First of all, the 1990s had witnessed increasing activity in the area of sex offender 
treatment with a national treatment programme being set up in 1992. This so-called 
Sex Offender Treatment Programme (SOTP) started to gain international recognition 
and by 1998 had been widely adopted as a whole or in parts by various other countries 
(Mann 1998). The British focus on treating sex offenders is important. As will be 
examined further in Chapter 6, the idea of blanket community notification about sex 
offenders living in an area can be understood as being based on the assumption that 
any other approaches to sex offender management such as treatment or deterrence do 
not work and it is therefore up to the community to protect itself (Simon 1998).
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As well as the therapeutic developments, an increasing level of co-operation amongst 
organisations working in the field of sex offender management and victim protection, 
especially the police and probation services, had started to emerge. This addressed 
both, the handling of sexual offenders as well as the gathering and sharing of 
information and intelligence relating to these offenders. Consequently, by the mid- 
1990s a relatively good knowledgebase on the nature of sexual offending and ways of 
dealing with such offences had started to develop (Interviewee 4).
Alongside with various instances of populist media coverage of sexual offences 
against children, a noticeable trend to look to the United States for inspiration on 
policies relating to criminal justice developed. From around 1994 the idea of a sex 
offender register started to gain popularity within the UK (Thomas 2000; Jones and 
Newburn 2002; Jones and Newburn 2002b). While at the time various lists containing 
information on sex offenders already existed, the idea of a national sex offender 
register was taken up in 1996 and after an initial consultation period put forward in 
the Sex Offenders Bill. This was published in the same year and became the Sex 
Offenders Act 1997.
As pail of the discussion surrounding this Bill the idea of public access to information 
contained on the register was put into the limelight. Both the wider media and various 
pressure groups started to focus on the approach to community notification adopted 
within the US (Kitzinger 1999). Although the overall arrangements within the US are 
a highly complex set of legislation consisting of a group of various laws and measures 
aimed at managing sex offenders, they have become commonly known as Megan's 
Law (Elbogen, Patry et al. 2003). This is named after seven-year old Megan Kanka 
who was raped and murdered by a twice-convicted paedophile living near her home 
(CSOM 2000c; Megans-Law.net 2003). Megan’s parents argued that had they known 
about the presence of a paedophile in their area, the crime would not have happened. 
In order to prevent similar crimes in future they began a highly publicised campaign 
for the protection of children (CSOM 2000c) with its focus on 'knowledge' and the 
public’s 'right to know' (Levi 2000). Following an outrage within Megan’s 
community and a 430,000 signature strong petition, the campaign led to the enactment 
of active community notification legislation in New Jersey in 1995, only 89 days after 
Megan’s disappearance. A federal version of this legislation was passed within the US
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in 1996 (Sorkin 1998). A detailed examination of the various measures and pieces of 
legislation that make up Megan's Law is provided in Appendix 2.
Despite the anticipation that the British Government would follow this approach and 
introduce an ‘American-slyle Megan's Law’ with blanket community notification on 
sex offenders living in an area (HC Debate 1997, c221) a decision was made in 1997 
not to go down that route.
The Act which received Royal Assent on 21 March 1997 and came into force on 1 
September of the same year was considered as a first step in order to raise the 
awareness about sexual offences and to serve as a stalling point for a wider discussion 
on the true nature of sexual offences by organisations working in the area of sex 
offender management and victim protection. Although this anticipated result was 
achieved, the Act had several legal loopholes relating to registration. Despite having 
been pointed out to policy makers during the surrounding debate, the inadequacies 
were not addressed in the Act’s final version (Interviewee 5). As a result, the bodies 
involved in sex offender management and victim protection 'have been playing catch­
up' with sex offender policies ever since (Interviewee 5).
Although some of these issues were addressed in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, 
the new Labour Government had decided in 1998 that a review of the legislation 
surrounding sexual offences and penalties on a broader basis was necessary. The 
terms of reference for this review were published by Jack Straw at the beginning of 
1999. The idea was
' [l]o review the sexual offences in the common and statute law of 
England and Wales, and make recommendations that will: Provide 
coherent and clear sexual offences1 which protect individuals, especially 
children and the more vulnerable, from abuse and exploitation; Enable 
abusers to be appropriately punished; and Be fair and non-
1 The reference to ‘provide coherent and clear sex offences which protect individuals’ is not an error in 
the quotation. It correctly quotes the terms of reference of the review as put forward by the then Home 
Secretary Jack Straw (see also the Home Office publication Setting the Boundaries). A less misleading 
statement would probably be to ‘provide coherent and clear categories of sex offences’.
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discriminatory in accordance with the European Court of Human Rights 
and the Human Rights Acf (HC Debate 1999, c80-81).
The review was to be conducted by two groups. First of all, a Steering Group was 
established. This consisted of both officials from relevant departments and expert 
advisers. These included representatives from the Home Office, Department of 
Health, lawyers, police and charities working within that area, most notably the 
NSPCC. Secondly, an External Reference Group composed of other individuals and 
organizations which had experience, expertise and opinions on a range of issues 
regarding various aspects of sexual offending was to advise the Steering Group (HC 
Debate 1999; Home Office 2000a, pp 139-140).
Overall, it was expected that the review would take about a year and the 
recommendations that resulted from the review were to form the basis of a 
consultation paper (HC Debate 1999, c81). The decision to review the law was based 
on the understanding that the current legislative framework was incoherent and 
outdated, resembling a "patchwork quilt of provisions', which only worked "because 
people make it to do so, not because there is a coherence and structure' (Home Office 
2000a, p iii 0.2). Most of it had originated from the 19th century and no longer 
adequately reflected contemporary social attitudes and roles (Home Office 2000a, p iii 
0.2).
An important part of the review was to consider and ensure compatibility of any 
arrangements with the European Convention on Human Rights since it was 
acknowledged that in the case of sex offences
"a particularly delicate and important interplay between the rights of the 
individual to the enjoyment of a private life, and the need of the state to 
provide protection and redress for citizens' exists (Home Office 2000a, p 
4).
A consultation paper which constituted the first stage of the overall review, entitled 
"Setting the Boundaries. Reforming the law on sex offences' (Home Office 2000a), 
was published on the 26 July 2000, just three days after the beginning of the News of
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the World’s naming-and-shaming campaign that followed the abduction and murder 
of Sarah Payne. In the foreword to this report Jack Straw wrote:
'We are continuing that open and consultative process by seeking the 
views of the public and of interested organization on all of the 
recommendations as well as the individual consultation points set out in 
the texf (Home Office 2000a, p i),
It is in this context of political reform that the discussion about community 
notification of sex offenders took place in 2000. The rest of this chapter explores these 
events in detail. First of all, the specific case of Sarah Payne is outlined. Thereafter, 
the focus shifts to the News of the Worlds name-and-shame campaign, its impact and 
the various reactions are explored.
The Case of Sarah Payne
On 1 July 2000 at around 7.45pm, while on a family visit to her paternal 
grandparents, eight-year old Sarah Payne went missing. She had been playing in a 
field 150 metres from her grandparents’ home in Kingston Gorse, Sussex with her 
brothers since 7pm but after hurting herself and a 'squabble' with her siblings decided 
to walk back (December 12 2001; December 13 2001 g). While her 13-year-old 
brother Lee followed her in order to resolve matters he lost sight of Sarah (July 17 
2000). However, he did notice a white van driving past (December 13 200lg), the 
driver of which was described by Lee later as 'a scruffy man with piercing blue eyes 
wearing a workman’s shirt' (Morrison December 12 2001). Due to Sarah’s failure to 
return home her parents reported her missing to the police and a first search of the 
area by a small number of officers and volunteers took place (July 17 2000).
The following day a full-scale search was launched involving 300 people, around 150 
of whom were police officers (July 17 2000). Simultaneously, a major criminal 
investigation began, code-named 'Operation Maple'. This turned into the biggest and 
most complex crime inquiry in Sussex Police’s history, involving 910 police officers 
as well as 112 members of support staff, and costing the tax-payer over £2m 
(December 20 2001). The rationale for starting this operation almost immediately was 
the worry that Sarah might have been abducted by a paedophile and was most likely
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dead (Morrison December 12 2001). The police thus set off to check a list of around 
30 known sex offenders living in close proximity to the area (December 13 200lg).
At the top of the list was Roy Whiting, a paedophile in his forties (Morrison 
December 12 2001). Whiting had kidnapped and indecently assaulted a nine-year-old 
girl in 1995. After admitting to the crime he was sentenced to four years for 
kidnapping. At the time he was not deemed a paedophile by the psychiatrist who 
assessed him (Hall December 13 2001b). He spent two years in prison during which 
he refused to undergo treatment (Hall December 13 2001b), but despite warnings 
from probation officers that he could strike again was released from prison in 1997 
(McDougall and McVeigh December 13 20011; McDougall December 14 2001) and 
initially supervised. Reports on the length of Whiting’s supervision vary between four 
(McDougall and McVeigh December 13 20011) and 18 months (December 13 2001b).
Outside Whiting’s flat in Littlehampton, West Sussex, a white Fiat Ducato van was 
parked which had been bought by Whiting one week prior to Sarah’s disappearance. 
(FSS 2003; December 12 2001; December 12 2001b). Following previous questioning 
during which Whiting claimed that at the time of Sarah’s disappearance he had been 
at a funfair in Hove, police continued to watch him. They noticed that he began to 
remove items from the van before getting into it and driving away. Fearing that he 
might be destroying evidence he was stopped by the police and arrested for the first 
time (Morrison December 12 2001). All contents of the van were removed by the 
police. Amongst other things, these included a red sweatshirt and a petrol receipt. The 
receipt indicated that Whiting had been only few miles from where Sarah’s body was 
later found (FSS 2003), 20 miles from where she had disappeared the previous night 
at 10pm (December 13 2001 g).
On Monday 3 July 2000 a man in his 30s was arrested in Crawley, West Sussex. 
However, both he and Whiting were released on police bail on Wednesday 5 July and 
the investigation turned nation-wide the following day (December 12 2001b; July 17 
2000).
Over the next few days several apparent sightings of Sarah were made. The locations 
of the sightings varied considerably and ranged from Knutsford to Glasgow.
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Following an initial plea made by Sarah’s parents two days after she went missing 
various members of her family continued the appeals for her safe return (July 17 
2000). .
On the morning of 17 July, however, a farmhand found the partially buried naked 
body of a young girl near Pulborough, north of Littlehampton. The body, which did 
not display any wounds from an assault and was badly decomposed, was formally 
identified as Sarah’s body on the following day. Although due to the state of the body 
the precise cause of death could not be identified, suffocation was given as the most 
likely one. As a result of this the police were now conducting a murder investigation 
(FSS 2003; December 12 2001; Morrison December 12 2001; December 12 2001b; 
July 17 2000).
Three days after the discovery of the body, following a clue, police discovered the 
only piece of Sarah’s clothing ever to be found, a black shoe (December 12 2001; 
December 13 200 lg). Forensic examination of the shoe unearthed fibres that matched 
the fibres of the red sweatshirt, linking Sarah to Whiting’s van (FSS 2003).
On 31 July Whiting was arrested once more for further questioning in relation to 
Sarah’s disappearance and murder, but was again released on police bail. However, 
following further forensic examination of Sarah’s body and the other items found in 
the van, on 6 February 2001 Whiting was arrested for a third time and charged with 
the murder of Sarah Payne (December 12 2001b). On 12 December 2001, almost one 
and a half years after the disappearance of Sarah, Roy Whiting was found guilty of 
her abduction and murder and jailed for life (December 12 2001b).
The Beginning of the ‘Name-and-Shame Campaign’
‘I'm going out to buy the News of the World — and if I’m in it - I’m not coming back’ 
(Quote from a convicted sex offender following the News of the World’s name-and-shame campaign -
Source: Document 83)
Following the discovery of Sarah’s body in the summer of 2000 her parents 
were inundated with media inquiries. The financial incentives that were offered to
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them for exclusive interviews reached up to £100,000 (Payne and Gekoski 2004). 
However, they refused any such offers by the media at large. When Mrs Payne 
pointed out to the Sunday-only tabloid News of the World, part of Rupert Murdoch’s 
News International Group, that they were not doing any exclusive interviews, nor 
taking money she recalls mentioning to their journalist an interest in Megan's Law and 
the question of how something similar could be introduced to Britain (Payne and 
Gekoski 2004).
This idea about the potential introduction of a British version of Megan's Law was 
taken up by the News of the World. According to an interviewee with close knowledge 
of both the situation and developments inside the News of the World
'public emotion was running high with regards to the missing girl" and 
the newspaper had 'very inside knowledge ...which at the time was not 
available to outsiders" about a 'beast out there". 'The News of the World
' knew from the very beginning that the person under suspicion was a 
paedophile with a long history of sex offences" (Interviewee 1).
Within 24 hours of talking to Sarah’s parents and taking on board Mrs Payne’s 
question as to how something along the lines of Megan's Law might be introduced to 
Britain, the News of the World had put together an initial design for a proposed 
campaign that would lobby for a range of measures aimed at the protection of 
children. This campaign proposal was taken by Rebekah Wade, the News of the 
World's editor, to Sarah’s family for further discussion (Payne and Gekoski 2004). In 
light of the fact that the News of the World had been 'aware of Megan's Law at the 
time and [had] very closely followed it and signed onto that" (Interviewee 1), the 
speed with which it developed its own campaign is not surprising. The original 
Megan's Law-campaign simply could be and indeed appears to have been used as a 
blueprint.
Part of the News of the World's master plan for its ‘For Sarah’ campaign included a 
name-and-shame campaign whereby details of known sex offenders would be 
published. Despite the widespread coverage and impact the News of the World's 
name-and-shame campaign had in the summer of 2000 and the apparent novelty of its 
approach, the idea to publicize details of sex offenders in the community was not a
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new one but had been taken from previous campaigns of a similar format. Name-and- 
shame campaigns had originated in the south-west of England in the mid-1990s and 
had subsequently been copied in other parts of Britain. For example, in 1996 the 
Dorset Bournemouth Echo, using confidential files on sex offenders, published 38 
pictures and last known addresses of convicted paedophiles (Cross and Lockyer 
2004). One year later, in 1997, there was an ‘outing’ of 28 local convicted 
paedophiles and other sex offenders by the Manchester Evening News, sister paper of 
The Guardian, and in 1998 both the Hartlepool Mail and the Oxford Mail argued that 
they had the obligation to notify their readers about any known convicted paedophiles 
living in their area (Cross and Lockyer 2004).
Just a fortnight before the News of the World's name-and-shame campaign in 2000, 
the Peterborough Evening Telegraph had published, against previous advice by the 
police, an article on its front page about a local paedophile, Billy Baker. This had 
resulted in an argument between the Evening Telegraph and the Cambridgeshire 
police (July 26 2000; Tapp July 26 2000c). The feature that the Evening Telegraph 
ran included a picture and the address of the man along with a quote by one of his 
victims’ relatives as saying ‘If I get my hands on him I’ll kill him' (Tapp July 26 
2000c). The Evening Telegraph's picture was subsequently used on hand-made 
posters which were plastered outside Baker’s house and circulated in the 
neighbourhood with a group of women gathering outside the man’s home. The police 
reacted to the situation by moving the man from his flat to an address outside the 
county given that there were not only concerns about the safety of Baker but also the 
safety of other elderly and vulnerable people who lived in the same sheltered 
accommodation and who felt threatened by the unwanted attention (Booth July 26 
2000b; Tapp July 26 2000c). The editor, Kevin Booth, defended his decision in an 
article where he stated that
‘If we know that a man with the potential to abuse children is living in 
your road, I regard it as our role to tell you about it. Not so that you can 
go along and take vigilante action against him.. But so that you might 
watch over your youngster more carefully, knowing that there is a 
paedophile in your midst. Knowledge is the only weapon the community 
needs' (Booth July 26 2000b).
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Furthermore, when addressing the argument that such name-and-shame publicity 
could have the potential of driving sex offenders underground he pointed out that
"If these people are on the sex offenders ’ register, it is a requirement that 
they must report any change of address to the police. The minute they 
don’t they are committing an offence for which they can be further 
punished by the courts'1 (Booth July 26 2000b). .
Despite intending to use a name-and-shame campaign, one major obstacle appears to 
have been unearthing data that could be used therein. "[Tjhis was the missing part of 
the News of the World’s project. They did not have the information’ (Interviewee 7). 
However, the News of the World managed to identify the Boys’ Scouts Association as 
one potential source from which such details could be gathered. For a long time the 
Scouts had kept a register of sexual offenders. The existence of such a database at the 
Scouts was easily traceable. For example, their list had been mentioned during the 
debate preceding the Sex Offenders Act 1997 (see for example HC Debate 1997b, 
c49-50). The database had been started by the Scouts prior to the setting up of the 
British sex offender register and had been put together through the cataloguing of 
newspaper clippings.
"The Scouts got the newspaper clippings about - it was really court 
reports - so and so had been convicted for meddling with children.
They’d get the name, get the clipping and put it into their file. So, when 
somebody applied to be a Scout Master, they ’d go through this and could 
do some sort of check and they ’d started that pre-sex offender register as 
a fairly kind of crude attempt at having a child protection protocol' 
(Interviewee 7).
It appears that the News of the World contacted the Scouts Association’s headquarter 
and that a reporter informed the Scouts about a plan to publicise the details of known 
sex offenders and in light of this asked for access to their database of newspaper 
clippings. However, the Scouts, aware of potential problems with such publications, 
are reported to have been initially reluctant to grant this. Eventually though, it seems 
that they provided the News of the World with some information:
"[Y]ou see the Scouts were over a barrel...and what the Scouts don’t 
need is a newspaper going on an anti-Scout campaign - you know the
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power of certain newspapers was very strong and could destroy their 
public reputation - which is already vulnerable on this frond 
(Interviewee 7).
Based initially on the information obtained from the Scouts, on Sunday 23 July 2000, 
very shortly after the discovery of Sarah’s body, the News of the World started its 
name-and-shame campaign in memory of Sarah Payne. This appears to have been 
despite prior talks between senior News of the World staff and the Association of 
Chief Police Officers in which the latter advised against such a campaign (ACPO 
2000). On this and the following Sunday the newspaper published the names, 
photographs and approximate whereabouts of 82 sex offenders. From the very 
beginning, the News of the World pointed out that this step was simply taken in order 
to provide parents with the knowledge ‘who are the monsters in our midsf (News of 
the World 23 July 2000) and advised against vigilantism:
‘ We do NOT want any vigilante acts or violence against these people. We 
do NOT want our readers to take any action. We do NOT want them to 
break the law. Knowledge is the only weapon the community needs'
(News of the World 23 July 2000, original emphases).
The News of the World pledged at the time that the campaign would not stop until all 
110,000 ‘proven paedophiles’ in Britain had been named and shamed (Taras and 
McMullan 23 July 2000). The actual style of campaigning by the News of the World 
followed the standard structure of reporting and addressing the topic of sex offenders 
in the media. Similar to the design of the Megan's Law campaign in the US, the News 
of the World set up a highly publicised petition which was eventually presented to 
politicians, in the British context to Jack Straw. The format of its petition was highly 
emotive with the use of evocative language and a picture of the murdered child 
featuring prominently.
The newspaper also commissioned MORI to carry out an opinion poll. The News of 
the World claimed that the MORI poll showed that 84% of Britons thought 
paedophiles should be named and 88% would want to know if one was living in their 
area (News of the World 23 July 2000b). In addition, the News of the World argued 
that the name-and-shame campaign was justified because the murder of Sarah Payne
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had shown that the monitoring of sex offenders by the police was ineffective 
(Millward July 24 2000).
The published list was immediately condemned by the National Association for the 
Care and Resettlement of Offenders (NACRO), the Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO), the Association of Chief Officers of Probation (ACOP) and several 
children’s charities (July 23 2000; Millward July 24 2000). Two strands of arguments 
were brought forward. First of all, there was the position that offenders had rights too, 
a point which mainly seems to have been advocated by NACRO, while the second 
strand of reasoning focused on public protection, which seems to have been the main 
concern of the probation service.
‘NACRO’s point of view was much more about the offender than public 
protection. ... You got one argument at one end of the spectrum arguing 
this is against Offenders’ rights, you know, offenders have a right to 
privacy and not to be harassed and all this kind of stuff and to get on
. with their rehabilitation. Probation’s position took some of this into 
account but...probation was much more interested in the public 
protection case than the defending offenders ’ rights and being seen as
■ protecting offenders from the public' (Interviewee 7).
The perceived threat to public protection was that the list could actually put children 
at higher risk. This perception was based on evidence obtained as a result of similar 
incidents and previous name-and-shame campaigns in the United Kingdom. It was 
pointed out that these campaigns had led to both vigilantism and paedophiles going 
underground, changing their names or simply moving away, resulting in difficulties in 
supervising and treating such offenders, which in turn increased the risks to both 
vulnerable adults and children (July 23 2000; Laville July 31 2000). In addition to 
that, a spokesman for the NSPCC pointed out that the campaign might create a false 
sense of security as the published photographs ‘do not contain all the people who 
offer a risk to children' (Neil Hunt, speaking in a clip on ITV Lunchtime News on 2 
August 2000).
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Moreover, there was the problem that there were several factual mistakes with the list, 
as outlined in Table 4.1. ‘Some of them [the people on the list] were dead, some were 
in jail - there were all sorts offlaws' (Interviewee 5).
Table 4.1: Some of the Inaccuracies in the Information Published 
on 23 July 2000 by the News of the World as identified by ACOP
• Two offenders are currently in prison. One has been serving a life sentence 
since 1989.
• One offender is dead
• A couple said to be in the NE, only spent 24hrs in the town identified, five 
years ago.
• In one offender, the likeness was so bad a probation officer could scarcely 
recognise the face of the offender, despite knowing him as a previous case of 
hers.
• One offender was said to have an additional conviction for an offence of 
indecent assault. They did not.
(Source: Document 19)
Almost immediately after the publication of the name-and-shame list, several serious 
acts of vigilantism occurred (see for example The Daily Mail, Monday July 24, 2000 
‘Paedophile vigilantes attack the wrong man'}. Over the following weeks, the News 
of the World distanced itself on a number of occasions from such acts, stressing that 
‘unlawful vigilante action' is ‘wholly unacceptable' (August 4 2000). Over the course 
of the campaign, the acts of vigilantism included several members of the public who 
were mistakenly identified as being on the list; two men committed suicide; and four 
innocent families had to flee their homes as a result of the campaign (Jeffery, Vasgar 
et al. August 10 2000). The worst and most violent riots took place on Portsmouth’s 
Paulsgrove estate where 150 people attacked the flat of.a man who was convicted in 
1989 for being a member of Britain’s biggest known child sex ring (Gillan August 5 
2000). The riots on Paulsgrove estate continued for six consecutive nights (Jeffery, 
Vasgar et al. August 10 2000). While most of the papers reported in detail on these 
acts of violence and questioned whether the News of the World should be prosecuted 
for ‘inciting public disorder', other Murdoch-owned titles such as The Sun, The
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Mirror or The Times seem to have been far less interested in these negative aspects of 
the campaign (Leonard August 11 2000).
Faced with an escalating situation, sex offenders going underground and scheduled 
work in sex offender treatment groups coming to a halt, the Association of Chief 
Officers of Probation (ACOP) wrote to Stuart Kuttner, the News of the World's 
managing editor, on Wednesday 26 July asking for a suspension of its campaign. The 
complaint to the News of the World was based on three main points: the interference 
the campaign caused to probation services’ statutory work in child protection; the 
negative impact the identification of offenders can have on their families and victims; 
and the disruption to public order caused by vigilantism (Document 40). This letter 
was copied to Guy Black at the Press Complaints Commission. The following day 
Stuart Kuttner, managing editor of the News of the World, replied that in light of the 
enormous public support the “For Sarah” campaign had created, they would continue 
it for the time being (Document 57).
At the same time, ACOP in collaboration with ACPO started to produce a ‘dossier of 
evidence’ to show to the Press Complaints Commission and substantiate their 
arguments about the dysfunctional nature of the News of the World's campaign. When 
the News of the World's editor, Rebekah Wade, found out about ACOP and ACPO’s 
intention to go to the Press Complaints Commission she ‘went ballistic' (Interviewee 
5). While neither of these organisations had ever given her any indication that they 
would refrain from doing this, she seemed to feel that they had betrayed her in some 
way (Interviewee 5).
As well as writing to the Press Complaints Commission, ACOP was looking into 
potential legal actions that could be taken. Such action also seems to have been 
considered by the Home Office. It appears that Home Office lawyers were looking 
into the possibility of an injunction against the News of the World. However, the legal 
advice received by ACOP and the Home Office on the chances of a successful action 
through courts to prevent further disclosures seems to have differed (Document 22). 
From a Home Office strategy document that has been obtained during the course of 
this research it emerges that the Home Office had decided, in light of their lack of 
reassurance in respect of successful legal action, that it would be tactically inadvisable
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for the Government to attempt to take any such action. It was assumed that it would 
risk opening up an opportunity for the News of the World to argue that it was being 
‘ bullied'’ by the Government on an issue of media freedom. The perceived danger was 
that this could be used by the News of the World in order to drive a wedge between 
the Government and the wider media (Document 22).
The potential involvement of the Press Complaints Commission was also discussed 
within Parliament, where it was argued that the press office should send a strong 
message that the News of the World's action, independently of any well-meant 
intentions or not, was profoundly dangerous and had put children at risk (HC Debate 
2000). Within the House of Lords several members raised questions about potential 
action to be taken by the Press Complaints Commission following the News of the 
World's publication (HL Debate 2000).
The Press Complaints Commission remained surprisingly quiet throughout these 
events. This was despite the fact that Lord Wakeham, its chairman at the time, had 
pointed out on 26 July that the Press Complaints Commission ‘w/ZZ hold a preliminary 
meeting this afternoon to consider these issues' (LIL Debate 2000, c420).
Nonetheless, Ms Wade pointed out, that irrespective of any criticism,
"The continued support of Sarah's family for our campaign plus the 
overwhelming public support means that the News of the World will 
continue its long tradition of exposing and investigating those who are a 
danger to our society' (July 25 2000).
The dossier of evidence compiled by ACPO and ACOP consisted of a comprehensive 
list of cases illustrating the effects and results of previous name-and-shame campaigns 
against sex offenders in Britain. In addition to being sent to the Press Complaints 
Commission, the Home Office and other "appropriate agencies', it was also discussed 
at a meeting between representatives of the News of the World, ACPO, ACOP, the 
National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders (NACRO), the 
National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC), the Suzy 
Lamplugh Trust and Sarah’s parents, Sara and Michael Payne, on Wednesday, 2 
August.
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The Meeting on 2 August 2000
The meeting on 2 August at the News of the World played a 4 crucial role' in 
shaping the direction of the events that followed (Interviewee 3). It appears to have 
been the brain-child of NACRO’s press officer who was also instrumental in getting 
the 4 coalition of agencies' present at the meeting together (Interviewee 5).
Following an open letter to Rebekah Wade on 28 July, signed by representatives of 
ACOP, NACRO, the Suzy Lamplugh Trust and Childline, in which another appeal for 
the suspension of the name-and-shame campaign was made (Document 36), an 
agreement was reached to meet on 2 August. While in parts of the media the 
impending meeting seems to have been described as having been arranged in order to 
'punish a badly behaved newspaper for stepping out of line' (Harding August 1 
2000), in their letter to Rebekah Wade the charities pointed out that the intention was 
to discuss 'positive measures that would make a difference' in child protection 
(Document 36). As NACRO’s representative Paul Cavadino said in a clip on that 
day’s ITV Lunchtime News:
4 The aim of the meeting is for us to express our concerns about the name­
. and-shame campaign, for the News of the World to put their views to us, 
and for us to see if we can reach common ground of any kind about the 
best ways of reducing the risk to the public from sex offenders'
(Document 82)
In addition, the NSPCC stressed in a letter to the editor of The Times that it 
recognized
'that the News of the World has helped to push protecting children from 
abuse further up the national agenda. There is genuine public concern 
about people who sexually abuse children and the News of the World has 
tried to address this' (Harding August 1 2000).
The people who initially attended the meeting were representatives of ACOP, ACPO, 
NACRO, the NSPCC, the Suzy Lamplugh Trust and the News of the World.
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The meeting is reported to have started off as very tense and it lasted far longer than 
initially anticipated. It was a rather stressful experience for most of those involved, 
given the media attention: 'It was very weird because you knew you had the world’s 
press waiting outside - it was really, really weird' (Interviewee 5).
According to several of those present at the meeting, it began with the various 
organizations involved presenting their views to the News of the World on why they 
considered the News of the World's actions to be both mistaken and untenable. These 
points of view were said to have been resisted very strongly by the representatives 
from the newspaper.
In order to support their position the News of the World's representatives used several 
tactics: 'sort of tricks, ploys' (Interviewee 5). They presented everybody with a paper 
written by a reasonably senior ex-Metropolitan Police officer which the newspaper 
argued provided support for its actions. In this paper the officer pointed out that in his 
opinion the police had failed to keep communities up-to-date with the movements and 
activities of paedophiles and recommended several courses of action (Document 46). 
This tactic by the News of the. World was said to have backfired though, because 
despite the officer’s senior rank, his expertise had not been within the field of sex 
offenders when he was in the police force. The points raised in the paper were 
reportedly taken apart by ACPO’s representative at the meeting because they did not 
reflect recent developments within this field.
Another tactic employed was to bring in a person from the United States via a 
conference call. The person, who was perceived by some of those present as being 
'very in your face' and 'very tetchy' (Interviewee 5), was the father of a little girl who 
had been murdered. As a result of this he had started to run a campaign on child 
protection and child safety in California. This included further promoting the ideas of 
Megan's Law and providing communities with proactive approaches to improving 
their safety.
The combative atmosphere initially resulted in stalemate. 'After a couple of hours we 
had got absolutely nowhere' (Interviewee 3). There was no sign that the News of the 
World would change its course of action. While the various agencies considered the
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News of the World's position to be untenable this perception was not necessarily 
shared by the paper’s representatives who argued 'black and blue that it was not 
untenable' (Interviewee 5). One possible explanation that has been offered for this is 
that 'if you do something like this you have to convince yourself that it is right even 
though you are doing it for [newspaper] circulation reasons' (Interviewee 5).
After several hours of impasse, the meeting was said to change for the better at around 
lunchtime when Sara and Michael Payne, who had been asked by the News of the 
World to attend the meeting, joined the debate. Mrs Payne’s subsequent comment on 
this meeting was:
‘ [w]hat struck me immediately was how many egos were around at the 
table. It was obvious that these people had never sat together in one 
room before and sensibly discussed child safety issues. They were all too 
busy fighting their own corners, for the interests of their own agencies, 
rather than working together for what was best to protect children' 
(Payne and Gekoski 2004, p 99),
The impact that the arrival of Sarah’s parents made was considered to be positive by 
some of those present.
‘ [T]hings improved a lot after their arrival — well actually because they 
had to — because they were human beings affected by a human tragedy 
and were reasonable people — then it was no longer a case of the News of 
the World simply being very hard-nosed and saying we do not accept 
these arguments we are not going to change and the representatives of 
the other organisations trying to persuade them that experience 
suggested that this was a damaging course of action — the discussion 
changed as they entered the discussion and it became much more 
humanly-focused and they were very reasonable. It was quite clear that — 
you see by then there had been quite a few cases of vigilante attacks not 
necessarily on sex offenders but by people mistaken for sex offenders 
who had been named and shamed — it was obvious that Sara Payne 
[Sarah’s mother] did not like these... and felt extremely uneasy about 
these attacks. So, we discussed these issues in a more reasonable and 
humanly focused way when they came in and once they were involved in
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the discussion - her in particular — she did not shift her view that there 
ought to be a Megan's Law type provision but she clearly did understand 
all the arguments that were expressed and all the concerns, and we had a 
much more reasonable discussion after that" (Interviewee 3).
However, Mrs Payne was later to comment that the presence of her and her husband 
at the meeting may have been resented by some of the others present (Payne and 
Gekoski 2004, p 99). This potential resentment was mirrored by some interviewees 
who reflected that inviting Sarah’s parents could be understood as some form of 
emotional blackmail on part of the News of the World (Interviewee 4).
‘ You see, what the News of the World thought, was that they could have 
Sara and Michael Payne as the weeping victims and it would cut the 
other organisations ’ legs from under [them]" (Interviewee 7).
Most importantly, though, the presence of Sara and Michael Payne meant that one of 
the key questions could not be properly discussed: would a Megan's Law have 
protected Sarah Payne?
‘[T]he difficulty I found for this debate was that at no point did anybody 
feel able to say to her “look Mrs Payne, if that man who abducted and 
killed your daughter had been known in the street it would not have 
helped you ”. This child was abducted in a country-lane by a man who 
was many miles away from where he lived. Knowing that that man lived 
in a particular street in a town several miles away how would that have — 
tell me, explain to me how that would have protected your child? But, 
how do you say to a woman who is bright in the sense of trying to 
understand the issues, at the same time coming to terms with — one can’t 
imagine, you can’t put yourself in that woman’s shoes - so, how could 
anybody say to her, “look, let's be fair about this Mrs Payne, shape up, 
stop being silly about this, the reality is that what you're proposing 
■ would not have saved your daughter How do you say that to a woman 
in those circumstances?" (Interviewee 4).
This point, that neither Sarah Payne nor Roy Whiting were in their ‘local’ area and 
that Sarah was ‘ snatched at random" was subsequently also raised several times in the 
media (Robson August 7 2000; December 12 2001c; Bunting December 13 200Id).
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Although many of those interviewed pointed out that asking Sarah’s parents to attend 
the meeting "was a pretty cruel thing to do..., especially to Michael Payne, who was 
absolutely in no shape at all...this man was grieving in a dreadful way1 (Interviewee 
7), within the changed atmosphere the debate proceeded sufficiently so that at the end 
of the day some form of agreement was reached. While both sides insisted on their 
point of view, the News of the World arguing for public access to information held on 
sex offenders, and ACOP, ACPO, NACRO, NSPCC and the Suzy Lamplugh Trust 
arguing against it, they said they would go away and reflect on how the wider 
discussion about sex offender management might be taken forward. According to the 
statements released following the meeting, the period of reflection would take place 
up to the weekend (Documents 43 & 44). The aim was to identify which points should 
be raised in a broader public debate on sex offender management.
One key driving force appears to have been the ACPO representative who seems to 
have agreed to draft a manifesto for the News of the World containing those things 
that the newspaper should demand from politicians.
‘[H]e was very shrewd about this...He saw that they needed to get out of 
this without losing face. They could not afford to lose face — so they 
needed a route out to save face and this mainly came down to the fact 
that the alliance of organisations wanted them to stop and they the News 
of the World wanted to suspend' (Interviewee 7).
’'There was no way the News of the World were going to say sorry we 
were wrong, so the other agencies needed to give them a way out and 
that was really what they were trying to do...in order to stop the damn 
campaign' (Interviewee 4).
At the time, the News of the World also mentioned to those present that it intended to 
go and see the Home Secretary to argue for Sarah's Law. The other agencies pointed 
out that while they would support the News of the World in arguing for the wider 
changes regarding sex offender legislation that had been raised during that day, they 
would not sign up to an automatic "right to know' (Interviewee 4). The changes that 
would be supported were amendments to the existing legislation in order to address
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loopholes and strengthen the registration requirements rather than a blanket 
notification approach.
Following the meeting, a lot of work was done with letters going to and fro between 
those involved. One day after the meeting the News of the World forwarded a page 
containing a draft of its ideas on changes in sex offender legislation to ACPO. The 
eleven key ideas raised by the News of the World are reproduced in Table 4.2. ACPO 
in collaboration with ACOP worked on this draft and rewrote it. The guiding 
principles that were applied to the re-drafting were the comments made by Sara and 
Michael Payne during Wednesday’s discussion. The key objectives that were 
extracted in this process were empowerment for parents to protect their children, 
empowerment for victims and making prevention more effective (Document 14).
Several of the original proposals put forward in the News of the World's document 
were left out or amended. For example, the idea of setting up a new register of 
paedophiles was considered to be unnecessary. Other items, such as the possibility of 
sending sex offenders back to prison if they breached a licence requirement, were 
taken out since they were already reflected in current legislation and procedures. 
Finally, some aspects were changed in order to make them more practical (Document 
14). The final list of campaign objectives that was arrived at is reproduced in Table 
4.3. After drafting these objectives ACOP and ACPO also got NACRO and the 
NSPCC to sign up to this draft (Interviewee 4).
‘ What they wrote was the For Sarah Campaign which was like a 10-point 
manifesto. And point one was public access to the sex offender register 
which they were never gonna get but from then onwards it became more 
and more reasonable. Things that were either in the pipeline or they 
could quite readily get in terms of a policy change. Now that gave the 
News of the World a bit more of a structured campaign to run. It also 
very helpfully gave ACPO a lot of the things that they had been arguing 
for from their point of view. It actually accelerated what they wanted...
[A] third of these things were never achievable. A third of these things 
were - you know interesting and probably would be happening 
anyway ...[A] nd then there was the rest of ACPO's agenda which were 
all things they wanted but never had the political leverage to get done.
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So, that kind of 10 point thing went round between the alliance, and to 
the News of the World’ (Interviewee 7).
Table 4.2: The Initial Outline of the News of the World's 
Proposed Sarah’s Law
• It is every parents [sic.] right to know if there is a convicted or known paedophile living 
in their neighbourhood and appropriate, responsible members of the public must have 
controlled access to a new register of paedophiles. Thus giving power to parents to 
protect their children when introducing a unknown adult into their lives
• There must be severe penalties for any person who abuses access to this register
• When a paedophile is released from prison he should be required to give notification 
in person of his new address and register on the new register of paedophiles within 
72 hours of their release instead of the current 14 day deadline. Failure to comply will 
result in severe penalties for the offender.
• Paedophiles who are released must be legally barred from ever again approaching 
their victims. There must be a protective exclusion zone.
• Paedophiles released on license will have that license revoked according to the 
danger they pose in the community
• Voluntary organisations dealing with children must be given the right to access the 
new paedophile register free of charge to check potential volunteers who pose a 
threat to children
• Dangerous paedophiles sentenced to life imprisonment must never [return to their] 
natural lives. Indeterminate sentences
• A revision of the current vetting system of paedophiles must take into account the 
degree of danger depending on a personality disorder assessment and not just the 
level of conviction
• Paedophiles on the register should be graded according to the danger they pose to 
children and their grading should be reflected in their sentencing
• Any of the 110,000 convicted paedophiles living and working in the community whose 
conviction remain unspent under the 1987 Rehabilitation of Offenders Act must now 
be registered retrospectively on the new Paedophile register
• Every child who is sexually abused has the right to victim support which must include 
trauma counselling.
(Source: Document 45)
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Table 4.3: The Manifesto of the Sarah’s Law Campaign
Key Message
As a result of the meeting held at the offices of the News of the World, the campaign for 
Sarah's Law has moved into another phase with more details being developed of the steps 
that must be taken to make child protection more effective in the future. The meeting was not 
just about naming and shaming of sex offenders, it was a sharing of the collective experience 
of people in the field of child protection, inspired by the determination of Sara and Michael 
Payne that the loss of their daughter would leave a legacy that would benefit all children in the 
future.
Campaign Objectives
Empowering parents to protect their children from risks caused by sex offenders
• It is every parent's right to have controlled access to information about individuals in 
their neighbourhood including convicted child sex offenders who may pose a risk to 
their child. In appropriate cases this access should be also given to responsible 
members of the public who have a responsibility for the care of children.
• There must be severe penalties for any person who abuses access to this information
• Parents should be able to access a local record of all organisations to determine if 
their employees or volunteers are subject to the child access vetting procedures
• Government should establish a task force to review existing programmes to promote 
child safety for children and parents
Empowering victims of sex abuse
• When passing sentence, courts should have the power to prevent offenders 
contacting or living near their victims. The orders would be made on the basis of 
representatives made by the victim.
• Release licence conditions should include restrictions on contact with victims
• Every child victim of sexual abuse as of right receive appropriate support, counselling 
and therapy.
Making prevention more effective
• The existing police vetting arrangements for people intending to work with children 
should be extended to cover all voluntary organisations. The government should 
make funds available to allow voluntary organisations to apply for the vetting
' information free of charge.
• The existing Sex Offender register should be amended to:
o Require registration to be made within 72 hours, 
o The registration should be in person at designated police stations, 
o The offenders should be required to have his or her photograph taken for 
identification purposes at the time of registration and at any other reasonable 
time when his or her appearance has changed.
o The re-registration of offenders should take place at pre-determined intervals 
o The penalty for failing to comply with the register should be increased from 
six months to five years imprisonment.
o Offenders should be required to notify foreign travel, 
o Sex Offenders Orders should be extended to, enable high-risk offenders who 
fall outside the current sex offender registration requirement to be included in 
the register.
o Sex Offender Orders should be revised to enable the police to make greater 
use of them as a proactive tool.
o It is every victim’s right to understand the sentence imposed by the court, 
victims have a right to know what period in custody the offender will actually 
serve.
o Sex offenders, should be subject to a risk assessed process at the time of 
their sentence by the court and indeterminate sentences be imposed in 
appropriate cases.
o Where an offender is assessed as suffering from severe personality disorder 
and as a consequence poses a significant threat to children, he should be 
detained in secure accommodation.
(Source: Document 51)
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On Friday 4 August 2000, after initially remaining defiant, arguing that 'the vast 
number of people believe that what we are doing is right and support the campaign' 
(Millward July 24 2000), but following mounting pressure and threats to members of 
staff (Gillan August 5 2000; Bright August 6 2000c), the News of the World 
discontinued its name-and-shame campaign and decided to go for a 6Sarah's Law' 
campaign instead. Pressing ‘the button marked US' and 1 reiterating Megan’s Law' 
(Preston August 6 2000d), the campaign argued for the introduction of a UK 
equivalent to the American Megan’s Law, entitled Sarah's Law (August 4 2000c).
While the majority of the papers saw this as a climbdown, Ms Wade stated that:
"This is a tremendous victory for every parent and every child in the 
country' (August 5 2000). 'We had another 100 names of convicted 
paedophiles ready to publish today. But we will put them on hold while 
the battle for the new laws continues.... We will not rest until the new 
measures are enshrined in law' (August 6 2000).
The ready availability of such information has however been questioned by some of 
those interviewed:
'they tried—this was their fatal flaw you see — they tried to continue with 
newspaper clippings but the longer that had to go on, the more out of 
date the newspaper clippings would be that they were gonna get...the 
older the information, the more they had to research it — the less reliable 
the information got' (Interviewee 7).
At the press conference where this change in direction was announced, which was 
attended and covered by a large international press corps, the set of proposals that had 
been developed in light of the meeting on Wednesday, 2 August, was also widely 
publicised. While there was no agreement regarding public notification, everybody 
involved agreed on the idea that under certain circumstances it was right to tell an 
individual person about the identity of an offender if that individual person would be 
at risk or could do something to protect another person, a practice which was in place 
anyway (Interviewee 3).
' [T]here was a phrase in the final declaration which was quite vague but 
basically to the effect that there are situations in which...at the discretion 
of authorities information could sometimes be given' (Interviewee 3).
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‘[TJhcit was not every person going into a police station saying ‘can you 
tell me of any sex offenders living in my street’ that was not what it was, 
but these organizations were in a desperate position if you like. They got 
all these enormous disruptions going on and they wanted to stop it and 
that was a compromise - their interpretation was quite clear and I think 
that is where Stuart Kuttner [of the News of the World] might say well, 
no actually these organizations are for “I’m going down the police 
station to get the details ” - that was never their position’ (Interviewee 4)
‘ These changes would have happened in any event [but] it was useful to 
crystallize them in a set of proposals’  (Interviewee 3).
In response to the cancellation of the campaign, the Home Office promised to 
‘urgently' consider improvements to the law on child protection (Jones August 7 
2000) and issued a statement saying that ‘The Sarah's Law Campaign proposals make 
an important contribution to the debate and demand very serious consideration’  
(August 4 2000b).
The News of the World's ‘Sarah's Law Campaign'
As it says in the News of the World’s press release of 4 August, ‘the fight to 
create a “Sarah's Law” ...has only just begun’ and the News of the World would now 
begin discussions with Jack Straw and the Home Office (Document 36). According to 
the News of the World’s “For Sarah” webpages, the campaign ‘calls for a range of 
measures to curb and control paedophiles’, at its heart being the reform to bring about 
‘ “Controlled Access To Information”, “The LEGAL RIGHT of every parent to know 
the identity of serious child sex offenders living in their community. However, with 
severe penalties in place for anybody who misuses this information’ (News of the 
World 2000, original emphases). Given that the notion of ‘controlled access’ is rather 
vague it was followed up for clarification in one interview. From this it emerged that 
the News of the World’s understanding could be described as
‘if I had children ...I wanted to know about sex offenders living in my 
area. So, if I went to the police station or to the probation service I want 
them to tell me for example there are three sex offenders in your street
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and so I could warn my children about not accepting sweeties from 
strangers...I, as a parent want to know about those who pose a serious 
threat' (Interviewee 1).
On being asked further what would represent a serious threat the answer provided was 
that the
‘flasher down the street or the person downloading childporn from the 
internet is less serious, I mean it’s not less serious but the consequences 
are less serious' (Interviewee 1).
In letters to Members of Parliament, in which the News of the World ‘invited’ MPs to 
back the introduction of a Sarah's Law in the United Kingdom (Document 52), as well 
as in an article by its editor, Rebekah Wade, the News of the World pointed out that 
the Sarah's Law Campaign had the ‘public endorsement' and was supported by 
ACPO, ACOP, the NSPCC, the prison service and charities as well as voluntary 
organisations working with children (Wade August 13 2000). This was elaborated on 
and put into context by representatives of these organisations. They pointed out that 
some of the quotes used by the News of the World had been taken out of context and 
that they did not support a publicly accessible register at all (Laville August 14 2000). 
While they supported most of the proposals that were developed as a result of the 
meeting on 2 August, they did not support a blanket policy of disclosing information 
on sex offenders (Interviewee 4).
Despite its claim of widespread support, the News of the World seems to have lacked 
support from the wider non-yVew International media other than The Mirror with 
which it usually does not work closely together:
‘ [Y]ou know The Mirror and the Sun; Mirror and the News of the World 
were always having a go at each other and they kind of declared a truce 
over that' (Interviewee 7).
The most trenchant critics of the News of the World's style of campaigning appear to 
have been The Independent, The Daily Telegraph and the BBC.
‘One of the things I found fascinating — and ACPO and ACOP 
representatives were never out of the TV studios at the time — one thing I 
remember was how vehemently anti-News of the World many journalists
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were and I can remember one Sunday morning being in the BBC studios 
in Birmingham and this journalist almost pestering me, saying you won’t 
give in will you, you will pursue them, you mustn’t give in, this is really 
important, they are doing terrible things here, that was the most forceful 
expression of what 1 got from a lot ofjournalists - the News of the World 
had very few friends in the journalistic world. That helped us as well, 
because the pressure was mounting from other quarters'1 (Interviewee 5).
There are, however, other possible reasons for such antipathy within the wider media 
towards the News of the World's actions unrelated to any principled stance towards 
sex offender management. First of all,
‘ [w]hat you had was the kind of broadsheet liberal approach which was: 
this is the crassest thing you can do and disliking it partly because it 
wasn’t sensible and partly because it was the News of the World who 
everybody loves to hate - looking down on the News of the World is one 
of the past-times in the country' (Interviewee 7).
Secondly, although Sarah’s family had refused financial incentives for exclusive 
interviews by the media at large, because of their campaigning they had become 
closely associated with the News of the World. The newspaper thereby not only 
gained preferred access to Sarah’s parents but also benefited from the surrounding 
publicity. It can be speculated that this would have served as an additional bone of 
contention and envy in the competitive world of news.
One important point that was raised from a political point of view was that the idea of 
a UK equivalent to Megan’s Law was not new. Michael Howard, at the time former 
Home Secretary, raised the point that the question of a Megan’s Law for the UK had 
been examined in 1997 prior to the introduction of the 1997 Sex Offenders Act. The 
idea was then rejected after civil servants had told him about the dangers of non­
compliance and vigilantism (Ahmed and Bright August 6 2000b). Nonetheless, 
Howard mentioned that it would make sense to look at the idea again since it had been 
on the statute book for three years (August 5 2000b). This was done by the NSPCC 
which started to research the effectiveness of Megan's Law in order to see if such 
measures would actually enhance the safety of children (Interviewee 2).
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At the same time, a spokesman for ACOP brought it to the attention of the public that 
while not having 'as catchy a title as Sarah's Law' the UK did have its own version of 
Megan’s Law (Laville July 31 2000). This was 'enshrined in a ‘‘Court of Appeal 
judgement in the case of Thorpe v the Chief Constable of North Wales Police ” ’ which 
authorises the police to release information on sex offenders if they deem it to be 
appropriate. However, unlike in the US, the release of information is not mandatory 
(Laville July 31 2000). The Sarah's Law Campaign was thus described as just a 
continuation of a debate that was started in North Wales in February 1999 when Sir 
Ronald Waterhouse, after looking into abuse in children’s homes, decided to name the 
individuals convicted of abuse. 'The Waterhouse report changed the way everyone 
thought about the disclosure of the names to the community'' (George Barrow, 
Spokesman for ACOP quoted in Bright August 6 2000c).
At the beginning of the 'crusade against paedophiles' there were fears that the 
Government' [would] be forced into a knee-jerk response to the campaign by putting 
in place a version of the law' (Ahmed and Bright August 6 2000b). Although the 
Home Office indicated that in spite of the Sarah's Law Campaign the public would not 
be able to access the paedophile register (Shrimsley August 7 2000), it does not 
appear to have made its stance within the debate clear to the wider public: 'they were 
effectively keeping a kind of no-comment [approach] - or keeping their distance from 
this' (Interviewee 7).
This ‘no-comment approach’ is surprising in so far as the position taken by the Home 
Office appears to have been very anti-community notification from the outset. For 
example, despite not being emphasised at the time, there exist two press releases from 
the summer of 2000, one from 26 June and one dated 2 August 2000, which made the 
Home Office’s position quite clear. In the first of these, which was released in light of 
the publication of the Review of Part One of the Sex Offenders Act 1997, the Home 
Office Minister Charles Clarke pointed out that the idea was to reach a balance 
between the protection of children and the opportunity for sex offenders to mend their 
ways rather than driving sex offenders underground (Home Office 2000b).
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In the second press release, which covered the publication of research into the 
effectiveness of the sex offender register in the UK, Charles Clarke again reiterated 
this point:
"The issue of disclosure is a sensitive one and I note the concern 
highlighted in the report by agencies like the Association of Chief 
Officers of Probation. The Government remains committed to the view 
that the decision to disclose information about sex offenders remains one 
for the police and probation services who are best placed to determine 
the most effective means of protecting children'’ (Home Office 2000c).
Home Office Minister Paul Boateng also pointed out that the Sarah's Law Campaign 
"hasn’t changed our thinking' (Shrimsley August 7 2000) and that the decision to 
name offenders was a "law enforcement matter', thus resting with the police and 
probation service (Jones August 7 2000). This statement in turn led to the threat by 
the News of the World's senior columnist that a revival of the name-and-shame 
campaign would be considered (Jones August 7 2000; Scott August 7 2000).
On 4 August, Home Office Minister Paul Boateng announced that the Government 
was interested in the proposals put forward in the Sarah's Law Campaign manifesto. 
While some of the proposed ideas were already being considered, the Government 
would like "to hear more about what some of the other ideas entail'. Consequently, 
the Home Office would welcome "quickly', the views of the various charities involved 
in working with young people, police and probation service on how these ideas should 
work (Home Office 2000e).
While the various press releases make the Home Office’s position seemingly very 
clear, many people involved in the debate voiced their surprise at the Government’s 
failure to take a clearer stance in the debate in general.
"In public pronouncement terms many commentators were observing how 
quiet the Government was generally speaking. Behind the scenes there 
was clear access to officials. In terms of making a public stance they 
didn’t. I mean Jack Straw might have made one or two mild statements 
about, you know, we must all behave according to the law, but there was 
no strong public expression' (Interviewee 5).
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Iii contrast to the Home Office, the Scottish Executive made its position very explicit. 
Despite having said that it would abide by whatever arrangements were made by 
Westminster so as to prevent a two-tier system in the UK for dealing with sex 
offenders (Nelson August 7 2000), the Scottish Executive pointed out that it would 
not establish a Sarah's Law in Scotland (Laing August 6 2000; Nelson August 7 
2000).
With the Sarah's Law Campaign gaining momentum (Ahmed and Bright August 6 
2000b) and the question of how to protect children dominating the papers (August 6 
2000c), Sarah’s parents asked for the help of Tony Blair. Referring to a letter of 
condolence he sent them, saying 4 If there is anything I can do for you, let me know', 
they urged him to ‘personally support the campaign' and introduce Sarah's Law 
(August 6 2000). They also tried to arrange a meeting with him but this did not 
materialise. Mrs Payne only managed to meet Tony Blair briefly when attending the 
Pride of Britain award for which she was nominated in 2001 (Payne and Gekoski 
2004).
Simultaneously, more critical voices regarding Sarah's Law could be heard. On 
Sunday, 6 August 2000, The Observer looked into the effectiveness of Megan’s Law 
(Vulliamy and Paton Walsh August 6 2000). The paper pointed out that the base of 
the For Sarah Campaign ‘has been seriously undermined by evidence that the 
American scheme is less successful than the existing British system'. The UK register 
of sex offenders has a compliance rate of 97% compared to 80% in the US (Ahmed 
and Bright August 6 2000b). A US expert interviewed by The Observer ‘warned that 
the law should not be seen as a panacea. “I don’t count on notification to protect 
anybody”' (ibid.).
Other more serious problems with the proposed Sarah's Law addressed the legal 
foundation of such a law and how far the feelings of victims should be considered in a 
‘fair and impartial' criminal justice system. ‘Legislation should not be enacted 
because we feel sad or mad, but because it furthers justice - because it will lead to a 
more fail-proof, just and equitable legal system' (Birkett August 9 2000). Publicising 
details of offenders could be challenged as a breach of the right to human privacy, 
which is granted by the European convention on human rights (Dyer September 13
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2000). Recent legal rulings had also confirmed that it was in society’s interest for 
offenders to be allowed to live normal, lawful lives (Jeffery, Vasgar et al. August 10 
2000).
In addition to legal aspects, practical problems with a Sarah's Law were raised:
'No system is 100% effective. It doesn’t matter how much legislation you 
put in place, you can never stop every sex offender. You can monitor him 
and you can reduce the risk, but you have to be realistic" (Terence 
Grange, Chief Constable of Dyfed-Powys and ACPO spokesman quoted 
in Hall December 13 2001b).
Other problems mentioned were distortions of the perception of the threats posed by 
sex offenders due to this campaign (Inman August 16 2000) and the question of why 
sex offenders should be singled out as a group of offenders as opposed to other 
offenders (Hume December 14 2001). The hypocrisy of parts of the media and society 
(Watson-Brown December 18 2001c) and government (Hyland August 12 2000; 
Johnson August 22 2002) were addressed too.
'As terrible as Sarah Payne’s death was, it is important to remember that 
fewer than 20 children a year are abducted, and about six murdered.
Sadly, most sexual and physical abuse is carried out in the home, by 
family members, and children are at a far bigger risk of being murdered 
by one of their parents than a predatory paedophile" (December 13 
2001k).
Sarah's Law might lead to further victimisation of children and give parents the wrong 
impression that their children are safe (Watson-Brown December 18 2001c).
There were continuing protests by anti-paedophile campaigners targeting suspected 
paedophiles (Jeffery, Vasgar et al. August 10 2000), thus damaging the Sarah's Law 
Campaign, and Sarah’s parents called upon them to end their protests (Gardham 
August 12 2000), telling them that if the Government had not introduced Sarah's Law 
within six months, they would stage a protest march on parliament with them 
(Gardham August 12 2000). On Tuesday, 11 September 2000, Sara and Michael 
Payne, accompanied by Rebekah Wade and Stuart Kuttner of the News of the World, 
met with Paul Boateng. Unfortunately, it was not possible to learn the precise details
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of this meeting during this research. As one person with close inside knowledge 
pointed out have to he careful what I say here. It did not achieve a great deal' 
(Interviewee 1). Prior to the meeting Sarah’s parents had met with Jack Straw and 
handed him a 700,000 name petition in favour of Sarah's Law, containing mainly 
names of News of the World readers (Dyer September 13 2000). Jack Straw 'was 
obviously sympathetic to Sara and Michael Payne but not enthusiastic about the 
proposed changes to the law’ (Interviewee 1). One of the aspects discussed during the 
meeting with Jack Straw appear to have been proposed changes to existing legislation. 
In a subsequent letter to Jack Straw the News of the World pointed out that they and 
the Payne family were delighted that many of the points proposed in the Sarah's Law 
manifesto would be incorporated in the Criminal Justice Bill. However, while they 
could not fully support these proposals since they fell short of 'controlled public 
access', they were willing to cautiously welcome those proposals if the Home Office 
publicly declared a commitment to finding a way through the obstacles presented by 
controlled access to such information (Document 29). In the same letter it was pointed 
out that the News of the World had employed lawyers in the US to compile draft 
legislation on how the notion of Sarah's Law could be defined. This draft legislation is 
provided in Appendix 3. In her story Mrs Payne states that she got the impression that 
Jack Straw was 'a true politician' who never seemed to agree or disagree with 
anything said by her (Payne and Gekoski 2004). After the meeting, Sarah’s parents 
were reported to have said that they 'have been assured there will be a Sarah's Law. 
We are very happy indeed. It's what we were all working so hard for' (September 13 
2000). .
However, in September the Home Office finally made it clear that albeit intending to 
give'[m]ore information about the whole issue of sex offenders, there would be no 
general public access to details about individuals' (Johnston September 13 2000). 
Jack Straw announced a package of measures to strengthen the protection of children 
and provide better information to the public on the management of sex and violent 
offenders in the community, but he ruled out Sarah's Law (September 15 2000). He 
said that:
'The tragedy of Sarah Payne’s death touched everyone’s lives. We have I 
believe recognised the very strong public concern which her murder has 
evoked. This has been brought home to us very strongly in the discussion
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we have had with Mr and Mrs Payne about how the law could be 
improved...These proposals have come about after close consultation 
with the police and probation services. As part of this, I have considered 
very closely the question whether there could be some form of controlled
■ access to the sex offender register. But in practice controlling such 
access would be impossible to enforce. The arguments against a general 
right of access are well rehearsed. Such an arrangement would not in 
our judgement assist the protection of children or public 
safety ...Controlled disclosure is I believe the better and safer route. 
Therefore I have concluded that the professional agencies - the police 
and probation services — are best placed to determine the disclosure of 
information on individual sex offenders...But I do believe that the public 
should have a right to know what measures the police and probation 
services have in place to protect the public’. (Home Office 2000d).
The new measures were 'to be rushed through Parliament by November’ (Johnston 
September 16 2000) and included a 'statutory duty on police and probation services 
to assess the risks posed by all sex offenders in the community’ as well as the 
opportunity for victims of sex offenders sentenced to 12 months or longer to be 
consulted by the probation service prior to the offender’s release (September 16 
2000). Additionally, judges would be given new powers, including banning offenders 
from living near their victims. Furthermore, the police would 'make available more 
information about the presence of sex offenders in the area’ (Johnston September 16 
2000).
While the news was welcomed by offender rehabilitation groups, anti-paedophile 
activists once again threatened to resurrect their protests. Member of Sarah’s family 
said that while they were happy with the measures and 'the speed with which the 
Government had acted’ (Johnston September 16 2000) they would continue their 
campaign (September 16 2000).
During September and October the new measures were discussed at length in the 
House of Lords as a late addition to the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act that 
was going through Parliament. At the time, the addition of such measures at the rather
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late stage of the Bill was justified with the argument that it provided an opportunity 
‘to introduce such additional protections as soon as possible' (HL Debate 2000f, 
Annex).
Such sudden urgency is surprising. Some of the new proposals2 had previously been 
raised on 12 June 2000 in the House of Commons as part of the Report and Third 
Reading of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act. At the time Mr Boateng 
pointed out that there were several concerns about the working of the Sex Offenders 
Act in practice. He also mentioned that the Government would launch a policy review 
of the Act. This would consider relevant issues and findings about the Act, taking into 
account ‘the views of a wide range of organisations, including children’s charities 
and the police'. At that point in time, though, the Government believed that any 
amendments of the Act prior to the consultation would be premature given that it 
would ‘not make sense in our view to consider that one aspect of the Act in isolation, 
when we have indicated our intention of conducting a more thoroughgoing review' 
(HC Debate 2000, c708).
Following the discussion of Jack Straw’s proposals ministers agreed on a number of 
statutory changes prior to the completion of a review of the Sex Offenders Act. 
Despite not including community notification, Mr Boateng, on introducing the 
changes during the debate on the Criminal Justice and Court Services Bill, advertised 
the measures in memory of Sarah as Sarah's Law. Although this can be considered as 
a clever ‘spin’ implying that the Government was following the popular request for 
community notification, this title for the new measures did not take off. However, the 
changes to sex offender legislation, discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, were 
welcomed by Conservative and Liberal MPs (November 14 2000).
In the first week of November, Megan’s mother, who had visited the UK in 1997 to 
support the calls for public access to the sex offender register (Thomas 2000, p 118), 
condemned the UK Government for its failure to introduce an anti-paedophile law in 
light of Sarah’s death. She said that she was ‘appalled that the Paynes ’ campaign had
2 These included the question of changing registration requirements under the Sex Offenders Act 1997 
from a fortnight to 48 hours in order to allow the police and other agencies involved to keep a closer 
eye on paedophiles and to hinder both sex offenders’ ability to escape and any ‘grooming’ of victims.
- Ill -
not been supported by UK politicians' urging them 'to keep up the pressure on Straw' 
(November 8 2000). She later pointed out that the UK Government ‘is putting the 
offender first' (Ellison December 19 2001).
The News of the World undertook several attempts to keep the discussion alive and to 
influence MPs. For example, the newspaper organised a meeting at Westminster in 
February 2001 for which it flew over Peter In verso, senator of New Jersey and 
described as 'the person who drafted the original Megan's Law' (Interviewee 1). In 
addition, Sarah’s parents were touring various pally conferences in their quest to have 
their version of Megan's Law. Nonetheless, the discussion around Sarah's Law ebbed 
off until one year later, when Whiting was found guilty of kidnapping and murdering 
Sarah Payne. It emerged that Sarah was not his first victim. This resulted in Sarah’s 
parents’ vow 'to step up their campaign for the introduction of Sarah's Law' 
(December 13 2001a) and mounting pressure on ministers to re-examine the way 
'convicted paedophiles are dealt with' (December 13 2001a). Despite apparent 
growing support for a Sarah's Law across the UK, Justice Minister Jim Wallace, in 
line with earlier statements by the Scottish Executive, ruled out such a move for 
Scotland (December 13 200 le; December 13 2001 i).
Following the conviction of Whiting, the News of the World's managing editor Mr 
Kuttner announced that the newspaper would resume its name-and-shame campaign 
since the conviction was 'a total vindication of the need for Sarah's Law' (Hodgson 
December 13 2001c). He said that:
'on balance we’re more concerned about the rights and the life and the 
welfare of innocent children than we are of the perverts, paedophiles and 
loathsome sex offenders who prey on kids' (December 12 2001c).
Surprisingly, the usefulness of the idea to revive the campaign was questioned by the 
News of the World's sister paper The Sun. There it was argued that tougher sentencing 
and not Sarah's Law would be the way forward (Hodgson December 13 2001c). This 
idea was supported by The Guardian. Reiterating the ideas that Sarah's Law 'drives 
offenders underground, it prompts vigilante actions and lynch law and leads to 
misidentification and innocent deaths', the newspaper argued for no automatic release 
for sex offenders instead (December 13 200lj).
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This shift towards the idea of harsher sentencing seems to have predominated the 
discussion from then on and was supported by several sides, including Home Office 
ministers Keith Bradley (December 13 2001c) and Beverley Hughes (December 13 
200 lh). Further support for harsher sentencing came from the National Association of 
Probation Officers (NAPO) (December 12 2001c) and to everyone’s surprise from the 
normally liberally-minded lord chief justice Lord Woolf. The latter went a step further 
and proposed to detain paedophiles and other individuals who posed a clear threat to 
public safety even if not yet convicted (December 26 2001; Dyer December 27 2001). 
The Government took up the idea of sentencing reforms and promised new sentencing 
arrangements instead of Sarah's Law which was considered to be unworkable.
‘ There is nothing to stop an offender whose name has been disclosed in 
one area buying a van and driving 100 miles to another area...Parents 
themselves also move. They visit family, they go on holiday. The idea that 
you can give parents all the time the names of people who might be a 
threat is simply unworkable' (December 13 2001 h).
Under these new sentencing arrangements judges would have to impose an automatic 
life sentence if there was a risk of re-offending and sex offenders would have to serve 
their whole sentence rather than being released after serving two-thirds of it (Ford 
December 14 2001).
Despite the Government’s public statements that it would not introduce Sarah's Law 
Sarah’s family was given the ‘hope of change' (McDougall December 14 2001) 
mainly due to two reasons. Firstly, Scotland Yard Commissioner Sir John Stevens 
pointed out that it was ‘time for debate' on how to deal with paedophiles. ‘It’s a very 
difficult issue. There has to be a balance of us safeguarding society against vigilante 
action. I believe there is a time for real debate' (ibid.). The other reason came after 
the News of the World resurrected its name-and-shame campaign following Whiting’s 
conviction. This time the News of the World did not use its original strategy but 
instead published the pictures of seven paedophiles who had failed to register on the 
sex offender register. Details for four of these offenders were provided by Scotland 
Yard (Alleyne December 17 2001). Scotland Yard defended this by arguing that it 
wanted ‘help from the public in tracking them [the missing paedophiles] down' 
(Alleyne December 17 2001). After their release these offenders ‘breached their 
obligation under the Sex Offenders Act 1997 by failing to sign on the sex offenders
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register' (December 16 2001c). This move by Scotland Yard upset the probation 
service due to being a breach of protocol between the probation service and the police, 
according to which, 'information about such offenders is not released unless both the 
services agree that this should be done' (Morris December 19 2001). However, the 
Home Office, rather than criticising the News of the World, pointed out that it had 'no 
objections to the newspaper’s campaign' (December 16 2001c). At the same time as 
ruling out the possibility of publicising the names and addresses of registered 
paedophiles, Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott praised the News of the World as 
'publicly spirited' (December 18 2001c) and compared the campaign to the way the 
TV programme ‘Crimewatch’ functioned (December 16 2001; December 17 2001). 
This was interpreted as a first indication of a potential change of attitude by the 
Government (December 17 2001) towards a softer stance on a publicly available 
paedophile list (December 17 2001b) and a 'warming towards' the News of the 
World's campaign (December 17 2001a).
Shortly after this, on 18 December 2001, Sarah’s parents met with the new Home 
Secretary David Blunkett, hoping to convince him of the need for Sarah's Law 
(December 18 2001c). Prior to the meeting they pointed out that they were not in 
favour of unlimited access but advocated that their campaign was only aimed at 
'predatory paedophiles' and not everybody on the sex offenders register (December 
18 2001b). During the meeting, however, rather than discussing Sarah's Law, the 
major point of discussion was the idea of 'disclosure in the most serious cases' to a 
multi-agency protection panel. Blunkett’s idea was to give parents a place on such 
panels (Travis December 17 2001), and to create a ‘buddy system’ under which 
convicted paedophiles had a person they could entrust with any feelings of re­
offending they might have (December 18 200Id). Although Blunkett told Sarah’s 
parents that he 'was listening and he will listen in the future' (December 18 200 Id) he 
made it clear that he would not back Sarah's Law (Morris December 19 2001).
At the time of writing this thesis, the Sarah's Law Campaign is still going and there 
are indications that the News of the World is trying to get the topic back onto the 
policy agenda. Following a poll ICM Research conducted for the News of the World 
in June 2005, the newspaper announced that 'our children are still NO SAFER than in 
2000' (News of the World 2005, original emphasis). In addition, there are reports that
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the News of the World ‘has been sending reporters posing as house buyers into local 
police stations and asking about MAPPA [Multi-Agency Public Protection 
Arrangements] and local sex offenders'" (Personal Correspondence).
This renewed prominence ascribed to the question of Sarah's Law conies after a time 
during which the campaign appears to have lost momentum and had taken the form of 
fringe meetings' and ‘talks around the country' (Interviewee 1), with Ms Payne 
continuing her attempts to convince the Government and the police of the need for a 
Sarah's Law (see for example May 11 2003; May 13 2003; Beattie October 3 2002). 
While David Blunkett publicly continued to resist Sarah's Law (Beattie October 3 
2002), there were nevertheless still signs of hope for those in favour of Sarah's Law. 
For example, the Consultation Paper on the Review of Part 1 of the Sex Offenders Act 
1997 commented that while wider access to information held on registered sex 
offenders had, after careful consideration, been rejected by the Government at the 
time of the Sarah Payne case:
‘Since then David Blunkett has indicated that he wants to ensure 
everything is being done to protect the public from sex offenders and will 
look at a variety of proposals that have been made, including the 
possibility of controlled access to information held about sex offenders.
The issue of wider access to the information on registered sex offenders 
is not further dealt with in this review' (Home Office 2001, p 3-4).
There was ample opportunity to discuss further the question of community 
notification and any feature regarding wider access to information held on sex 
offenders during the passage of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, as well as the wider 
issue of reviewing the law on sexual offences. However, there appears to have been 
only one more time that the position of the Government towards the idea of Sarah's 
Law as advocated by her parents was raised. This took place when Peterborough’s 
MP, Mrs Helen Clark, asked
‘the Secretary of State for the Home Department [Beverly Hughes], 
pursuant to her statement of 17 December 2001, Official Report, column 
7, on sex offenders, for what reason she has concluded that it is not in the 
interests of child protection to make people's names and addresses
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widely accessible in the community; and. if she will make a statement'
(HC Debate 2002, cl 80w).
The answer provided mirrored those given on previous occasions. Beverly Hughes 
pointed out that the Government’s conclusion to resist Sarah's Law was
'borne out by the experience following the News of the World's sex 
offender campaigns in 1998 and 2000. The Association of Chief Officers 
of Probation provided anecdotal evidence about the effects of those 
campaigns, including that a number of high risk sex offenders lost 
contact with the public protection agencies; many others who were 
previously participating in treatment programmes stopped doing so for 
fear of being identified; a number of serious assaults on people who were 
mistaken for sex offenders took place; and the families, who in some 
cases had been the victims of sex offenders, were also assaulted and 
abused by members of the public. All these factors are deeply regrettable 
but perhaps the most regrettable potential consequence of community 
notification is that children will be placed at greater risk from sex 
offenders who are not complying with the requirements of the Sex 
Offenders Acf (HC Debate 2002, cl81w).
Rebekah Wade during her time at the News of the World continued to threaten to use a 
name-and-shame campaign again if the demands for Sarah's Law were not fully met 
(Beattie October 3 2002). The Sarah's Law Campaign got renewed support at the time 
of the Amanda “Milly ” Dowler and Jessica and Holly cases, the News of the World 
asking David Blunkett: 'How many victims, how many broken hearts do you need 
before you give us Sarah's Law?' (August 19 2002).
Other than that, there do not seem to have been any further discussions on the topic. 
As one senior source within the Home Office pointed out, 'In addition, I do not re­
call that the issue [of community notification] was raised during the passage of the 
Sexual Offences Act 2003 through Parliament' (Personal Correspondence).
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Summary
This chapter has provided an exploration of the campaign for the introduction of a 
British equivalent of the United States’ Megan's Law, a law providing mandatory 
community notification about sex offenders living in an area, by the Sunday-only 
tabloid News of the World. This call for a British-style Megan's Law followed the 
murder and abduction of eight-year old Sarah Payne by a previously convicted sex 
offender. The debate took place at a time when the British legislation on sex offenders 
was being reviewed and a dialogue of how to improve existing arrangements had 
started.
The News of the World's campaign, which seems to have been modelled directly on 
the campaign that led to Megan's Law, started off with a name-and-shame campaign. 
Accordingly, details of sex offenders, which appear to have been mainly derived from 
newspaper clippings, were published in two consecutive editions. The publications of 
sex offenders’ details, which, partly due to their origin displayed several inaccuracies, 
led to widespread disruption to the work of organisations involved in sex offender 
management and child protection as well as various acts of vigilantism.
Following talks between representatives of police, probation and various other 
organisations involved in offender management and child protection, a list of 
proposals was developed with the News of the World, addressing potential changes in 
policy' in order to improve child protection. This was a list of changes that the News of 
the World, could and did lobby for. Although this resulted in a number of amendments 
to existing policies, the main concern of the campaign, i.e. controlled access for the 
wider public to information held on sex offenders, was not translated into legislation. 
This remains the case at the point of writing this thesis in 2005.
After exploring these events, the next chapter considers the network of players 
involved at the time and examines their respective actions and positions.
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Chapter 5
The Policy Network
Having discussed the Sarah's Law Campaign and the context within which it 
took place, this chapter considers in more detail the various agencies involved in the 
debate surrounding the News of the World campaign and their respective courses of 
action. In addition to analysing the ways in which these organisations got involved in 
the debate and their position within the emerging network, personal and 
organisational connections between the players are explored. This in turn allows for a 
number of tentative explanations regarding their actions during the debate and 
potential influences thereon.
The Network’s Participants
The data available indicates that the key organisations involved in the events 
surrounding the News of the World's campaigning are the Association of Chief 
Officers of Probation (ACOP), Association of Chief Police Officers (ACOP), the 
National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders (NACRO), the 
National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC), the Suzy 
Lamplugh Trust, the Press Complaints Commission and the Home Office.
This emerging network of players can be subdivided into three main categories: those 
opposed to blanket community notification; those in favour; and those whose public 
stance was not always obvious at the time. The first category is made up of ACPO, 
ACOP, NSPCC, the Suzy Lamplugh Trust and NACRO. Following the News of the 
World's name-and-shame campaign, these organisations would join forces and make 
up what has become known as the ‘alliance of organisations’. In the second category 
one finds the News of the World, supported by Sarah’s parents, Sara and Michael 
Payne. The last category consists of the Press Complaints Commission and the Home 
Office both of which surprised observers through their lack of public 
pronouncements.
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Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)
ACPO appears to be the organisation that got to know about the News of the 
World’s planned campaign first. One week prior to the beginning of the campaign 
ACPO had been contacted by the News of the World twice. At both times there appear 
to have been lengthy discussions between senior News of the World representatives 
and ACPO’s spokesman and Chief Constable for Gloucestershire, Tony Butler. On 
both occasions the arguments brought forward by the News of the World failed to 
convince Tony Butler that the planned actions would benefit children’s safety and he 
had thus advised against this course of action (ACPO 2000). However, the News of 
the World informed ACPO that it would go ahead with its planned course of action 
which, in light of the arguments outlined to the News of the World, surprised ACPO. 
Previous experiences with name-and-shame campaigns in the UK which had 
illustrated what could happen when communities got to know about sex offenders 
living in their area, served as an important source of knowledge and as a backdrop 
around which the police could model its response. Consequently, all Chief Constables 
were warned about the campaign and the potential impact it might have.
Having warned the various police forces about the likelihood of what was going to 
happen, as soon as the first list of offenders was published on 23 July it was examined 
closely by the police. In addition, all police forces were asked to report in detail on the 
content of the list and the impact it was having on the police’s work (Interviewee 4).
The picture that emerged was that not only were there several flaws in the list 
published by the News of the World, but that the offenders listed were not necessarily 
the ‘predatory paedophiles’ who had initially provided the impetus for both the 
Megan's Law campaign in the US and the News of the World’s campaign. As one 
interviewee recalls,
'Tony Butler had one case in Gloucestershire for example who was 
named and shamed. The offender had committed a relatively low-level 
crime. It was one of those sort of in-the-family ones or as a friend. I think 
it was an indecent assault. He was back with his wife and three children 
and his wife was receiving chemotherapy for cancer. He was so 
concerned about the potential for vigilantism and so on that he took his -
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he phoned the police, he phoned the sex offender unit and said ‘look I am 
off’ ’ - and took his whole family to Scotland and he left the county. The 
police had a number of others — the officers contacted the people who 
were named in the list and those they had knowledge of and so on, trying 
to reassure them. The thing the police were doing was trying to protect 
those people [on the listf (Interviewee 4).
Although the police were not generally in support of any parental rights to access 
information on individual sex offenders, they appear to have been willing to examine, 
as part of the review of the Sex Offenders Act, how far any benefits to child 
protection might arise out of an extension of the circumstances under which certain 
information could be disclosed to specific individuals or the public at large 
(Document 15).
Along with these various activities ACPO publicised information on the 
developments that had taken place within the field of sex offender management, and 
those procedures that had emerged as good practices. Special emphasis was placed on 
inter-agency developments and co-operation amongst those working with sex 
offenders. For example, in a press release on 2 August 2000, commenting on the 
publication of the research finding relating to the implementation of the Sex 
Offenders Act 1997 which was published by the Home Office on the same day, 
ACPO referred to past and ongoing activities in the area of sex offender management. 
The key points mentioned in this press release have been summarised in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Recent Approaches to Raising the Profile of Sex 
Offender Issues
• In 1999 ACPO introduced a national risk assessment model to all 
police forces. This was accompanied by a national briefing programme 
undertake by Dr David Thornton, a recognised national expert.
• Conferences:
o There had been two national conferences in the past 12 months 
dealing with sex offender matters:
■ One in November 1999 which brought together senior 
investigating officers of police forces throughout England 
and Wales to share experiences in respect of the 
investigation of allegations of child abuse in childrens' 
homes and other similar establishments.
■ One in February 1999 for child protection officers which 
included discussions on sex offender issues.
o Conferences had been held annually for the past 7 years and 
were an ongoing feature of briefing in relation to sex offender 
policy and practice. A further conference specifically in relation 
to the management of sex offenders was to take place in 
October 1999. The conference would be attended by officers in 
England and Wales and would provide an opportunity to discuss 
proposals to strengthen the sex offender legislation in the light of 
the recently announced government review. The agenda was to 
include presentations by Joyce Plotnikoff and Richard Wilson on 
the findings of their research.
• Important initiatives:
o Nationally, there had been very significant developments in the 
multi-agency approach to the monitoring of sex offenders in the 
community. During 1998, there had been some very important 
developments in operational intelligence systems at both the 
local and national level. These were contributing to enhancing 
the effectiveness of the management of sex offenders in the 
community.
• Considerable work had been undertaken in respect of the control of 
dangerous offenders with severe personality disorders. ACPO had 
responded to the government’s consultation document and anticipated 
improved opportunities of dealing with these offenders in some form of 
secure accommodation thus taking them out of the community.
(Adapted from ACPO 2000b)
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Association of Chief Officers of Probation (ACOP)
While ACPO had been contacted by the News of the World prior to the 
beginning of the name-and-shame campaign and had been asked about their opinion 
this does not appear to have happened in the case of ACOP. However, the person 
responsible for work with sex offenders at ACOP seems to have resigned on the 
Friday prior to the first publication and so there is a theoretical possibility that 
information about any prior knowledge might have been lost as a result of this. Gill 
Mackenzie, who had given up her responsibility for work with sex offenders when she 
had been made chair of ACOP, was put in charge. She only seems to have found out 
about the campaign when it started.
‘27ze first Gill Mackenzie knew about it was when she received an early 
morning phonecall from a journalist on the Sunday saying ‘what’s your 
position? ’ and then all hell broke loose. From then until some time in 
August it was just a nightmare. It was just a daily nightmare...[I]t was 
utterly frantic and very worrying... [Mjeetings, discussions, receiving 
information, giving out advice, trying to work with other organizations to 
work on something... This was a very difficult time' (Interviewee 5).
The short notice with which ACOP and the majority of the organisations affected 
initially seem to have found out about the News of the World's campaign is interesting 
in that it mirrors a tactic usually employed by Sunday papers when managing the 
publication of an exclusive story about a sex scandal. In such cases surprise is an 
important element. The aim is to inform the victim only at the last possible moment. 
This leaves the attacked with only a few hours of thinking time before the print run 
starts. lIn that short, concentrated period many a far-reaching decision has been 
made in haste' (Jones 1999, p 190).
With the beginning of the name-and-shame campaign various people started to 
contact ACOP. In light of the fact that ACOP had commented frequently on previous 
incidents of name-and-shame campaigns, people were aware that it was ‘a probation 
kind of authority on sex offenders' (Interviewee 7).
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From previous experiences, the people in charge at ACOP had learnt that collating 
evidence about sex offenders and the impact various name-and-shame campaigns had 
on the work with them, and then distributing them to the press, could be an important 
tool in influencing any discussions about offenders and the way they are managed. 
This was especially important in 1998 when there was widespread press coverage of 
the release of some sex offenders into the community. Back then local media were 
outing sex offenders and whipping up campaigns for their expulsion from the 
community. These activities of the press had resulted in considerable problems for the 
probation service which in turn produced ‘a dossier of evidence’ (Document 11). This 
was made public and used to complain to the Press Complaints Commission. 
'‘Although the Press Complaints Commission was not that receptive [to the dossier] it 
had a powerful influence on other journalists'1 (Interviewee 5). Reference to the 
information gathered was even made in The Economist (Interviewee 5). The move to 
put together such a dossier of available evidence supporting the arguments put 
forward by police and probation has subsequently been considered as being a very 
important one. •
lIf there is one thing in Gill Mackenzie’s whole time as lead for work 
with sex offenders that I think she got right ... it was this decision in 
1997-ish to start collating the evidence'1 (Interviewee 5).
In 2000 ACOP also wrote to the Press Complaints Commission and met up with its 
director, Guy Black. However, although ACOP was actively pursuing the option of a 
formal complaint, ACOP was aware that the way in which the Press Complaints 
Commission’s policy was written meant that the Press Complaints Commission would 
argue that it was not in a position to start an adjudication process (Document 37). At 
the time the Press Complaints Commission usually did not consider complaints that 
arose from third parties. In addition, it had granted itself the right to decide whether or 
not complainants were 4directly affected by the matters about which they complain’’ 
(House of Commons 2002, § 6.16). This question about eligible complainants had 
already been an obstacle for ACOP in 1998. Back then ACOP had, however, been 
reluctant to enter into a confrontation with any newspapers that would have resulted 
from issuing a complaint to the Press Complaints Commission which the latter 
required in order to take actions (Document 11). As one interviewee recalls:
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‘ACOP had enumerated the outbreaks of vigilantism [that resulted from 
the media’s campaign surrounding the cases of Sidney Cooke and Robert 
Oliver] and took them to the Press Complaints Commission -they didn’t 
get anywhere basically because they weren ’t the injured party. The Press 
Complaints Commission listened very politely and one or two things 
followed from it but then it died down for a while... That’s typical I think 
of the logic of the Press Complaints Commission - what probation got 
the first time round: “You are not eligible complainants ’’’(Interviewee 
5).
Fully aware of the question of third-party complaints ACOP seems to have pursued 
two options in 2000. First of all, it pointed out to its members that if there were any 
offenders or families directly affected by the News of the World's campaign who 
wished to make a formal complaint to the Press Complaints Commission they should 
get in touch (Document 65). Secondly, it pointed out to the Press Complaints 
Commission that although its concerns did not fall under any of the clauses outlined 
in the Press Complaints Commission’s code of conducts the latter could explore a 
complaint under other sections of its policy: the question of privacy; identification of 
children in sex cases; and the identification of an offender’s relatives and friends 
without consent (Document 37). However, it seems that within ACOP doubts existed 
as to any potential actions on side of the Press Complaints Commission.
‘ [Tjhe function of the Press Complaints Commission for the police and 
probation services was to give the news story another angle...- today 
police and probation jointly demanded that the Press Complaints 
Commission look into this because of X[Y and Z and it was better as a 
news story than in getting something out of the Press Complaints 
Commission. What you are looking for ...[are]... all sorts of devices to 
give the story an angle and so writing to the Press Complaints 
Commission is a great angle. Another journalist will pick that up you 
know' (Interviewee 7).
Although eventually the Press Complaints Commission would amend some of its 
policies and issue guidelines on handling similar case, ‘[tjhis guidance arrived well
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after the Sarah Payne campaign, about 8 months after. They made no bearing at the 
time' (Interviewee 7).
Along with these activities it appears that ACPO and ACOP and some of the other 
agencies involved jointly designed a 5-point programme of proposed legislative 
measures that was forwarded to the Home Office (Document 22) and is reproduced in 
Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: “Sarah's Law” - Proposed Legislative Measures
• Creation of a duty on chief officer of police and chief officer of probation jointly 
to establish arrangements for assessing and managing the risks posed by sex 
offenders with a requirement annually to publish information about those 
arrangements, coupled with the power for the Secretary of State to issue 
guidance on such things as the form in which such information is to be 
published; the other agencies which should be involved; the publication of 
information about local arrangements, including, for example, information 
about the number of times disclosures have been made and the categories of 
people to whom information has been disclosed; information about local 
treatment programmes etc.
• A power for the Secretary of State to make regulations concerning notification 
to the police and probation service by those responsible for the detention, 
discharge and release of sex offenders liable to registration under the Sex 
Offenders Act 1997
• A duty on the probation service to ascertain from the victim (or, if appropriate, 
the parent or guardian of the victim) their wish to be informed about the 
release arrangements for any sex offender serving a sentence of twelve 
months or more. Where the victim wishes to be informed, a duty on the 
probation service to take all reasonable steps to notify the victim of the 
release date, whether any conditions are attached to the license, whether 
those conditions include any restricting the movements of the offender, and if 
so, to be told specifically the terms of any conditions which relate to contact 
with the victim
• A new power for the Crown Court, when convicting an offender who falls 
within the scope of the Sex Offenders Act, to make a “restriction” order 
(including requirements about not approaching victims) placing restrictions on 
the offender which will have effect on release from custody. The order will be 
capable of being of indefinite duration and of being varied or discharged on 
application by the offender, the police or the probation service
• Amendments to the Sex Offenders Act to require initial registration in person 
within 72 hours of sentence or release; to give the police power to photograph 
and fingerprint the offender on initial registration; to require notification of 
foreign travel; and to increase the penalty for failure to register to 5 years 
imprisonment
(Source: Document 31)
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Throughout the debate there appear to have been two main reasons motivating ACOP 
and ACPO. First of all, there was a question of public order and safety:
4 These were individuals [people mentioned on the News of the World's 
list] who were entitled to being protected. We don’t have lynch-law in 
this country and it does not matter what someone has done, if their house 
is attacked it is just the same crime as if they throw a rock through the 
window now here' (Interviewee 4).
The second driving force spurring police and probation into action was the fact that 
the working relationship that had been built over time with many sex offenders was 
broken down by the name-and-shame campaign. Such relationships were an important 
part of managing sex offenders within the community. As a result of the name-and- 
shame campaign some offenders started to mistrust police and probation on the basis 
that they assumed that these organisations had leaked information to the newspaper.
M lot of offenders assumed that the News of the World was getting their 
information from the police - if you are a not very bright offender and 
the News of the World says that this [the name-and-shame campaign] is 
a major national campaign to name-and-shame every single sex offender, 
the offenders think: “shit, someone is telling them - must be the police 
(Interviewee 7).
In addition, some offenders had stalled to disappear. This led to concerns amongst the 
police and probation service that the News of the World's campaign was going to 
create long-term damage to their work with sex offenders.
4 [Tjhere was this element of trust which they were trying to develop with 
the sex offenders because it is one thing having a law but it is another 
one getting people to comply with it — and you only get people to comply 
with it if there is an element of trust. OK this is a dangerous offender but 
they have to sort of befriend him - this is the kind of thing they have to do 
as a police or probation officer — it comes with the job - it makes their 
job easy... So, there is this element of trust that the services were really 
concerned that was broken down - following on from this there were 
people actually disappearing. If people were disappearing they were 
gonna have to try and find them. There was the potential to prosecute
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people for failing to register on the basis that they had disappeared 
because they -were in fear of their life. Now how fair is that? They’d say 
“Sure I disappeared because I don’t know whom to trust - I have read 
about so and so having their house fire-bombed or whatever it is and so I 
am off!”" (Interviewee 4).
National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC)
As soon as the News of the World's naming and shaming campaign started, the 
NSPCC was inundated with inquiries. 4 There was this real frenzy and panic" 
(Interviewee 2). The inquiries did not only address questions about safety issues for 
children in respect to sexual offending, but also the line the NSPCC was taking in 
relation to the points addressed by the News of the World's campaign. Inquiries came 
from all sorts of sources, including from general members of the public and 
volunteers working for the NSPCC, but especially from the media.
fWJhen there is anything like this in the news the NSPCC is contacted 
by members of the public, ... who maybe have some safety concerns they 
would like to talk through, or they would like more information about, or 
particular volunteer people, who support us, give money to us, quite 
often phone up and say what’s your opinion on X or Y. So, we had a lot 
ofpublic inquiries, but we also had a lot of media inquiries" (Interviewee 
2).
When developing the line to be taken by the NSPCC, three main sources of influence 
seem to have existed. First of all, due to the huge interest displayed by both the media 
and the public there appear to have been some internal concerns about the work done 
by the NSPCC with adult sex offenders. At meetings between NSPCC staff some of 
their people, especially within their adult sex offender group which discussed best 
practice and issues for NSPCC staff, aired fears about the impact on the NSPCC’s 
work. Of special concern was the safety of some of their clients and their families. A 
lot of those people were being managed within the community and while their 
behaviour was considered to be neither a risk nor a threat they were frequently still 
living at or near' the address of their victims and some of them were potentially 
targeted. Secondly, given concerns voiced by other organizations, especially ACPO
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and APOC, the intention was ‘/o develop a joint sort of police response'. However, 
there appears to have been divergence as to the position to take vis-a-vis the News of 
the World's campaign within the NSPCC (Interviewee 2).
The third and final influence seems to have been that rather quickly the NSPCC 
became aware of the fact that the News of the World would start to push for a 
community notification system modelled on the American Megan's Law. While 
initially there was
‘a fairly strong line of thought that the NSPCC should not go down the 
community notification route...there was some openness, particularly 
from certain people within the organization, to ‘jet’s see”' (Interviewee 
2).
Consequently, it was decided to conduct some internal research into the effectiveness 
of community notification and see what the evidence base was.
V think there was concern or interest — I mean interest internally about — 
actually, was there some evidence that suggested it would protect 
children' so that ‘if there had been evidence [about the effectiveness of 
Megan's Law] then the NSPCC might have thought about supporting it' 
(Interviewee 2).
At the same time the NSPCC seems to have done some lobbying for improvements to 
child protection. As the NSPCC’s director and chief executive, Jim Harding, pointed 
out in a letter to the editor of The Times,
‘The Government can do more to protect children from sexual and other 
forms of abuse. This Government’s record on child protection is good, 
but being good is no excuse for not being better ....The NSPCC and the 
News of the World can agree on one fundamental point - we don’t want 
child abuse to drop down the public and political agenda ever again' 
(Harding August 1 2000).
Behind the scenes representatives of the NSPCC were trying to arrange a meeting 
with the then Minister of State, Charles Clarke, in order to discuss the NSPCC’s 
position towards the News of the World's campaign and to exchange views on how
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the NSPCC could aid in the development of future policies aimed at the protection of 
children (Document 53). The NSPCC also informed the Home Office that it had 
started to look into the idea of ‘controlled access’. Research it had commissioned was 
examining the current position within the USA and other jurisdictions. The NSPCC 
hoped that this would both forward the debate and play a part in the formulation of 
relevant Government policies (Document 53) and indeed, the findings of the research 
seem to have became one of the key documents of reference for both Government and 
other agencies in the field of sex offender management when talking about sex 
offender community notification.
Suzy Lamplugh Trust
The involvement of the Suzy Lamplugh Trust in the discussion was very much 
from a personal safety point of view, which is the main area of its work. The Trust 
had been set up by Diana Lamplugh in order to highlight the risks to personal safety 
people face and to give advice on how to minimise them after her daughter Suzy, a 25 
year old estate agent, had disappeared when she went to meet an unknown client. The 
arguments brought forward by the Trust mirrored those of the other charities in so far 
as there was concern
'that the introduction of Sarah's law, following on from Megan's law in 
the US would drive sex offenders underground or cause a vigilante type 
of action' (Personal Correspondence).
The key person involved on behalf of the Trust, which did not have a Parliamentary 
advisor at the time, was Diana Lamplugh herself (Personal Correspondence). 
Amongst people working within the area of sex offender management and child 
protection Diana Lamplugh was considered to be somebody 'on the victim side who is 
very logical about having an approach to policy that works' (Interviewee 7). It also 
appears that as someone who had gone through a similar experience as Sarah’s 
parents, she had concerns that although all this was done in the name of Sarah Payne, 
it might not be the best for her family.
'I think that partly her point of view was that this was not going to help 
[Sarah Payne’s family] in the slightest as the relatives of the victim - as 
victims' (Interviewee 7).
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Although aware of the potential consequences of the News of the World's campaign, 
the role assumed by the Suzy Lamplugh Trust in the debate appears to have been one 
of mediator:
‘[T]he important thing about having Diana Lamplugh there on our side 
was that Diana was the only person who could look at Sara Payne and 
Mr Payne and know exactly what they were going through - because she 
had lost her Suzy, who was an adult, in horrendous circumstances and 
her body was never found, it was awful. Diana Lamplugh is an amazing 
woman but she was on the side of reflection and our side and that was 
valuable because it added credibility, a human credibility, that the likes 
of ACPO and ACOP representatives just could not because they were 
just seen as functionists' (Interviewee 5).
National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders 
(NACRO)
NACRO’s main involvement with sex offenders is in the area of practical 
services, such as resettlement, housing, education and employment. They first got to 
know about the News of the World's campaign on the Saturday just before the 
campaign started. On that day key personnel of the organization were contacted by 
another Murdoch-owned news station, SKY News. SKY News pointed out that
‘they had been told by the News of the World that this [the naming and 
shaming campaign] is [was] going to start on the Sunday - the news was 
embargoed till 5pm on the Saturday and they wanted to do an interview 
with Paul Cavadino commenting on this for the news package that they 
would broadcast from 5 o ’clock that evening' (Interviewee 3).
Paul Cavadino, NACRO’s director of policy, agreed to do this and the official 
position immediately taken by NACRO was to criticise the campaign and point to 
potential negative side-effects the campaign could have. .
‘[I]t was thoroughly irresponsible — and that it would be likely to - it 
would reduce public safety rather than increase it and that there would 
be a risk of vigilante attacks against people who were named — because
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of that offenders would be more likely to go underground and disappear 
so that nobody would know where they were so it would be difficult for 
the police to exercise surveillance and for the probation service to 
supervise them and the result would be more danger to children from 
thaf (Interviewee 2).
NACRO’s view was also mainly arrived at through previous experience of similar 
incidents in the British context. In these cases, where newspapers had published 
details of people and identified them as a sex offender, staff at NACRO had found 
that those people had subsequently absconded from the hostels in which they were 
being supervised or had otherwise gone to ground, mainly due to fear. ‘[I]h the 
British context it was clear to NACRO that the Megan's Law’s provisions in this 
climate would be pretty damaging' (Interviewee 3).
In the previous year, as part of the first stage of the Government’s review of 
legislation regarding sexual offences, NACRO had sent a policy proposal to the Home 
Office. This proposal included on the one hand arguments for extended supervision of 
sex offenders and on the other the introduction of certain restrictions and arguments 
against public notification (Interviewee 2). This time however, NACRO’s main 
contribution to the debate was to comment extensively on the News of the World's 
campaign within the media and there was no feeling that any inquiry into the potential 
effectiveness of community notification was necessary.
'Ah- well, Paul Cavadino was aware of the evidence that was around at 
the lime...NACRO produced arguments, certainly, but they did not 
produce a particular document' (Interviewee 3).
Instead, NACRO continued to refer to the documents produced by the NSPCC, ACPO 
and ACOP. It appears to be the case that NACRO considered its own contribution to 
be one of practical experience which complemented rather than replicated the input 
provided by the other organizations.
'Most of the research on Megan's Law on the other side of the Atlantic 
was done by the NSPCC. So NACRO was aware of that and the different 
organisations involved had different types of information themselves; so 
for example APOC had the dossier of evidence, NSPCC had the
- 131 -
research on Megan's Law, the police and NACRO had experience of 
different things — so there was a body of evidence and 
experience...NACRO’s main links were with other organizations, they 
were the people they were working with - probation, NSPCC, Suzy 
Lamplugh Trust - and NACRO’s main links were with them, in order to 
try to put great pressure on showing that the view that this was - this 
view was widely shared amongst several organizations working in the 
area of crime’  (Interviewee 3).
One way of complementing the arguments put forward by the other organisations was 
through issuing press releases which pointed out potential ways of improving child 
protection and emphasised the non-desirability of the American approach:
'There are positive things that can be done to reduce the risk posed by 
paedophiles, both those who have offended in the past, and those who 
have not offended yet, but may. Improving the supervision and treatment 
of sex offenders, educating parents, teachers and others who work with 
children to spot early signs of child abuse, teaching children the 
importance of resisting inappropriate advances and telling someone they 
trust if it happens will all do much more to reduce child abuse than 
adopting a dubious approach imported from across the Atlantic' 
(NACRO 2000)
At the same time, in order to deal with the problems arising from the News of the 
World's activities it has been said that NACRO intended
'to have a sort of confrontation with the News of the World and wanted 
to have a delegation of people and were looking for people to do this' 
(Interviewee 7).
Focusing on forming such an alliance was perceived as having priority over trying to 
lobby the Government on issues of sex offender policy at the time.
'[T]he Government was arguing on the same side as these organisations 
were, so the priority wasn ’t to influence the Government - the priority 
was to get the News of the World to call this off (Interviewee 3).
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The main sources drawn upon in getting together such a delegation were organisations 
already involved and well-established in the area of sex offender management and 
child protection. One of the main areas of ‘recruitment’ was the Penal Affairs 
Consortium, an umbrella body for penal lobbying groups, such as the Howard League 
for Penal Reform, the Prisons Reform Trust, NACRO and, at the time, ACOP 
(Interviewee 7).
The Make-Up of the Alliance of Organisations
Within the alliance of organisations the dominant role seems to have been taken 
on by ACOP and ACPO which also appear to have been the two organisations that co­
operated most closely with each other.
'Probation was the police’s partner, not on enforcement, but on risk 
management, so it was right that [they] put something together ...NACRO 
were concerned about the offenders’ protection and so on, quite 
properly, and rehabilitation. NSPCC was concerned about the children’s 
side and they did not have the professional expertise to know whether if 
you did X it would protect them [children]. So, as I recall, they basically 
went along and I don’t mean in a sense in that they were not thinking 
about this, but it was the police’s and probation’s expertise and they 
could see this work’ (Interviewee 4).
ACOP’s and ACPO’s leading role is also reflected in the fact that they were the 
main organisations involved in talks with the Home Office. Both maintained 
direct contact with Government officials, including Paul Boateng, who at the 
time was in charge of sex offender policy as Minister of State.
'Police and probation were talking with Boateng. They got a direct line 
to Boateng because they were keeping him aware of what was going 
on...Police and probation were talking to the officials on the weekends 
and everything...An ACPO representative brought him [Paul Boateng] 
down to Gloucestershire before this kicked off and briefed him on all the 
stuff the police were doing on sex offenders, so he was up to speed. He 
[Paul Boateng] was already up to speed on all the stuff police and 
probation were doing nationally’ (Interviewee 4).
- 133 -
While from the available documents the precise standing of the other three 
organisations within the network cannot be determined precisely it appears that, at 
least in the eyes of the News of the World, NACRO was not considered as an 
important player.
‘ NACRO doesn ’t feature on the News of the World’s worry list. They are 
doing something about resettling paedophiles but in the News of the 
World’s view paedophiles can’t be rehabilitated'’ (Interviewee 1).
A key question is why was it ACPO, ACOP, the NSPCC, the Suzy Lamplugh Trust 
and NACRO who were involved rather than any of the other bodies within the sex 
offender policy area such as Barnardos, the Lucy Faithful Foundation, the Department 
of Flealth or the Prison Service? While the Department of Health and the Prison 
Service would not have been affected by the disclosure of information on sex 
offenders to the same extent as the police and probation service, and thus might not 
have had too great an organisational interest in this discussion at the time, the 
questions remains as to why neither Barnardos, operating in the area of child 
protection, nor the Lucy Faithful Foundation, aiding in re-integrating sex offenders 
into society, nor any of the other organisations in this area appear to have played a 
more prominent role at the time. This is especially surprising in so far as Barnardos 
for example appears to have been one of the organisations that would have been able 
to contribute to the debate. As one interviewee pointed out when asked which other 
organisations would have been likely to have been involved in the debate in 2000: Nt 
is difficult for me to say...Iwouldn ’t like to hazard a guess, but I imagine it would be 
Barnardos and the NCH [formerly known as The National Children's Homef 
(Interviewee 3).
Several potential reasons have been identified for the lack of involvement. First of all, 
not all of the organisations working in areas affected by sexual offences and the 
management of sex offenders were necessarily ‘campaigning organisations’ nor had 
the resources to partake in the debate. An example of this seems to have been the 
Lucy Faithful Foundation.
‘ [T]hey are very small you see and they are not a campaigning 
organisation. Although they do a lot more on public education now and
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have a service called "Stop it Now ” they were not at that point then. At 
that point they were running treatment programmes for sex offenders, 
principally residential treatment programmes for sex offenders and so 
they did not have the machinery to get into that sort of media side of it’ 
(Interviewee 7).
In other cases, the profile and power of those that did play a key role, especially when 
the topic arose again in the media after the conviction of Roy Whiting, appears to 
have been an obstacle. As a representative of one organisation working within the 
area of treating sexual abusers commented:
‘ RF decided not to issue press releases etc but did a lot of preparation in 
case we had enquiries from the media. What happened was that the 
statutory agencies, notably [what is now] the National Probation 
Directorate, mobilised forces and dominate [d] the media so we didn’t 
get a look in’ (Personal Correspondence).
Another potential reason for why other players who were directly contacted at the 
time preferred not to get involved, was that public opinion was not clear-cut and the 
debate as such was quite fierce.
‘[A] lot of voluntary organisations who relied on public support 
especially for income did not want to be aligned with something that 
could then get them bad publicity’ (Interviewee 7).
However, while not involved publicly to the same extent as the organisations making 
up ‘the alliance’ it appears that other charities were involved in a sex offender 
disclosure and notification seminar organised by ACOP in September 2000. 
Delegates included members of ‘the alliance’, representatives of the Local 
Government Association (LGA), the National Organisation for the Treatment of 
Abusers (NOTA) and the Lucy Faithful Foundation. The purpose was not only to 
provide a briefing on the name-and-shame approach but also to find common ground, 
develop useful policies, operationalise scenarios and develop ideas for future 
consultation and legislation (Document 71).
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The News of the World
Although the News of the World's actual actions have been described in detail 
in Chapter 4, it is necessary to explore the reasons for its campaign. While Sara and 
Michael Payne were driven by the simple determination that the loss of their daughter 
Sarah should leave a legacy that would benefit other children in the future (Document 
18), the reasons underlying the News of the World's involvement appear to be more 
vexed.
Despite the fact that the News of the World claimed at the time that‘Our aim is safety 
for our children' (News of the World 23 July 2000) others have identified more 
practical reasons as underlying the campaign.
‘There is only ever one reason and that’s circulation. All editors, 
journalists will say to you that the bottom-line is always circulation 
because that’s profit' (Interviewee 5).
The circulation of the News of the World had been in constant decline and there had 
been a frequent turnover of editors trying to revive the tabloid’s readership. 
Consequently, ‘a journalistic coup that dominates rivals’ headlines, boosts sales, 
wins days of TV and radio follow-ups - and makes you a star' must have been the 
dream of its new young editor, Rebekah Wade (Preston August 6 2000d). The News 
of the World sold 95,000 extra copies and the campaign helped to promote its 
‘recently re-launched' webpages (December 16 2001b), where an interactive map of 
paedophiles was made available to concerned parents (Hall December 13 2001b).
Several people have also commented about certain discrepancies that could be 
observed between the News of the World's claim to be interested in child protection 
and other ‘news’ it reported. This lack of congruence was perceived to cast doubt on 
the motivation underlying the campaign. For example, within the News of the World's 
23 July edition one of the initial 49 people ‘outed’ on its name-and-shame list was a 
female sex offender who, according to the News of the World, ‘[gjot probation in 
1996 for sex with a 14-year-old boy' (Taras and McMullan 23 July 2000, p 2). 
However, on the following Sunday, 30 July, when the News of the World went ahead 
and published the second part of its name-and-shame list, in the newspaper’s
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accompanying magazine was an article about a 44 year-old woman seducing and 
having an affair with a 17-year-old schoolboy as part of a column entitled ‘What’s my 
secret?’ (News of the World July 30, 2000d, p 28).
‘Now, the tone of this story was ‘wasn’t I daring and adventurous, wasn 7 
this an exciting thing to do So, on the one hand they were castigating 
people...[while at the same time using similar incidents as an exciting 
story]'' (Interviewee 5).
Whatever the true motivation underlying the News of the World's involvement, 
Rebekah Wade was praised later by publicist Max Clifford for her cunning editorial 
judgement from ‘a circulation and readership point of view' (December 16 2001b).
The Government
As has been previously outlined, in public pronouncement terms the 
Government’s voice remained surprisingly muted throughout the debate. In addition, 
when looking solely at reports within the media it is not always clear which stance 
was supported by the Government: would community notification be introduced to 
Britain or not?
Behind the scenes, however, the Government appears to have had a very clear 
strategy. This emerges from a number of confidential documents outlining the 
Government’s approach that have been obtained during the research for this thesis 
(Documents 22 & 23). From one document produced on 3 August 2000 by the Home 
Office’s Merital Health Unit it emerges that issues surrounding the disclosure of 
information to the public about sex offenders were actually being analysed. The 
problem that was identified within this document was that although the police and 
other services that possessed personal information on sex offenders had the right to 
reveal such information to the public in cases in which there were good reasons to 
consider this to be in the public’s best interest, there was no way in which the public 
could make inquiries in order to obtain any such information, even in those cases in 
which there might be a well-founded need to do so. The idea was, therefore, to set up 
a mechanism through which a specific member of the public, such as a parent with 
reasons for concern, could for very specific and limited purposes apply to obtain
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information if another person had any relevant previous convictions. The Mental 
Health Unit’s analysis looked at five key areas that arose out of this idea: (1) defining 
the circumstances in which disclosure would be permissible; (2) how information 
should be stored and through which channels any information should be obtainable; 
(3) the nature of information that could be disclosed; (4) ensuring an appropriate use 
of the information by the person obtaining it; (5) the question of funding any such 
arrangements. Although highlighting various options and potential ways in which 
such a mechanism might operate, the conclusion reached in the document was that 
there were several legislative and practical obstacles to any such scheme including 
concerns about breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights. It was also 
argued that existing plans regarding access to information would probably address 
most of the problems any envisaged limited disclosure scheme would be intended to 
address, albeit via a different route (Document 23).
Although looking into various issues to do with wider accessibility to information 
held on sex offenders, from the very beginning the Government does not appear to 
have had any disposition towards a policy of general community disclosure. One 
reason that reinforced any reluctance to shifts in policy appears to have been the 
timing of the News of the World's campaigning. The Home Office was aware that 
during July and August there would be very limited access to Ministers with a firm 
grounding in the subject area. This was considered as limiting the capacity for 
strategic decision-taking (Document 22). Instead, the initial approach that was to be 
taken would be a clear expression of Ministerial support for the News of the World's 
aim of improving child safety, but with criticism of the means employed by the 
newspaper. Any strident public criticism of the News of the World was to be avoided 
in order to prevent the newspaper moving into 'a more negative defensive posture'. 
Instead the Government was to put pressure on the News of the World behind the 
scenes and search for means of assisting the News of the World to withdraw from its 
name-and-shame campaign ‘gracefully' while at the same time preparing for any 
coercive action that might become necessary (Document 22).
Simultaneously, it was pointed out that the Home Office was required to
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’'play its part in such a way as to ensure that [its] relationship with 
ACPO and ACOP is not weakened and is if possible [sic.] strengthened' 
(Document 22).
To this effect the Government, in light of the fact that these organisations were the 
professional practitioners most closely concerned, was to express support for their 
actions. This might also be one of the reasons why the Home Office forwarded 
various pieces of information to these organisations, such as for example a letter to 
Rebekah Wade and advanced warnings on Home Office actions (Documents 15, 42 & 
54). In addition, the Government was considering looking into the 5-point 
programme, previously outlined in Table 5.2, which had been forwarded to them by 
ACPO and ACOP (Document 22).
Overall the Government was to express readiness to examine new avenues of 
improving children’s safety where there existed ‘evidence to back them' (Document 
22). To this effect, the Government was thinking about inviting the various 
organisations involved to draw up detailed proposals for discussion after the summer 
break and presenting these as a new policy review that was brought about by the News 
of the World's campaign (Document 22).
During September various measures were considered. From available documents it 
emerges that the Home Office appears to have consulted ACPO and ACOP 
representatives in detail on such measures (Documents 54 & 55). Eventually several 
additions addressing some of the issues raised by the Sarah's Law Campaign were 
included in the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000. These are discussed 
further in Chapter 6.
While so far this chapter has mainly focused on the role played by the various 
organisations within the Sarah's Law network and has highlighted some of the links 
that existed during the Sarah's Law debate, the remainder of the chapter explores the 
wider organisational and personal links that can be identified between the various 
players in order to get a fuller understanding of the players’ position and actions.
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Links between the Players in the Network
Although some of the players within this policy network emerged as relative 
‘newcomers’ in the policy discussion about sex offender management, one of the 
main sources the network drew upon were organisations already involved and well- 
established in the area of sex offender management and child protection. As the 
events unfolded in 2000, some of these organisations were included in the newly 
emerging network fairly quickly. This new network can therefore be seen as an 
offspring of the pre-existing, broader policy network dealing with issues relating to 
sex offenders which was already active in trying to shape relevant policies. This older 
network had been relatively long-standing and parts of it can be traced back to at least 
the early 1990s. Given that the newly emerging network drew upon such pre-existing 
arrangements, several established organisational links can be identified between the 
public bodies and the agencies opposing Sarah's Law, as well as between 
Government, the media and the Press Complaints Commission.
Organisational Links
As mentioned in Chapter 4, since the early 1990s an increasing 'working 
interdependence' between ACPO and ACOP in respect to sex offender management 
had taken place, both in relation to exchanging information as well as to actual 
practices (Interviewee 5). Given that the police and probation service were in charge 
of co-ordinating various aspects relating to child abuse, child protection and sex 
offenders, closer co-operation between these organizations was necessary. Both 
organizations had been lobbying heavily for closing existing loopholes in sex offender 
legislation and were key players in the 2000 debate. The relationship between ACOP 
and ACPO during the Sarah's Law debate has been described as a very close liaison of 
a very constructive nature (Document 72).
Close organizational links had also started to develop between these two organizations 
and NACRO prior to the News of the World's campaign.
'NACRO works often with ACPO on several issues...NACRO works with 
them on various crime issues and issues relating to the prevention of 
crime itself (Interviewee 3).
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The organisational links between these three organisations seem to have been fostered 
by developments in risk assessment and the increasing focus on community protection 
that had taken place in Britain, along with aspects regarding issues of confidentiality 
which arose from the sharing of information following the Sex Offenders Act 1997 
and necessitated closer organizational co-operation.
In respect to the question of public access to information held on sex offenders it 
seems that there existed previous links between ACOP, ACPO and the NSPCC. In 
1997, when the British sex offender register was being considered, The Guardian 
announced that chief constables, chief probation officers and the NSPCC were 
opposing routine community notification and any automatic right of public access to 
the sex offender register (Guardian, 19 February 1997, quoted in Kitzinger 1999, p 
211).
In addition to this, not only were all of these organisations "involved in reducing crime 
and concerned about public safety' (Interviewee 3) and as such linked by their work, 
but they also had a history of actively lobbying Government and advising it on policy 
developments. For example, representatives of ACPO, ACOP and the NSPCC were 
part of the Steering Group that published Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the Law 
on Sex Offences. The NSPCC produced ministerial briefings to improve the protection 
of children from sex offences and NACRO, ACPO and ACOP had all been lobbying 
Government to address the existing shortcomings in sex offender policies (HL Debate 
2000; HL Debate 2000d). Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the NSPCC along 
with the Suzy Lamplugh Trust, NACRO and ACOP were at the time members of the 
umbrella body of all penal lobbying groups, the Penal Affairs Consortium 
(Interviewee 7).
The links between these public bodies and charities appear to have been marked by a 
certain level of co-operation, both prior to the events surrounding the Sarah Payne 
case and in the summer of 2000 with some members of the Home Office closely 
liaising with police and probation (Document 72). However, the organizational links 
between ACOP, ACPO and the News of the World as well as with the Press 
Complaints Commission appear to have been previously somewhat tainted. In a
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postscript to a briefing note from 1998, entitled ‘ACOP and the Press Complaints 
Commission’ (Document 11), it is pointed out that ACOP was aware that
'the News of the World is closely following high-profile cases involving 
probation supervision. Some are relatively low risk...while others have 
involved more violent offenders ...ACOP has received reports from 
probation areas and others about payments being made to offenders to 
[for] information on fellow hostel residents and bogus callers requesting 
staff to divulge sensitive information' (Document 11).
Such practices would not have helped with either the probation’s or the police’s work 
in the management of any offender. As such it can be assumed that the relationship 
between these organizations and the News of the World was at least troubled by such 
practices.
In the same briefing note, previous events that had influenced ACOP’s and the Press 
Complaints Commission’s relationship are summarised, highlighting the considerable 
difficulties for the probation service in the spring of 1998 that resulted from the 
impending release of two sex offenders, Sidney Cooke and Robert Oliver. These 
events are described in more detail in the exploration of the broader policy context 
provided in Appendix 1.
It seems that differences between ACPO and the Press Complaints Commission can 
be traced back even further than 1998:
'At the end of the Fred and Rosemary West case ACPO took 12 
substantiated complaints I think it was - witnesses being bought out by 
newspapers - they took that to the PCC and after several months the 
Press Complaints Commission wrote back saying "we rejected your
■ complaints because we actually changed the rules now and the rules now 
would mean that what you complain about would not be a breach ”. So 
ACPO said "but they were a. breach at the lime” and they said "well we 
are not going into that but you haven’t got a complaint because the rules 
— we altered the rules ”. Now I was outraged by this but that was how it 
was' (Interviewee 4).
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While the relationship between these organizations and the Press Complaints 
Commission appears to have been strained, the Press Complaints Commission seems 
to have had positive links to the News of the World. According to reports in the wider 
press, Rupert Murdoch’s News International Group was one of the strongest allies of 
the Press Complaints Commission prior to the resignation of its Chairman Lord 
Wakeham in light of the Enron scandal (see for example Wells February 1, 2002). 
Concerns about the Press Complaints Commission’s closeness to the tabloids have 
also been aired by editors of The Daily Telegraph, The Independent and The 
Guardian (Wells July 15 2002). There have been statements about a 'smoke and 
mirrors' culture present at the Press Complaints Commission with which 'non-stick 
coat'-covered-1 Mr Fix-It'-Lord Wakeham obscured the Press Complaints 
Commission’s back-door dealing (House of Commons 2002 § 6.12; Wells February 1, 
2002; BBC 9 January 2002).
Another important organizational link that existed prior to the News of the World's 
campaign is the one between News International and the Labour Government. While 
in the 1980s the Labour party had boycotted Murdoch’s media because of the way 
Murdoch treated the print unions, as well as the fact that News International's titles 
mounted media assaults on Labour during every general election from Thatcher’s 
victory in 1979 to Major’s in 1992 (Underwood 2005), this changed in the 1990s. At 
the time, Blair and other senior members of the Labour Party started to woo Rupert 
Murdoch (Marsden November 20 1998). Their attempts paid off and News 
International titles, most prominently The Sun, appear to have been ordered by 
Murdoch to switch allegiance from the Tories to Labour and thus played a role in 
getting Labour into power in 1997. The close relationship between News International 
and Labour appears to have continued after the 1997 General Election. It is reputed 
that Murdoch has been very influential with the Labour Party (Underwood 2005) and 
Murdoch’s media undeniably appears to have had a special relationship with Labour 
(Johnson 1998).
Murdoch-owned The Times and The Sun became Labour’s favourite newspapers. As 
Labour MP Alice Mahon said: 'The Sun is the paper which Campbell has put on a 
pedestal and it’s now Blair’s house journal' (quoted in Jones 1999, p 316). A 
continuous stream of articles produced in the name of Tony Blair and various Labour
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ministers appeared in The Sun and the News of the World. For example, when looking 
at by-lined articles, articles produced in the name of the Prime Minister and written in 
a joint effort by governmental and newspaper writers to \prepare the punchiest prose 
and the snappiest headlines' (Jones 1999, p 178), fifteen of the twenty-three 
published during the first 18 months after Labour came into power were published in 
The Sun, with three more in the News of the World (Jones 1999, p 177-179).
In his examination of New Labour and its relationship with the media, Jones argues 
that both Tony Blair and his ministers have invested so much time and effort into 
‘ tailoring the government’s news agenda to win favourable treatment from Murdoch’s 
newspapers that serious points of conflict have to be addressed' (Jones 1999, p 174). 
While such co-operation between a party and the media are nothing new and various 
examples of close working relationships between the media and Prime Ministers can 
be found throughout previous governments, because of the "sheer intensity and 
regularity of the two-way contact, political historians would be hard pressed to find 
an example to match the degree of cooperation which has been established between 
No. 10 Downing Street and the Murdoch empire' (Jones 1999, p 175). The key 
objective was of course to ensure that the Labour Party continued to retain The Sun's 
support through to the 2001 election (Jones 1999, p 175).
It appears that the special access to information, news-stories and governmental 
officials granted to News International titles was so strong that it can be seen as 
executives of Murdoch’s media companies having "a hotline to the Prime Minister’s 
official spokesman [at the time Alistair Campbell]' at their disposal (Jones 1999, p 
176). As one of The Sun's political correspondents, Martin Bentham, once jokingly 
said to BBC political correspondent Nicholas Jones: "You do know, don’tyou that we 
only go along to the No. 10 lobby briefings now for show?' (quoted in Jones 1999, p 
180).
Personal Links
While the organisational links paint an intriguing picture, another set of 
comiections that seems to be of importance in this network, and that need to be borne 
in mind when examining the events, are personal links between the various actors.
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Such connections are likely to have provided the players with increased access to 
people and information, as well as with the potential to exert more influence than 
would otherwise have been possible. They not only often reinforced the pre-existing 
organisational links, but in combination with these might explain some of the actions 
or non-actions taken by those involved.
One link that can be identified appears to be the one between Gill Mackenzie of 
ACOP and Tony Butler of ACPO. The close link that existed between them and their 
organisations can be considered as being important in keeping alive the opposition to 
Sarah's Law. It meant that information obtained would be passed more quickly 
between the two organizations and that any actions could be co-ordinated more easily. 
‘7 think the fact that they -were locally in Gloucestershire, and it helps 
that they know each other and so on, but when it got to the crunch both 
their organisations having been working closely locally as well — more in
some areas than in others' (Interviewee 4).
While this link and its impact on their work can be easily established from the wider 
media and other publications (see for example Silverman and Wilson 2002) things get 
rather messy and vague when some of the other personal links are examined within 
this network. As such, they cannot necessarily be ‘proven’ in a strict academic sense 
but often rely on anecdotal evidence. This shortcoming will be returned to in the final 
chapter of this thesis.
The close working relationship between the Downing street press office and 
representatives of News International resulted in the blossoming of close friendships 
between members of both of these organisations, with Downing Street representatives 
becoming regular attendants at the social events hosted by News International's 
editors and executives (Jones 1999, p 178). Any personal links between Tony Blair 
and Rupert Murdoch or Rebekah Wade are important in so far as they would have 
placed the Government in a difficult position in light of the News of the World's 
campaigning for Sarah's Law. While overall the principal players have kept silent and 
have refrained from giving much away, with both Labour and News International 
commanding a great degree of loyalty from those in the know (Jones 1999, p 176), 
several things can be learnt from the sources available.
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Tony and Cherie Blair were invited to dinner by Rupert Murdoch and his wife Anna 
on several occasions before being flown to Australia in 1995 where Tony Blair was 
the principal speaker at the News International Corporation’s triennial conference at 
the Murdoch-owned Hayman Islands resort (Neil 1997; Pilger 1998; O'Carroll March 
19 2004). Also, Andrew Neil, who used to work for Murdoch as editor of The Sunday 
Times, reveals in his autobiography that although ft] he extent of the ties that 
developed between New Labour and News Corp has never been fully revealed there 
were regular meetings between the two top men’, Tony Blair and Rupert Murdoch 
(Neil 1997, p xxii).
Such a relationship between Blair and Murdoch might have been a potential problem 
during the Sarah's Law debate. The News of the World frequently campaigns on 
various topics and some interviewees have expressed doubts as to Rupert Murdoch’s 
initial awareness of the name-and-shame campaign.
‘ Why do you tell the kind of most important media mogul in the world 
what you’re doing when it’s just one of your little campaigns ...I don’t 
think they — he knew because it was just one of the things they did, you 
know, school dinners, dog shit, ID cards, it’s another campaign, sex 
offenders, it wasn’t until the shit hit the fan you know in terms of the big 
public debate and in putting the News of the World in a rocket position 
that it really became a big story because what you got and what you 
don’t get with other News of the World campaigns is that you got other 
newspapers commenting on another newspaper’s story’  (Interviewee 7).
However, it appears that once he got to know about the News of the World’s campaign 
Rupert Murdoch, unlike the Government, backed it.
also remember, I think it was Stuart Kuttner [the then managing editor- 
of the News of the World] saying, not at that meeting [of 2 August 2000], 
but that Rupert Murdoch was fully behind it as well - he would have had 
to have known, they could not do something like this without telling 
Rupert Murdoch' (Interviewee 5).
In addition to his link to Rupert Murdoch, Tony Blair at the time also appears to have 
had good links with the editor of the News of the World, Rebekah Wade, especially
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through his wife Cherie who is reputed to have had a particularly close relationship 
with Ms Wade (see for example Leonard 14 January 2003; Frost May 15 2003), and 
also some connection with Lord Wakeham of the Press Complaints Commission, ‘a 
man so well connected that he probably networks in his dreams'1 (BBC 9 January 
2002). While the true nature of the personal link between Lord Wakeham and Tony 
Blair cannot be established, in his position as Chairman of the Press Complaints 
Commission Lord Wakeham appears to have shown special concerns for 
‘establishment grandees like the Blairs'1 (Chancellor January 31 2002) and was asked 
by Tony Blair to head the Royal Commission on Lords Reform in 1999 (Jones 
February 1, 2002b).
Rebekah Wade, in turn, not only had good relationships with Rupert Murdoch, with 
cynics calling her ‘‘RupertMurdoch’s in-house lap-dog' (Frost May 15 2003), but also 
with the Director of the Press Complaints Commission, Guy Black, who in 2000 was 
contacted by ACOP about potential actions that could be taken against the News of the 
World. While there are only rumours that Rebekah Wade ‘holidays with the two 
former press policemen' (National Union of Journalists November 11 2003), this 
definitely appears to have been the case with Guy Black. Guy Black, who became 
Director of the Press Complaints Commission in 1996 and who went on to become 
the press secretary for Michael Howard, had another close personal link to Rebekah 
Wade: he was a ‘childhood friend' of Ms Wade’s partner, Ross Kemp (see for 
example Wells January 17 2002).
‘ What ACOP did not know at the time was that the head of the Press 
Complaints Commission was such a close friend of the editor of the News 
of the World. They actually went on holiday together' (Interviewee 5).
As far as the continuation of the debate after the summer and autumn of 2000 goes, 
there also appears to be an important link between Rebekah Wade and David 
Blunkett. It appears that starting with her role as editor of the News of the World she 
had regular meetings with him (Maguire January 31 2003), though it is not certain if 
this link is purely organizational or of a more personal nature too. David Blunkett, 
however, was an important connection for the News of the World.
: ‘David Blunkett has been very pro [the demands of the For Sarah 
Campaign] and the News of the World is still in talks with him. It is
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thanks to him that most of the points have been put through' (Interviewee 
1).
In its continuation of the For Sarah Campaign the News of the World itself described 
‘[few, enlightened Home Secretary' Blunkett (News of the World 01 July 2001) as 
being ‘ widely hailed as one of the most innovative home secretaries for a generation' 
(News of the World 23 December 2001) while both Messrs Straw and Boateng were 
portrayed in a rather more negative way. '
‘ [H]apless Mr Straw did not have the guts to implement the core demand 
of Sarah's Law. Like his sidekick minister Paul Boateng, he waffled and 
squirmed...but failed to act. Thankfully, the pair [are] no longer in 
charge' (News of the World 01 July 2001).
Although the topic of public disclosure no longer appeared prominently on the policy 
agenda after 2000, on 1 July 2001 the News of the World reported that Blair and 
Blunkett had promised to reconsider Sarah's Law (News of the World 01 July 2001).
One potential reason as to why the News of the World might have reported so much 
more favourably on David Blunkett than on his predecessor, despite no change in 
policy when he took over as Home Secretary from Jack Straw on 8 June 2001, might 
have been Blunkett’s close connections to News International. When examining 
reports in the wider media it can be learnt that David Blunkett not only had good 
personal connections with Les Hinton, simultaneously chairman of News 
International and the Press Complaints Commission’s Code Commission (Currie 
December 14, 2004), but that one of his special advisors as a Home Secretary, 
Katherine Raymond, actually lived with Les Hinton (Glover March 28 2005). This 
web of intricate relationships can potentially account for some of the actions and 
inactions at the time.
It is not possible to identify the true position that the Press Complaints Commission 
took as a regulating body in 2000 and over time improvements to its policy appear to 
have been established. However, its failure to take a strong stance does raise the 
question of how far this inaction, combined with the connections between some of its 
senior members of staff and News International staff, indicate a conflicting set of 
interests.
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‘'Having said that about the Chief of the Press Complaints Commission 
being a friend of Rebekah’s, in fairness - not redeeming it - which would 
almost be a sacking situation in my world — it would just be outrageous 
- they did listen very tentatively and in due course there were 
modifications to their policy — so there was an improvement in their 
policy'' (Interviewee 5).
The End of the Policy Network
The policy network that specifically surrounded the Sarah's Law Campaign 
seems to have disintegrated after March 2001. This might partially be attributable to 
the fact that some of the representatives involved retired soon after the events of 
autumn 2000 and any future direction of the relationship with the News of the World 
was dependent on new people (Document 67). More importantly, however, it seems 
that there might have been a lack of interest in maintaining some of the links.
On 27 March 2001 a meeting took place at the News of the World. This appears to 
have been attended by representatives of ACOP, the NSPCC and members of the 
News of the World. From a document summarising the meeting it emerges that the 
discussion seems to have focused on two points (Document 67). First of all, there was 
the initial guidance on Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) - the 
News of the World seems to have been unaware of these and wanted to be briefed on 
them. The second point that seems to have been discussed was the previously 
mentioned proposed Bill by News of the World, reproduced in Appendix 3, for which 
the News of the World is reputed to have mentioned some parliamentary support. It 
seems that the representatives of the alliance noticed several divergences in the Bill’s 
wording from those used in the document published on 4 August 2000 with clearly 
differing views on what constituted controlled access. This meant that while willing to 
consider some of the points put forward in the Bill and being interested in the News of 
the World's underlying intentions, the representatives of the alliance were unwilling 
to provide face value support for it. Reputedly one of the News of the World's 
representatives then reminded them that the newspaper’s name-and-shame campaign 
had only been suspended. On the basis of this threat some people later appear to have
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had various concerns about staying in a relationship with the News of the World 
(Document 67).
Summary
This chapter has analysed the policy network of key players involved in the 
Sarah's Law debate. For each of the main players, the way in which they got involved, 
their motives for involvement and activities, as well as their role within the Sarah's 
Law network has been examined.
The chapter has also explored the various links that existed within the network. While 
some of these emerged as a result of the Sarah's Law Campaign, a number of pre­
existing personal and organisational links can be identified. On the one hand, such 
links appear to have aided co-operation between some of the organisations involved, 
while in other instances they presented potentially conflicting sets of interests.
The final part of the chapter looked at the way in which the specific Sarah's Law 
network came to an end. Some of the reasons that were identified as underlying this 
were changes in personnel and an only muted interest in maintaining the network in 
that specific format.
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Chapter 6
Evidence, Lesson-Drawing and Policy Outcomes
Having explored the roles, actions and links between the various players 
involved in the Sarah's Law network, this chapter looks at the different forms of 
evidence used and quoted in the policy discussion surrounding the News of the 
World's "For Sarah" campaign. The chapter starts by analysing the evidence put 
forward by the News of the World in support of public disclosure of information on 
sex offenders. Thereafter the available evidence on community notification from the 
US will be explored and the Government’s and other participants’ awareness of this is 
addressed. From there, the chapter provides details on the various sources of evidence 
put forward by those organisations opposing the introduction of Megan's Law-style 
legislation in the UK, before the final section outlines the policy outcomes that 
resulted from the debate.
The News of the World’s Evidence
In order to substantiate and lend credibility to its campaign the News of the 
World used a variety of sources, one of the key ones being accounts of various people. 
These accounts fall into three categories. First of all, there are testimonies by ‘expert 
witnesses’ who provide ‘information’ about certain aspects regarding the nature of 
paedophiles and sexual offences. Those quoted include Ray Wyre, 'an expert on cases 
of child abduction' (Gekoski 23 July 2000), Detective Chief Inspector Bob 
McLachlan, 'head of Scotland Yard’s paedophile unit' (Taras and McMullan 23 July 
2000b), Marc Klaas, 'the key man responsible for giving American parents the 
absolute right to know the offenders in their midst' (News of the World 30 July 2000) 
and Dorothy Grace-Elder, 'Member of the Scottish Parliament and a former UK 
Investigative Reporter of the Year' (News of the World 30 July 2000).
Secondly, reference is made to people in ‘authoritative’ positions or the public 
limelight who are quoted as expressing their support for certain aspects of the News of 
the World's campaigning or the potential helpfulness of some of the ideas underlying
- 151 -
it. Examples are Childline chairman Esther Rantzen (Kellaway and Begley 23 July 
2000), Donna Waler of Justice for Children, ‘a national organisation that monitors 
paedophile activity' (News of the World 30 July 2000c), ‘former High Court judge' 
Sir Maurice Drake (News of the World 06 August 2000), ‘former Flying Squad 
Commander John O’Connor, who spent 30years in the Met[ropolitan Police]' (News 
of the World 06 August 2000), ‘former head of Scotland Yard’s obscene publications 
unit and author of a book on paedophiles' Mike Hammes (Kellaway and Begley 23 
July 2000), Bishop Pat Buckley (Kellaway and Begley 23 July 2000), ‘GMTV star' 
Eamonn Holmes, two representatives of an organisation called Mothers Against 
Murder and Aggression (MAMA), Lyn Costello and Dee Warner (News of the World 
30 July 2000), deputy chief executive of Unlock, an association which represents ex­
offenders, Bobby Cummines and ‘[ejven a convicted paedophile', James King (News 
of the World 30 July 2000).
The third and final category of people referred to by the News of the World consists of 
those who have been affected by sexual offences, either directly or indirectly, and 
parents whose child was murdered. In the latter cases a sexual motivation might or 
might not be underlying the offence but this is less obvious to the News of the World's 
reader. While Sarah Payne’s family obviously takes centre stage in this category, 
others who feature are Maureen Kanka, mother of Megan after whom Megan's Law is 
named, Chris Hook, whose 7-year old daughter Sophie was abducted, raped and killed 
(News of the World 30 July 2000), Marc Klaas, whose 12-year old daughter Polly 
was abducted and killed (News of the World 30 July 2000), Winnie Johnson, mother 
of the Moors Murder victim Keith Bennet (News of the World 30 July 2000) and ‘the 
mother of murdered toddler James Bulger' (Kellaway and Begley 23 July 2000).
What becomes apparent on closer examination is, however, that a number of the 
statements attributed to people in groups one and two have a huge potential of being 
misunderstood in the context in which they are used by the News of the World. As a 
result, those readers of the News of the World who do not pay close attention to the 
nuances and the precise point to which a quote refers or who lack background 
information might get a distorted impression of a reference’s meaning and draw 
wrong conclusions about the topic under discussion (see for example the News of the
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World's description of events in News of the World 06 August 2000b; News of the 
World 30 July 2000c; Kellaway and Begley 23 July 2000).
Along with references to miscellaneous people with different levels of expertise in the 
area of child protection and sex offender management, and examples of 'people who 
had lost a family member in child abduction, the News of the Worlds, campaign also 
used various statistics and references to research in support of its views. One of the 
points of reference used by the News of the World throughout its campaign was the 
number of known paedophiles. The News of the Worlds campaign focused on 
110,000 "proven paedophiles' that lived in Britain, "virtually one for every square 
mile of the country' (Taras and McMullan 23 July 2000) and it promised that the lists 
it intended to publish over the following weeks would eventually include "at least 
110,000 names' and would be "the biggest database on paedophiles in the world' 
(News of the World 23 July 2000). This is an unlikely promise and contradicts 
information given in another article within the same paper. According to this article, 
reporters of the News of the World had only access to the. Scout Association’s 40,000- 
name files, where, on the authority of the Scout’s research manager Richard Thornton, 
"anyone who has ever offended against children' was recorded (News of the World 23 
July 2000c).
Despite such discrepancies regarding the access to any information on sex offenders, 
it appears that the News of the Worlds reference to 110,000 ‘paedophiles’ is based on 
research findings. In 1997, as part of its Research Findings series, the Home Office 
Research and Statistics Directorate published the findings of a study examining the 
prevalence of convictions for various sexual offences by men in England and Wales 
(Marshall 1997). The aim of the report was to provide a reliable estimate as to the 
numbers of known sexual offenders and link this to the provisions of the Sex 
Offenders Act 1997. In the report it is said that at least 110,000 people of the studied 
population had convictions for sexual offences against a child back in 1993 (Marshall 
1997). Offences against children that were included in the study did not only cover 
"serious sexual offences', but also those that related to indecent photographs of people 
under 16 years of age. Of the 110,000 men, 100,000 would have needed to register 
under the provisions of the Sex Offenders Act, while 10,000 would have been exempt 
due to the nature of the offence committed (Marshall 1997). So, although the News of
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the World's data is based on research findings, the way in which the information is 
used indicates the addition of a spin in order to provide support for the News of the 
World's arguments.
With regard to the number of paedophiles, it is also important to bear in mind 
classification problems with sex offenders. Not every sexual offence against a child is 
necessarily committed by a paedophile, and so further doubt is cast upon the News of 
the World's claim of 110,000 proven paedophiles.
'When someone is raping a 13-year old girl you may say it’s a 
paedophile but it might be simply because she was available, whereas his 
last victim was a 24-year old woman' (Interviewee 4).
While several ‘surveys’ about public perception of the News of the World's campaign 
took place at the time, such as on Carlton’s London Tonight, ITV Teletext, Sky TV 
and in The Mirror, all of which were quoted by the News of the World as providing at 
least a level of 80% support for the campaign (News of the World 06 August 2000), 
the data most frequently referred to was a MORI poll commissioned by the News of 
the World. The newspaper stated that a ‘significant',‘ eye-opening public opinion poll' 
indicated that the wider British public ‘voiced huge support' and ‘massive backing' 
for the name-and-shame approach taken by the News of the World (News of the 
World 23 July 2000; News of the World 23 July 2000b). The statistics referred to by 
the newspaper were that according to this poll a ‘massive' 84% of Britons thought 
paedophiles should be named and 88% would want to know if one was living in their 
area. Or, as the newspaper entitled its article: ‘88% say name and shame' (News of 
the World 23 July 2000b). This led the News of the World to conclude that it had ‘the 
support of the people' (News of the World 23 July 2000).
When examining this statement in light of the actual poll, for which 614 adults were 
interviewed over the phone and the data then weighted to the population, the picture 
that emerges is the following. The numbers quoted by the News of the World refer to 
questions Q17 and Q18 of the poll which read ‘Convicted paedophiles should be 
publicly named' and ‘Local people should know if there is a convicted peadophile 
[paedophile] in their neighbourhood' respectively, with the respondent being given 
the option to agree or disagree. Earlier on in the poll, however, people were asked
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under question Q3 ‘What, if anything, do you think could be done to improve the 
safety of children in your area' with the option to provide a spontaneous answer. 
While 35% argued for ‘more policing' and 16% for ‘better parenting, responsibility 
for and care of children' only a mere 2% had provided ‘public naming of 
paedophiles' as an answer in that case.
The same question was put forward in two subsequent polls conducted by MORI for 
the News of the World, one on 20 August 2000 (then question Ql) and one on 16 
December 2001 (then question Q3). In the August 2000 poll 3% put forward the 
public naming of convicted paedophiles as an option to improve child safety. In 
December 2001, which marked the conviction of Sarah’s killer and by which time the 
campaigning by Sara and Michael Payne and the News of the World for the 
introduction of a Sarah's Law had been in process for more than one year, still only 
5% provided this as an answer. In addition to this, the December 2001 poll also 
resurrected questions Q17 and Q18 of the original poll (then questions Q13 and Q14), 
but only 64% were in favour of naming paedophiles and 72% agreed that local people 
should know about the presence of convicted paedophiles in their neighbourhood.
One other reason brought forward by the News of the World as a justification for the 
name-and-shame campaign was the assumption that the murder of Sarah Payne had 
shown that the monitoring of sex offenders by the police was ineffective (Millward 
July 24 2000), a sentiment shared by only 49% of those asked in the original MORI 
poll (see question Ql 1).
It appears that MORI, which is regarded as being very particular about the way in 
which its statistics are used, was ‘very upset' about the way in which the News of the 
World reported these findings (Interviewee 7).'
Of course the News of the World attempted to present its reporting as neutral, only 
revealing the ‘facts’. While this distancing is obvious in those cases in which 
reference to third parties is made, the News of the World considered it necessary to 
point this out in relation to the MORI poll and told its readers that ‘ [t]he survey was 
held on Friday by leading pollsters MORI - who are completely independent of the 
News of the World' (News of the World 23 July 2000b).
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The News of the World promoted the idea that ‘[kjnowledge is the only weapon the 
community needs ’ (News of the World 23 July 2000) and in an article dated 23 July 
the News of the World's Los Angeles correspondent Stuart White stated that 
‘[nfaming and shaming works in America' (White 23 July 2000c). It was also argued 
that not only the British, but several other European governments, such as those of 
France, Denmark, Holland and Italy, could learn a lot from America. According to the 
article, parents in America had easy access to details on 'every single one of the 
country’s 324,926 registered paedophiles' (News of the World 23 July 2000).
Given that there was widespread agreement in the summer of 2000 that existing 
measures to protect children needed to be improved, and that the Government was 
willing to listen to ideas backed by evidence (Document 22), it is necessary to explore 
further the evidence that was available on community notification from abroad.
Throughout the 1990s the notion of sex offender registers and questions regarding 
community notification started to take centre stage in the discourse on sex offender 
management in Britain, the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Although in 
each of these countries a widespread discussion about sex offender registers and 
community notification took place during the 1990s (see Appendix 4) it seems that in 
the summer of 2000 it was only within the US and the Canadian province of Manitoba 
that community notification measures including full public notification were in place. 
Research on the effectiveness of community notification measures appears to have 
only been available from the US and this is examined in the next section.
Exploring the Evidence-Base on Megan's Law
Programme Structure of Megan's Law
Megan's Law consists of five broad categorical steps; registration, 
determination and assignment of risk of reoffense, notification of the registrant about 
this, hearing and notification of the community (AOC 2001). The actual programme 
theory on which it builds consists of problem identification, public disclosure, 
sanction instigation and the offender’s response (Pawson 2002). The underlying
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rationale of registering sex offenders and informing the community is that by leaving 
their details with the police, the latter will be aware of the whereabouts of such 
offenders in its jurisdiction and can use this information when investigating crimes 
that appear to be sexually motivated or include a sexual act (Farkas and Stichman 
2002). The next step, disclosing any information held on such criminals to the wider 
public, was initially designed to serve two purposes. First of all, the aim was to 
prevent sexual crimes by increasing the population’s awareness of sex offenders 
living in their area and to act as a deterrent to known transgressors. Secondly, by 
providing details of convicted sex offenders to people living within a designated area 
it was assumed that this also could further criminal investigations (Schram and Milloy 
1995; Rathbun 1998). Since then an additional feature has been identified, that of 
educating the public. It is assumed that through the various means of community 
notification the public can be taught about sexual offending per se, different 
categories of sexual offenders and the modus operandi of those criminal justice 
agencies involved in monitoring and supervising sexual offenders (CSOM 1997).
With the key idea underlying registration and community notification being ‘risk to 
the public', the first step of community notification is to identify the level of risk a sex 
offender poses and to pool the information in a reliable way (Pawson 2002). This is 
usually done by examining the criminal history, doing a psychological evaluation and 
examining details of pre-sentence investigation for any sex offender. Further to this, 
offenders are then subdivided into different tiers of risk. In order to do this many 
jurisdictions follow the approach taken by Washington State and identify three tiers of 
risk: Level I low risk of reoffense, Level II moderate risk of reoffense and Level III 
high risk of reoffense. However, some jurisdictions leave out the second group so that 
an offender either has a low or a high risk of reoffending (Matson and Lieb 1996).
Once an offender has been classified, the focus shifts towards disseminating relevant 
information about the offender. Depending on the level of risk the scope of 
community notification varies. For the low risk group information will normally be 
shared with law enforcement agencies and sometimes with victims of or witnesses to 
the offence. In addition, in the moderate group, certain organizations which are 
obvious targets for certain groups of sex offenders, such as schools, child care centres, 
family day care providers, but sometimes also businesses, ■ organizations and
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community groups, may be notified of the offender’s release. Finally, in addition to 
all these measures, for the group of offenders classified as high-risk offenders, 
members of the public who are likely to encounter the offender or even the entire 
community are informed (Brooks 1995; Matson and Lieb 1996; CSOM 1997; Matson 
and Lieb 1997).
The form of notification can be either of a broad, selective or passive nature 
depending on the state. If broad notification takes place the information about the sex 
offender is actively and widely disseminated to members of the public. In case of the 
second, more selective approach, those required to be protected, such as former 
victims or vulnerable groups within the population, are notified. Those states that use 
a passive approach to notification require both individuals and organizations to 
actively look for information on sex offenders by themselves (CSOM 2001b).
Most commonly, the information that can be obtained, or that is being distributed, 
consists of a photograph with a physical description of the offender, an outline of the 
offender’s criminal history and details of the offender’s current residence. Sometimes 
though, other aspects such as the offenders’ place of employment, vehicle description 
or behavioural patterns used in previous crimes might also be published (Matson and 
Lieb 1996). While there are several different ways of disseminating the information, 
the most widely used ones are: media release, door-to-door flyers, mailed flyers, or 
internet distribution.
After the community notification has taken place the focus shifts to the community 
(Pawson 2002). Citizens are asked to assist in the surveillance of the sex offender in 
the community and to take protective and preventive action in order to prevent further 
offences. It is assumed that the offender, due to the supposedly increased perception 
of risk of being caught and the assumption that a bigger effort is required to maintain 
a sexually offending lifestyle, will accept his guilt and become more ready for 
treatment of his problem as well as avoid future offending. Should another offence 
take place, it is assumed that the information gathered about the offender as part of the 
previous steps can be used to assist tracing and prosecuting the offender (Pawson 
2002).
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The programme theory of Megan's Law assumes a smooth transition from one stage 
to the next. However, along each of the four steps there is potential for unintended 
problems. Such problems can range from errors in the classification process to 
vigilantism or geographical relocation of offending behaviour, as can be seen from 
Table 6.1
Table 6.1: Unintended Consequences of Registration & Notification
Problem
Misidentification
_► Disclosure
Dissimulation
Sanction _>
Misapplication
Offender
Resistance
▼ ▼ ▼ ▼
Use of Poorly managed The wider The offender
registration notification by public applies reacts to the
measures that sparse or sanctions that local
are unreliable in excessive go beyond sanctions by
their application publicity, or by precaution and offending
and/or invalid in oversimplification surveillance, elsewhere or
the conception or over-complexity such as moves and
and/or in presentation. humiliation and fails to re-
unconstitutional Other voices such vigilantism, or register, or
in law means as the ‘public’ and fall short of relapses
that risk levels the ‘media’ may precaution and under
fails to discern take over the surveillance, heightened
the true problem. dominant framing due to for anxiety or
The initial ‘expert of the problem example abandons
framing’ of the ignorance or treatment
problem fails apathy. As a programmes
\ result the for fear of\ partnership extended
between the publicity
public and law
enforcement
fails to gel
(Adapted from Pawson 2002, p 14)
Revisiting a set of apprehensions about community notification that he had raised 
back in 1996 when a federal version of Megan's Law was being discussed in the US,
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Freeman-Longo (2003) identifies 28 potential areas of concern in respect to 
community notification that are provided in Table 6.2. While this list provides a 
thorough basis for exploration, a lot of the points are interrelated. Consequently, it is 
useful to cluster these points into broader categories: the theoretical origins and basis 
of community notification programmes; the effectiveness of such interventions; 
financial, implementation and legal issues; and finally, implications for the offender, 
the victim and the community. The subsequent discussion will focus on these four 
areas.
Table 6.2: Problems with Community Notification
• Origins of Public Notification
• Lack of Supporting Data Determining the Efficacy of Public Notification
• Cost
• Subsequent Violence
• Extension to Other Crimes
• Confidentiality
• Constitutional Rights
• Beyond Punishment
• Primary Prevention
• False Sense of Security
• Terrorizing the Community
• Impact on Victims
• Impact on Others
• Plea-bargains
• Risk Determination
• External vs Internal Control
• Adversarial Role/ Ethical Dilemma
• Undermining Treatment
• Misplaced Responsibility
• Limiting of the Offender’s Ability to Function in the Community
• Age of the Offender
• Mentally III Sex Offenders
• Intelligence of the Offender
• Female Sexual Abusers
• Decrease in Reporting
• Real Estate
• Use of Technology
• Abuse of the Law
(Adapted from Freeman-Longo 2003)
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Concerns about the Theoretical Origins and Basis of Community 
Notification Programmes
Community notification came about as a result of highly publicized sexual 
offences, often committed by repeat offenders (CSOM 1999c). The sensationalist 
approach taken by the media led to an overdramatized picture of this specific kind of 
sexual offence which haunted the public (La Fond and Winick 1998b) and started to 
drive sex offender policies (English 1998). Any attempts to base a response to crime 
on 'isolated but highly publicized and emotionally charged crimes is likely to be ill- 
considered and to create as many problems as it seeks to solve' (La Fond 1998, p 
468). The community notification approach focuses on 'stranger danger', i.e. those 
cases where the offender is not known to the victim. This, however, is only a 
relatively small percentage of all sex offenders. From the very outset then, community 
notification only has the potential to impact, if at all, on a very limited number of 
offenders (Steinbock 1995; Becker and Murphy 1998). Despite this limitation, the 
registration and community notification approach has been applied to all groups of 
sex offenders, independently of whether they knew their victim or not. This can be 
explained by a general tendency to ‘oversell’ any measure aimed at crime prevention 
(Petrosino and Petrosino 1999, p 142).
Another difficulty of Megan's Law is its very title. Being of a populist nature in 
'timing, naming and operation' (Simon 1998, p 462), the simple fact that such 
measures are named after victims of extreme sexual crimes means that the political 
stakes in opposing any such legislation have been raised. Rather than allowing for an 
objective examination or discussion when considering any aspects of these laws one is 
literally confronted with the crimes, the suffering of the victims and the popular 
feelings about these crimes (Simon 1998).
Although one of the basic purposes of these laws appears to be a positive one, to 
provide citizens with the information to protect themselves and their families and thus 
to reduce the risk of becoming the victim of a sexual offence, on reflection 
community notification can be understood as an acknowledgement of failure. The 
measures are designed to deal with people that are assumed to present a long-term risk 
to society. Therefore, Megan's Law can be seen to be based on the perception that
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other approaches to dealing with sex offenders, such as deterrence or treatment in 
prison, have failed (Simon 1998, p 461). This is also reflected by the fact that within 
the classification scheme there is no Level 0, a category where it is assumed that there 
is no risk of reoffending. ‘[A]ll registered sex offenders are presumed to pose some 
risk of reoffence' (Levi 2000, p 583). One question that arises from this is that if it is 
deemed necessary to warn a community about the presence of a sex offender in its 
vicinity, should this sex offender actually be at large in the community to start with?
While the question about the effectiveness of sex offender treatment is still hotly 
debated, the defeatist assumption evident in blanket community notification that 
treatment as an option has failed is questionable in light of the available information. 
This can be seen from Appendix 5 which provides background information on the 
nature and extent of sexual offences and explores issues surrounding the effectiveness 
of sex offender treatment.
Measures provided by Megan's Law have been popular across the board (Proctor, 
Badzinski et al. 2002). Essentially, they shift the potential responsibility for failure 
away from the state towards citizens and by doing so, grant the state innnunity from 
any rage resulting from sexual offences once measures for registering sex offenders 
and notifying the community about them have been put in place. Members of the 
community are now responsible themselves for taking protective measures (Simon 
1998). Nonetheless, a positive perception of Megan's Law continues to exist amongst 
parts of the US population (Proctor, Badzinski et al. 2002). This picture is reinforced 
further by the American news media. The danger inherent in a glorification of these 
measures is that potential shortcomings of Megan's Law are more likely to be ignored 
and people might be less eager to lobby for more effective approaches when trying to 
protect the community from sexual crimes (Proctor, Badzinski et al. 2002).
Effectiveness of Public Notification
Given concerns about the theoretical and practical assumptions on which 
Megan's Law is based, combined with the high costs involved, it is reasonable to 
assume that all aspects relating to these laws should be permanently assessed and 
evaluated (Petrosino and Petrosino 1999). However, despite its popularity, huge
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commitment of resources, and the fact that community notification in respect to sex 
offenders has become increasingly widespread over the last 15 years, there is 
surprisingly little research into the effectiveness of such measures. While the practical 
difficulties of conducting research on sexual offending will certainly play a role in 
this, other reasons appear to include the huge differences between and within states 
with respect to the design and implementation of these measures (CSOM 2001b).
Megan's Law seems to have been enacted without a proper knowledge base about the 
effectiveness of both registration and community notification. By 1996 only 
California and Washington State had produced written reviews (Matson and Lieb 
1996b) and only one study, by the Washington State Institute for Public Policy, had 
examined empirically whether community notification helped in protecting citizens 
by reducing recidivism (Lieb 1998).
Since then, Pawson, in his exploration of the question of whether Megan’s Law works 
(Pawson 2002), argues that when looking at outcome evidence there is only one study 
by Schram and Milloy, published in 1995, that even 4approximated to the so-called 
gold standard of the controlled comparison'' (Pawson 2002, p 43). However, even in 
this study, the outcome evidence on re-offending is difficult to interpret. The two 
groups used were not randomly assigned, which results in an inherent selection bias in 
the design of the study (Petrosino and Petrosino 1999). Despite this shortcoming 
Pawson (2002) defends the quality of the study by pointing out that it would be 
impractical and ethically dubious to assign offenders randomly to experimental and 
control groups when dealing with sex offences.
In their study, Schram and Milloy found that it seems to be the case that '‘community 
notification had little effect on recidivism' (Schram and Milloy 1995, p 20) in respect 
to both juvenile and adult sex offenders, but that it "may have had an impact on the 
timing of new arrests' (ibid.). Those offenders subjected to community notification 
"were arrested for new crimes much more quickly than comparable offenders who 
were released without notification' (Schram and Milloy 1995, p 19). One could argue 
that this leads to the conclusion that the strength of Megan's Law lies with detection 
rather than prevention (Pawson 2002).
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However, there is another theoretical possibility. Behavioural difficulties can be 
assumed to be aggravated by societal reactions to them (McCaghy and Capron 1994). 
Community notification measures potentially increase an offender’s level of stress 
and feelings of isolation, shame and rejection (Edwards 2001). As such it can produce 
negative emotional states in the offender who, even if previously treated and willing 
to change, might thereby be driven towards a cognitively distorted way of decision 
making. If maladjustment to the community setting and negative emotional states are 
potential triggers in reoffending, community notification measures can be perceived 
as increasing the likelihood thereof (Edwards 2001).
As can be seen from Diagram 6.1 the increase in detection of crimes that results from 
Megan's Law lies with the amount of crime in general rather than specifically with 
sexual offences. In the case of sexual crimes, both notification and control group 
appear to have a comparable rate of recidivism within a similar timeframe. The 
recidivism rate of around 20% for sex offences is consistent with findings by other 
studies.
Schram and Millroy (1995) point out that these findings are difficult to interpret 
without further research into potential changes in law enforcement and the behaviour 
of the community that might result from notification. Some authors have argued that 
the findings of this research indicate that community notification is 'producing a 
different response from the offender, law enforcement and or the community, either in 
combination or alone' and therefore can be considered as having an effect (Lieb 1998, 
p 102). This, however, should not be misperceived as being effective in the sense of 
achieving the intended goals.
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Diagram 6.1: Findings of Schram & Millroy
ESTIMATED CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE ARRESTED
FOR NEW SEX OFFENSES BY MONTHS AT RISK
Cumulative Percentage Arrested for New Sex Offenses100% I— ----------- ,............................ ......................................
80% ................................................................. -.................. ....................
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40%
Months at Risk
♦Notification Group - Comparison Group
ESTIMATED CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE ARRESTED
FOR NEW OFFENSES OF ANY KIND BY MONTHS AT RISK
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Months at Risk
♦Notification Group ■ Comparison Group
Cumulative Percentage Arrested for New Offenses
6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54
(Schram and Milloy 1995, pp 17-18)
The next question is whether Megan's Law helps potential victims to protect 
themselves. An exploratory assessment of Megan's Law’s preventive potential was 
carried out by Petrosino and Petrosino (1999). Examining an existing set of data on 
sexual offenders, consisting of the relevant criminal history of these offenders and 
geographical data relating to their offences, their aim was to identify retrospectively 
the
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‘potential of the law for preventing the most recent crimes (the instant 
offenses) of a sample of serious sex offenders and for the more focused 
analysis of stranger-predatory offenses'1 (Petrosino and Petrosino 1999, p 
145).
Out of the 136 cases of serious sexual offences they looked at, 36 had committed an 
offence in the past that would have required them to undergo registration. Out of these 
36 cases they found that the majority of those offenders eligible for registration had 
not committed stranger-predatory offences. This is outlined in Table 6.3 while the 
potential effectiveness is illustrated in Table 6.4.
Table 6.3: Type of Crimes Committed by Registry-Eligible
Participants
PercentageType of Offence Total
Predatory-stranger 12 33
Close family incest (father, stepfather, grandfather or
brother)
9 25
Live-in boyfriend, close family friend, or uncle
molesting children
7 19
Employer, employee, or co-worker molesting children 5 14
Date rape 3 8
Total 36 100
Note: Numbers do not add to 100% due to rounding
(Petrosino and Petrosino 1999, p 150)
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Table 6.4: Potential of the Massachusetts Registry Law in Preventing 
Predatory-Stranger Crimes by Registry-Eligible Offenders
General Type of 
Crime Brief Description Proximity
Potential of 
Notification 
Reaching Victim
Abduction (rape)
Offender waited in 
store parking lot for 
female shopper to 
return to car, 
kidnapped her and 
raped her
Offender lived in 
different jurisdiction 
from victim
Improbable
Abduction 
(attempted rape)
Offender kidnapped 
woman from street 
and took her to 
secluded place and 
attempted rape
Offender lived in 
different state from 
victim
Improbable
Attempted rape
Offender burgled 
homes and raped 
women who were at 
home
Offender committed 
his crimes in same 
jurisdiction but 
several miles away
Poor to moderate
Child rape
Offender
manipulated young 
boys (age 7 to 11) to 
come to a secluded 
area where he raped 
them
Offender lived in one 
jurisdiction and 
committed his 
crimes in 
neighbouring city
Improbable
Child rape
Offender lured 
teenage boy (age
13) to secluded area 
and raped him
Both victim and 
offender lived in 
neighbourhood
Good
Child rape
Offender lured 
young boys (age 10 
to 11) to secluded 
area and raped one
Offender lived in 
different town Improbable
Child molestation
Offender lured 5- 
year old girl to his 
apartment
Offender lived 
upstairs from victim 
in apartment
Good
Child molestation
Offender lured 7- 
year-old male victim 
to secluded area 
and molested him
Offender and victim 
lived in same 
neighbourhood
Good
Rape Offender raped 78- year-old woman
Both offender and 
victim lived in same 
housing complex
Good
Rape
Offender broke in 
and raped woman, 
he later robbed the 
husband at gunpoint
Offender from 
another state Improbable
Rape
Offender followed 
victim on city street, 
knocked her down 
and raped her
Offender and victim 
from different parts 
of town
Poor to moderate
Sex ring
Offender ran and 
participated in 
paedophile sex ring
Offender lived in 
different state from 
victims
Improbable
(Petrosino and Petrosino 1999 pp 151-2)
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Out of the twelve cases in which a predatory-stranger offence took place only half had 
the potential for being prevented by community notification. Even then, this would 
have been ‘ dependent on police using an effective notification method and the 
eventual victim receiving if (Petrosino and Petrosino 1999, p 150). Out of these six, 
only in four cases the potential of the notification reaching the victim would have 
been good. Two further assumptions in assessing these four cases as potentially 
having had a good chance of being warned must be pointed out. First of all, after the 
victim obtained the information he or she would have had to act on it. Secondly, it is 
assumed that none of the preventive measures taken by the potential victim could 
have been overcome by the offender. However, even when allowing for these two 
assumptions, the possibility still exists that by a simple displacement of the activity 
the offender might have targeted another victim. This leads the authors to the 
conclusion that 'the public safety potential... [of Megan’s Law] ...is limited'’ (Petrosino 
and Petrosino 1999, p 154).
Although the little evidence that exists does not appear to provide strong support for 
Megan's Law, practitioners often believe that the danger of notification helps to 
motivate some offenders who are not subject to notification to behave appropriately 
(Finn 1997). It might thus be the case that the 'threat of community disclosure is the 
greatest contribution of notification as a tool for managing sex offenders in the 
community’ (Finn 1997, p 467).
Costs, Legal and Implementation Issues
Given the relatively low level of recidivism amongst sex offenders, the 
application of 'blanket policies] covering all sexual offenders, is questionable in so 
far as it is resource intensive, even in cases where a minimal level of intervention 
might have sufficed (Harris and Rice 1998). This is especially noteworthy given that 
Megan's Law is an unfunded mandate (Poole and Lieb 1995) with states having to pay 
for these measures themselves.
While the costs to the state of setting up community notification arises mainly out of 
those incurred by the End of Sentence Review Committee, local costs incurred by 
community notification vary greatly, mainly depending on the size of the population
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of the area and the priority given and approach taken to community notification. One 
important influence on the budget is the amount of contact that is maintained with the 
offender (Poole and Lieb 1995). While precise details on costs of setting up such 
schemes are again difficult to come by and if obtained, difficult to interpret due to 
different standards within states, initial set-up costs have been estimated to be in the 
region of $120,000 in Washington to $200,000 in Virginia (Poole and Lieb 1995; 
Freeman-Longo 2003).
Once a registration and community notification system has been set up, the additional 
operational costs to the state that arise usually relate to data collection and data 
processing, administration of the central registry, administration of the registration 
forms, programme evaluation, compliance monitoring and enforcement, and 
disclosure. In their examination of US sex offender registers Hebenton and Thomas 
(1997) found that on average the cost for processing the initial registration form was 
between $15-30 per offender, that the costs incurred by annual postal address 
verification was $5-10 per address, and that every actual police verification check cost 
in the region of $50-70. The ‘average’ cost of disclosing details involving postal 
mailings and a community meeting ranged between $250-400. Despite these costs, 
states admit that the maintained registries are not accurate and that probably in excess 
of 25% of the data may be incorrect (Freeman-Longo 2003), with some states 
assuming that ‘ the whereabouts of as many as 50% of registered sex offenders are not 
known' (CSOM 2001b, p 14).
In addition to the financial impact, those authorities that have to deal with community 
notification find it ‘very time-consuming and burdensome' (Finn 1997, p 10; Zevitz 
and Farkas 2000). This is especially the case when the efforts to keep the data up-to- 
date are examined. In every state there are problems with regard to the compliance 
with registration (CSOM 2001b). While in the past most states applied a passive 
approach for both updating as well as verifying offenders’ details (Hebenton and 
Thomas 1997), this has now changed, with states introducing penalties for non­
compliance. Nonetheless, since many sex offenders are not under direct community 
supervision, such as probation or parole, essentially the responsibility for conforming 
with the registration requirements lies with the sex offender and is influenced by the 
‘degree to which law enforcement tracks and/or verifies offenders' whereabouts'
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(CSOM 2001b, p 14). Due to its unfunded mandate nature, there is often a ‘patchy 
implementation' (Pawson 2002) and essentially, the quality of the data a state has on 
its sex offenders depends on the amount of resources allocated (Hebenton and 
Thomas 1997).
Another implementation problem relates to the correct attribution of risk to sex 
offenders. In order for risk assessment to be done correctly, clear definitions of the 
different risk categories and both ‘reliable and valid operational procedures' for the 
application of these categories to individual offenders have to exist. This task is 
extremely difficult (Pawson 2002), especially as no one knows the precise rate of 
reconviction amongst sex offenders. Those in charge of risk assessment in 
Washington State did find the process problematic due to ‘unclear risk classification 
guidelines' (Finn 1997, p 9). Although differences in risks are partially accounted for 
in the three tiers of risk, assignment to these categories varies hugely across different 
states (Pawson 2002). While in Washington it was found that ‘law enforcement 
officials were remarkably accurate in their identification of high risk juvenile 
offenders for community notification' (Schram and Milloy 1995, p 2), there are 
several potential pitfalls when assigning risk.
In New Jersey’s Registrant Risk Assessment Scale Manual which accompanies its 
Risk Assessment Form, it is claimed that ‘the panel has formulated a method of 
objectively placing registrants in tiers' (Todd Whitman and Farmer jr 2000, 
Appendix, Exhibit E, p 1). However, it will be difficult to correctly assign values 
under each of the categories given on the form. When reflecting over potential future 
offences, it also has to be born in mind that although past offences might impact on 
future offending, the latter will inevitably be influenced by several other factors, such 
as treatment, the psychological and emotional state of the offender and the 
opportunity to offend, all of which cannot be accounted for. Essentially, it appears to 
be the case that the attempt to arrive at a three-tiered classification in the way it is 
done, is ‘an imprecise instrument on [sic.j a multifaceted phenomenon' (Pawson 
2002, p 17). Given that there does not appear to be any proper assessment of this 
approach, all that can be done here is to highlight potential pitfalls and dangers.
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While it is not the aim of this thesis to assess the legal appropriateness of Megan's 
Law, some of the aspects challenged before courts are important in so far as they are 
of a general nature and thus would have to be addressed under both UK and EU 
legislation in the case of a Sarah’s Law. Although the registration aspect of Megan's 
Law is mainly unproblematic since it usually does not infringe any rights to privacy or 
lead to vigilantism, the community notification aspect has sparked great controversy 
(Steinbock 1995). Legal challenges to the community notification aspect of Megan's 
Law are of a threefold nature and concern punishment, privacy and due process 
(Sacco 1998).
It is claimed that community notification laws represent an additional punishment to 
previously imposed punishments such as detention. Rather than addressing the 
question of additional punishment, the reply given by states is usually of a definitional 
nature. It is argued that community notification is a regulatory, not a punitive measure 
(Levi 2000), so that the offender’s rights are displaced with the rights of the 
knowledge-system (Hebenton and Thomas 1996). All that community notification 
measures are claimed to do are to
‘provide the information necessary to make the public and vulnerable 
individuals aware of the potential danger posed by sex offenders and let 
them know how to protect themselves and their families' (Sacco 1998, p 
51).
Since all details of the offender are already in the public domain in so far as they are 
readily observable information, and since states point out that this information is not 
to be used for illegal purposes, any negative consequences for the offender arising out 
of community notification are the offender’s own fault, brought about by the 
offender’s previous behaviour and ‘not the result of the State notification and 
dissemination of public information about the crime and the conviction' (Sacco 1998, 
p 51). Although it is claimed that ‘registration is not extra punishment, that’s 
certainly not what is being said and felt by hundreds of thousands of sex offenders' 
(NCIA 1996, p 7).
The second challenge is that community notification invades an offender’s 
constitutional right to privacy. As Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis pointed out, 
‘The right to be left alone is the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
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valued by civilized man' (quoted in NCIA 1996, p 8). The response given to the 
question of infringing privacy is usually that there is no ‘constitutionally protected 
privacy interest' (Sacco 1998, p 51). As before, it is pointed out that the information 
is already available in the public sphere. Since rights to privacy involve an act of 
balance between public and private interests, any constitutionally granted right of 
privacy would also be limited in the case of sex offenders: the victim’s interest would 
be weighted against the offender’s.
The final challenge addresses the right to due process and the claim that community 
notification infringes on sex offenders’ liberty interest. Again the counter-argument is 
that if there were such a thing it would involve a balancing test. Also, since the laws 
only provide information, they do not pose any constraints. Any constraints 
experienced by the offender arising out of community notification are said to be once 
again the offender’s own fault since they arise out of the 'heinous crime' committed 
(Sacco 1998).
Overall, Megan's Law therefore reflects a shift away from concerns of the civil liberty 
of the offender towards greater protection of vulnerable women and children, with the 
inevitable result that the liberties of sex offenders are being diminished (Brooks 
1995). The replies to legal challenges, rather than addressing the question in hand 
seem to answer the question by re-defining the problem.
As well as these legal problems, there are other features that need to be addressed. 
First and foremost, it is assumed that the infringement of personal rights to a certain 
number of offenders is acceptable in light of the idea that the potential harm to 
children posed by high risk offenders is great. The question then arises that if it is 
possible to identify such offenders, why are they being released in the first place 
(Steinbock 1995)? Secondly, it is logically and reasonably possible to argue that
'it is morally wrong to detain [or for that matter curtail] a demonstrably 
high-risk offender after the end of his sentence, even though serious 
crimes against innocent persons will probably be prevented, because that 
further detention constitutes punishment for a crime that has not yet 
happened' (Harris and Rice 1998, p 74).
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Finally, the claim most often cited in favour of community notification, that if these 
measures 'save one child, they are worth if is difficult to maintain if these laws harm 
other people, especially if innocent. One must ask whether any law is 'worth harming 
others...for the sake of one' (Freeman-Longo 2003, p 7).
Implications for the Offender, the Victim and the Community
Although research in Washington State found that harassment 'has not been 
nearly as severe or as frequent as expected' (Finn 1997, p 14) it seems to be the case 
that in the US, at least in 10% of the cases of disclosure, some form of harassment 
takes place (Hebenton and Thomas 1996). It is, however, difficult to assess the true 
nature of vigilantism since not all instances of harassment will be reported (Matson 
and Lieb 1996b) and there is only anecdotal evidence on harassment, albeit for almost 
every state in the US (CSOM 2001b). Most of the harassment seems to involve verbal 
threats and/or attempts to drive the offender out of the community (CSOM 2001b).
A study on the perception of community notification legislation found that these 
measures might have positive therapeutic consequences for sex offenders in so far as 
some participants considered these laws to provide a strong incentive, not to reoffend 
(Elbogen, Patry et al. 2003). Unfortunately, there is no further follow-up data 
available to examine the actual impact of these measures on treatment and rates of 
recidivism. The study was also limited to Nebraska and the authors mention the 
possibility that participants simply attempted to display themselves in a favourable 
light (Elbogen, Patry et al. 2003).
When examining the attitude of sex offenders towards community notification, Zevitz 
and Farkas (2000) found that offenders had the impression that community 
notification had a negative impact on their transition from prison to society. As can be 
seen in Table 6.5, the main worries were exclusion from accommodation, threats and 
the negative impact this might have on their family members.
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Table 6.5: Consequences of Notification, as Reported by Sex 
Offenders
Problem Percentage Reporting (%)
Exclusion of residence 83
Threats/harassment 77
Emotional harm to family members 67
Ostracized by neighbours/acquaintances 67
Loss of employment 57
Added pressure from probation/parole
agent
50
Vigilante attack 3
(Zevitz and Farkas 2000, p 10)
The authors concluded that it would be necessary to examine in more detail the extent 
to which any pressures resulting from community notification played a role in 
offenders’ success or failure under their community supervision arrangements and 
question the idea that community notification will lead to an acceptance of guilt on 
the part of sex offenders, which is often seen as a first step towards effective treatment 
(Zevitz and Farkas 2000).
While there do not appear to be any precise details on victims’ views in respect to 
community notification, there is the danger that as a result of these measures victims, 
especially if related to the offender or living in the offender’s neighbourhood, can be 
identified (CSOM 2001b).
As regards the community in general a lot of speculations and assumptions can be 
found with little or no supporting evidence. Winick (1998) assumes that there are 
potentially two positive aspects of community notification. First of all, the community 
might be positively affected by the feeling of control over its territory that is achieved 
through obtaining information relating to sex offenders, which in turn might reduce 
the level of anxiety and fear. Secondly, law enforcement officials might be assisted by
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these measures in overcoming ‘a heightened sense of helplessness, despair, and 
depression at their inability to protect the community from the actions of sex 
offenders', since Megan's Law assists them in feeling that they can help and protect 
the community as such: ‘Megan's Law thus can be an oasis of job satisfaction in what 
otherwise often is highly frustrating work' (Winick 1998, pp 553-554). Despite the 
perception of increased workload mentioned earlier, it appears that law enforcement 
officials in general do find Megan's Law useful in locating and apprehending 
suspected sex offenders (Matson and Lieb 1996b).
In face of any potentially positive impacts, community notification can also have 
negative impacts on the community. Any information about sex offenders can lead to 
an increase in 'the saliency of the risk of a sex offense, causing fear, anxiety and 
sometimes even hysteria' (Winick 1998; Elbogen, Patry et al. 2003). As Zevitz and 
Farkas (2000) found, some attendees of notification meetings left those meetings with 
a feeling of heightened concern about the sex offending. In addition, community 
notification can lead to a fear and suspiciousness of strangers' resulting in a 
breakdown of the community (Winick 1998, p 554).
Finally, communities can be provided with details of offenders which, especially as 
relates to addresses (Sheppard 1997), are out of date or have never been correct. This 
can lead to unnecessary harm to people, particularly those who happen to occupy the 
former residence of a sex offender (CSOM 2001b). This and the mere presence of sex 
offenders in the community also have an impact on the value of real estate (Bell 
1998). Although there does not seem to be any empirical research assessing the 
precise impact of the presence of sex offenders on the value of a property, there have 
been cases where buyers have filed suit against sellers in cases where they had not 
been informed about sexual offences taking place in or in proximity to a property, the 
claim being that this reduced the value. This has led to the recommendation that 
'appraisers should address these issues [existence of sex offenders in the community] 
within their reports' (Bell 1998, p 40).
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Awareness about International Evidence in Britain prior to the 
Sarah's Law Campaign.
Although it has not been possible to identify the precise extent to which 
practitioners and the British Government were aware of the international evidence- 
base on Megan's Law prior to the Sarah Payne case, it is possible to make some 
tentative assumptions. The Government is reported to have examined Megan's Law in 
light of its plans to set up a national sex offender register in the early 1990s. In light of 
American compliance rates and the danger of vigilantism, a decision was however 
made not to follow down that route (Ahmed and Bright August 6 2000b). It seems 
that the British Government and the British police closely observed the American 
approach to sex offender registration and searched for potential lessons that could be 
drawn and applied to the British context throughout the late 1990s. For example, the 
Home Office’s Police Research Group commissioned research to gather examples of 
good practice from the US in order to learn from its approach to policing sex 
offenders. This was carried out between 1995 and 1996 by Hebenton and Thomas and 
the findings were published in 1997 as part of the Police Research Group’s Crime 
Detection and Prevention Series (Hebenton and Thomas 1997). In relation to the 
question of disclosure they found that while overall a lot of American police officers 
considered the disclosure of offenders’ details to be of value, the practice involved a 
great amount of work and included as one essential aspect the education of the 
community in order to prevent a false sense of security on the one hand or alarm and 
vigilantism on the other.
In addition to such research there also appears to have been an examination of the 
American approach by British practitioners involved in sex offender management. 
Sponsored by the Fulbright Commission, the management of child sex offenders in 
the community had been explored as part of professional development programmes. 
While various parts of the US were visited, the focus seems to have been on 
Washington State which was considered to be on the forefront of developing 
approaches to managing sex offenders in the community (Interviewee 6). Within 
Washington State part of the approach was to hold public notification meetings.
‘They were generally positive events... there was a meeting at school 
called by the police and correctional services. They had about 100
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people turn up and there was a joint presentation by police and 
correctional services about, it was sort of a public information exercise 
for the main. So they were talking about sexual offending behaviour and 
who offends and what to look out for and towards the end of the meeting 
they identified the individual who was returning to the community and 
tried to put the harm he presented and the nature of the risk into a 
context so that people did not feel unreasonably anxious about him being 
in the community. There was quite a high feeling of anxiety when the 
meeting started but they managed the meeting well and there was a 
degree of public reassurance when people left and their experience in 
Washington State was that they had a very low level of offending 
behaviour against offenders and disruption had not occurred there. But 
that wasn ’t so across the states' (Interviewee 6).
When looking at the broader context within the US, however, the picture that emerged 
was that
‘sex offender registration in the States is a very mixed bag. So, the 
accuracy of records, the adherence to registration generally is very poor 
across the States. I think in California, where they have had the process 
of registration for some time, around 50 years, the compliance rate is as 
low 30%. Clearly, if you don’t know where people are it’s a fairly useless 
piece of legislation. You just have pictures ofpeople' (Interviewee 6).
While some of the organisations involved in the debate about Sarah's Law were aware 
of some of the research on the effectiveness of community notification from the US — 
for example in a press release on 30 July 2000 NACRO referred extensively to the 
findings of the aforementioned study by Schram and Milloy (Document 41) - the 
NSPCC set out to review the effectiveness of Megan's Law and community 
notification measures.
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The NSPCC’s Research
Although there appears to be a common trend when doing research within a 
policy making team that often ‘apolicy is agreed and some research then is needed to 
back it up' (Interviewee 2), this does not necessarily seem to have been the case in 
these circumstances.
‘ With this it did not feel like this because I think the News of the World 
were moving quite fast and because we had to do this quite quickly it did 
not feel quite like that and in fact some of the findings were not actually - 
they were sometimes - how shall I put it - I think some people had been 
wanting to be more supportive [of Megan's Lawf (Interviewee 2).
The research started out as a '‘very quick fact finding mission...you know, stop what 
you are doing, do this you have got two or three weeks, see what you can find’  
(Interviewee 2). Following earlier discussions within the NSPCC the research appears 
to have been properly started on Monday 14 August (Personal Correspondence). It is 
interesting to consider what the importance ascribed to this research within the 
NSPCC might have been at the time since it was assigned to someone located in a 
completely different, unrelated field and who was very new to the organization.
‘ Elizabeth Lovell did not know at that stage a lot about people’s work in 
that team [the NSPCC’s policy and public affairs team] and the 
connections that they had - say with civil servants, the Association of 
Chief Police Officers. Elizabeth was not involved in the discussions that 
were going on at that stage...she was very much coming in new so that 
she wasn’t all so aware of what was going on around her’  (Interviewee 
2).
The initial findings were rather short and sketchy because the existing research base 
seemed to be limited.
'Elizabeth Lovell produced four sides — maybe eight, but nothing really 
great, bullet points of what she found from mainly looking at websites, I 
think there were a few telephone conversations to people in the States — 
pulling together — and it was clear that there wasn’t much [evaluation
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done], so there really wasn’t much evidence to support it [Megan's 
Law]' (Interviewee 2).
At the time, researching Megan's Law seemed to be a rich area to develop and to turn 
the findings into something more substantial appeared to be a good idea. Within the 
NSPCC it was realized that the debate about community notification would go on 
rather than go away and always had the potential to be brought up again, especially in 
reaction to a specific case where it might be relevant. Consequently, the research was 
extended. Given the very strong public reaction, and in order to come up with a 
properly defendable position with regard to the News of the World's campaign, the 
research process was marked by 'really, really looking for some robust evidence' 
(Interviewee 2).
However, given time constraints, and the impression that community notification 
initiatives in other countries, such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand were not 
developed to the same degree as those in the United States, it was assumed that it was 
unlikely that any useful evaluative material from these countries existed at the time. 
This, combined with difficulties in obtaining any information relating to community 
notification for other countries, led to the decision that the most productive and 
relevant thing to do was to focus the research purely on the United States (Interviewee 
2). The main methodology chosen for the research was a literature review which was 
conducted mainly via the Internet and a series of semi-structured interviews with 
various people involved in community notification across the United States. Those 
interviews, twelve of which took place over a timespan of only three days between 23 
and 25 August 2000, addressed amongst other things the key questions of vigilantism, 
compliance rate, potential impacts on levels of recidivism, anxiety within the 
community and the broader question of the ways in which Megan's Law has helped or 
hindered the protection of children and the management of sex offenders in the 
community (Interviewee 2 & Personal Correspondence). Of those contacted quite a 
number were key people working in the area of sex offender research and 
management, such as Roxanne Lieb and Scott Matson. The speed with which the 
interviews were organised and carried out again resulted partly from the fact that for 
the NSPCC 'speed was of the essence'. People in the US had heard about the Sarah 
Payne case and were keen to talk (Personal Correspondence).
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By the end of August, all the information required had been amassed and was in good 
note form. While a couple of key people within the policy and public affairs section of 
the NSPCC had been continuously updated on the research findings, other people to 
whom this research was relevant were informed via an internal memo stating the main 
findings during the first week in September 2000 (Personal Correspondence).
It appeal’s that throughout the progress of this research the NSPCC had been 
developing its policy line according to the findings, at the same time as keeping the 
Home Office up-to-date so that other people were aware of therm However, due to 
other commitments which had been put on hold after the beginning of the News of (he 
World's campaign, it took some time before the initial internal document was 
transformed into the official report Megan's Law: Does it protect children? and was 
more widely disseminated (Interviewee 2). In the meantime, NSPCC’s policy advisors 
were in meetings with civil servants and MPs, were sitting on representative groups 
discussing this issue and were participating in the overall review of the law on sex 
offences. Although they were able to use the pre-publication findings in order to 
inform their discussions and contributions, the official report Megan's Law: Does it 
protect children? (Lovell 2001) was only published in early 2001 (Interviewee 2).
The report’s launch took place at a seminar at the NSPCC’s main building in London. 
Key civil servants and people from other organizations, such as ACPO and APOC 
were invited to this event. There was a presentation,
‘they had discussions, they had lunch, they had more discussion about 
various lines and approaches - it was that kind of day you know. It was 
not a huge thing but it was quite a good selection -1 don’t think it was a 
chatty kind of meeting but the discussion was very good' (Interviewee 2).
In addition to those people present at the launch event, the report was also 
disseminated to several other individuals and organizations, as can be seen from Table 
6.6 (Personal Correspondence).
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Table 6.6: Dissemination of the NSPCC’s report 
Megan's Law: Does it protect children?
Information was sent to:
• Police
• Probation
• ADSS
• MAPPPs
• Home Office
• House of Commons library,
• Ministers with an interest
• MPs with an interest .
• Academics with an interest
• US contacts and clearinghouses
• All interviewed/acknowledged in the paper
(Source: Personal Correspondence)
While some of the above were sent a full copy of the report, others, who were 
considered to be less likely to read the full report such as MPs and peers in the House 
of Lords, were sent a ‘research briefing’ which consisted of the report’s executive 
summary. Following the launch seminar, further presentations on the report were 
given at the National Organisation for the Treatment of Abusers’ (NOTA) annual 
conference in September 2001, the annual ACPO conference on sexual offences and 
child protection in October 2001 and in the summer of the following year at the 
International Society for the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect (ISPCAN). 
However, the NSPCC’s dissemination strategy "missed a trick in terms of the 
American marked where it was hardly publicised (Interviewee 2 & Personal 
Correspondence).
The report, while stating similar findings and echoing earlier conclusions to those 
given in the internal memos, does contain more details, partly due to the fact that 
relationships with some of the American contacts had developed further (Interviewee 
2 & Personal Correspondence). When comparing the NSPCC’s report to the review of
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the available research on Megan's Law that was conducted for this thesis, it is evident 
that the NSPCC’s research refers to the key studies available on Megan's Law at the 
time and can be seen as a thorough review of the available research evidence. In 
essence, it highlights thirteen key findings, as given in Table 6.7, and concludes that
‘there is very little evidence to substantiate claims that community 
notification enhances child safely. It is possible that there are both 
intended and unintended positive and negative outcomes of community 
notification. We simply do not know enough about these at this time' 
(Lovell 2001, p 35).
The report’s conclusion that ‘we simply do not know' is an important one in light of 
practitioners’ needs. At several of the conferences and in various discussions people 
appeared to show a slight frustration with this conclusion, confirming the 
understanding that policymakers and practitioners favour straight-forward black-and- 
white conclusions and recommendations.
‘[T]hal researcher’s line that there is no evidence to suggest that it 
protects children — they still want to know does it protect children or 
not... there is still that sort of., from some of the people in the audience 
there was that slight frustration that OK you’ve done this research - does 
it protect children or not... ’ (Interviewee 2).
However, overall the reaction to the report was '‘very positive' with several people 
from both Britain and the United States sending letters of appreciation to the NSPCC, 
one of them coming from Roxanne Lieb, one of the key researchers of Washington 
State’s approach (Interviewee 2). In addition, this document was widely quoted by the 
other organisations involved and appears to have become an important source for 
lending independent support to the Government’s decision of not introducing 
community notification (Personal Correspondence).
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Table 6.7: Key Findings of Megan's Law: Does it protect children?
• Figures on stranger abuse are not available and there is no evidence that 
community notification has resulted in a decreased number of assaults by 
strangers on children
• Although levels of recorded intra-familial sexual abuse in the US show a 
marked decline since the early 1990s, the decline predates the introduction of 
Megan's Law
• There is very little research about how community notification empowers 
parents, or the ways in which parents use this information in order to protect 
children
• There is little knowledge about whether and how adults and children change 
their behaviour as a result of community notification
• There is little to suggest that people are more or less anxious as a result of 
community notification
• There is no evidence to suggest that community notification procedures have 
or have not deterred children, siblings or parents from disclosing intra-familial 
abuse
• There is very little awareness of, or concern about, sex offenders using public 
information sources in order to network
• There appears to be some indication that community notification may result in 
harassment and vigilantism. However, there is little empirical quantitative or 
qualitative evidence about this: the number of reported examples is low and it 
is difficult to know the level of unreported incidents
• There seems to be little evidence about whether or not community notification 
drives sex offenders ‘underground’
• Despite reports of concerns about the reintegration of sex offenders into the 
community as a result of community notification, there is very little evidence 
about this in the literature
• It is difficult to know whether notification impacts on recidivism. To date 
however, there is no conclusive evidence that community notification reduces 
re-offending
• Although there is broad agreement that community notification has enhanced 
the tracking and monitoring of sex offenders, there is little collated information 
to substantiate this
• The cost of implementing community notification is high both in financial and 
personnel terms
(Adapted from Lovell 2001, pp 2-3)
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The Dossier of Evidence
Although the research base regarding the effectiveness of community 
notification measures in child protection appears to have been inconclusive, ACOP 
and ACPO provided evidence from practice regarding the impact of disclosing sex 
offenders’ details within Britain, which was seen to be very conclusive. Despite being 
publicly known as the "dossier of evidence' several people with close knowledge of 
this work criticised this choice of terminology. "I don‘t like the word dossier because 
it has a bad connotation...I would not call it a dossier' (Interviewee 4). "It was a list 
at best' (Interviewee 5). Whatever the most appropriate title, in a joint letter from 
ACPO and ACOP to Tim Toulmin, Deputy Director of the Press Complaints 
Commission at the time, the title given to the collected set of evidence provided was a 
"dossier of reports and incidents' (Document 13).
As previously mentioned, the idea for collecting evidence on the impact media 
campaigns had on the work with sex offenders originated from around the release of 
Sidney Cooke and Robert Oliver in 1998. The original dossier, on which the one in 
2000 would be modelled, was dated 24 April 1998 and listed, over several A4 pages 
organised by geographical location, ranging from Wales, the South East and the 
Midlands to the North, various incidents that had resulted from press publications 
about sex offenders and their offences. In several of the cases innocent people were 
mistaken for someone on the list and attacked, or as a result of the erroneous 
identification were in the need of protection; some offenders had to be moved, wrong 
accusations had to be clarified and surveillance or supervision arrangements that were 
in place for some offenders were disrupted. Other offenders simply left their assigned 
accommodation and went underground or broke some of their licensing arrangements. 
In addition there were letters from anti-sex offender groups to the probation service 
trying to pressurise the service into supplying a picture of an offender due to be 
released so that this could be used for press publication (Document 12). At the time, 
in addition to being forwarded to the Press Complaints Commission, this dossier was 
actively distributed to some members of the press. It provided ACOP with an 
important point of reference in dealing with the media.
"They could actually say to people - “look we have gathered this 
evidence together”. I mean the media is interested in stories and they
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could say this is the evidence we gathered and these are the stories from 
this evidence because the media, are not interested in stats but they are 
interested in human stories'1 (Interviewee 5).
The lessons that were learnt from this experience were drawn upon in the response to 
the News of the World's campaign in 2000. As a result, this time round the gathering 
of information was far more focused (Interviewee 5). Just one day after the News of 
the World's name-and-shame campaign started a letter was sent to all chief probation 
officers. In the letter, entitled ‘(Here we go again...) News of the World: Name and 
Shame Campaign' all services were asked to closely examine the developments in 
their area and to report back any instances of problems that might occur (Document 
69). Immediately replies reporting a variety of incidents that had resulted from the 
News of the World campaign stalled to accumulate at ACOP. All this once again 
enabled ACOP, in co-operation with ACPO, to produce a 'dossier of evidence' which 
they used to argue their position.
The dossier compiled in the summer of 2000 followed a similar layout to the one 
produced in 1998. It also listed, organised by geographical location, various incidents 
that occurred as a result of the naming and shaming of sex offenders. The three key 
themes identified in the dossier of 2000 were that the News of the World's actions 
hindered the probation service’s work in child protection, caused harm to third parties 
and caused violence (Document 19).
The evidence included in the dossier covered a broad spectrum of incidents that 
occurred from 23 July to around 11 August 2000, all mirroring behavioural patterns 
and incidents that seem to be a standard result of name-and-shame campaigns in 
Britain. It also included some correspondence signed 'Vigilantes' which reads:
'If the phades [paedophiles] are driven underground they can’t do any 
harm to kids can they? But it is no longer an issue of the police it is an 
issue of the people and we intend to drive them off this estate even if we 
are to use violence to do it' (Document 16).
In addition, there were various letters of appeals from convicted sex offenders. One of 
these was signed 'A desperate man at his wit’s end'. The letter written by a convicted
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sex offender, dated 25 July, was addressed to the Chief Constable of Gloucestershire 
Tony Butler in person and was an 'appeal for help'. The sex offender, who, given the 
circumstances, decided to remain anonymous, reveals throughout the letter that he has 
one conviction, was released from prison six years ago, is 61 years old, 85% disabled 
with a serious heart condition and diabetes and is living with his 'dear wife who has 
stood by him throughout'. He pointed out that 'after this terrible irresponsibility by 
the News of the World' he was in fear for his life and that of his wife and was now, 
despite never having hidden or changed his name in any way so far, forced to do so. 
He would move to another part of the country. While pointing out that he was not 
asking for sympathy, he also recounted some of the experiences that he had during his 
time in prison which are not an easy read, such as being segregated from the other 
prisoners for his own protection and finding excreta and urine in his food on several 
occasions. Pointing out that he had already paid a very high price for what he did he 
went on to ask that after ' [hjaving paid my Debt to Society - What right does the 
News of the World have for punishing me all over again?' (Document 17).
While compiling the dossier, police and probation also made contact with other 
experts in the area of child protection and sex offender management, as well as those 
who might know more about Megan's Law, and their expertise was drawn upon 
(Interviewee 4). The people contacted appear to have included Don Grubin, a British 
expert working in the area of mental health who had done a lot of research on sex 
offending against children and sex offender treatment, as well as practitioners that had 
visited the US.
' [T]here was a guy who worked in the Met who did go to the States and I 
think it predated this...he got a scholarship to research Megan's Law and 
he had been there. Police and probation got in touch with him and the 
enforcement rate was - the best rate I think was Washington State - but 
in California for example the enforcement rate was minimal. They were 
put on the register and that was it. They did not do any follow-up or 
anything. They did not know where they were. And so it was very, very 
patchy' (Interviewee 4).
Drawing on the expertise of such people provided an important source of reassurance 
and support for the stance taken by ACOP and ACPO in the various discussions, both
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with the parents of Sarah Payne and the News of the World, as well as with 
representatives of the Home Office.
4 [W]hen they went into these meetings they were not just on the back-foot 
you know but they had a lot of knowledge about this. I felt confident that 
when they were there with Sara Payne they were not making this up and 
panicking. They had a lot of practice and they had options that they were 
trying to pursue with Government to get things done' (Interviewee 4).
Policy Outcomes
The picture that emerges from the analysis of the available evidence throws 
doubt on the usefulness and appropriateness of introducing sex offender community 
notification along the lines of Megan's Law, and the question that presented itself to 
the politicians and practitioners was what to do. There was widespread agreement that 
child protection measures needed to be improved and that legislation regarding sexual 
offences needed updating. Consequently, the Government appears to have felt under 
pressure to address these issues urgently.
‘[Cjritical incidents like Sarah Payne — the pressure that that places on 
politicians to respond to the public anxiety and the media pressure - 
politicians feel that they have to be shown to be engaged in what are 
tragedies and trying to prevent future tragedies from occurring — so I 
understand the wish for Home Secretaries to do something to make 
things better — that sort of legislation isn ’t always good legislation if it is 
not thought through clearly what the implications are’ (Interviewee 6).
As has been briefly addressed when looking at the events surrounding the Sarah 
Payne case, as a result of the News of the World's "For Sarah" campaign in Chapter 4, 
several policy changes were rushed through Parliament. Being included in the 
Criminal Justice and Court Services Act that was going through Parliament, some of 
these changes amended sections of Part 1 of the Sex Offenders Act 1997 (see Table 
6.8).
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Table 6.8: Changes introduced by the Criminal Justice and Court 
Services Act 2000
Four changes to procedures on initial notification:
• a reduction from 14 days to 3 days in the period during which initial 
notification must be made
• a new requirement that initial notification be made in person
• a new power for the police on initial notification to take fingerprints and 
photographs of offenders
• a new requirement that notification of relevant information be made at a police 
station prescribed by the Secretary of State (subject to regulations, which are 
also coming into effect on 1 June)
and three completely new provisions intended to strengthen court and police powers 
in respect of relevant offenders
• an increase in the maximum penalty for a failure to comply with the Act’s 
requirements to 5 years imprisonment and/or a fine on indictment
• a new power for courts on convicting an offender of a relevant sexual offence 
to impose a restraining order .on him; and
• a new requirement that a relevant offender must notify the police of his 
intention to leave the United Kingdom and of his return (subject to regulations, 
which are also coming into effect on 1 June)
(Home Office 2001a)
Throughout the research for this thesis, these amendments have been considered to be 
a positive development by those interviewed.
'They were sensible proposals. The organizations involved — police 
NACRO etc - were all in favour' (Interviewee 3).
However, there was also a broad perception that the changes to the Sex Offenders Act 
that resulted from the events would have occurred in any event.
am sure they would have happened anyway. Before and after there was 
a process of extension of supervision and restrictions on sex offenders - 
it has been largely worked out by officials working with offenders and 
victims' (Interviewee 3).
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Although the News of the World subsequently has tried to take a lot of the credit for 
bringing about these changes (see for example News of the World 01 July 2001; 
News of the World 23 December 2001; News of the World 15 July 2001), as has been 
seen, the proposed changes appear to have originated from the organisations working 
in this area, especially as a result of a contribution made by ACOP and ACPO.
7 think if something good came out of it, it did strengthen some of the 
provisions later on, hut not in the way - but the alliance of organisations 
were arguing for them anyway - I mean that was one of the ironies and 
one thing that annoyed me about Kuttner was that he was claiming that 
the things that we got, I mean the things that ACOP and ACPO 
proposed, that stopped the campaign were things police and probation 
wanted to have anyway' (Interviewee 4).
While the changes regarding the Sex Offenders Act 1997 were important in 
addressing existing loopholes that had previously been identified, the main result of 
the debate in the summer of 2000 was the introduction of Multi-Agency Protection 
Panels (MAPPA) across England and Wales. Sections 67 and 68 of the Criminal 
Justice and Court Services Act 2000 imposed duties upon the police and probation 
services to set up MAPPA in each of the 42 Areas of England and Wales. It also 
required the authorities responsible for sex offender management in each area to 
establish arrangements to assess and manage the risks posed by sexual and violent 
offenders; to monitor those arrangements and make necessary changes; and, to 
prepare and publish an annual report on the MAPPA (National Probation Service 
2004, pi). This basic legislative outline meant that the necessary arrangements could 
take shape through a process of professional consultation.
'What happened then...was that this basic outline [provided in the 
Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000] has been developed by 
the Public Protection Unit and practitioners, identifying what's good 
practice, and getting some thing of the sort of thoroughness, the 
robustness, that you begin to see in the national guidance. And then that 
is built on by the Criminal Justice Act of2003 where you see the prison 
service coming into the part of responsible authority and lay advisors. So 
it’s a sort of incremental development' (Interviewee 6).
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The legacy of Sarah Payne’s tragedy within MAPPA can be considered to be twofold. 
The first part relates to the specific category of sex offenders to which Roy Whiting 
belonged, while the second addresses the notion of public education and confidence.
‘First of all, Roy Whiting was a convicted sex offender and he was 
convicted of a similar offence of abduction of a girl and her sexual 
abuse... He is sort of a - MAPPA, deals well, essentially the structures 
that were developed deal well with an individual of that nature...The 
other stream of thought out of the tragedy of Sarah... was the issue of 
public confidence... [AJn onus was placed on the responsible authority to 
improve the dialogue, its communication, with the public in order to 
build up public confidence, maybe even to educate the public about the 
nature of sexual offending behaviour. So that process of dialogue was 
intended to start through the requirement of an annual report to be 
published' (Interviewee 6).
This theme of building public confidence continued through to the appointment of lay 
advisors to the strategic level of MAPPA in 2003. The idea underlying these 
appointments appears to have been sparked off through subsequent talks with the 
News of the World.
’‘Representatives of the alliance of organisations went back to meet Andy 
Coulson [a member of staff at the News of the World] about 4 months 
later... to give him a progress report. Rebekah Wade wasn’t that 
interested so it was delegated to Andy Coulson...One representative of 
the alliance of organisations said this is what MAPPA looks like and he 
[Andy Coulson] said, well where is the public in this, where is the For 
Sarah representative - I want a For Sarah representative on this - The 
representatives of the alliance of organisations said, well, it would be 
very difficult to get a member of the public involved in the casework 
without them being trained and it’s pretty horrible stuff - and he said, 
no, there ought to be a member of the public on this - although he wasn’t 
very threatening about this the representatives went... to ACOP and they 
said, “Hmm, well, not a bad idea ”' (Interviewee 7).
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This idea was then developed further. A pilot scheme was set up in 2002 in order to 
examine the feasibility of having lay people involved in overseeing on a strategic 
level the sex offender management arrangements within an area. The evaluation of 
this scheme was 'very positive' and at the time of writing the responsible authorities 
were in the process of appointing and training 84 lay advisors across England and 
Wales, two for each area (Interviewee 6).
At one point it was also considered to include journalists at the strategic level of 
MAPPA. The underlying ideas for this were that firstly, the inclusion of journalists 
could be very helpful in the public education about sex offenders and their 
management. Secondly, if a journalist was involved in MAPPA it meant that if a local 
newspaper 'started going barney', the authorities in charge of sex offender 
management would have 'someone to speak on their own [the media’s] terms' 
(Interviewee 7). However, this idea did not materialize in the end. ‘[T]he politicians 
did not want a newspaper so [they] only went for lay members' (Interviewee 7).
These outcomes meant that some of the changes to sex offender legislation ACPO and 
ACOP had been arguing for since the introduction of the 1997 Sex Offenders Act 
were finally put into place. At the same time, the Government was given a basis from 
which it could reply to the News of the World's demands for public knowledge about 
sex offenders.
'[T]he Government felt safe to argue against the News of the World, it 
gave them territory to argue on - the publication of the MAPPA reports 
and you know the reports get published every year with the number of 
sex offenders in each area and they thought that they could argue that 
that met what the News of the World wanted so that people had an 
awareness of what the risk was. But it didn't endanger individuals or 
offenders by explicitly notifying them, you know, making it 
educational.. .And so the kind of general pattern was very much like the 
sex offender register where you get a piece ofpolicy arrived at from not 
a very sound point of view but then the policy is refined to have the same 
sort of public presentation as the original concept but to make it 
operationally something quite useful - ...it was the same with MAPPA. It 
started off with something about public notification and access to sex
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offender register and it ended up with possibly the world's most 
sophisticated information sharing offender management planning victim 
contact arrangements you can get’ (Interviewee 7).
Summary
This chapter has explored the evidence-base on Megan's Law and the various 
sources of evidence used within the debate about the introduction of a British 
equivalent. The picture that emerges when looking at the research evidence on 
Megan's Law is that there is no conclusive evidence as to its effectiveness in 
improving child safety. While there appears to have been some awareness about this 
in Britain prior to the Sarah's Law Campaign, this perception was reinforced by the 
findings of the NSPCC’s research into the effectiveness of Megan's Law.
In addition to such lessons from abroad, previous name-and-shame campaigns in 
Britain as well as the impact of the Sarah's Law Campaign indicated that disclosing 
information on sex offenders in Britain tended to have negative effects on offender 
management as well as public protection.
The other main focus of this chapter has been an examination of the policy 
developments that resulted from the Sarah's Law debate. While shortcomings in the 
existing legislation were addressed, the most important outcome can be considered to 
be the introduction of Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA). 
Although these had started to emerge prior to the case of Sarah Payne it appears that 
the latter accelerated their introduction and led to the inclusion of members of the 
public at the strategic level of MAPPA in order to improve public confidence and 
understanding.
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Chapter 7
Discussion: Learning from the Case Study
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 have addressed the case-specific research questions 
outlined in Table 3.3. As such, they examine the events surrounding the Sarah's Law 
debate, the network of key actors involved, the nature and origin of the various forms 
of evidence used throughout the debate, as well as the potential lessons that could 
have been drawn across time and space. This chapter takes the insights that were 
gained and discusses them in relation to the literature on policy networks, evidence- 
based policy making and lesson-drawing. Consequently, the focus shifts away from 
the case-specific research questions towards the more general ones outlined in Table 
3.2. The chapter follows the structure of Chapter 2 in that it starts off by looking at 
policy networks before turning towards the insights on the use of evidence in the 
policy process and lesson-drawing. The final pail of this chapter concentrates on 
discussing how one can understand the nexus of networks, evidence and lesson­
drawing within the policy process. .
Policy Networks
The existing literature on policy networks reviewed in Chapter 2 identifies a 
set of key parameters or variables that need to be explored when analysing policy 
networks. First of all, how did the network come into existence? Secondly, what are 
the key defining characteristics of the network and finally, what are the links that exist 
within the network and to what extent, if any, do they impact on its operation? As 
such, these parameters provided the basis for the specific questions about the Sarah's 
Law network. The detailed account of the Sarah's Law network given in Chapter 4 
and 5 is now used to comment on how this case study contributes to the understanding 
of policy networks.
The review of existing literature on policy networks in Chapter 2 highlighted how 
four main network metaphors or concepts have emerged as different ways of 
characterising policy networks and explaining their operation: iron triangles, issue
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networks, policy communities and advocacy coalitions. To recapitulate, iron triangles 
perceive policy networks to be very stable, tripartite arrangements of interest groups, 
committees and an executive agency, which operate over a long period of time with 
little or no outside interference within a narrow policy niche. In contrast, the concept 
of issue networks envisages a huge number of network participants from various 
backgrounds. The composition of a policy network is perceived to be in a permanent 
flux as a result of some members leaving and others moving into a policy network. 
Consequently, no one is considered to be really in control of the agenda and there is 
an unequal distribution of power and resources. Sitting somewhere between iron 
triangles and issue networks, the concept of policy communities sees networks as 
being made up of a limited number of participants from specialist backgrounds. 
Membership is considered to be reasonably stable over time and it is postulated that 
there is a balance of power between the network participants. Finally, the advocacy 
coalition concept of a policy network, while acknowledging a variety of participants 
within any set of coalitions, also supports the idea of an elite-focused network 
membership. The overall number of participants is considered to be limited because in 
order to be effective participants will need to coalesce.
Throughout this section on policy networks reference will be made to each of the four 
network concepts and the extent to which they help to explain and are supported by 
the operation of the Sarah's Law network. The section itself, however, is organised 
around the key parameters or questions for understanding policy networks: network 
emergence; network characteristics; and network links. The issue of which of the four 
concepts provides the best overall characterisation of the Sarah's Law network is 
addressed at the end of the section.
Network Emergence
As noted in Chapter 2, one of the existing literature’s shortcomings is that it 
fails to address in detail how a policy network comes into existence. In general, the 
literature concentrates on policy networks that are already in existence. Two of the 
four main approaches to the analysis of policy networks, iron triangles and issue 
networks do not address the question of network emergence. Although the concept of 
advocacy coalition focuses on established networks, and does not provide a historical
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context for analysing the emergence of policy networks, it does seem to assume that 
new networks form as a result of dissatisfaction amongst some actors with an area of 
policy who therefore set out to form a new policy network in order to influence policy 
developments in this area (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins- 
Smith 1993a; Watt 1997). To some extent this is similar to the idea of network 
emergence put forward by supporters of the policy communities concept. According 
to this concept the emergence of a new policy focus will lead to a new policy 
community starting to evolve around it (Jordan 1990). This draws attention to the 
importance of a topic’s position on the broader policy agenda prior to network 
formation and this does indeed appear to have been an important issue when looking 
at the formation of the Sarah's Law network. However, none of the four concepts pays 
sufficient attention to the history of a policy topic and the network(s) associated with 
it.
As was highlighted in Chapter 4, when the topic of blanket community notification 
arose in the summer of 2000 it was not an entirely new area of concern. It had already 
been addressed in the British context in light of the debate surrounding the Sex 
Offenders Act 1997 and the proposed introduction of a sex offender register. While at 
that time the idea of blanket community notification had been rejected and the topic’s 
prominence on the policy agenda declined, one can note that some of the 
organisations that were part of the Sarah's Law network also contributed to the debate 
in 1997. This is illustrated in Diagram 7.1.
This implies that although the precise composition of a policy network which emerges 
in response to a particular policy issue can differ from previous manifestations of a 
network addressing the same or similar topic, any prior involvement in a relevant 
policy debate makes it more likely that those players previously involved will 
participate the next time the topic gets onto the policy agenda.
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In addition, although a new policy network can form around a ‘hot’ topic that features 
prominently on the policy agenda, its origins may have a longer history. Therefore, 
when studying a policy network surrounding a specific topic, an important research 
question is whether one is dealing with one overarching single network which 
addresses that policy issue at different stages of its existence, or whether different 
networks emerge to address the same issue each time the topic is high on the policy 
agenda. In the case of the Sarah's Law network a case can be made that there were 
two different networks involved in 1997 and 2000. Not only was membership partly 
different, but in 1997 community notification was addressed specifically in relation to 
the then envisaged Sex Offenders Act; in 2000 it was addressed as an issue of its own, 
with the network's make-up being far more specific as a result. However, there is an 
overlap in membership in 1997 and 2000 and hence an alternative assessment is that 
one is dealing with one network adapting over time. Further exploration of the 1997 
network would be necessary to address this issue more fully and that is beyond the 
focus of this thesis.
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The antecedents of the Sarah's Law network highlights the importance of taking a 
longitudinal approach when exploring network origins, which includes studying a 
policy topic’s prominence on the policy agenda over time. This should include an 
exploration of the various players involved at those instances where the topic took 
centre stage and how this changes over time. However, the development of a 
longitudinal approach may just postpone rather than address the question of original 
network emergence. The use of the agenda-setting theories outlined in Chapter 2 may 
complement a longitudinal analysis in understanding the emergence of policy 
networks. Certainly, the wave-like pattern of community notification’s prominence on 
the policy agenda seems to provide strong support for Kingdon’s (1984) model of 
‘policy streams’ and Baumgartner and Jones’ (1991; 1993; 2004) notion of a 
‘punctuated equilibrium’.
When exploring the background debate surrounding the Sex Offenders Act 1997 (see 
Chapter 4), one can identify the development of ‘streams’, along the lines of those 
advocated by Kingdon, prior to the summer of 2000: a problem stream addressing 
areas that are considered to be major problems by policymakers; a political stream 
setting the governmental agenda in light of the public mood, pressure groups and 
various campaigns; and a policy stream containing various policy proposals.
In this case, the problem stream that can be identified is the perception amongst 
policymakers that there were several shortcomings in the existing legislation on sex 
offenders and that there was a need to improve measures aimed at child protection. 
This problem stream is closely connected to the political one: the perception of the 
public as well as practitioners and various organisations working in the area of child 
protection was that existing measures aimed at sex offender management and victim 
protection were inadequate. Finally, some of the agencies working in this area had 
been actively lobbying for different ways of improving current arrangements and 
legislation, as for example a tightening of registration requirements for sex offenders. 
The generation of such policy proposals and the various inputs into the policy debate 
make up Kingdon’s third stream, the policy one. This wider ongoing debate meant 
that the case of Sarah Payne focused attention and reinforced the pre-existing 
perception of a problem. It thereby opened a wider policy window which allowed the 
pushing forward of ‘pet solutions’ (Kingdon 1984, p 173) to address the perceived
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problems. According to Kingdon, under normal circumstances, critical or ‘focusing 
events’ do not carry a subject to the top of the policy agenda on their own. They only 
focus attention on a problem which already exists in people’s minds (Kingdon 1984, p 
103). Based on the analysis of the context within which the Sarah's Law debate took 
place, this explanation of the role of ‘focusing events’ is supported.
Although Kingdon draws attention to the idea that some subjects rise on the agenda 
while others are neglected, his model has been criticised as concentrating too much on 
constant change and adaptation. It provides an interesting explanation of change, but 
it does not account for periods of relative policy stability or sectoral differences (John 
1998). Here, Baumgartner and Jones’ model of punctuated equilibrium is helpful. It 
describes a pattern whereby within a specific policy sector periods of stability 
alternate with periods of rapid change during which public interest, media scrutiny 
and public action all focus on a specific topic. Eventually a topic will again fade from 
the policy agenda. The reason for the periods of relative stability is that once policy 
has been developed on a topic at a time of heightened activity, other policy topic areas 
become more interesting and in the initial topic area the new arrangements settle into 
more stable routines (Baumgartner and Jones 1991; Baumgartner and Jones 1993). 
And indeed in this case study, once the question of community notification had 
appeared high-on the agenda in 1997, as part of the debate on sex offender registers, it 
indeed faded from the policy agenda after the introduction of the Sex Offenders Act 
1997: community notification had been rejected and it was now time to implement the 
legislative changes brought about by the Act.
This issue of a policy network emerging around a ‘hot’ topic has already been 
mentioned, but a question remains about what constitutes a ‘hot’ topic around which a 
network will emerge. As has been outlined in Chapter 4, although the issue of 
improving sex offender legislation and victim protection was on the wider policy 
agenda, the urgency with which these issues needed to be addressed only came about 
as a result of the News of the World's actions. Initially, when the abduction and 
murder of Sarah Payne took place the case as such was not immediately linked to the 
policy issue of sex offender legislation. Instead, it originally was simply another 
instance of child abduction and murder. It was only after the details surrounding the 
abduction and murder had started to emerge, and the News of the World had decided
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to campaign for changes to existing sex offender legislation, that a specific political 
dimension was added to the case. This campaign and the impact of the name-and- 
shame campaign very quickly pushed the topic onto the policy agenda and focused the 
debate. This draws attention to the possibility that within the right context an incident 
which might initially not be directly connected to a policy debate can become linked 
to a policy topic, thereby turn into a ‘focusing event’, and act as a catalyst for network 
emergence. However, such linking appears to require the activity of a high profile 
agency, as in this case the News of the World. The defining characteristics that are 
required for such ‘linking’ need further exploration.
A final area that needs to be addressed when exploring network emergence is how far 
players have a choice about getting involved in policy networks. Voluntary 
participation seems to be assumed by at least three of the four network concepts: issue 
networks, policy communities and advocacy coalitions. In light of this case’s findings 
it seems that network participation is not always voluntary. Those organisations 
directly affected by the campaign were immediately drawn into the policy network. 
However, although some of those affected tried to get other agencies working in the 
areas of child protection and sex offender management to participate in the debate, not 
all of those who could have participated appear to have chosen that path. This 
indicates that network inclusion can be of a voluntary or compulsory nature, 
depending on the degree to which an organisation is directly affected by the topic 
under discussion. While neither the police nor probation appear to have had a choice 
about whether to get involved in light of the campaign’s impact on their work, other 
organisations’ involvement such as that of the Suzy Lamplugh Trust or the NSPCC 
can be considered to be of a more voluntary nature.
Network Characteristics
Chapter 2 highlighted several aspects of network characteristics that need to be 
addressed: the overall nature of a network; the reasons for players’ involvement; and 
the features of network operation.
When exploring the Sarah's Law network it is obvious that it was addressing a very 
small policy niche within the broader policy field of criminal justice and thus can be
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considered as a sub-network within the wider network around that issue. This 
indicates that different levels of policy networks with different levels of specialisation 
can exist. Consequently, actors can simultaneously be part of a multitude of networks. 
However, not only was the policy issue under consideration a specialised one, but the 
number of active participants was also very limited. On the side proposing blanket 
community notification one can identify the News of the World and Sarah’s parents, 
while the opposition to such an approach was made up of ACOP, ACPO, NACRO, 
the NSPCC and the Suzy Lamplugh Trust.
One potential criticism of the existing network concepts that was raised in Chapter 2 
was the assumption that academic inquiry should focus on elite group membership of 
policy networks. People without a specialist background are considered to lack the 
time and resources required to get involved in a policy network.
There is some support for this assumption within the Sarah's Law debate. Those 
people and agencies who were in talks with the Home Office about policy 
development and who shaped the policy manifesto for the "For Sarah" campaign were 
indeed experts within this policy area. At the same time, while neither the News of the 
World nor Sara and Michael Payne can be considered as experts in that policy area 
they did play an important role within the network. However, this might have more to 
do with the special nature of the events leading to the emergence of the Sarah's Law 
network rather than being an aspect that is more widely applicable.
The broader policy network on sex offender management and victim protection does 
indeed also appear to be relatively closed to ‘outsiders’ in general and to consist of the 
‘elites’ within this area: a very specific set of children charities, governmental 
departments, various lobbies and interest groups. However, as can be seen in the cases 
of Diana Lamplugh and over the course of time Sarah’s mother, there is the potential 
for non-elites to become involved more deeply in a policy debate and to gain access to 
the wider policy network. The question that needs to be addressed then is how far 
such people should be considered to be ‘elites’ themselves or can they still be 
considered as members of the wider public.
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When looking at the motives underlying participants’ network involvement, the focus 
within the existing policy network concepts is usually on one or two dominant 
motives. In the case of iron triangles it is argued that members receive some form of 
material benefit from participating in such arrangements. Similarly, economic 
interests or professional reasons are considered to be the driving forces for players in 
policy communities. On the other hand, the idea of issue networks advocates that 
actors become attached to a network for emotional or intellectual reasons. This is also 
supposed to be the case in advocacy coalitions, where the translation of a core belief 
into policies motivates participants’ actions.
Each of these motives is to some extent present as reasons driving actors’ involvement 
in the Sarah's Law network. One could argue that involvement in the Sarah's Law 
network was primarily driven by ideological reasons in that all organisations involved 
claimed to be interested in the improvement of sex offender legislation and child 
protection. However, on closer inspection it seems that different motives underpinned 
the involvement of different sets of actors. These are outlined in Diagram 7.2, which 
also highlights the need to consider the reasons for non-involvement as well as 
involvement. The existing literature seems to ignore the possibility that those aspects 
driving involvement can also result in actors’ deliberate decision not to get involved 
within a specific policy network.
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Diagram 7.2: Reasons for Participation/Non-Participation in a 
Policy Network
anxsoftM
The first set of motives is made up of emotional reasons. An example of actors driven 
by that category, are Sarah’s parents, Sara and Michael Payne. Secondly, there are 
those players motivated by ideology. This appears to have been one of the driving 
forces behind the contribution and involvement of NACRO which seems to have 
centred on the idea of offenders’ rights. The third category that emerges as spurring 
network involvement are professional reasons. This is exemplified most prominently 
by the involvement of the police and probation services as a result of their work being 
directly affected by the News of the World's campaign and the resulting discussion. 
The fourth set refers to players’ reputation. On the one hand the public’s perception of 
an organisation’s role can lead to a contribution to a policy debate. For example, in 
case of the NSPCC it seems that there was a certain expectation amongst various parts 
of society that the NSPCC would provide some insights into the issue of community 
notification. On the other hand, reputation also appears to have been one reason as to 
why some organisations working in the area of offender management or child 
protection who were provided with the opportunity of getting involved more closely
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in the policy network decided not to do so. The reasons underlying such a decision 
appear to have been concerns about the organisations’ public image or reputation and 
any potential detrimental effects the taking up of a specific stance might have on 
donations made by members of the public. The last set is that of economic interests. 
As has been stressed by various commentators at the time and in subsequent 
discussions, it is arguable that the News of the World’s involvement can be understood 
as being mainly driven by the incentive of economic rewards resulting from an 
increased circulation of the newspaper.
So, rather than having a sole reason that drives a policy network, it seems that 
participants can get involved in networks for reasons which might differ from the 
motives of other members of the same network. It seems unlikely that one can clearly 
demarcate those reasons and draw a line as to where one set of motives starts and 
another one ends. Instead, although it might be possible to identify one main motive 
as driving an individual’s or organisation’s involvement or non-involvement, there is 
likely to be some overlap between these categories since they are closely connected. 
For example, professional reasons for involvement may also address areas of ideology 
and reputation as well as emotions and economic interests so that it is unlikely that 
there will ever be one ‘pure’ motive for network involvement.
While so far the focus has been mainly on organisational motives, one also needs to 
bear in mind that individual sets of motives can exist amongst the various players 
involved. These may or may not coincide with those of the organisation they represent 
and there is a need for further consideration of this and its possible implications.
Another aspect that needs to be considered when examining these five sets of motives 
is the question of how far motives are susceptible to change. The advocacy coalitions 
concept distinguishes between ‘core beliefs’ and ‘secondary values’ with the former 
being less susceptible to change, similarly the notion of long-standing values is a 
feature of the policy community approach. On the face of it, one could speculate that 
some of the reasons for involvement, such as emotion or ideology, are potentially 
more fixed than others, such as economic interests. However, this and the previous 
point about differences in organisational and personal motives for an involvement in a 
policy network need to be explored further in future research.
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Within the existing literature on policy networks there is widespread agreement that 
the values and membership of a policy network are constant over long periods of time. 
This view is supported by the long-term existence of a broader policy network on sex 
offenders and child protection prior to the Sarah's Law network, but, it does not apply 
to the Sarah's Law network as such. As was pointed out in Chapter 5, changes in 
personnel and an apparent organisational dis-interest in maintaining some of the links 
within the network meant that players began to withdraw from the network in 2001. 
As a result, the specific Sarah's Law network ceased to exist. This provides support 
for the proposition made by supporters of the policy community concept that unless 
there is a ‘positive-sum game’, so that each network member benefits from the 
arrangements, the policy network is unlikely to continue (Marsh and Rhodes 1992).
While the News of the World and Sarah’s mother continue to promote the idea of 
access to information on sex offenders living within a community, the actual policy 
network involved in that debate was relatively short-lived in that it mainly covered the 
period of summer 2000 to spring 2001. However, should the campaigning of the News 
of the World and Sara Payne increase again in momentum, and as Chapter 4 
highlighted there are some indications that this might happen, it will be interesting to 
examine the composition of any emerging policy network and how far the new 
network corresponds to the one that emerged in 2000.
Network Links
Within the broader literature on policy networks attention has been drawn to 
the ways in which alliances are a politically relevant behaviour of interest groups 
(Heany 2001a). One of the major reasons driving the formation of alliances within a 
policy arena is the large number of players trying to influence the policy process. As a 
result, an overcrowding of lobbyists can often be noted. This in turn leads various 
organisations to form alliances so as to deal with the limited resources available 
(Heany 2001a). While the tendency to form alliances is no longer disputed, what is 
missing is a more complete examination of the reasons underlying the formation of 
alliances: with whom are groups most likely to co-operate and for what reasons 
(Heany 2001a)?
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According to the advocacy coalitions concept, the building of alliances is one 
potential way in which actors within policy networks try to translate their ambitions 
into policies. The policy community approach mentions that in relation to the idea of 
coalition building exchange-based relationships can develop between lobbyists and 
policymakers. -
As mentioned in previous chapters, those organisations working in the area of sex 
offender management and child protection actively tried to put together an alliance of 
organisations in order to put pressure on the News of the World to stop its name-and- 
shame campaign. The organisations that formed the alliance were all from within the 
broader criminal justice policy network and as such had been in contact on previous 
issues. As has been outlined in Chapter 5, the various charities that got involved in 
2000 had been lobbying for various measures to improve sex offender management 
and victim protection. In many cases, these activities even precede the Sex Offenders 
Act 1997. In addition, the actors that formed the alliance of organisations were closely 
connected to the umbrella body for penal lobbying groups, the Penal Affairs 
Consortium. This appears to have provided a readily available pool of agencies from 
which those organisations opposing Sarah's Law could draw potential allies.
Since it is usually the case that those organisations which have had positive alliances 
with each other in the past are likely to renew such co-operation (Heany 2001a), the 
involvement of ACOP, ACPO, the NSPCC and NACRO does not come as a surprise 
and supports this perception. All of them had worked closely together on previous 
occasions and to some extent had been involved in the previous debate about blanket 
community notification in the UK. Each of these organisations had a unique set of 
expertise which can be seen as increasing the alliance’s resources. In addition to that, 
it can be postulated that co-operation between these organisations improved their 
stance in the policy debate by showing that organisations from various backgrounds 
agreed on the approach to take. In light of the public mood about and attitude towards 
sex offenders, a very strong lobby would be needed to argue for reasonable changes 
and to avoid the usual knee-jerk response to such a high profile incident as the murder 
of Sarah Payne, especially when politicians tend to take on the public’s mood 
(Sampson 1994; Lieb 2000). As such, these agencies had a set of shared interests and
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aims. A very smart move in bringing together the alliance appears to have been the 
inclusion of the Suzy Lamplugh Trust. The latter could offer one strategic advantage 
none of the other agencies could: an emotional ‘link’ of a mother who has lost her 
daughter. In relation to this latter point, it seems that within the alliance different roles 
and responsibilities can be identified. First of all, there is the mediating role of the 
Suzy Lamplugh Trust. Secondly, there is the driving force behind the alliance 
formation, in this case NACRO. Finally, there are the main activists which provide 
the evidence and arguments, ACOP, ACPO and the NSPCC. As such a unique ‘role’ 
can be identified for each member of the alliance of organisations. Indeed, it seems 
that alliance formation can to some extent be understood as a division of labour 
between those agencies involved.
At the same time, the formation of alliances does not only appear as a way of 
overcoming limited resources, but also as a way of increasing political leverage and 
power as well as access to policymakers. However, alliance membership does not 
imply that there is total agreement about ends and means. As was discussed in 
Chapter 5, although the overall aim of the alliance of organisations was initially to 
stop the Neyvs of the World's name-and-shame campaign and to argue against blanket 
community notification measures, within the alliance different perspectives were 
present: ACOP and ACPO were interested in aspects relating to public protection 
while NACRO’s main focus was the right of the offender.
When looking more broadly at the links between the various organisations within a 
policy network the literature highlights a number of issues. In general it is assumed 
that relationships are relatively stable and persist over a long period of time. In 
addition, the concept of policy community advocates that a mutually supportive 
relationship can develop between policymakers and pressure groups. Both 
longstanding and supportive links can be observed in the Sarah's Law network, 
although they appear to be pre-existent rather than an emergent factor within this 
network. For example, although it is difficult to ascertain the extent of any mutually 
supportive links that existed between the Home Office and any of the bodies making 
up the alliance of organisations, the Home Office briefed the members of the alliance 
of organisations on some of the steps it was taking and forwarded them various 
information that might be relevant to the policy debate (see Chapter 5).
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In addition, it does seem to be the case that at least some of the relationships within 
the Sarah's Law network were also marked by mutual exchanges between civil 
servants and ‘pressure groups’, as advocated by the policy communities approach. For 
example the Home Office appears to have drawn heavily on the expertise of both 
ACOP and ACPO in the formulation of the legislative changes that followed from the 
Sarah Payne case: in order to instruct Parliamentary Counsel about a proposed 
‘Sarah's Law’ legislative package at the close of play on 19 September, an email was 
sent from the Home Office to ACOP and ACPO with the request for detailed 
comments on various parts of this package (Document 55). Such consultation appears 
to have been on very specific matters and did not necessarily involve all members of 
the policy network. Although one can identify bilateral supportive relationships, this 
might have been a result of the special nature of the Sarah's Law network, its short 
lifespan and the time constraints under which the participants operated, rather than a 
general defining trait of policy networks.
Along with such ‘positive’ links, there are however negative ones, such as those cases 
where previous encounters have tainted working relationships or where obstacles are 
presented for players. An example of the latter seems to be the Government’s links to 
News International. While there does not appear to have been any real interest on side 
of the Government in pursuing the idea of blanket community notification put forward 
by the News of the World (see Chapter 6), it seems to have been important for the 
Government not to upset the newspaper or its parent company in light of their past 
support in the 1997 general election and their political influence in shaping public 
opinion in the upcoming election in 2001.
Given that both positive and negative relationships between the various players within 
a policy network can influence the course of a policy debate - in that on the one hand 
they can provide otherwise unavailable access or options, or on the other block such 
advantages or place participants in conflicting positions of interests - both types of 
relationship need to be considered and analysed. Positive co-operation in the shape of 
alliance-formation is already mentioned within the literature, but the possibility of 
conflictual or negative links is not clearly addressed.
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Personal links that exist over and above those that appear as a result of network 
interaction between representatives of various organisations are another potentially 
important aspect of policy networks and one which appears to be generally neglected 
in the existing literature on policy networks.
As has been discussed in Chapter 5, personal links can provide important insights into 
the workings of a policy network. Such links can both reinforce existing 
organisational links and thereby facilitate alliance-building or they can run counter to 
organisational links and present players with conflicting agendas. Although the act of 
drawing attention to any personal links and examining how far and in which ways 
they impact on the operation of a policy network seems to be a rich area to develop, 
there are several problems that arise for the researcher. First of all it is difficult to 
‘unearth’ all such links given that they are usually not widely publicised. Various 
people who participate within a network might be willing to reveal some of the 
information but any such revelations are likely to be confidential, if made at all. It is 
also debatable whether any individual would reveal personal links that could be 
considered as ‘questionable’ or lead to negative consequences for the individual 
making the revelation. Moreover, even if one manages to identify any links it is 
difficult to establish the ways in which such links influence the policy debate, 
especially if ‘scientific proof is required. Evidence is likely to be circumstantial and 
anecdotal. At the same time, there is the danger of distortion and the danger of 
‘smear’. This means that any of the anecdotal evidence encountered might be 
unfounded. Given that the research into such links could easily become too populist 
and could be seen as operating on a tightrope between popular journalism and 
‘serious’ academic inquiry, the researcher would need to exercise a great degree of 
caution. This is necessary, not only in the interest of the integrity of the research but 
also, very pragmatically, in the researcher’s own interest given today’s litigious 
culture and any detrimental effects that might result from exploring such links. 
Nevertheless, there is the danger of ignoring the impact of the personal side of policy 
networks, should such links not be explored in an analysis of network operation.
In summary, then, each of the four main policy network concepts outlined in Chapter 
2 - iron triangles, issue networks, policy communities and advocacy coalitions - 
capture some of the features evident in the Sarah's Law network. However, the
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emergent structure and links in the latter network suggest a number of areas where the 
existing literature offers only limited insights. First of all, there is the question 
regarding players’ reasons for getting involved in a policy network. While each of 
these concepts seems to imply a voluntary choice on part of the actors, from the study 
of the Sarah's Law network it appears that they are not necessarily presented with 
such an option and might well get automatically drawn into a network. As such it is 
useful to differentiate between at least two categories for network involvement: 
voluntary and compulsory. Along with this, a number of motives can be identified 
amongst network participants including economic, reputational, professional, 
ideological and emotional reasons. While individuals’ motives can coincide with 
those of the organisation they represent they might be different. The ways in which 
such motives influence network activities need to be explored further. Thirdly, there is 
an ongoing problem of defining where a network begins and ends. Policy networks 
can emerge around a specific issue, in this case Sarah's Law, but such networks need 
to be considered within the wider policy and policy making context. Fourthly, while 
alliance formation provides the opportunity to divide tasks within a policy network 
and to increase the chance of political influence, the question of alliance formation 
and operation needs to be addressed further in the analysis of policy networks, 
especially as they can both enable and frustrate players’ operation within a network. 
By the same token, it is necessary to explore further the existence of organisational 
and personal links within a network and how such links impact on its operation. 
Although as a result of network operation there will automatically be a plethora of 
personal and organisational links between members of a network, it is important to 
understand and examine them in light of any pre-existing connections between 
network members or connections which develop over and above any reasons relating 
to the policy issue being addressed by the network.
The question is whether this means that there is a need for a new concept or for 
further articulation of the existing ones. Given the confusing plethora of existing 
terminology within the area of policy networks, it seems that the latter is a more 
desirable approach. The concept that seems to lend itself most for further articulation 
is that of policy communities. This can partly be ascribed to the fact that it was 
specifically designed for the British context.
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Having examined network emergence as well as the defining characteristics and links 
within policy networks, it is now time to examine what can be learnt about the way in 
which evidence is used in policy debate.
Evidence
As has been shown in Chapter 6, a variety of evidence featured in the Sarah's 
Law debate. Based on the insights that were gained from the case and relating these to 
the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, the following discussion will address the nature 
of evidence within this policy area, the use of evidence, and the factors with which 
evidence had to compete.
The Nature of Evidence
When looking at the nature of the evidence that was used in the Sarah's Law 
debate, both by those supporting and those opposing Megan's Law-style legislation, 
three types of evidence can be identified. First of all, there were various research 
findings and statistics that were used to support the arguments put forward in the 
debate. Secondly, extensive reference was made to practitioner knowledge and 
previous experiences with community notification. Finally, there were a number of 
emotive examples that featured in the debate and points were illustrated through ‘first­
hand experiences’. These different types of evidence are outlined in Table 7.1. 
Although both proponents and opponents of blanket community notification seem to 
have used all three categories of evidence, one can notice that the extent to which this 
was done differed. The evidence put forward by the News of the World in favour of 
Megan's Law-style arrangements revolved more around emotive examples, while 
those used by the opponents of a Megan's Law focused more on the other two 
categories. One reason for this might be a potentially greater interest in emotive 
examples by the wider public on the one hand and the importance of a more 
‘objectively’ founded way of reasoning when trying to argue against populist criminal 
justice interventions, especially if they address sexual offences on the other.
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Table 7.1: Types of Evidence Referred to in the Sarah's Law Debate
Research 
Findings & 
Statistics
Practitioner
Knowledge
Emotive
Examples
Advocates of 
Sarah's Law
MORI Poll/ Other 
Polls
Petition for Sarah's 
Law
Various Data on
Sex Offenders
Quoted 'Experts'
Sarah Payne
Megan Kanka
Polly Klaas
Keith Bennet
James Bulger
Opponents of 
Sarah's Law
Research for: 
Megan's Law:
Does it protect 
children?
Research into the 
Effectiveness of 
the British Sex 
Offender Register
Previous Research 
into the
Effectiveness of 
Megan's Law
Other Research on 
Sex Offender 
Management by 
Experts in the
Area
Experiences with 
Previous Name- 
and-Shame 
Campaigns
Practitioner 
Feedback and 
Understanding of 
Best Practice 
regarding Sex 
Offender 
Management,
Victim Protection 
and Community 
Notification
Practitioner 
Knowledge-Base 
on Sex Offender 
Management
Case Examples in 
the ACOP/ACPO 
Dossier of
Evidence
Letters/ Telephone 
calls received from 
those affected by 
the News of the 
World’s 
campaigning
The boundaries between these three categories of evidence are not clearly demarcated, 
as symbolised by the dotted line in Table 7.1, and some ‘evidence’ spans more than 
one category. During the case study interviews some of the interviewees referred to 
existing research on sex offender management which indicates that for example
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practitioner knowledge might not be clearly distinguishable from the category of 
research findings.
Davies (2004) has pointed out that the privileging of any one type of evidence within 
the policy process is not desirable in that different types of evidence can provide 
different insights. Each of the three categories can be understood as serving different 
purposes. While both practitioner knowledge and research findings and statistics are 
used in order to rationally substantiate a policy position, the use of emotive examples 
serves to make any argument not only more accessible but also more appealing to the 
interests of a wider audience. As such it is arguable that a combination of various 
types of evidence in support of a policy position is desirable and potentially more 
beneficial to its uptake than if only one category is used.
If the categories of evidence used in the Sarah's Law debate are compared to the 
health care hierarchy of evidence outlined in Diagram 2.2, it can be seen that the main 
emphasis was on what is considered to be the three lower forms of evidence: well- 
designed trials without randomisation, such as single-group pre-post and time series 
studies; well-designed non-experimental studies from more than one centre; and 
opinions of respected authorities, based on practice evidence as well as descriptive 
studies or reports of expert committees. Although expert opinion fares as the lowest 
form in health care’s hierarchy of evidence, within this specific case it appears to have 
been one of the main contributions in the debate. The importance ascribed to 
practitioner and expert knowledge might result from the perceived impossibility of 
having the same extent of experimentation in the field as found in medicine. In 
addition, it emphasises the broader understanding of appropriate ‘evidence’ within 
policy making than the more restrictive understanding of what counts as good 
evidence amongst some academics (Davies 2004).
Evidence Use
Based on the work of Weiss (1972; 1977;1986), six ways in which evidence 
can enter the policy process were identified in Chapter 2. These can further be 
classified under three broad categories of evidence use: instrumental, conceptual and 
strategic use of knowledge (Ginsburg and Gorostiaga 2001).
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The picture that emerges from this research regarding the way in which evidence was 
utilised in the Sarah's Law debate, is that it appears to have been used mainly in a 
strategic way to support pre-determined policy positions. As was pointed out in 
Chapters 4 and 6, the main aim of the organisations working in the area of sex 
offender management and victim protection was To stop the damn campaign' 
(Interviewee 4). At the same time, the News of the World used evidence to put across 
the idea of the ‘public’s right to blow’ about-sex offenders living in an area. In both 
cases evidence can indeed be perceived as serving the role of political ammunition in 
order to counteract the actions taken by opponents. Simultaneously, a tactical use of 
evidence can be found, namely the importance of assessing available evidence before 
making any policy decisions, an aspect which was quoted several times during the 
Sarah's Law debate, thereby indeed providing some ‘breathing space’ for politicians.
However, the perception of a predominantly strategic use of knowledge might be 
related to the timescale of the study. The focus on a critical incident, the overall short 
time span covered by the Sarah's Law debate, as well as the fact that both proponents 
and opponents had a clear aim, might all have contributed to the more strategic use of 
biowledge. Both instrumental and conceptual uses of evidence appear to be more 
applicable in the longer term given their focus on a process of problem identification 
and solution finding or the percolation of evidence respectively. Such processes need 
time and appear to be more likely in a relatively stable policy environment (Mulgan 
2003), rather than in one that is in need of an urgent solution, as was the case in the 
Sarah's Law debate.
Bearing this in mind, a more longitudinal case study in this area may find instrumental 
and conceptual uses of evidence (Weiss 1977). Indeed, an instrumental approach 
seems to be evident in the Government’s review of sex offender legislation that 
started in 1999. This appeared to embody a policy goal of improving existing 
legislative measures, which was shared by the Government and by the organisations 
involved in child protection and sex offender management. Given that a genuinely 
instrumental use of research is considered to be rare (Weiss 1986), it is even more 
surprising to find indications thereof within the area of sex offender policies, an area
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where evidence can run counter to popular perceptions of the nature of sex offences 
and what should be done about them.
A conceptual use of evidence also seems to be evident in the broader policy network. 
For example, the usefulness of multi-agency arrangements in the area of sex offender 
management and an understanding of the dangers of name-and-shame campaigns 
appear to have percolated through the various levels of policy making (see Chapters 4 
and 6 and for example Kemshall and Maguire 2001). So, in relation to sex offender 
management, there appear to be many ways in which evidence enters the policy 
process. Although, at the time of heightened debate, as was the situation with Sarah's 
Law, the strategic use of evidence seems to be the most prevalent mode of use.
Contrary to some literature on the use of evidence in the policy process, the overall 
extent of evidence-use during this policy debate appears to have been high. As has 
been illustrated in Chapters 4 and 6, the use of evidence was seen as an obvious 
strategy within that policy area and was perceived to be an important part of 
developing and supporting an argument in light of the topic’s sensitivity and high 
profile.
In Chapter 2 six factors were identified in the literature as facilitating the uptake of 
evidence: the timing, relevance, clarity and quality of the evidence, and the political 
adeptness and personality of the evidence provider (Nutley, Davies et al. 2000; Percy- 
Smith, Burden et al. 2004). When looking at the various sources of evidence 
identified within the Sarah's Law debate one can see that all of these factors played a 
role, albeit to varying degrees. First of all, the various pieces of information were 
available at the right time. For example, the effectiveness of the British sex offender 
register had just been assessed and the compliance rate of 94.7% was much higher 
than the best one in America which was only 85% (Dilley July 24 2000). In addition, 
the information and insights on blanket community notification provided by the 
NSPCC’s research was put together relatively quickly in light of the News of the 
World's campaign. A pre-existing set of information about instances in which 
communities got to know about sex offenders living in their midst already existed and 
new insights that emerged in light of the News of the World's name-and-shame 
campaign were quickly documented by the dossier of evidence produced by ACOP
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and ACPO. Secondly, the evidence had clear implications for action. Although there 
was no clear understanding of the effectiveness of Megan's Law, the evidence that 
existed from within Britain indicated that blanket sex offender community notification 
was likely to lead to vigilantism and reduce sex offenders’ compliance with 
registration requirements, thereby increasing the risk to society. As such the evidence 
pointed against the introduction of such measures. Thirdly, the evidence used by the 
opponents of Megan's Law was consistent with the existing policy approach that 
community notification should only be used as an exception and must be justified on 
'the basis of likelihood of the harm which non-disclosure might otherwise cause'1 
(Home Office 1997, p 18 - for further details see Appendix 1). The evidence also 
originated from sources that were trusted and considered to be authoritative in the area 
of sex offender management and victim protection (Document 22).
While support for the six factors facilitating evidence-use can be found in the overall 
set of evidence used within the debate, they do not necessarily apply to all individual 
instances thereof. For example, in its conclusion the NSPCC report points out that
‘ [i]t is possible that there are both intended and unintended, positive and 
negative outcomes of community notification. We simply do no know 
enough about these at this time... [T]here is clearly a need for further 
research in the US’ (Lovell 2001, p 35).
As has been shown in Chapter 6, the findings could not provide any clear 
recommendations regarding the effectiveness of blanket community notification 
policies. The NSPCC found that policymakers would have preferred black-and-white 
conclusions and recommendations but this does not seem to have stopped the NSPCC 
report from becoming influential. While one reason for this appears to be the 
comprehensive nature of the report, its uptake might also be related to its 
‘independent’ nature. It provided policy makers with an opportunity to refer to an 
outside, non-governmental source, which implies an objective policy position. For 
example one Home Office representative pointed out:
‘ [W]e have concluded that extending access to the information on 
the register of sex offenders would not improve child protection. There is 
no evidence from the United States that their community notification laws 
reduce offending against children and very little evidence that they 
enhance child safety in any way. Research by the National Society for
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the Prevention of Cruelty to Children has confirmed this conclusion" 
(Personal Correspondence).
The case study stresses that another important point in the uptake and accumulation of 
evidence on a topic seems to be its perceived importance in the future. As Chapter 6 
highlighted, the NSPCC’s in-depth research on the effectiveness of Megan's Law was 
to some extent motivated by the perception that the question of community 
notification was very likely to arise again in the future, especially following cases 
similar to the Sarah Payne one, and therefore it merited further exploration.
Finally, as can be seen in the case of the dossier of evidence and the experiences of 
ACOP and ACPO in using that dossier, the use of ‘good stories’ to exemplify a point 
is important if evidence is to have an impact.
Chapter 2 highlighted that within the existing literature on evidence-based policy 
making three types of policy fields have been suggested. These are: stable policy 
fields, where a well-established evidence base can be found and which provides some 
directions as what to do; policy fields in a flux, where policies are perceived as 
inadequate but where despite an understanding that things need to change there is no 
general agreement on potential solutions and the available knowledge-base is 
contested; and finally, novel policy fields, where as a result of the novelty of the topic 
no reliable evidence-base exists (Mulgan 2002; Mulgan 2003).
The Sarah's Law debate was not a novel policy field; neither sex offender 
management nor community notification policies are recent developments. However, 
the extent to which it is a stable policy field or one in a flux is debatable. The overall 
field of sex offender management can be understood to be in a flux, given that there 
was agreement that existing sex offender policies were inadequate and changes was 
necessary and the available evidence-base was to some extent contested. However, 
one can also argue that it is a stable policy field. As mentioned in Chapter 4, from 
around the mid-1990s a relatively good understanding of effective approaches to sex 
offender management had started to become established and in the Sarah's Law debate 
this was combined with the insights from various name-and-shame campaigns. Policy 
changes within this field were introduced incrementally, especially the amendments to
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existing legislation in light of the Sarah's Law debate, providing further support for 
the stable policy field argument. So it is possible to simultaneously identify support 
for two different categories of policy fields. While Mulgan (2003) seems to 
understand these categories to be operating on an either-or nature, so that a policy 
field is either stable, fixed or in a flux, it seems any such typology needs to treat the 
resulting categories as far more interlinked and fluent, as illustrated in Diagram 7.3.
Diagram 7.3: Novel, Stable and Policy Fields in a Flux
inherently Novel Field
- Newness prevents a strong evidence-base
- Limited, if any understanding of what does and does not work
..... .........
▼
■ Stable Policy Field
Policy Field in a Flux
- policies that once worked are no longer appropriate •
- general understanding that things need to change ..............................
- great deal of experimentation
- disagreement over basic theoretical approaches, 
potential solutions and the knowledge-base in general :
While one can assume that any policy field starts out at some point as an inherently 
new one, relevant evidence and an increased understanding of what works will begin 
to build up. Consequently, as indicated by the shaded areas in the diagram, it will start
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to evolve into a more stable policy field. By the same token, it is safe to assume that 
over time and in light of socio-cultural as well as scientific developments, at least 
some of the aspects of a policy field will take on the shape of a policy field in flux. 
Once again it is unlikely that there is one single ‘swing’ moment whereby a stable 
policy field suddenly becomes one in a flux but rather it may lean more towards one 
or the other. As such, the fields don’t seem to have clear boundaries.
If there is no clearly demarcated border between these three types of policy fields 
however, the perception that one can only speak of evidence-based policy making in 
stable policy fields, with the making of policies in other areas at best being policy- 
informed (Mulgan 2003), is questionable and seems to be too narrow.
Competing Influences
As highlighted in Chapter 2, it is often assumed that evidence has to compete 
with a variety of other influences in the policy process. Such factors are considered to 
include lobbyists and pressure groups, habits and tradition, values, resources, 
judgement as well as pragmatics and contingencies (Davies 2004).
When looking at any other influences with which research evidence had to compete in 
the Sarah's Law debate, it seems that first and foremost competition arose from other 
evidence used to substantiate a position. As previously illustrated in Table 7.1, both 
opponents and proponents of blanket community notification used a comparable set of 
evidence: research findings and statistics, practitioner knowledge and emotive 
examples. This means that any piece of evidence was not only competing with any 
opposing evidence within the same category, such as for example practitioner 
knowledge supporting community notification competing with practitioner knowledge 
opposing it, but also with evidence put forward in any of the other two categories.
Given that the habits and traditions within the British penal approach appear to have 
been based more in ideas of prevention and treatment as opposed to the more punitive 
approach taken in the US and that the values, resources and pragmatics at the time all 
seem to have supported the position put forward by the alliance of organisation’s 
evidence, not a lot of other sources of influence with which the evidence had to
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compete can be identified. Those that can be identified are some public pressure and 
potentially any links or interests governmental representatives might have had in 
relation to the News of the World, as discussed in Chapter 5. However, it seems that 
neither of these aspects presented a real competition for the use of evidence.
The question that emerges is why the available evidence did not seem to face much 
competition from other sources. Although it is only possible to speculate about the 
answer to this question it might have something to do with the controversial and 
sensitive nature of the policy area of sexual offences. From a policy perspective it can 
be assumed that in light of the sensitive nature of the topic it is in the policymakers’ 
interest to focus the debate around the available evidence and thus make a 
controversial policy area conforming as closely to Mulgan’s idea of a stable policy 
field as possible. Referring to the available evidence can potentially provide a 
safeguard in that the policymaker can ‘hide’ behind evidence and refer to ‘expert 
sources’, thereby making him or her less susceptible to any potential attacks. The 
likely proximity of the next general election (in the event held in 2001) may have 
heightened this process. .
Summarising the main points that have arisen in relation to evidence-use in the policy 
process, it seems that in the short-term evidence is used in a strategic way by the 
various players in a policy network but that over a longer period of time instrumental 
and conceptual use also occur. A reasonable passage of time is necessary for the latter 
two forms of evidence-use to occur. While to some extent policymakers prefer 
straightforward black-and-white recommendations that have been extracted from the 
available information, this does not appear to be necessary for research findings to 
become influential. Factors identified as facilitating evidence use are the origin, 
presentation and timing of evidence. The rigid distinction of various policy fields 
according to the standing and role of evidence was not found to be useful, although a 
more fluid model for characterising evidence-use in different parts of a policy field 
and over time may be helpful.
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Lesson-Drawing
As was pointed out in Chapter 2, the concept of lesson-drawing could be seen 
as consisting of three consecutive steps (Mossberger and . Wolman 2001). First of all, 
there is the search for information on what can be learnt from other countries or other 
points in time. Secondly, there is a need to evaluate the resultant findings. Finally, 
there is the application of any lessons, and from an academic view the exploration of 
the extent to which any findings are actually used in the policy process. As a result, 
the questions of lessons’ origin, the characteristics of lessons as well as how and to 
which extent they are used will be the focus of the following sections.
Lesson Sources
The perception within the existing literature is that there are two main sources 
for drawing lessons: a country’s own history and other countries (Rose 1993). Within 
the Sarah's Law debate it seems that both sources were drawn upon. On the one hand, 
this confirms the theoretical assumptions regarding potential sources for drawing 
lessons. On the other hand, it indicates the importance and breadth of the lesson­
drawing concept within the Sarah's Law debate.
Despite the unparalleled impact of the News of the World's name-and-shame 
campaign, the concept of such campaigns was nothing new and had been used in the 
UK on previous occasions. This has been outlined in Chapter 4. Previous outings of 
sex offenders had provided a ready pool of information on the effect such campaigns 
had had on the work with sex offenders and the community at large from which a 
number of lessons could be drawn. Within the British context potential avenues for 
improving sex offender policies had also emerged from practice. These could be used 
in developing a policy response to the Sarah's Law Campaign and were used as a 
basis for coming up with the concept of MAPPAs. As such lesson-drawing across 
time and across Britain was possible and indeed seems to have taken place.
Along with this, the search for lessons also covered insights that could be learnt from 
other countries. In the literature it is argued that a country will normally look towards 
those countries that are perceived as being most similar rather than those which are
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geographically closest, so that the UK has usually turned towards America and 
Australia instead of, for example, Europe (Rose 2001; Pierson 2003). In this respect 
the case of Sarah's Law does not seem to be any different and has confirmed this 
tendency to look towards countries which are considered to be similar to one’s own 
when looking for potential lessons. As has been seen in Chapter 6, the attention 
focused on America and initially to some extent on Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand. The focus on these countries also makes sense in terms of policy 
developments on sex offender management and community notification that had 
previously taken place within them. As a result of highly publicised sex offences, 
similar policy pressures had emerged in these countries during the 1990s. Over the 
last 10 to 20 years in each of these countries there has been an increasing concern 
about introducing effective measures for managing sex offenders and protecting the 
community. In all cases, the idea of a national sex offender register was put forward 
as one step towards achieving this goal. Although it was only in 2004 that all 
countries had finally set up a national sex offender register, various registers had 
previously been set up at a local or federal level and the debate surrounding such 
registers was in all cases under way by the early 1990s. In terms of the five styles of 
policy convergence, identified by Bennett (1991) and outlined in Table 2.8, in the 
case of sex offender legislation, there has been a convergence of policy goals, content 
and instruments between these countries.
While the existing literature seems to assume that it is normally governments who 
look abroad with the intention to draw lessons (see for example Jones and Newburn 
2002; Jones and Newburn 2002b; Dolowitz 2003; Pierson 2003), in this case the 
driving force seems to have been the News of the World's campaign. As such the 
impetus for lesson-drawing came from outside rather than within government. 
Policymakers had, however, previously examined Megan's Law in light of the Sex 
Offenders Act 1997. These points imply that lesson-drawing can arise both as a result 
of active search for lessons or through a more passive getting to know about lessons 
and then using them in the current policy context with the driving forces including 
both governmental and non-governmental players.
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Lesson Evaluation
Following on from the gathering of information, the literature argues that 
potential lessons are examined in light of at least two factors: political desirability and 
technical feasibility. The former addresses the consistency of potential lessons with 
existing values, goals and aspirations, while the latter explores the practicalities of any 
implementation. Once again, it seems that lesson-drawing in the Sarah's Law debate 
incorporated both types of examination. As has been seen in Chapter 5 the 
compatibility of blanket community notification with the existing values and goals of 
the British approach to sex offender management runs throughout the debate. As was 
pointed out in the same chapter, the Home Office’s Mental Health Unit also looked 
into the feasibility of increasing public access to information on sex offenders and 
examined various points relating to the implementation and practicality of such 
schemes.
The literature on lesson evaluation suggests four possible scenarios regarding the 
desirability and practicality of transferring a policy (highly desirable and practical, 
highly desirable but not very practical, highly practical but not desirable and neither 
desirable nor practical - see Table 2.10). The available information on blanket 
community notification indicated that it had a low desirability and can be classified as 
having a low practicality too. It was not desirable in that it interfered with the 
effective management of sex offenders and potentially increased the risks to society; it 
was not practical in that no possibility of revealing information to some parts of 
society without risking the leaking of such information could be envisaged. It is 
therefore understandable that no transfer of blanket community notification policies 
took place.
Lesson Usage
The picture that has emerged so far is that although extensive lesson-drawing 
appears to have taken place throughout the Sarah's Law debate, the lessons that were 
drawn in relation to community notification policies were negative - after considering 
a policy implemented in another place or at another time a decision is made not to go 
down that policy route - and did not lead to a policy transfer This negative outcome, 
although theoretically possible and mentioned as one possibility by Newmark (2002)
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and Dolowitz and Marsh (1996), is not explored in detail in the literature. It is 
therefore useful to adapt the typologies of usage put forward by Rose (1993) and 
Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) and include a category for non-implementation in those 
cases in which the lessons learnt were of a negative nature. This might be referred to 
as ‘dismissal’ (see Table 7.2).
Table 7.2: Alternative Ways of Drawing a Lesson Including
Negative Lessons
Copying
Enacting more or less intact a
program already in effect in another
jurisdiction
Adaptation
Adjusting for contextual differences a
program already in effect in another
jurisdiction
Making a Hybrid
Combining elements of programs
from two different places
Synthesis
Combining familiar elements from
programs in a number of different
places to create a new program
Inspiration
Using programs elsewhere as an
intellectual stimulus to develop a
novel program
Dismissal
Not enacting a policy after it is
noticed that the lessons that can be
drawn are of a negative nature
(Based on and extended from Rose 1993, p 30)
While so far the discussion about lesson-drawing has been based on the generally 
accepted perception that lesson-drawing relates to the use of insights gained on 
policies, administrative arrangements or institutions in the development of other
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policies, administrative’arrangements or institutions (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996), it 
appeal’s that lesson-drawing is far more encompassing than this. As can be seen from 
the Sarah's Law case, it is not limited to the content of a policy issue, but also applies 
to the tactics used by others in pursuing a particular policy outcome. For example, the 
News of the World's Sarah's Law Campaign seems to have been modelled directly on 
the campaign for Megan's Law that was run by Megan’s parents in New Jersey in 
1995. As such, lesson-drawing seems to focus on process issues, such as tactics, and 
not just on insights about policies, administrative arrangements or institutions.
Some of the shortcomings with the existing literature on policy transfer raised in 
Chapter 2 were that it does not provide sufficient consideration of the circumstances 
in which lesson-drawing is likely to arise, who is likely to initiate it and why, or the 
form it is likely to take (Pierson 2003). This research provides some insights into 
these areas. Although further findings from other cases are needed, it seems that 
lesson-drawing in an area is likely to arise at times of heightened policy activity 
within that area, when ‘quick-fix solutions’ are required and/or when there is 
dissatisfaction with existing policies. It appears that lesson-drawing can be initiated 
by a variety of actors, including the media, as in this case, rather than just 
policymakers.
When looking at the shape of lesson-drawing, it is important to understand policy 
transfer both spatially and temporally, that is lesson-drawing across space and across 
time. The exploration of Megan's Law is an instance of ‘traditional’ spatial lesson­
drawing, where one country analyses another’s policy. However, the introduction of 
MAPPAs, one of the policy outcomes of the Sarah's Law debate described in Chapter 
6, appears to have evolved from local initiatives in the UK; promising approaches in 
dealing with sex offenders were ‘transferred’ to a national level. Simultaneously, the 
examination of previous name-and-shame is an example of lesson-drawing across 
time within the same county. So, it is useful to think of lesson-drawing as comprising 
local, national and international levels as well as time. The overall insights from the 
Sarah Payne debate for lesson-drawing are summarised in Diagram 7.4 which moves 
from the need for inspiration or a dissatisfaction with existing policies or practices 
through a consideration of various sources to a range of outcomes.
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Diagram 7.4: Understanding Lesson-Drawing
Diagram 7.4 may give the impression that the overall lesson-drawing process is a 
rational decision-making process. However, as previously mentioned, lesson-drawing 
is an activity undertaken by all players in a policy network. Although these players 
may make rational assessments about the relevance and usefulness of various lessons 
in light of their own interests and motives, this does not mean that the overall lesson­
drawing process is best characterised as a rational, problem-solving process. 
Furthermore, when assessing the desirability of importing lessons from elsewhere, 
there is potential for the overall lesson-drawing process to be influenced by fads and 
fashion as well as conscious rational choices.
Having looked at policy networks, evidence and lesson-drawing, the question remains 
as to how the relationship between the three concepts can be understood.
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The Nexus between Policy Networks, Evidence and Lesson­
Drawing
As has been seen throughout the thesis, policy networks, evidence-use and 
lesson-drawing are important concepts that explain the modern policy process. Policy 
networks provide an analytical tool through which one can explore the characteristics 
of the forum in which policy discussion and policy formulation takes place. It 
highlights the way in which various players get together in order to debate policy 
issues, the players’ background as well as their reasons for participating in the debate. 
In addition, it draws attention to the actions they take and most importantly how the 
policy network participants are linked with each other on a personal and 
organisational level. Analysing the use of evidence highlights the extent to which a 
policy is based on insights that can be gained from research and practice and the 
competing role of other influences on the policy process. Simultaneously it draws 
attention to the way(s) in which research and other evidence is used. Finally, the 
concept of lesson-drawing prompts a broader examination of the origin of various 
policy ideas and situates a policy development within a wider geographical and 
historical context.
Thus, all three concepts of policy networks, evidence-use and lesson-drawing 
highlight different features of the policy making process. Within the existing literature 
each of these three concepts tends to be considered in isolation from the others, but 
the issues they address display a large degree of interconnectedness. The concepts 
thus act as complementary lenses that provide a richer understanding of the processes 
at work in the making of policy. It is therefore useful to consider these three concepts 
in combination when exploring policy making. But how do they fit together?
This question is discussed in the remainder of this chapter. First of all, the relationship 
between evidence and lesson-drawing is examined. Thereafter, evidence and lesson­
drawing are linked to the concept of policy networks. Finally, an emerging model of 
their interconnection is discussed and further questions that need to be addressed 
about this relationship are highlighted.
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The two concepts of evidence-based policy making and lesson-drawing are closely 
related. When talking about one of the concepts it is very likely that one automatically 
addresses facets of the other. For example, when looking at lessons that can be learnt 
from sex offender policies in the US and their applicability to the British context, one 
inevitably needs to address the available evidence-base on such policies. At the same 
time, when trying to base policies in the best available evidence, lesson-drawing is 
inevitable. Although this might not necessarily include lesson-drawing across 
international boundaries in that the focus could be solely on one’s own country it will, 
by force of circumstance, at least include the drawing of lessons across time within 
that one country. The concepts of evidence-based policy making and lesson-drawing 
can thus potentially be used interchangeably in that they both address the search for 
effective policies and practices.
In Chapter 2, ‘evidence’ was defined as a "systematic investigation towards 
increasing the sum of knowledge' (Davies, Nutley et al. 2000b, p 3), while the activity 
of lesson-drawing was described as
4 a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative 
arrangements, institutions etc. in one time and/or place is used in the 
development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in 
another time and/or place' (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, p 344).
Albeit addressing similar issues, unlike their parent concepts of evidence-based policy 
making and the concept of lesson-drawing, these two terms, when approached from a 
process perspective, cannot be used interchangeably. Rather, it seems that they 
complement each other in that evidence provides the basis for lesson-drawing; had 
there not been any indication as to the impact of name-and-shame campaigns in the 
British context nor any signs as to what constitutes effective sex offender 
management and victim protection, it would have been impossible to draw any 
lessons. Nonetheless, the evidence-base could have existed without any lessons being 
drawn. Given that lesson-drawing necessitates evidence but evidence does not require 
lesson-drawing it seems that lesson-drawing might be conceptualised as a second step 
that may follow on from the collection of evidence. Although they address different 
aspects, it might therefore be useful to combine the notion of evidence and the act of 
lesson-drawing, and to understand them as two parts that potentially make up the 
knowledge-base on an issue.
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However, although lessons can be drawn from any available evidence, it is possible 
that the same piece of evidence can lead to different lessons. While the News of the 
World argued that the lesson from the American Megan's Law was that community 
notification is an efficient measure in child protection, this view was not shared by the 
other organisations involved in the policy network.
It is thus useful to differentiate between latent evidence, that which could be used and 
active evidence, that which is used. These two categories are related to latent lessons, 
those that could be drawn, and active lessons, those that are drawn. These points are 
summarised in Diagram 7.5.
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Diagram 7.5: The Relationship between Evidence and Lesson­
Drawing
j b b 1 b
Research - 
Evidence
Practice
Knowledge
Research
Evidence
Practice
Knowledge
The discussion so far paints the picture of an evidence and knowledge-base existing 
independently of the policy networks which might make use of this evidence-base. 
However, the analysis of the Sarah's Law network suggests at least three ways of 
envisaging the links between a knowledge-base and a policy network: first, 
knowledge exists independently from a policy network and its actors and is used by 
them; second, knowledge is dependant on a policy network; and third, knowledge is a 
determinant of a policy network’s characteristics. Each of these categories is 
considered in more detail below.
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In relation to the first point, knowledge on sex offender community notification had 
started to accumulate nationally and internationally in detail during the 1990s. As 
such, evidence had started to build up with the result that a variety of lessons could be 
drawn therefrom. Part of this knowledge existed independently of any of the 
organisations involved in the Sarah's Law network or any of its players. At the same 
time, some of this knowledge had started to be taken up by a number of the 
organisations working in the area of sex offender management and victim protection. 
Additional insights, such as the effects of name-and-shame campaigns within Britain 
had been gained by for example ACOP and ACPO. Although there was a certain 
degree of overlapping knowledge, such as the understanding by members of the 
alliance of organisations that community notification could lead to sex offenders 
going underground, one can also identify some player-unique knowledge such as the 
lessons learnt by ACOP and ACPO from previous name-and-shame campaigns.
So, different players will bring various sets of active evidence and lessons regarding a 
policy topic to a policy network. From the broader pool of evidence on a policy topic 
different players will identify various sorts of evidence. These can be different from 
those identified by other players or the same. In addition, the scope of the identified 
evidence can differ. The evidence will become each player’s ‘active evidence’. Within 
these sets of evidence various latent lessons exist that could be drawn. Depending on 
each players interests, background and operational context the sort of lessons drawn 
from the evidence by each player can again be the same or differ and be higher or 
lesser in number. Those lessons that are drawn then represent a players active lessons. 
Different constellations of actors can thus result in diverse knowledge-bases within a 
policy network. This is illustrated in Diagram 7.6. While it can be assumed that the 
lessons that are drawn from a set of evidence can be influenced by players motives 
and interests, this is an area that needs further research.
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Diagram 7.6: Policy Actors and their Knowledge-Base
Player A Player B
Interests/Motives \ Interests/Motives i
Active
Lessons
• ••
f
>1
Active
Lessons
• •
] i 1Hi 1J [ 1r
{
Latent
Lessons
<
* ! < i'* « *• ■*.»*■ ** a. 4* *> .»***•
’ L » L *
* * &
•* * 1
%
■■
 ...
...
...
...
...
..
5
Latent
Lessons
L ,«•, »«
: L L * L
*
i 1
Active
Evidence
Active
Evidence
•:
::
Active
Evidence
oooo
—A----- -------------
: • ee :I ® ©
z
1 v
I
t
* *■* **. 5 ♦»
5......
t
L/ ; x
•' Latent Evic
LJ
X
5* ‘ Z * «fc !ence ;
5 « * LJ,.......
*****•1
A A
-231 -
Although the knowledge within a policy network is thereby partly pre-determined it 
can develop further as the policy network operates. This is illustrated in the Sarah's 
Law network by the information-gathering and knowledge-creating activities by 
members of the alliance of organisations. As a result of these activities the 
knowledge-base within the policy network was expanded further. Once again, 
knowledge-creation is likely to be linked to the interests of network members. This 
means that the composition of a policy network will in turn again influence the 
knowledge-base referred to in the policy discussion within that network.
Finally, the knowledge-base of various potential network members also seems to 
influence the shape of the policy network. As can be seen from Chapter 5’s discussion 
of how the various players became involved in the Sarah's Law network, the 
perceived knowledge and expertise that an organisation had on the topic of sex 
offender management and victim protection was one reason why an organisation got 
drawn into or became voluntarily involved in the policy debate and had thereby 
became part of the policy network.
A number of points have arisen from this discussion. First of all, it is useful to 
consider the relationship between policy networks, evidence and lesson-drawing 
concepts in combination when exploring the policy process. Secondly, the concepts of 
evidence and lesson-drawing appear to be intrinsically linked in that lesson-drawing is 
dependent upon evidence. It is useful to consider potential evidence and lessons as 
well as the evidence that was actually used and the lessons that were drawn in order to 
compare possibilities with actualities and thereby gain an understanding of the 
robustness of the latter in light of the former. The resulting knowledge-base that 
players can arrive at collectively determines the overall knowledge-base within a 
policy network on the one hand, while at the same time, the extent of knowledge a 
player is perceived to have can determine the composition of the policy network. In 
other words, the knowledge-base both determines the shape of the policy network and 
vice versa.
While the emerging points provide some insights into the relationship between the 
policy network, evidence and lesson-drawing, further research is needed in order to 
explore these insights more broadly.
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Summary
This chapter has used the Sarah Payne case to critically assess and augment 
the existing three concepts of policy networks, evidence-use and lesson-drawing. 
Each of these concepts has emerged as an important aspect of policy making that 
needs to be addressed when trying to understand the policy process.
What emerges from the application of the policy network concepts of iron triangles, 
issue networks, policy communities and advocacy coalitions to the Sarah Payne 
network, is that although each of them explains some of the features that were found, 
none of them is all-encompassing. The areas that present concepts neglect include the 
question of each player’s degree of choice in network involvement, the variety of 
reasons that can drive players’ participation, issues of alliance formation, the role of 
organisational and personal links within the network and their impact on network 
operation.
Another area that has not been paid sufficient attention to in the literature is the issue 
of network emergence. Some support was found for the wave-like nature of policy 
topics’ presence on the policy agenda and the importance of examining policy 
networks within their broader policy context as well as their history within that policy 
context if one is to understand network emergence.
Evidence appears to have featured prominently in the policy development surrounding 
the Sarah's Law debate. This is a surprising feature in that policies regarding sex 
offenders are frequently a result of a knee-jerk reaction and driven by public outcries 
rather than being based in evidence. Overall, three types of evidence can be identified 
as having been used: research findings and statistics; practitioner knowledge; and 
emotive examples. Of these, the major source of evidence drawn upon in the policy 
debate appears to have been practitioner knowledge. Support was found for the 
importance ascribed to the presentation and availability of evidence within the 
existing literature on evidence-use and policymakers’ apparent preference for 
straightforward recommendations that have been extracted from the available 
evidence. However, the latter does not seem to be a necessary requirement for
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research in order for it to be influential, as illustrated by the NSPCC report on the 
effectiveness of Megan's Law.
In respect to lesson-drawing, some support was found for the assumption that 
psychological rather than geographical proximity is likely to influence a country’s 
choice of focus when looking for potential lessons. Another important point that 
emerged was that lesson-drawing needs to be understood more broadly. It is not only 
governments who draw lessons, all players within the Sarah's Law debate drew 
lessons from elsewhere, albeit to a different extent. Within the concept of lesson­
drawing it also seems necessary to incorporate the idea of negative lesson-drawing 
which addresses the situation in which lessons were drawn, but it was decided not to 
transfer a policy as a result thereof.
Finally, it emerged that the three areas of policy network, evidence-based policy 
making and lesson-drawing are closely connected and need to be addressed in 
combination when looking at the policy process. Both evidence and lesson-drawing 
make up the knowledge-base on a topic and that knowledge-base can both be 
determined by a policy network’s make-up as well as determine it. It is influenced by 
a policy network’s composition in that each participant will have a certain amount of 
individual knowledge, which in total specifies the network’s overall knowledge-base. 
At the same time, the perceived and actual knowledge of an actor on a policy issue 
will have an effect on the perceived desirability of that player’s involvement in a 
specific policy network.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
This concluding chapter provides an overview of the thesis and its main 
findings before moving on to reflect on the research’s contribution, its strengths and 
limitations, and the avenues it suggests for further research.
Thesis Overview
The starting point for this thesis was an interest in improving our 
understanding of the policy process by exploring the influence and interconnection of 
policy networks, evidence and lesson-drawing on policy making. Each of these 
concepts has had a long history in relation to the formulation of policy but it has been 
mainly over the last decade that the three concepts have achieved particular 
prominence in descriptive and normative models of the policy process.
From the literature on policy networks, evidence-based policy making and lesson­
drawing, a set of research questions emerged: What are the key parameters of policy 
networks? How is evidence used within the policy process? How are lessons drawn? 
These questions were developed further into a set of more detailed questions which, 
along with the theoretical content of the concepts of policy networks, evidence-based 
policy making and lesson-drawing, provided the theoretical lenses for the empirical 
research project. Due to the nature of the questions that were being asked it was 
decided that the best way of exploring these was through a case study using 
documentary analysis and elite interviews.
After looking into various options, an area identified as a promising one for exploring 
these research questions was the field of criminal justice. The relationship between 
evidence and criminal justice has often been a strained one in the past and the 
existence of various popular misperceptions about effective policies in offender 
management appeared to have acted as an obstacle to evidence-based policy making, 
especially in the area of sex offender policies.
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Within the criminal justice field the case of Sarah Payne and the debate about sex 
offender community notification was selected for detailed case consideration. The 
reason for this was that this case addressed an area in which public opinion and 
insights from research and practice frequently clash; policies relating to sex offenders 
are often perceived as being driven by public outcries rather than being based on 
evidence of what works best. In addition, the case was considered to be particularly 
interesting in that despite some initial indications that the British Government might 
introduce blanket sex offender community notification, modelled on the American 
Megan's Law, in the end it resisted such calls. Instead, a number of other measures 
aimed at managing sex offenders and protecting the community were introduced.
When exploring the debate about community notification following Sarah Payne’s 
death, it emerged that the decision not to introduce blanket community notification in 
the UK was influenced by the pre-existing British knowledge-base on sex offender 
management and victim protection. This knowledge-base consisted of various pieces 
of research, documented practitioner experience, and previous British experiences of 
cases in which communities got to know about sex offenders living in their midst. In 
addition, evidence on the effectiveness of blanket community notification available 
from the US played a supporting role; the campaigns for and against the introduction 
of blanket community notification in the UK drew on evidence from the American 
debate and approaches used there. As such, lesson-drawing both across time and 
space could be identified as an important aspect in the policy debate and policy 
development.
Another key factor that influenced the nature and flow of the policy debate was the 
structure and nature of the network of players involved. One network characteristic 
that emerged as being especially important was the nature and extent of personal and 
organisational links within the policy network. These related both to pre-existing and 
emerging links amongst network participants as well as those that existed for reasons 
other than the policy debate that was taking place. Such links provided both 
opportunities and obstacles for the players involved and the operation of the overall 
network. A combination of different motives, ranging from economic to emotional 
reasons, can be identified as underlying the involvement of key players in the Sarah's 
Law network and these too are important in explaining network interactions.
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All of this provided a number of insights in relation to the existing literature on policy 
networks, evidence-based policy making and policy transfer which are discussed in 
the next section.
Research Contributions
This research makes various contributes towards our understanding of the 
policy process, the operation and influence of policy networks, the use of evidence 
within the policy process and the drawing of lessons. And, in analysing the Sarah 
Payne case, it also contributes a clearer understanding of those particular events.
First of all, in relation to this latter point, the research provides some detailed insights 
into the reasons why, despite similarities in policy rhetoric and style between the 
debates on sex offender community notification in the US and the UK, there have 
been differences in policy outcome. It thus provides an answer as to why, in the face 
of an overall tendency within Britain to import criminal justice policy approaches 
from the US, no policy transfer took place in this case.
In addition to such case-specific insights, a number of theoretical contributions 
emerge from the exploration of the Sarah Payne case. First of all, it has reinforced the 
perception that policy networks, evidence and lesson-drawing are three key defining 
features of the modern policy process and that they are closely related to one another. 
As a result, it is important to consider them in combination when exploring the policy 
process.
Within the area of policy networks, it was found that although each of the main 
concepts for understanding networks - iron triangles, issue networks, policy 
communities and advocacy coalitions - highlight some important aspects of policy 
networks, when analysing the Sarah's Law network none of the concepts and the 
assumptions that underpin them provided a sufficient characterisation of that network. 
Several aspects of the Sarah's Law network are not fully addressed by these existing 
concepts, such as the degree of choice participants have in getting involved in a policy 
network, the causes and processes of alliance building between players within a
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network, and the importance, characteristics and impact of organisational and 
personal links that exist in such a network.
Furthermore, while taken together the four main concepts for understanding policy 
networks stress different reasons for players’ involvement in a network, each concept 
makes an argument for there being one defining reason for involvement. In contrast 
the study of the Sarah's Law network demonstrates that there was a variety of 
organisational reasons for network participation rather than one defining one. And it is 
likely that on top of this there were particular personal reasons for involvement as 
well.
The research highlights the difficulties in defining a network’s origin, in that a policy 
topic can have a longer history than an individual policy network. However, the 
exploration of the various points at which sex offender community notification played 
a prominent role on the British policy agenda provides some support for agenda­
setting theories as put forward by Baumgartner and Jones (1991; 1993) and Kingdon 
(1984), which explain why and when a topic rises up the policy agenda. Specific 
policy networks, it appears, emerge as a topic becomes prominent, and these specific 
networks draw upon ongoing networks of interaction amongst the key organisations 
working in the particular policy field.
In relation to evidence-based policy making evidence appeared to play an important 
role in shaping policy formulation in the Sarah's Law debate. The standard societal 
response to sex crimes is that a sexually motivated murder of a child or woman by 
someone who happens to have a record of sex crimes throws a community into panic, 
this is then given huge publicity before the quest for effective social response by the 
agitated community leads to political knee-jerk reactions of tougher policing or 
harsher sentencing (Sutherland 1950; Sampson 1994; Lieb 2000). However, in the 
Sarah's Law case the debate focused on presenting ‘evidence-based’ arguments about 
the most effective ways of managing sex offenders.
The evidence that was used within the Sarah's Law debate falls into three categories: 
research findings and statistics; practitioner knowledge; and emotive examples. The 
most prominent role appears to have been played by practitioner knowledge, an area
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that is not fully explored within the literature on evidence-based policy making. 
Although practitioner knowledge is considered to be one of the lower forms of 
evidence in the hierarchy of evidence used within medicine, it seems to be a useful 
one in this policy area.
Within the existing literature a number of ways in which evidence can enter the policy 
process have been identified. In the Sarah's Law debate the way in which evidence 
entered the policy process was mainly of a strategic nature - that is, to support an 
argument. However, this might be attributable to the controversial nature of the case 
and the short timescale it covers. There are some indications that when looking at sex 
offender policies over a longer period of time both instrumental and conceptual use of 
evidence occurred. It may be that various categories of evidence-use can be identified 
more clearly if one looks at a broader timescale.
Some support was found in the case study for the view that the format and 
accessibility of evidence are important factors in explaining the uptake of evidence. 
There is also some evidence that policy makers and practitioners prefer clear-cut 
recommendations that have been extracted from research. However, the absence of 
clear-cut findings does not mean that a piece of research will not become influential. 
Instead, the determining key factors explaining the influence of research evidence in 
this case were its comprehensiveness and its perceived value for future policy debates 
on the same topic as well as the assumed integrity of the evidence-provider.
One of the key insights to emerge from the case analysis is that the concept of policy 
transfer is intrinsically linked to the idea of evidence-based policy making, although 
the two areas have largely been treated as separate concerns in the existing literature. 
The drawing of lessons is dependent on the existence of evidence and can therefore be 
understood as a sub-set of evidence-based policy making.
The existing notion of lesson-drawing focuses too much on cases in which policy 
transfer has taken place. It is necessary to develop the concept further by including 
instances in which lessons were drawn but the idea of transferring a policy was 
dismissed in light of the emerging picture. Lesson-drawing is not limited to practice 
and policies but also includes issues of tactics and process that can be employed to
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initiate the formulation of new policies or practices. From this case it can be said that 
lesson-drawing is as an action pursued by all members of a policy network and not 
just those in governmental positions.
Although the purpose of this thesis is primarily to develop academic understanding of 
the policy process, it also provides the basis for some lessons for practice, i.e. for 
those engaged in the policy process. First of all, the case study emphasises the 
importance of understanding the reasons why people and organisations participate or 
do not participate in a policy network. There are likely to be multiple reasons and an 
exploration of these is helpful when seeking to build alliances and reach consensus.
Furthermore, in order to fully understand the policy field in which one is operating, 
special attention should be paid to any pre-existing or ongoing organisational or 
personal links that might exist between actors within a policy network. These links 
may not relate to the issue at hand but they can impact on network operation.
As regards evidence-based policy making, the importance of appropriate formats and 
channels of distribution in the dissemination of evidence has been confirmed. It is 
useful for evidence producers to bear in mind the timing, relevance, clarity, quality 
and political adeptness of their output as well as their reputation within the policy 
arena. Various forms of evidence will compete with one another for attention. As such 
it is useful to combine different formats of evidence presentation to increase impact, 
like for example including knowledge-based statements and emotive examples in 
reports of research findings. Using real life examples to which people can relate 
seems to be an important strategy to increase the influence of research findings, 
especially when wider distribution through the media is envisaged. Furthermore, 
given that evidence enters the policy process via a range of network actors, as part of 
any dissemination process it is important to target all network actors and not just 
governmental ones.
Finally, on the subject of policy transfer and lesson-drawing the thesis reiterates the 
importance of bearing in mind the socio-cultural context within which any lessons 
that have been drawn from abroad would be placed: not everything that could be 
transferred, even if it might be politically desirable and technically feasible, should be
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transferred. In addition to considering the cultural environment, ethical and moral 
issues need to be examined too.
Research Limitations
As a result of this research a more in-depth understanding of the events 
surrounding the case of Sarah Payne and the British debate about sex offender 
community notification has been achieved. And this understanding of the specific 
events has been used to enhance conceptual understanding of the policy process. 
Although a lot of hitherto unavailable information and insights have been gained 
through conducting the research, there are limitations to what has been achieved. One 
limitation relates to the restricted accessibility of documents and individuals’ 
willingness to participate in the research project. This was especially so in the cases of 
the News of the World and the Government. While a lot could be learnt from the 
available documents it would have been beneficial to have gained more insights into 
the News of the World's motivation and politicians’ perceptions and attitudes, as well 
as the extent and nature of the organisational and personal links between these two. 
Gaining such access to the media and politicians is, however, always likely to be 
fraught with difficulties.
A second issue that arises from the restricted accessibility of documents is the issue of 
selectivity. In most of the instances where individuals, usually interviewees, 
forwarded information to the researcher, people seemed to try to provide as much 
information as possible and a great degree of willingness to assist was noticeable. 
However, there is the possibility of conscious and/or unconscious selectivity, so that 
some of the important documentary information available was not included. Although 
there is the possibility that as a result of such selectivity some important insights that 
could have been gained have not been, the main problem likely to result from a 
selective forwarding of data is that the obtained information is skewed, thereby 
leading to a distorted picture of the events. While this cannot be ruled out, every 
attempt was made to counteract this danger by triangulating the data from various 
sources wherever possible.
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Another limitation relates to the chosen research methodology. As was mentioned in 
Chapter 3, the case study approach, especially if of a single-case nature, is not 
regarded as providing a good basis for generalisations. In this instance the problem 
could be confounded by the fact that it is not only a single-case study but also one that 
focuses on a rather exceptional instead of a more standard case of policy 
development. However, despite the uniqueness of the Sarah Payne case, policy 
formulation in light of ‘shock’ events seems to be more widespread. In addition, as 
was pointed out in Chapter 2, such shock events frequently offer the opportunity for 
policy change. In this respect, the characteristics displayed within this case might be 
less exceptional than they appear at first sight. However, further research into similar 
catalytic events in the same or other policy areas is required in order to assess this.
Methodological Reflections
Overall, it was found that the single-case study approach, using documentary 
analysis and elite interviews, is a useful way of analysing policy networks, evidence- 
based policy making and policy transfer. Despite its reputation as an historian’s rather 
than a social scientist’s tool, documentary analysis proved very useful in 
understanding the case. A qualitative analysis of available documents can make a 
better contribution to the social sciences than is sometimes assumed, especially when 
used in combination with elite interviews. Given its usefulness, documentary analysis 
warrants better consideration in research methods texts and more widespread 
application in research practice.
Despite the usefulness of documentary analysis, interviews with elite players were 
essential and documentary analysis alone would not have sufficed. Interviews with 
key players not only served the important function of providing further insights into 
and triangulation of the data obtained from documentary sources, but they were also 
an important means of gaining access to otherwise restricted documents. Given that 
access to such documents always followed the interview it meant that individuals 
could not be interviewed about the content of these documents at the time. It would 
therefore have been ideal to have had follow-up interviews with each of the players 
towards the end of the research in order to address issues arising from the emerging 
analysis but, due to resource constraints, this was not possible.
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Although the overall experience was that documentary analysis and elite interviews 
were useful research method, their use in a high profile or controversial policy area is 
problematic since the researcher is dependent on gaining access to individuals and 
potentially restricted documents. This access is likely to be more difficult to negotiate 
in such policy areas.
A final methodological reflection relates to the benefits of studying the policy process 
retrospectively. The retrospective analysis of the Sarah Payne case was beneficial for 
two reasons. First, the Sarah's Law debate has lost some of its sensitivity and as a 
result a more detailed documentation of the events was available than would probably 
have been available at the time. Second, retrospective analysis meant that it was 
possible to situate the case in its broader policy context by addressing prior and 
subsequent developments. However, in relation to researching such cases it is 
important to bear in mind that as temporal distance between a piece of research and its 
object of enquiry increases the reliability of recall accuracy by interviewees is likely 
to decrease. In addition, as was experienced throughout this research, documents 
relating to events that took place some time ago do get lost, destroyed or misplaced. 
As a result, the researcher needs to make a difficult judgement when researching a 
controversial topic: when is the point at which enough time has elapsed so that people 
are willing to talk and share their insights into what took place, while at the same time 
the event(s) are not too distant for people to remember intricate details and documents 
are not considered to be obsolete and therefore destroyed? While no generally 
applicable advice can be given, judging from the experiences of researching the Sarah 
Payne case three to five years distance between the original events and the detailed 
examination seems to be about right.
Potential Areas for Further Research
As has been indicated in this and the preceding chapter, a number of avenues 
for further research have opened up in light of this research. Of these, three areas for 
further research deserve to be highlighted: the extent and nature of organisational 
links within a policy network; the combination of different formats of evidence in 
policy debates; and the shape and extent of lesson-drawing by non-governmental 
players.
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Chapter 5 highlighted that pre-existing personal and organisational links between 
network actors, which do not relate directly to the policy issue under consideration, 
can potentially have a huge influence on the way in which a policy network operates. 
This includes the courses of action taken by network participants and the formulation 
of policies. Within the existing policy network literature this issue does not appear to 
be addressed well enough and warrants further exploration. Such research needs to 
consider the precise ways in which organisational and personal links influence policy 
networks and any actions other players might take in order to establish links of their 
own or counteract those of others.
A lot of the literature on evidence-based policy making is concerned with the 
evaluation of research findings within policy implementation. What is needed is a 
more detailed examination of how different forms of evidence are accessed, weighted 
and combined in the development of policies. This would be of special interest to 
evidence-providers and those trying to influence the policy process.
Since lesson-drawing appears to be a much broader activity than assumed in that all 
participants within a policy network seem to be doing this, the exploration of lesson­
drawing within policy networks merits further attention. Of special interest are the 
sources from which lessons are drawn, their nature, and the question of how and to 
which extent they are used and by whom.
Finally, given that the focus of this research was on a single case, there is always the 
issue of replication. It would be beneficial to compare and contrast the findings of this 
case study with other cases which investigate policy network activity when a policy 
topic is pushed on the policy agenda through a critical and controversial incident. 
There is also the need to further investigate how far the findings from this case relate 
to the ongoing, more ‘low-profile’ policy making process within the area of criminal 
justice and social policy more broadly.
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Appendix 1
The Broader Policy Context of the Sarah Payne Case:
practice and legislative developments in the area of 
sex offender management and victim protection
Developments in Practice
In Britain the 1990s had witnessed an increasing level of developments in the 
practice of sex offender management, both within prison and on release. Of special 
importance in this context is the Sex Offender Treatment Programme that had been set 
up in prisons, and the increasing co-operation and interdependence of the work done 
by the probation and police service (Interviewee 5).
The Sex Offender Treatment Programme (SOTP) started in 1991 as a result of the 
Woolf report and the Criminal Justice Act 1991, both of which provided specific 
recommendations for the management of sex offenders held in prisons. The 
programme was centrally designed and took into account research evidence on the 
effectiveness of various treatment approaches for sex offenders. A cognitive- 
behavioural approach was taken, which has been shown to be one of the most 
promising approaches for reducing recidivism (Mann 1998; Friendship, Mann et al. 
2003). The programme is centred around group work and is made up of five parts, 
outlined in Table Al.l. It was set up on a national scale in 1992 and its CORE 
programme was modified in both 1996 and 2000. These modifications extended the 
number of hours of treatment and introduced an accreditation system to ensure 
persistent quality of the programme (Friendship, Mann et al. 2003). The programme 
has gained international recognition and has been widely adopted either in its entirety 
or in parts in several other countries (Mann 1998).
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Table A1.1: Components of the Sex Offender Treatment Programme
1. Assessment of potential treatment effectiveness for each sex offender using 
interviews, psychometric testing, personality assessment, medical assessment and 
psycho-physiological testing of sexual arousal via penile plethysmograph. This leads 
to a decision regarding treatment suitability.
2. CORE Programme - First treatment programme an offender has to undertake 
with the goals of
• Reducing denial and minimisation
• Enhancing understanding of the victim’s experience
• Developing strategies for avoiding reoffending
3. ADAPTED CORE Programme - modified version of the CORE programme for 
offenders with an IQ of less than 80.
4. EXTENDED Programme - A second stage programme for offenders with high 
levels of deviance who successfully completed the first part but require further 
treatment not covered thereby. The goals are:
• Identifying and challenging patterns of dysfunctional thinking
• Improving management of emotions
• Improving relationship and intimacy skills
• Addressing deviant fantasies and sexual arousal
• Understanding the links of all these factors to sexual offending
5. BOOSTER Programme - A programme designed for those who successfully 
finished the CORE section and are about to be released from prison. The idea is to 
freshen up the lessons from previous sections as well as developing and practising 
aspects of the strategies developed to avoid reoffending
(Adapted from Mann 1998, pp 347-349)
Evaluations of the SOTP’s CORE Programme so far have indicated that it is 
successful at reducing reconvictions for low-risk offenders and has a significant 
impact on sexual and violent reconvictions for medium-risk offenders. While the
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focus is explicitly on sexual offending, violent offending appears also to be reduced in 
those who participated in the programme. Unfortunately, it is not sufficient at 
reducing reconvictions for high-risk offenders (Friendship, Mann et al. 2003).
Along with the setting up of a national treatment programme within prisons, from the 
early 1990s a growing co-operation started to emerge between various organizations 
involved in sex offender management, especially between police and the probation 
service. This related both to the actual management of sex offenders, as well as to the 
accumulation and sharing of information and intelligence on these offenders. 
Increasingly, the focus was on best practice. As a result, by the mid-1990s a relatively 
good understanding of the nature of sexual offences and offenders and how to deal 
with them, combined with ways of assessing the risk they posed to society, was in 
place (Interviewee 4).
On top of wider inter-agency co-operation there was also the development of various 
local practices when dealing with sex offenders, especially following the introduction 
of the Sex Offenders Act. One of the key developments appears to have been in the 
West-Midlands. A number of hospitals and other agencies involved in child protection 
were working closely together in the management of sex offenders. This had been 
developed informally by the probation and police services of West-Midlands and 
while similar arrangements had been set up across the country this one was working 
particularly well and provided the embryonic basis on which the Multi-Agency 
Protection Panels (MAPPAs) would be modelled following the Sarah Payne case 
(Interviewee 4).
Legislative Developments
The Sex Offenders Act 1997
The registration of criminals and the compilation of such information on a 
national register have a long history in the United Kingdom. The first notification 
system was set up in 1864 by the Penal Servitude Bill. This required {ticket-of-leave’ 
offenders to register with the police within three days of leaving prison and then on a 
monthly basis unless they changed address, in which case they were required to report
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to the police within 48 hours (Thomas 2000, p 41). Unfortunately, due to 
communication difficulties amongst the police and the lack of a central register the 
system did not work in maintaining accurate information on released prisoners. 
Consequently, in 1869 the Habitual Criminals Act established a national register of 
criminals within England, Wales and Ireland, extended to Scotland in 1871 by the, 
Prevention of Crimes Act, that was to be held at Scotland Yard and expected to be 
updated regularly. The success of this system was questionable and it was eventually 
dismantled by Winston Churchill in 1910 (Thomas 2000, pp 42-3). Eighty years later 
such a registration scheme, this time focusing on sex offenders, was back on the 
agenda with some of the key themes and arguments, resonating the concerns voiced in 
Victorian times.
While from the mid-1960s there appears to have been a tendency by the Home Office 
to inform local authorities about the release of certain kinds of sex offenders (Crow 
2001) and there are indications that the police has always kept records of people for 
sexual and other offences (Berman and Danby 2003), from around 1994 calls for a 
register of such offenders, especially of paedophiles, were increasingly aired. This 
idea had first been put forward at the annual general meeting of the British 
Association of Social Workers in 1988 (Thomas 2000). The increased popularity of 
such a register can partly be ascribed to the prominent media coverage of paedophilic 
cases, the impact this had on public understanding, as well as the increasing tendency 
to look to the United States for inspiration regarding criminal policies (Grover and 
Soothill 1995; Jones and Newburn 2002; Jones and Newburn 2002b; Soothill and 
Walby 1991).
In 1996 two private Members’ Bills, The Sexual Offences Against Children (Register 
of Offender) Bill 27 February 1996, and the Paedophiles (Registration and 
Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 12 June 1996, had failed to introduce a national 
register. In the same year, however, the Home Office published a consultation 
document in which the idea of a register was mentioned. At that time, an array of 
other lists containing sex offenders’ details, especially paedophiles’, already existed. 
These were the Police National Computer List, the National Identification Service 
List, the National Criminal Intelligence Service List, Scotland Yard's National 
Paedophile Index List, List 99 of the Department for Education and Employment, and
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the Department of Health Consultancy Index List. Local police stations held a variety 
of additional lists as did voluntary organizations such as the Scout Association and the 
National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (IIC Debate 1997b, c49- 
50).
The arguments for setting up a national register mirrored those in the US. It might 
assist the police in identifying suspects following a crime and it might help to prevent 
crime, thereby giving added protection and security to the wider public. Such a 
register could have a deterrent effect, especially in addressing reoffending (HC 
Debate 1997b, see for example c26). Despite initial reluctance by Michael Howard to 
proceed with the consultation due to the proximity of a general election and worries 
that the required legislation might not be passed in time (Cobley 2000), in the end the 
Government published the Sex Offenders Bill on 18 December 1996. During the 
resulting debate in the House of Commons the main criticisms focused on the 
timeframe of the Bill - which was not supposed to be applied retrospectively - the 
way in which the gathered information should be used, and the usefulness of such a 
register in light of the arguments put forward in favour of the Bill (HC Debate 1997; 
HC Debate 1997b).
The publicity surrounding this Bill seemed to have raised expectations amongst the 
public that the Government would follow the American approach and introduce an 
4American-style Megan's Law' with public notification about paedophiles moving into 
an area (HC Debate 1997, c221). Across the UK, the idea of paedophiles living within 
the community received extensive regional media coverage with journalists and 
pressure groups increasingly picking up on Megan's Law (Kitzinger 1999). Within 
Parliament a lot of the arguments on sex offender registers and community 
notification addressed key questions of civil liberties, the underlying concepts and 
philosophical dimensions of punishment and rehabilitation, the effectiveness of 
treatment and aspects relating to vigilantism (HC Debate 1997; HC Debate 1997b). 
Opinions were divided. Some members argued that in the cases of sex offenders, 
especially against children, ‘we should seriously examine our normal concerns about 
protecting civil liberties' (HC Debate 1997b, c64) and that not only the public has a 
right to know but that 'The rights of children - the most vulnerable group in our
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society - must come before those of convicted criminals' (HC Debate 1997b, c58). 
Others took a more moderate view and argued that:
'the Bill is akin to branding them on the forehead. In effect, the Bill states 
that prison cannot rehabilitate, that there is no cure and that there is no 
chance of rehabilitation...[W]hen a person has been punished and the 
punishment is finished, he has paid his debt to society and the slate 
should be wiped clean. That is not to say that we should forget 
everything, but we should keep that in mind' (HC Debate 1997b, c62).
Given the constraints of time and the societal pressures at the time the Bill was 
discussed, a certain degree of eagerness seems to have dominated the discussion (see 
for example HC Debate 1997b, c57 & c58), which has been commented on by various 
authors when examining the Bill (see for example Selfe and Burke 2001). On 21 
March 1997 the Sex Offenders Act (1997) received Royal Assent and came into force 
on 1 September of the same year.
Behind the scenes, things had not been running smoothly during the debate. While the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) was sent a copy of the Bill it did not 
have any consultation on it. Instead, ACPO was informed that this Bill would go 
before Parliament at the beginning of the Parliament session in January 1997. This led 
to some disgruntlement on ACPO’s side given that they had identified several major 
problems with the proposals put forward in the Bill (Interviewee 4).
One major problem was the timescale under which the new measures should be 
introduced. Those involved in the implementation of the Act had about six weeks to 
bring about the necessary changes and the deadline of 1 September meant that this 
needed to be carried out at a time in which lots of people were on holiday. 'It was a 
hell of a job' (Interviewee 5).
Following discussion in the House of Commons it had been decided that in order to 
save on bureaucracy, new software and thereby costs, the easiest way of keeping such 
a register would be to include the information on the police national computer (PNC) 
(HC Debate 1997, c215ff). However, experts estimated at the time that it would take 
up to two years to configure and set up the PNC. To guarantee compliance with the
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deadline the PNC was 'cobbled up'. This meant that there was no search facility 
regarding sex offenders whatsoever. In order to monitor sex offenders the police 
needed to have 'a physical dump of the PNC' each time they intended to check 
something. The result was that in order to find out about registration requirements, 
location and other details on offenders they would get 'a massive bunch of paper 
through which the police then had to go by hand' (Interviewee 4). It was even 
impossible to find out about relatively simple points, such as the overall number of 
offenders. 'You could not search it to see how many people are on the register. You 
had to physically dump it and then count them' (Interviewee 4).
Along with such practical problems there were several serious flaws within the 
original draft of the Bill. These were discussed at length between the police and the 
civil servants involved. Areas that were identified as problematic were the foreign 
element' which was 'almost un-enforceable' but 'had to be there because morally it 
made some very good statements about “look if you are going abroad don’t think you 
can abuse children and get away with it”' and aspects relating to registration. There 
were several loopholes, mainly resulting from the timescales within which offenders 
had to register, which enabled sex offenders, if sly enough, to legally avoid 
registration despite any requirements thereto (Interviewee 4).
While these deficits were pointed out to the civil servants involved, in March, a few 
weeks into the discussion, some of the key organizations affected by this Act got a 
phonecall saying:
'Right, you’ve got two options with this Bill, because John Major has 
called an election. Option one is that you accept it with all its faults on 
[sic.] or it is dumped. You know, we loose it this week and we don’t know 
when it will be put in place again' (Interviewee 4).
Faced with the dilemma of losing the Bill altogether or simply accepting the identified 
shortcomings, the criminal justice organizations decided that it would be better to opt 
for getting the Bill through Parliament and having it passed, since at least this would 
start to raise awareness about sex offenders and put a basis for discussions on the true 
nature of dangerous sex offenders into place. Although this anticipated result was 
achieved, the identified loopholes meant that the bodies involved in sex offender
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management ’‘have been playing catch-up’ with sex offender policies ever since 
(Interviewee 5).
Content of the Act
The rather brief Act consists of two main sections. While the second section 
addresses sexual offences committed outside the United Kingdom, it is Part 1 of the 
Sex Offenders Act 1997 that is of relevance to this thesis. Pail 1 deals with the 
registration requirements for sex offenders. According to it, all offenders who are 
either cautioned or convicted for a sexual offence as given in Schedule 1 to the Act, 
outlined in Table A1.2, and not found guilty for reasons of insanity or disability, fall 
under the notification requirements, the time period of which is given in Table A1.3.
The Act works on an ‘either-or-nature\ This does not provide the courts with any 
discretionary power regarding registration requirements. Either a person is cautioned 
or convicted for one of the specific offences outlined in the Act and thereby will 
automatically be subject to registration, or the person is not, in which case no 
registration requirement can be imposed upon that person (Berman and Danby 2003). 
Those to which the Act applies are required to provide the police with their name and 
home address within 14 days of the conviction or commencement of the Act. In 
addition, if the offender has a change in name, home address or has resided or stayed 
at an address other than the home address provided for 14 days or longer the police 
needs to be informed about this within 14 days, too.
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Table A1.2: Sex Offenders Act 1997: Sexual Offences to which Part 
1 Applies
1. Rape
2. Intercourse with a girl under 13
3. Intercourse with a girl between 13 and 16 except when the offender was 
under 20
4. Incest by a man unless the victim of or, as the case may be, the other party to 
the offence was 18 or over and unless the offender is or has been sentenced 
to imprisonment for a term of 30 months or more or is or has been admitted to 
a hospital subject to a restriction order
5. Buggery except in cases where the offender was under 20 or where the victim 
of or, as the case may be, the other party to the offence was 18 or over and 
unless the offender is or has been sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 30 
months or more or is or has been admitted to a hospital subject to a 
restriction order
6. Indecency between men except in cases where the offender was under 20 or 
where the victim of or, as the case may be, the other party to the offence was 
18 or over and unless the offender is or has been sentenced to imprisonment 
for a term of 30 months or more or is or has been admitted to a hospital 
subject to a restriction order
7. Indecent assault on a woman unless the victim of or, as the case may be, the 
other party to the offence was 18 or over or unless the offender is or has been 
sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 30 months or more or is or has been 
admitted to a hospital subject to a restriction order
8. Indecent assault on a man unless the victim of or, as the case may be, the 
other party to the offence was 18 or over or unless the offender is or has been 
sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 30 months or more or is or has been 
admitted to a hospital subject to a restriction order
9. Assault with intent to commit buggery unless the victim of or, as the case may 
be, the other party to the offence was 18 or over or unless the offender is or 
has been sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 30 months or more or is or 
has been admitted to a hospital subject to a restriction order
10. Causing or encouraging prostitution, intercourse with, or indecent assault on, 
girl under 16
11. Indecent conduct towards young child
12. Inciting girl under 16 to have incestuous sexual intercourse
13. Indecent photographs of children
14. Offences relating to goods prohibited to be imported under section 42 of the 
Customs and Consolidation Act 1876 (prohibitions and restrictions)
15. Possession of indecent photographs of children •
(Adapted from TSO 1997, Schedule 1 Section 1)
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Table A1.3: Sex Offenders Act 1997: Notification Period
Sentence
Imprisonment for life
Admitted to a hospital subject to a restriction order 
Imprisonment for more than 6 but less than 30 months 
Imprisonment for 6 months or less
Admitted to a hospital without being subject to a
restriction order
Any other sentence or caution
Applicable Period
Indefinite 
Indefinite 
10 years 
7 years
7 years
5 years
(Adapted from TSO 1997 Part 1.(4))
Use of Information on the Register
Within the actual Act there are no guidelines on how to use the information 
held on the register, a point of criticism which was not only widely discussed during 
the House of Commons debate, since this ‘glaring hole’ meant that questions relating 
to individual responsibilities and procedures were left unclear (HC Debate 1997, 
c218), but also within academic circles (see for example Soothill and Francis 1997; 
Soothill, Francis et al. 1997; Soothill and Francis 1998).
Just before the Act came into force, the Home Office and the Department of Health 
did however publish some guidelines on managing information acquired under the 
provisions of the Act (DOH 1997; Home Office 1997). The guidelines were only 
considered to be of an interim nature. More detailed guidance was to follow once the 
operation of the Act had been scrutinized and further discussions with relevant 
agencies and departments had taken place (Home Office 1997, p 4). As a result the 
instructions are of a rather sketchy nature. Within Appendix A of the Home Office’s 
circular it is written that
‘Ministers have made it very clear that information must not merely be 
recorded or filed: it is essential that risk assessment should be 
undertaken by the police working with other child protection agencies, in
-254-
order to protect children and vulnerable adults. Information should not 
be handed out gratuitously, however and assessment of risk is at the 
heart of the process which should be adopted...Ministers consider it 
essential that information is passed to other agencies in accordance with 
the guidance in order to protect the public as effectively as possible'
(Home Office 1997, p 16)
In addition to this, some general principles regarding the disclosure of information are 
given, as provided in Table A1.4. However, precise details or instructions on the 
disclosure of information and mechanisms for assessing the risk posed by sex 
offenders are lacking.
Essentially, the new arrangements should be ‘an extension of current good practice' 
(Home Office 1997, p 17) and any disclosure should be based on a case-by-case basis. 
Things that should be considered in each case and form part of the risk assessment 
were:
• the nature and pattern of previous offending;
• compliance with previous sentences or Court Orders;
• the probability that a further offence will be committed and the harm such 
behaviour would cause;
• any predatory behaviour which may indicate a likelihood of reoffending;
• potential victims and whether they are children or otherwise especially 
vulnerable;
• any potential consequences of disclosure to the offender and the offender’s 
family;
• and finally any potential consequences of disclosure in the wider context of 
law and order (Home Office 1997, p 19).
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Table A1.4: Principles relating to the Disclosure of Information 
obtained through the Sex Offenders Act 1997
• Disclosure to third parties of personal information about individual offenders 
should be exceptions to a general policy of confidentiality
• Each decision on whether or not to disclose has to be justified on the basis of 
the likelihood of the harm which non-disclosure might otherwise cause
• Disclosure should be seen as part of an overall plan for managing the risk 
posed by a potential offender and the need to protect an individual child, a 
group of children or other vulnerable persons
• There will always be a risk of legal action by an offender against the police 
relating to disclosure
• In some circumstances it may be appropriate to warn an offender that 
disclosure is to be made to encourage different behaviour
• Decisions should be based on an assessment of the seriousness of the risk, 
or displacing the offending, of the continuing visibility of the offender and any 
other operational considerations in respect of the management of the risk 
posed by the offender
(Adapted from Home Office 1997, p 18)
Given the assumption that disclosure to a member of the general public would be the 
exception rather than the norm, the three key areas identified within the circular in 
which disclosure might be especially justified are the workplace in general, schools 
and playgroups and youth groups. In each of the cases disclosure should be made to 
individuals at a senior level or individuals directly affected and the police is expected 
to provide guidance and advice on the appropriate actions to be taken by the receiving 
party. Again the expectations as to the precise nature of this are rather vague, and 
given that the way in which sensitive and confidential information is handled varies 
between different organizations, it was expected that the precise policies would 
"evolve in the light of experience' (Home Office 1997, p 24).
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Assessment of the Register’s Use
The police’s use of the information accumulated under the Sex Offenders Act 
was evaluated for the first time between 1998 and 1999. The results were published in 
2000, three days after the commencement of the News of the World's name-and- 
shame campaign, as part of the Home Office’s Police Research Series (Plotnikoff and 
Woolfson 2000). This report highlighted that while the compliance rate for those 
required to register ranged between 85.4% and 100% amongst different forces, overall 
the national rate of compliance was very high at 94.7%. Despite finding that on 
balance the majority of police officers felt that the Act’s contribution to policing 
justified the efforts involved, with the main benefits being improved quality of 
information and working relationship with other agencies, several areas of concerns 
were identified. These related to deficiencies in the current legislation, inadequate 
resources for monitoring offenders, increased workloads, fears that resources had 
been diverted away from other categories of higher risk offenders, timeliness and 
quality of the flow of information from courts, prisons and hospitals regarding 
offenders required to register and the creation of unrealistic expectations on the part of 
the public and other agencies. While all forces had established a policy on community 
notification few had used it, and even the disclosure of information to all local officers 
was not a standard practice in all police forces. Only 30% of the forces provided cases 
in which monitoring activity triggered by the register was assumed to have 
contributed to crime prevention and only 23% stated that they were using information 
from the register in their investigations (Plotnikoff and Woolfson 2000).
Independently of the official review, amongst researchers the Act has been widely 
criticized for a variety of reasons, mainly relating to dilemmas in establishing and 
operating a sex offender register, ethical objections and a lack of clarity underlying 
the precise purpose of the Act (see for example Soothill and Francis 1997; Soothill 
and Francis 1998; McAlinden 1999).
Crime and Disorder Act 1998
Following the implementation of the Sex Offenders Act (1997) and several 
highly publicised cases of sex offenders in the community, the Government found that 
there remained serious gaps in the provisions of the Act and that communities were
still not getting ’'adequate'’ protection from the activities of sex offenders, particularly 
those ‘who prey on children and other vulnerable people" (Home Office 1997b, p 1). 
Pail of this problem could be ascribed to the non-retrospective nature of the Sex 
Offenders Act which meant that anybody convicted prior to the enforcement of the 
Act was exempt from the registration requirements.
After further consultation and discussion, the Crime and Disorder Act (1998) 
introduced the notion of Sex Offender Order (TSO 1998, Section 2). These orders 
were aimed at protecting the public from the risk of sexual offences by placing 
restrictions on the behaviour of sex offenders and required the offender to register 
with the police under the provisions of the Sex Offenders Act 1997. Further details on 
these orders are set out in Table A 1.5. One problem with these arrangements was, 
however, that ‘a Sex Offender Order made in England could not be implemented in 
Scotland and vice versa which is crazy" (Interviewee 5).
The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 also addressed the question of sharing information 
and extended existing arrangements for disclosing information. While no duty for 
such disclosure was imposed on anybody, section 115 of the Act states that both 
persons and organisations which previously might not have been allowed to disclose 
information were, for the purpose of the Act, given powers to disclose information to 
the police, probation service, local authorities or health authorities (TSO 1998, 
Section 115).
In addition to this, the Act provided courts with the power to pass ‘extended 
sentences’ on both sexual and violent offenders. This meant that offenders in these 
categories could be subjected to an extended period of post-release supervision. This 
was in addition to any existing terms of imprisonment and post-release supervision 
that would have been imposed under the Criminal Justice Act 1991. Once again it was 
decided that it would not be possible to apply for such sentences retrospectively.
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Table A1.5: Basic Principles for Sex Offender Orders
• Orders can be sought against anyone who has been convicted, found not 
guilty by reason of insanity or found to be under a disability and to have done 
the act charged, or cautioned for an offence covered by the Part 1 of the Sex 
Offenders Act 1997 either in the UK or overseas. This includes offenders 
whose convictions etc predate the commencement of the Act. One of the 
requirements of a SOO is to register for the duration of the order.
• Given that the fundamental purpose of a sex offender order is to protect the 
public from serious harm, a key factor to be considered by both the police, in 
preparing a case file, and by the court in determining the application, is the 
risk presented by the defendant since the relevant date, as defined in the Act. 
To secure an order the police will need to establish there is a reasonable 
cause to believe that an order is necessary to protect the public, or individual 
members of the public, from harm.
• Care needs to be taken that the prohibitions in the order can be justified by 
the assessment of risk. While there is a difficult balance to be struck between 
the rights of the defendant and the need to protect the community, the need 
for such orders'is dictated by the importance of protecting the public, in 
particular children and vulnerable adults. As a prohibitive rather than a 
punitive measure, the sex offender order enables this to be done without 
recourse to the criminal law. It must be remembered that the only prohibitions 
which can be imposed by a sex offender order are those necessary for the 
purpose of protecting the public from serious harm from the defendant. The 
behaviour prohibited by the order might well be considered unproblematic if 
exhibited by another member of the public - it is the offender’s previous 
offending behaviour and subsequent demonstration that he may pose a risk 
of further such behaviour, which will make him eligible for an order.
• A SOO is a serious matter and breach of any prohibition contained in them 
gives rise to criminal proceedings and penalties. Every effort needs to be 
made to ensure the defendant understands this, and that he attends the 
hearing of the application and is given the opportunity to state his case.
(Adapted from Home Office 2002b)
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The Case of 'Regina -v- Chief Constable of North Wales Police 
and Others Ex Parte Thorpe and Another’
Another development when looking at the debate surrounding the Sarah's Law 
Campaign is the case that had shaped the British approach to dealing with information 
held on sex offenders: Regina -v- Chief Constable of North Wales Police and Others 
Ex Parte Thorpe and Another, more widely known as the ‘North Wales case’.
On 17 July 1996 a married couple, Peter Thorpe, 46, and his wife Christine, 42, (19 
March 1998) who had each served seven years and four months of an eleven year 
prison sentence following their conviction for various sexual offences against 
children, were released from prison (19 March 1998). Prior to their release, 
Northumbrian Police prepared a document for the probation service in which it was 
indicated that both offenders, at the time referred to as AB and CD for reasons of 
anonymity, were considered to be extremely dangerous and would pose ‘a 
considerable risk to children and vulnerable adults in the community' whom they 
would ‘ target and procure' for sexual offences (BAILII 1998, p 3).
Following their release, the couple had been provided with a flat but after several 
articles about the couple had appeared in the local newspaper they had to leave due to 
fear of reprisal from members of the community. After several attempts by the couple 
to find other accommodation, which were thwarted by various reports in local 
newspapers and angry responses by members of the community, the couple eventually 
bought a caravan and moved to a site at Ruabon near Wrexham at the beginning of 
October 1996 (BAILII 1998).
The local police force, North Wales Police, was aware of the couple’s presence at the 
caravan park as well as of the Northumbrian Police’s report. Following further 
discussions about the presence and background of the couple with various agencies 
and organizations involved in the management of sex offenders in the area, it was 
decided that all these agencies should know the whereabouts of the couple in order to 
monitor their activity. With the Easter holidays coming up there were also various 
concerns about the couple staying at the caravan park. The park would be frequented 
by many children during that time. Consequently, contact was made with the couple
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in order to encourage them to move to a place where their chances of coming into 
direct contact with children would be smaller. A number of meetings took place 
between the couple, their solicitor, members of the police and the probation service 
during which the couple had been informed that their identities might be disclosed to 
the owner of the site. Although the couple opposed this and stated that in order to 
prevent this they would move somewhere else, they were still living on the site at the 
end of March 1997, shortly before the Easter holidays (BAILII 1998).
Consequently, following further discussions between probation and police it was 
decided to inform the owner of the caravan site about the couple’s history. This was 
then done by a member of the police force. This decision was based on a newly 
developed policy by North Wales Police which was finalised on 19 March 1997. 
According to this policy, which referred back to Home Office circular 45/1986 where 
it stated that 'police information should not he disclosed unless there are important 
considerations of public interest to justify departure from the general rule of 
confidentiality", any disclosure should only be made on a ‘need-to-know basis". The 
disclosure of the couple’s past to the owner of the caravan site was done using 
material that had previously appeared in the press and as such was part of the public 
domain. The owner of the caravan site revoked the couple’s license to stay and they 
moved elsewhere (BAILII 1998).
After their eviction from the caravan park the couple went to High Court, seeking an 
order to the effect that the action taken by the police was unlawful, constituted 
harassment and was in breach of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom. The ruling judge Lord Bingham rejected 
this in July 1997, but pointed out that
'It would plainly be objectional if a police force were to adopt a blanket 
policy of dissemination of information about previous offenders 
regardless of the facts of the individual case or the nature of the previous 
offending or the risk of further offending" (quoted in Legal Constitutional 
and Administrative Review Committee 1998, p 41).
This judgement was upheld in the Court of Appeal by the Master of the Rolls Lord 
Woolf in March 1998, who pointed out that while ' [ejach case must be judged on its
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own facts... [disclosure should only be made where there is a pressing need for that 
disclosure' (BAILII 1998, p 9). He also pointed to the additional guidance on 
disclosure that had subsequently been given by the Home Office in circular 39/1997 
(Home Office 1997).
Along with the Case of‘Regina -v- Chief Constable of North Wales Police and Others 
Ex Parte Thorpe and Another' the circumstances surrounding the releases of Robert 
Oliver and Sidney Cooke are important in understanding the Sarah's Law debate in 
that they provided insights as to what happens when communities get to know about 
details on sex offenders.
The Cases of Robert Oliver, Steve Barrell, Lesley Baily and 
Sidney Cooke
On 13 November 1985 the police found the body of 14-year old Jason Swift 
who, following the separation of his parents, had gone missing and was earning 
money as what the media called a ‘rent boy' (see for example 13 March 1998). While 
probably not homosexual himself, being paid to commit homosexual acts allowed 
Jason to buy food and sometimes gave him somewhere to stay for the night (Deputy 
Chief Superintendent Roger Stoodley in Panorama 11 May 1998).
In November of 1985 Jason had been taken to a flat on the Kingsmead Estate in the 
East End of London where he was drugged, violently abused and killed by a group of 
men. While the police believed others to be involved there was only evidence to 
convict Steven Barrell, Lesley Bailey, Robert Oliver and Sidney Cooke. The latter 
three had previous convictions for sexual offences (Panorama 11 May 1998). Because 
the sentencing had taken place prior to the coming into force of the 1991 Criminal 
Justice Act and the 1997 Sex Offenders Act, it was impossible to place any 
restrictions or supervision requirements upon any of them on their release 
(Interviewee 4).
One of the four, Lesley Bailey appears to have been killed in prison (April 26 1998).
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Robert Oliver, despite going through the Sex Offender Treatment Programme was 
still considered to be a high-risk offender on his release in September 1997. Both his 
release from prison and whereabouts were covered widely in the press with various 
forms of community notification also taking place. This led to widespread protests 
with the result that Oliver kept on moving from London to Swindon, Dublin, 
Manchester and finally Brighton where, having been 'publicly identified as a menace 
and having been hounded and pursued across the country' he turned himself in to the 
Brighton Police with the request for protection. There, due to serious difficulties the 
probation service faced in arranging somewhere for Oliver to stay, he was kept in a 
cell for four months before being moved to Glenham House in Milton Keynes, a 
medium-secure unit for mentally disordered offenders (Panorama 11 May 1998).
The police did not disclose any information on the release of the third offender, 
Steven Barrell. Despite by then having been granted the power to disclose information 
under certain circumstances, the police did not consider this to be necessary in 
Barrell’s case. He was seen as a 'minor player' in the death and abuse of Jason Swift 
(Deputy Chief Superintendent Roger Stoodley in Panorama 11 May 1998). However, 
a local newspaper in Northamptonshire, The Northampton Chronicle, discovered the 
presence of Barrell in the area and, despite the fact that he had lived there for three 
years after his release from prison without being involved in any further incidents, 
named and shamed him on its front page in March of 1998. As a result of this ‘outing’ 
Barrell quickly 'went on the trot for about six weeks because he was being 
intimidated' (Interviewee 4). Along with moving away, he also changed his surname 
with the effect that both police and probation service temporarily lost track of him 
(Panorama 11 May 1998).
The fourth person, Sidney Cooke, was also considered to be both dangerous and 
predatory by the probation service (4 April 1998). When he was released from prison 
on Monday 6 April 1998, something which was covered widely by the media, he had 
previously voluntarily agreed to be both supervised and electronically tagged (4 April 
1998). In order to avoid confrontations with protesters, he had been secretly 
transferred from Wandsworth prison, where he had spent most of his time, to an 
unnamed secure institution on the Saturday prior to his release (6 April 1998). Having 
previously informed the authorities that he would like to go to Bristol, Cooke was
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eventually taken to a police station in the Somerset and Avon area (Panorama 11 May 
1998) where he was housed in a prison cell. While the Chief Constable of Somerset, 
where Cooke was held in custody, kept his presence quiet, throughout the entire 
Bristol area police stations were picketed with people demonstrating outside and some 
of the protests turning nasty with bricks and other objects being thrown at police 
stations (Interviewee 4). One of the main problems faced again by the services in 
charge was finding provisions for Cooke and organising long-term arrangements.
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Appendix 2
The Pieces of Legislation Making Up Megan's Law
Although Megan's Law is the one usually cited when referring to sex offender 
registration and community notification (Elbogen, Patry et al. 2003), it is only one 
part of a highly complex set of legislation. Consequently, when talking about Megan's 
Law, the reference is usually to a group of laws and various measures aimed at 
managing sex offenders (Matson and Lieb 1997). These measures should more 
appropriately be named ‘The Wetterling Scheme’ because they are essentially 
amendments to a piece of legislation called The Wetterling Act.
In 1990 Washington State issued the Community Protection Act, America’s first law 
to authorize public notification on the release of sex offenders into the community 
(Megans-Law.net 2003). As part of this, convicted sex offenders on release from 
custody, or while under supervision, had to register with local law enforcement 
agencies. It also authorized public officials to inform the public of ‘dangerous’ sex 
offenders moving into their midst (Matson and Lieb 1996).
Despite the difficulties inherent in designing an effective sex offender registration and 
notification programme that is able to withstand legal challenges while meeting the 
requirements of a community (Chaiken 1998b), President Clinton set out on an 
'aggressive three part plan to stop sexual predators' (Clinton 1996). As a result, as 
part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act 1994, the Jacob 
Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act 
(The Jacob Wetterling Act) was passed (Sorkin 1998). The act, named after 11-year 
old Jacob Wetterling, who was abducted by an armed, masked man in 1989 
(Wetterling 1998), required in its original version that states set up registers of those 
offenders convicted of sexually violent offences or crimes against children and that 
they establish tighter registration requirements for highly dangerous sex offenders. 
Offenders were required to verify their addresses on an annual basis for ten years and 
sexually violent predators were required to verify their addresses on a quarterly basis 
for the rest of their life (CSOM 1999b).
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States were put in charge of distributing information on these registers to law 
enforcement agencies and in cases where such information was necessary for public 
safety also to disclose this information to the public (Sorkin 1998). Initially, the 
deadline for compliance with the Act was September 1997. However, those states that 
were making ‘good faith efforts to achieve compliance' were later given a two-year 
extension (Matson and Lieb 1997). States that did not conform faced a 10% cut in 
their Edward Byrne Memorial Grant funding (Scholle 2000), which forms pail of the 
budget to tackle crime. This money was to be redistributed to those states that had met 
the requirements (CSOM 1999c)1.
In May 1996, amending the Wetterling Act by making community notification 
mandatory rather than optional in those cases where states considered it to be 
warranted, a federal version of New Jersey’s Megan’s Law was passed (Sorkin 1998). 
It had the same deadline for compliance and set of consequences as the Wetterling 
Act, given that the federal version of Megan's Law was considered to be pail of the 
‘Wetterling scheme’ (Sorkin 1998; CSOM 1999c). This meant that the loss in case of 
non-compliance was still an overall 10% of the Edward Byrne Memorial Grant 
funding rather than an additional 10% on top of the 10% faced as punishment in case 
of non-compliance with the original Wetterling Act (Sorkin 1998).
Further to these developments President Clinton asked for a national register of sex 
offenders to be set up. This followed a first examination by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s (FBI) Criminal Justice Information Service’s Advisory Policy Board 
(CJIS APB) into the advantages of a national sex offender register in 1995 (Rathbun 
1998). Clinton asked the Attorney General to come up with an outline for such a 
register, giving her 60 days to do so (Clinton 1996a), and eventually decided to go 
ahead with the framework she provided (Clinton 1996). In October 1996, the Pam 
Lyncher Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act was enacted which gave the
The Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Grant Program (Byrne 
Formula Grant Program) is a partnership among federal, state, and local governments to create safer 
communities. The Byrne Formula Grant Program was created by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. In 
2003 funding was $487,577,733. From this allocation, each state receives a base amount of 0.25 
percent of the total allocation. Remaining funds are allocated according to each state's population.
BJA (2004). Overview and History of the Jacob Wetterling Act. 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/what/2aljwacthistory.html (Accessed 16 January 2004), Bureau of 
Justice Assistance.
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FBI three years to set up a national database of sex offenders (Matson and Lieb 1997). 
In those states where a 'minimally sufficient sex offender registration program' was 
missing the FBI would be put in charge of handling sex offender registration (Sorkin 
1998; Scholle 2000). Additionally, this act prescribed 'more stringent registration 
requirements' (Sorkin 1998). Those offenders that were convicted of extremely 
serious sexual offences or committed several registerable offences were now 
subjected to lifelong registration (CSOM 1999c).
So far the Wetterling Act has been amended twice more: first of all, in 1998 by 
Section 115 of the General Provisions of Title I of the Departments of Commerce, 
Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (CJSA). 
This act amended the registration requirements given under the Wetterling Act in 
order to include tighter registration requirements for sexually violent offenders and 
added a registration requirement for federal and military sex offenders as well as those 
sex offenders who are non-resident students or workers. While making participation 
in the National Sex Offender Registry (NSOR) compulsory it also provided states 
with increased discretion in respect to some of the original aspects of the Wetterling 
Act, such as the approaches taken to verify the details of registrants (CSOM 1999c; 
BJA 2004).
The second amendment took place in 2000. Under the Campus Sex Crimes Prevention 
Act offenders are required to report information regarding any enrolment, 
employment or voluntary activity at any institution of higher education even if they 
are already required to register. States are required to make sure that this registration 
information is passed on to those law enforcement agencies whose jurisdiction 
includes the institution of higher education at which the offender is present and that 
this information is entered into the appropriate records and data systems within the 
state (BJA 2004; SOC 2004). ■
Despite this federal legal framework, the precise form and nature of arrangements for 
sex offender registration and community notification differ between the various states, 
as can be seen from the following diagram.
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Diagram A2.1. Type of Notification Provided by States
Type of Notification Provided by States
= Broad Community Notification
= Notification to Organizations or Individuals at Risk
= Passive Notification
(CSOM 2001b, p 5)
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Appendix 3
Sarah's Law - The News of the World’s Draft Bill
DRAFT BILL - Protection of Children
Draft
of a
bill
for
An Act to make further provision for the protection of children.
Be it enacted..........
Disclosure of names of sex or violent offenders
1. The following section shall be inserted in the Criminal Justice and Court 
Services Act 2000 after section 64-
“Carers entitled to know of offenders living locally
64A.-(1) A person caring for a child living within the area of a responsible 
authority (“the relevant area") may apply to be given the names and 
addresses of any relevant sexual or violent offenders know to the authority 
to be living in that area.
(2) An application under subsection (1) shall be made in writing to a police 
constable stationed in the relevant area and shall state-
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(a) the name and address of the applicant;
(b) the name of the child or children cared for by the applicant, and the 
address of the child or children if not living with the applicant; and
(c) the name and address of any school attended by the child or 
children,
and, subject to subsections (4) to (6), the applicant shall be entitled to be 
given (in writing) the names and address of all relevant sexual or violent 
offenders known to the responsible authority to be living within one mile of any 
address given in the application.
Draft Bill — Protection of Children
(3) Each responsible authority shall make arrangements with respect to 
applications under this section, and such arrangements must ensure-
(a) that, subject to subsections (4) to (6), the information 
required to be given to the applicant in accordance with 
subsection (2) is given within 5 days of the date the 
application is made (disregarding weekends and bank 
holiday), and
(b) that there are nominated constables at each police station in 
the authority’s area responsible for dealing with such 
applications (referred to below as “nominated constables”).
(4) A person who is not caring for a child living within the relevant area or 
who is a relevant sexual or violent offender is not entitled to be given any 
information under this section.
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(5) The name of an offender shall not be given to an applicant if the 
offender has not been convicted of any offence involving a child and is 
considered by the responsible authority unlikely to be a danger to children.
(6) The applicant shall not be given any names and addresses under this 
section if the nominated constable has reasonable grounds for believing 
that the applicant is not entitled to be given that information, and if-
(a) further information is required to be provided by the 
applicant, or
(b) an investigation is carried out by the police,
to determine whether or not the applicant is so entitled, the information 
shall be provided as soon as is reasonably practicable once the authority 
is satisfied that the applicant is entitled to the information.
(7) Any investigation carried out by the police as mentioned in subsection 
(6) must be carried out expeditiously.
(8) An applicant is not, by virtue of this section, entitled to see any records 
kept by the authority other than the names and addresses, if any, provided 
under subsection (2).
(9) An applicant must not disclose any information given to him under this 
section except to a child whom he is caring for.
(10) An applicant must not-
Draft Bill — Protection of Children
-271 -
(a) visit the place where an offender, whose name and address 
have been given to the applicant under this section, is living, 
or
(b) take part in any demonstration of any kind in the vicinity of 
that place.
(11) A person who contravenes subsection (9) or (10) shall be guilty of an 
offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £10,000.
(12) For the purposes of the section-
(a) a person cares for a child if he has full or partial responsibility 
for the day to day care of a child (disregarding any time the 
child spends with a child-minder or in school);
(b) “child” means a child under the age of 16 years;
(c) “relevant sexual or violent offender” has the meaning given 
by section 66; and
(d) “responsible authority” has the meaning given by section 64.
(12) This section shall come into force on 1st September 2001.”
Amendment of section 77.
2. In section 77(3) of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 
the following paragraph shall be inserted after paragraph (b)-
“(ba) section 64A;”
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Extend
3. This Act extends to England and Wales only.
Citation and commencement
4.-(1) This Act may be cited as the Protection of Children Act 2001
(2) This Act shall come into force on 1st September 2001.
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Appendix 4
Sex Offender Registration and Community 
Notification: Developments in Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand
Canada
Over the last 20 years public concerns about sex offenders in Canada have 
been comparable to those in the United States. Although by the early 1990s most of 
the Canadian provinces had established child abuse registers, from the mid-1990s 
onwards calls were increasingly made for the introduction of a national sex offender 
register. Huge variations in standards and procedures among the existing 
arrangements within the various provinces meant that it was difficult, if not 
impossible to share information between jurisdictions (The F/P/T Working Group on 
High Risk Offenders 1998).
Federal Developments
The defining moment in the discussion about sex offender registration and 
community notification within the Canadian context occurred when Christopher 
Stephenson, an 11-year old boy from Toronto, was abducted from a shopping mall by 
Joseph Fredericks in 1988. Fredericks had a long history of sexually assaulting 
children and had spent most of his life in the Canadian mental health system. At the 
time of the abduction he was on mandatory supervision. He had previously been 
diagnosed as suffering from psychopathy, paedophilia, sexual sadism and was 
considered to be a 'dangerous, mentally disordered person' (Petrunik 2001, p 6). 
Over a two-day period Fredericks raped Christopher several times before strangling 
him, splitting his throat and leaving him in a wooded area where he bled to death 
(Petrunik 2001). While it took four years before a provincial coroner’s inquest into 
Christopher’s death took place, the coroner’s jury finally recommended in 1993 the 
establishment of a national sex offender register, an idea that was supported by
-274-
Christopher’s family, victim support groups and law enforcement agencies (Ministry 
of Community Safety and Correctional Services 2004b).
The setting up of a national register of convicted child abusers was also supported by 
the Liberal Party, which at the time was in opposition. This was expressed in a 
document published in 1993 with the title A Liberal Perspective on Crime and Justice 
Issues. On gaining power in the autumn of 1993, the Liberal Party set up a 
Federal/Provincial/Territorial Working Group on High Risk Offenders. The group 
consisted of government officials and did not include any members of victims’ 
organizations or the medical profession (Petrunik 2001).
The group reported back twice, once in 1995 and again in 1998. The conclusions 
reached in both cases were of a similar nature. Essentially, it was argued that the 
establishment of a new national register of sex offenders or paedophiles ‘would not 
significantly improve upon the status quo’ in protecting the public. The argument was 
that there existed already a substantial basis for achieving the aim of protecting the 
public. These measures included the existing Canadian Police Information Centre 
(CPIC) which contained criminal history information, the active background­
screening of people working in positions of trust, and the existing public notification 
schemes that had been set up in the majority of jurisdiction (The F/P/T Working 
Group on High Risk Offenders 1998, pp 17-18). In addition, the Working Group put 
forward 10 Recommendations to further improve the level of protection which are 
provided in Table A4.1. Of special interest is the second recommendation which 
actively encourages dialogue and lesson-drawing between different jurisdictions when 
designing a register of paedophiles.
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Table A4.1: Recommendations by the Federal/Provincial/Territorial 
Working Group on High Risk Offender
1. It is recommended that Ministers endorse the Canadian Police Information 
Centre data system, with enhancements identified in this report, as a sound 
basis for screening systems to protect children and other vulnerable groups 
from convicted sexual offenders.
2. It is recommended that any jurisdiction considering a provincial paedophile 
registry that would contain information generated by other jurisdictions and to 
which the public would have direct access, consult fully with all other 
jurisdictions during the development phase.
3. It is recommended that the Community Notification Advisory Committee 
continue to examine the issue of standardized policies and procedures and, 
at its request, that CPIC consider whether it could facilitate the transfer of 
information about public notifications among jurisdictions.
4. It is recommended that all jurisdictions support, help develop and promote 
public education initiatives that would promote parental involvement and 
practical steps that they can take to protect their children from victimization, 
including the request that youth organizations (that are supported by the 
jurisdictions) adopt adequate screening policies and practices.
5. It is recommended that all jurisdictions:
o establish policies that define and promote the adoption of adequate 
screening policies and procedures by organizations and agencies who 
place volunteers and employees in positions of trust with children and 
other vulnerable individuals; and .
o consider making such screening systems mandatory for agencies 
under their direct control, license or in receipt of public funding.
6. It is recommended that all jurisdictions support the involvement of the 
Criminal Intelligence Service Canada in using police intelligence information 
to assess the risk posed by known and suspected sex offenders against 
children. Further development of this capability could be addressed in the 
context of the National Police Services Review that is currently underway by 
Solicitor General Canada in consultation with partners and stakeholders.
7. It is recommended that CPIC policy be amended so that a notation is placed 
on the CPIC system when a sex offender whose victim was a child or 
member of another vulnerable group receives a pardon and his or her 
criminal history record is sealed (Option'6).
8. It is recommended that, where the legal authority exists, all police agencies 
take fingerprints in every case where an offender is charged or convicted of a 
sex offence where the victim is a child or a member of another vulnerable 
group.
9. It is recommended that all jurisdictions encourage or require local police to:
o conduct thorough background and record checks when conducting 
pardon application investigations,
o share all relevant information with the National Parole Board, and > 
o assign particular priority to cases of sex offenders who have victimized 
children or other vulnerable persons.
10. It is recommended that the National Parole Board continue to carefully review 
all available information when considering the application for a pardon by a 
sex offender who has victimized a child or member of another vulnerable 
group and exercise the highest standard of caution in these cases.
(The F/P/T Working Group on High Risk Offenders 1998, pp 20-22)
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While over the course of the next few years modifications and additions to existing 
legislation were made, critics pointed out that the Liberal Government seemed to have 
a ‘short term memory’ about its plans for a national register of convicted child abusers 
(Statement by Myron Thompson in Government Orders 2001, @1540). Only in 
February 2004 the Canadian House of Commons finally passed Bill C-16 which led to 
the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) in April 2004. The Act was 
proclaimed as law and came into force on December 15, 2004 (Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police 2005).
Provincial and Territorial Developments
On the provincial level, especially in provinces with a Conservative 
government, the situation has been different and far more proactive. Over several 
years, justice ministers of various provinces urged the federal government to set up a 
national register of sex offenders (Manitoba Government 1998; Manitoba 
Government 2001; Ministries of the Solicitor General of Ontario and Alberta 2002). 
This lobbying was also supported by the Canadian police force. The police did not 
think that the existing Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC) was providing 
police agencies with enough information and notification about the release of sex 
offenders and their arrival in a community (CPA 2003). The main argument brought 
forward was that in cases of child abduction for sexual purposes, 91% of those victims 
that were murdered were dead within 24 hours of their abduction. A register of sex 
offenders would enable the police to respond more speedily (Ministry of Community 
Safety and Correctional Services 2004).
Despite the efforts of provincial governments, police associations and victims’ 
groups, the federal government was reluctant to set up a national register of convicted 
sex offenders. A lot of the provinces therefore decided to act alone (Petrunik 2001). 
While various arrangements were made in British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Nova 
Scotia and New Brunswick which allowed the disclosure of information about 
dangerous offenders to the community under certain circumstances (John Howard 
Society of Alberta 1999), the main developments have taken place in the provinces of 
Manitoba, Ontario and Alberta.
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Manitoba
In February 1995 Manitoba set up the Community Notification Advisory 
Committee (CNAC). This was made up of people from the criminal justice and 
mental health system. The primary objective of the committee is to balance the 
offender’s right to privacy with the community’s right to protect itself. The committee 
reviews the cases of those offenders that have been identified by the police as being at 
a risk of committing further sexual offences. If possible, offenders are informed that 
their case has been referred to the committee and that a public notification may be 
made. Offenders are then given an opportunity to make a written submission to the 
committee or to get someone to do so on their behalf. After reviewing the case, the 
committee advises the police if a community should be warned about such an offender 
in their midst and what format the notification should take (Manitoba Government 
1995; Manitoba Justice 2004). The whole process is outlined in Diagram A4.1.
Despite the introduction of this review process, Manitoba did not set up an 
independent sex offender register at the time but rather appears to have relied on the 
information gathered by the police. It is also important to note that the final decision 
about which action to take remained with the police (MacKay 2003).
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Diagram A4.1: Manitoba Community Notification Process
i Federal or Provincial Corrections, 
Police and/or Community identify 
high-risk sexual offender.
2 Notify Police,
I
3. Police bring case to Committee. 
Offender notified before 
Committee deliberates.
I
4. Committee considers written 
submission from offender. 
Committee examines information
and assesses risk.
6 Police consider the Committee 
recommendation.
I
7. Police release/do not release information,
V.................... ......... :;i i . ■ . . J
(Manitoba Justice 2004)
Ontario
In 2001 the government of Ontario enacted Christopher’s Law (Sex Offender 
Registry), named in honour of Christopher Stephenson. This established a provincial 
register of sex offenders living within Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and 
Correctional Services 2000; Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services 
2004) and made Ontario the first Canadian province with a register of convicted sex 
offenders (MacKay 2003; Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services 
2004).
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The requirement to register applies to all sex offenders living in Ontario and was 
retroactive in so far as that it did not only apply to sex offenders convicted on the day 
of or after the introduction of Christopher’s Law, but also to those who were already 
serving a sentence at the time (MacKay 2003). While local police forces are allowed 
to disclose information about sexual offenders considered to pose a serious risk to the 
community in general, the public does not have access to the database (Ministry of 
Community Safety and Correctional Services 2004b). Any disclosure made has to be 
in accordance with Canadian legislation about freedom of information and protection 
of privacy (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services 2000). The 
Ontario register has. been ascribed a compliance rate of between 93-95%, making it 
one of the most effective registers in North America. The high rate of compliance is 
partly ascribed to the fact that the contained information is not publicly available 
(September 16 2003a; Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services 
2004c).
Alberta
Following the death of a five-year old girl in Alberta, the provincial 
government decided to go ahead with the establishment of a sex offender registry and 
co-ordinating its efforts with other provinces (John Howard Society of Alberta 2001). 
In 2002 the Solicitor General of Alberta made available on the internet information on 
high-risk offenders in order to enhance public safety and "enable members of the 
public to take suitable precautionary measures'. While these webpages provide 
information on the most serious offenders not all dangerous or serious offenders are 
included (Solicitor General 2004).
Australia
One of the main driving forces behind the public discussions about sex 
offenders and paedophiles in the Australian context has been the media, with reports 
about Australians participating in sex tours to Asia, abuse of children by members of 
the clergy, a variety of other paedophile activities and reports into an alleged 
protection of paedophiles by the police (James 1996; Wood 1997b; Smallbone and 
Wortley 2001). As in the United States and Canada, a lot of the criminal law is being
-280-
made by the governments of the different states and so there have been a variety of 
developments on the federal, provincial and even private level.
During the 1990s several official inquiries into sex offender legislation and 
arrangements for dealing with such offenders took place, all addressing the notion of a 
register of sex offenders. In 1995, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National 
Crime Authority published a report entitled ‘Organised Criminal Paedophile 
Activity’. The Committee’s inquiry had followed calls from police agencies for an 
improved way of sharing information amongst different police services and a great 
number of proposals by non-governmental organisations, especially the National 
Association for Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect (NAPCAN), for a national 
register of child sex offenders. In order to allow an improved screening of people 
coming into contact with children, NAPCAN proposed that the register should include 
not only convicted sex offenders, but also people who in the past had been accused of 
sexual offences against children or against whom there was evidence of sexual 
offending without conviction. Access to such a register should not be restricted to 
police agencies but ideally be extended to all parents in order to provide them with 
'the means to ascertain the safely of their children'1 (Parliamentary Joint Committee 
on the National Crime Authority 1995, Section 4.20). The data should also contain 
details of non-child sexual offences such as indecent exposure or aggravated assaults. 
These proposals were supported by the representatives of other non-governmental 
organizations that reported to the Committee (Parliamentary Joint Committee on the 
National Crime Authority 1995, Section 4.21).
The Committee looked into a wide spectrum of evidence from a variety of sources, 
especially paying attention to trends and developments in the United States and 
Canada, While acknowledging and broadly supporting 'an improved method of 
recording those convicted of child-sex offences'1 (Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
the National Crime Authority 1995, Section 4.29), the Committee did not recommend 
the establishment of a register along the lines proposed by NAPCAN. The main areas 
of concerns were the accessibility and costs of such a register, questions relating to 
constitutional rights of those on the register, the range of offences to be included and 
the contentious question of including both suspected and convicted sex offenders 
(Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Crime Authority 1995). -
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In the same year, however, the Victorian Parliamentary Crime Prevention Committee, 
after a 12-month inquiry, stated in its report to the Victorian Parliament that 'The 
Registration of sex offenders as a management tool is considered essential in the long 
term reduction in sex offending rates' (Victorian Parliamentary Crime Prevention 
Committee 1995, p 262). The committee consequently recommended that the Victoria 
Police should set up a register of sex offenders. The recommendations made were 
mainly based on the notion that
' [gjiven the high recidivism rate of sex offenders and their propensity to 
continue to reoffend over their lifetime, the State must take whatever 
steps necessary to reduce the incidence of child sexual abuse and protect 
the community' (Victorian Parliamentary Crime Prevention Committee 
1995, p 260).
In order to ensure objectivity the Committee consulted a diverse range of sources, 
including victims and offenders, health professionals, government officials and child 
protection workers (Smith 1995). However, the foreword to the report written by the 
Committee’s chairman casts doubt upon its objectivity:
'The horror stories relayed by victims and investigators cry out for an 
emotional response to the problem... The scales of justice have weighed 
too long in favour of the accused, to the detriment of both the victim and 
the community. The Committee's recommendations redress this 
imbalance whilst still providing adequate protection for the rights of the 
accused' (Smith 1995).
Another recommendation made by the committee was that both the Attorney General 
and the Police Minister should lobby for the establishment of a national register 
(Victorian Parliamentary Crime Prevention Committee 1995).
Two years later, in 1997 another report was published, this time by the Wood Royal 
Commission into the New South Wales Police Services. The origin of this inquiry was 
the arrest of a police officer suspected of supplying a prohibited drug in March 1988. 
In light of emerging evidence however, the inquiry soon turned into a full 
investigation into alleged police protection of paedophiles. Following an initial 
investigation supervised by the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC),
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and due to overlapping responsibilities with the work done by the Royal Commission 
into the New South Wales Police Services which had been set up in 1994, the latter 
took over the entire inquiry.
Over the course of the inquiry the focus on issues relating to paedophilia increased, 
and during the final two years of its investigation this was the almost exclusive 
concern of the Commission (James 1997; Wood 1997b). During that time, the 
Commission received a larger variety of submissions by various organizations 
supporting the formation of a sex offender register, and the Commission found itself 
under great internal pressure to set up a register (Wood 1997, p 1174). Following an 
examination of sex offender registers in existence at the time, with a special focus on 
the United States’ Megan’s Law and the United Kingdom’s Sex Offenders Act 1997 
as well as the 1995 Parliament of Victoria Crime Prevention Committee Report, the 
commission concluded that while it did not favour any legislation mirroring Megan’s 
Law it had fewer concerns about an approach along the requirements of the British 
approach to sex offender registration. To some extent the line of action taken by 
Australia already paralleled British practices, especially in the areas of probation and 
parole supervision. The Committee did however point out that even British-style 
registration could be of limited value since it risked driving offenders across states 
and provide a false sense of security unless it formed part of a broader uniform 
national system (Wood 1997, pp 1180-1181). The conclusion reached by the 
commission was that a system for the compulsory registration of convicted child 
sexual offenders with the Police Service should be considered (Wood 1997, p 1198) 
and that in light of the mobility of paedophiles and potential recidivism a national 
register of paedophiles should be created (Wood 1997, p 1194). Information stored on 
this register could be used both to inform certain approved parties as well as to issue 
warnings to the wider public under specific circumstances and in accordance with 
guidelines that would required.
In November 1997 a Private Member’s Bill, the Criminal Law (Sex Offences 
Reporting) Bill 1997, was introduced into the Legislative Assembly of Queensland, 
which necessitated that people convicted of certain paedophile offences report their 
personal details to the police and which gave the police the power to keep a register of 
sex offenders. The Bill was referred to the Legal, Constitutional and Administrative
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Review Committee which was given a relatively short timeframe to investigate the 
Bill. Following some background research into this area of offences, the Committee 
consulted key bodies who might have an interest in this Bill, such as legal and 
community organisations, academic faculties and schools as well as governmental 
departments (Legal Constitutional and Administrative Review Committee 1998). The 
Committee compared the Bill with existing legislation in other countries, especially 
again the US and the UK, and concluded that the proposed Bill resembled the UK Sex 
Offenders Act 1997 more closely than Megan's Law in so far as no public access was 
envisaged. Due to the short timeframe in which the Sex Offenders Act had existed, 
however, it was difficult to assess its effectiveness. The resulting recommendations 
addressed similar issues to the ones previously raised by the Wood Commission but 
instead of endorsing the Bill, the Committee simply outlined potential areas of 
concerns and questions that would need to be addressed in the existing draft of the 
Bill and argued that the future of the Bill was essentially an issue for Parliament, 
rather than this Committee (Legal Constitutional and Administrative Review 
Committee 1998, p 89).
In Australia, following the meeting of the Australasian Police Ministers Council in 
2003, it was agreed that a national system for registering the details of child sex 
offenders should be set up. Access to this would be restricted to police in Federal, 
State and Territory jurisdictions (Minister of Justice and Customs 2003). The resulting 
Australian National Child Offender Register (ANCOR) was launched on 1 September 
2004 (Minister of Justice and Customs 2004).
New Zealand
The case of New Zealand is fascinating in that in 1996 the lack of any register 
of sex offenders or paedophiles drove the then journalist Deborah Coddington to 
publish a book entitled ‘The New Zealand Paedophile & Sex Offender Index’, 
followed one year later by ‘The Australian Paedophile & Sex Offender Index’ 
(Coddington 2003b; Coddington 20031). These publications provided alphabetical 
lists on a number of sex offenders, totalling around 500 in the New Zealand and 650 
in the Australian version, including some information on the offence, ranging from 
sexual assault to exposure and homicide, and a summary of the disposition (Ronken
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and Lincoln 2001; Coddington 2003f). Coddington collected the information in a two 
stage process. First of all, she sifted through newspapers in order to identify case 
names. Once this had been done she contacted the relevant courts for further 
information. The content of the indexes is legally justified since it only uses publicly 
available information contained in the media and law reports (Ronken and Lincoln 
2001).
The publication of the Index had a mixed reception. From some parts of the media 
and several official organisations, such as the New South Wales Council for Civil 
Liberties and the Office of the Federal Privacy Commissioner, strong criticisms were 
voiced (Wood 1997). A ‘ torrent of abuse' from ‘all the bien.pensanl chattering class 
brigade who believe if we just be nice to criminals, they’ll behave themselves and stop 
offending' descended on her (Coddington 2003d). However, on the other hand it was 
welcomed by organisations such as the Movement Against Kindred Offenders 
(MAKO) and For Love of Children (FLOC), both of which subsequently started to 
prepare similar lists for publication on the internet (Ronken and Lincoln 2001; see for 
example http: //www.mako. org. au/makoniti .html).
The Wood Commission concluded in its 1997 report after having examined this kind 
of private register that
fa]part from the common dangers concerning double punishment, 
discrimination (compared with other offenders), negative impact on 
rehabilitation, encouragement of vigilantism, and unfair flow-on to 
relatives, additional disadvantages flow from the circumstances that:
• any entry sourced to media coverage risks inaccuracy in reporting,
and in failing to detect reversal of a conviction on appeal, a 
circumstance only rarely reported; .
• the entries are not specific as to the actual facts of the offence, and 
include many items which are relatively trivial, or which from the 
bare statement of the offence in its short form may present a very 
misleading picture of the actual conduct involved;
• this type of index may also present a false picture, and a false 
sense of security so far as it does not report the outcome of the
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many matters determined in closed court, through pre-trial 
diversion programs, or subject to restrictions on reporting;
• its availability to the public may prejudice a jury trial where jurors 
empanelled in such a trial tempted to read the book to determine 
whether an accused in their hands had a prior record for sexual 
offences;
• such a register being publicly available, may be used by
paedophiles to establish links or networks; ■
• this kind of register is very difficult to correct, given the fact that it 
may be in currency for some years between editions; and
• while an incorrect entry may lead to an action for defamation, 
such proceedings are beyond the reach of most persons, are 
uncertain in their outcome, and any injury sustained is unlikely to 
be adequately compensated by an award of damages" (Wood 1997, 
p 1180).
Undeterred, by any such criticisms, Deborah Coddington has since published 
subsequent versions of her Index, the most recent one in 2003 which contained almost 
1900 entries (Coddington 2003e).
In 2002 Deborah Coddington, who by then had become Member of Parliament for the 
liberal party ACT New Zealand, tabled a Bill entitled the Sex Offenders Registry Bill. 
The aim of the Bill was to set up a registry of sex offenders and was modelled on 
Ontario’s 2000 Christopher’s Law and the United Kingdom 1997 Sex Offenders Act 
(Coddington 2002; Coddington 2002b). While one of the principles underlying the 
Bill is that 'the community’s interest must come firsf, thereby subsuming the privacy 
interests of sex offenders to the interests of the community (Coddington 2002b), it is 
more moderate than Coddington’s publications; information on the registry may 
normally not be disclosed and access to any information would be restricted 
(Coddington 2002b, Section 13). The Bill was subsequently examined for consistency 
with existing privacy legislation in New Zealand and no problems were found 
(Bennett 2003). At the time of writing, the Bill was before a select committee 
(http://publications.clerk.parliament.govt.nz.clients.intergen.net.nz/BillsBeforeSelect 
Committees. aspx).
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Appendix 5
Sex Offences and Offenders: A Background
The Extent of Sexual Offences
The number of reported sex offences in the United Kingdom is relatively 
small. It constitutes only around one per cent of all recorded crimes (Fisher and Mair 
1998). This number has been relatively stable over the last 40 years (West 2000) and 
with an average annual increase of four per cent the amount of recorded sex offences 
has risen at a similar rate to other recorded crimes in Britain (Perkins, Hammond et al. 
1998). However, these totals do not necessarily reflect the true extent of sexual 
offences. There is widespread understanding that the number of incidents is seriously 
underreported in official statistics. The main reasons for this discrepancy are the 
willingness of the victim to report, terminology and methodology.
Victims’ willingness to report sexual crimes appears to be one of the most prominent 
reasons why sex offences are underreported. Despite indications that in recent years 
the willingness of sufferers to report such incidents has increased (Myhill and Allen 
2002), the experience of shame and guilt following sexual assaults combined with the 
desire to get over the experience means that frequently victims do not make any 
charges (CSOM 2001). Such reluctance is reinforced by fear of further victimization 
as well as worries about not being believed, or disruption to family life, and is 
particularly prominent if the victim is acquainted with the offender (Myhill and Allen 
2002). However, even if a sexual assault is reported to the police, it does not mean 
that it will be recorded as a sexual crime or even as a crime in general. Discretionary 
powers of the police, insufficient evidence, lack of witnesses, problems in classifying 
sexual offences and demarcating them from other types of offences, or withdrawal of 
accusation by the victim, are just some of the reasons for this (Sampson 1994; West 
1996; Cobley 2000; Home Office 2000).
Terminological issues affecting figures on sexual offences arise from official and 
victims’ choice of words. Changes in legal definitions or statistical categories mean
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that numbers for different years cannot necessarily be aggregated or compared 
(Marshall 1997; Cobley 2000; Soothill 2003). In addition, victims are often either 
unwilling to use, or experience difficulties with, certain terms. For example, in their 
examination of the British Crime Survey Myhill and Allen found that less than 60% 
of female rape victims self-classified the offence as rape (Myhill and Allen 2002, p 
vii). Such problems might arise out of the stigma attached to sexual crimes or 
difficulties in labelling acquaintances as sex offenders (Myhill and Allen 2002).
Finally, statistics often only report principal crimes. These are those crimes that 
receive the most severe sentence. As a result, any convictions for sexual crimes that 
carry a less severe sentence than those for any other offences committed will be 
concealed (Marshall 1997). Along with this, the timeframe and method used to collect 
any data plays an important part in the compiling of numbers. Quite often it is the 
number of cautions or convictions, thus the number of occasions, rather than the 
number of individuals committing crimes (Marshall 1997), that are recorded,.
Consequently, the question as to the true extent of sexual offending arises, and 
estimates differ. In a study comparing official and unofficial numbers, Marshall and 
Barbare concluded that the prevalence of sexual offences can be assumed to be 2.4 
times higher than those given in official records (Marshall 1997). However, given that 
the ratio of recorded crimes to crime incidents is considered to be the lowest for 
sexual offences (Home Office 2000), the extent of such crimes might be far greater. 
Some findings indicate that in cases of adult sexual victimisation, only one in five 
incidents - a mere 18% - were reported to the police (Myhill and Allen 2002), and 
some authors have argued that in cases of child sexual abuse the number of 
unreported incidents might be as high as 93% (Abel, Becker et al. 1984).
Characteristics of Sex Offenders
Sex offenders are frequently seen as a homogenous group of offenders whose 
crimes focus almost exclusively on sexual ones. Because of this, they are normally 
treated by the legal and medical professions as ‘specialists' (Sampson 1994; Simon 
1997). However, doubt has been cast upon this idea. Within criminological circles it is 
assumed that any criminal specialization by offenders is the exception rather than the
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norm (Simon 1997). The general illusion of specialization amongst malefactors can 
partly be explained by referring back to the statistical procedures involved collating 
data on criminals. Given that the official focus is commonly on the most serious 
crime, any other offences committed by the same individual can easily be overseen 
(Simon 1997). While studies of sex offenders indicate that a lot of them have a history 
of committing non-sexual crimes (see for example Becker, Kaplan et al. 1986; 
Fehrenbach, Smith et al. 1986; Loucks 2002), implying that they are ‘generalists', 
other findings support the idea that there must be offender-specific differences 
amongst various types of sex offenders. For example, those who commit sex crimes 
against children appear to have a lower rate for other non-sexual offences (Grubin 
1998) and there appear to be important differences regarding recidivism between 
these different groups (Boyd, Hagan et al. 2000). If there are criminal category 
specific differences, however, support seems to be given to the specialization 
hypothesis.
One solution to this apparent contradiction has been provided by Soothill, Francis, et 
al. (2000), who argue that part of the problem is the fact that the question whether sex 
offenders are generalists or specialists is exclusive. By introducing a two-level 
analysis it can be acknowledged that sex offenders can be specialists and generalists 
simultaneously. As such, sex offenders might be generalists in so far as that they can 
commit a range of offences while simultaneously specializing within this range and 
focusing on certain subcategories.
Despite several attempts to extract sex offender specific characteristics, in general as 
well as those of potential subgroups within this population, the picture that emerges is 
one of heterogeneity rather than homogeneity. As can be seen from the list in Table 
A5.1, offender characteristics differ a lot and most of the ones identified are equally 
applicable to groups of non-sexual offenders.
The difficulty in identifying any typical characteristics appears to be especially 
problematic with child sexual abusers who have been found to be extraordinarily 
heterogeneous in respect to their personal characteristics, life experiences and 
criminal histories (Glaser 1997; Prentky, Knight et al. 1997; Grubin 1998). Given that
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no single molester profile appears to exist (Prentky, Knight et al. 1997), one is led to 
conclude that 'there is no such thing as the typical paedophile' (Glaser 1997, p 6).
Table A5.1: Characteristics of Sex Offenders
• Socially isolated individuals
• Possess feelings of inadequacy
• Low self-esteem
• Fear of rejection
• Feeling of anger towards women
• Depression and other negative affective states
• Antisocial qualities
• Atypical and persistent erotic fantasies
• Deviant sexual preferences
• Lack of social competence and assertiveness skills
• Deficits in information processing skills
• Lack of empathy
• Lack of impulse control
• Poor attachments to parents during childhood
• Difficulties with inter-personal relationships
• Loneliness and lack of intimacy skills
• Hold a variety of distorted attitudes, beliefs and perceptions about their 
offending
• Are highly manipulative
• Denial, minimization and other cognitive distortions are common and
serve to maintain their behaviour ,
• Are likely to underreport or minimise the actual number of offences, the 
number of victims and in the case of child victims the age of the 
children abused
• Are unlikely to take responsibility for their behaviour, are likely to blame 
the victim or deny any harm caused to the victim.
• Are likely to show little awareness of guilt or remorse toward their 
victims
• Tend to come from abusive and dysfunctional homes
• Parental violence, substance abuse and involvement in the criminal 
justice system is not uncommon in the offender’s background
• Have a greater incidence of lower intellectual functioning
• Have histories of school and behavioural problems, delinquency and 
criminal behaviour, diagnoses of conduct and personality disorders and 
substance abuse
(Adapted from Simon 1997, pp 41-2)
Such problems, however, have not deterred multitudinous attempts at coming up with 
classification schemes for sex offenders. These commonly started off by crudely
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dividing them into two categories based on the age of the victim, thereby discounting 
the nature of the sexual act. Thus, independently of the fact of whether a rape took 
place or not, sex offenders whose victims were 16 years or older were classified as 
‘rapists', whereas offenders whose victim was below the age of 16 were referred to as 
'paedophiles' or 'child molesters' (Mair 1993). Such crude classification according to 
the age of the victim is counter-productive when trying to design appropriate 
responses and preventive measures to sex offences. As a result, more complex 
classification schemes have developed over time.
Typologies derived from psychometric testing, psychiatric schemes or specific 
classification schemes focusing on only one type of offender, such as rapists or child 
molesters, have all been applied to sexual offenders. Along with the progressive 
complexity of these approaches, an increasing difficulty in administering them has 
been noticeable. In their widely regarded review of classification schemes for sex 
offenders, Fisher and Mair, concluded that
‘/h7 good classification scheme should be reliable, efficient, pertinent to 
a large number of offenders, and cheap and simple to administer. None 
of the classification schemes reviewed fulfilled all these characteristics.
. While some of them could serve as a basis for further developments, all 
were flawed to some extent' (Fisher and Mair 1998, p 3).
The main areas of concern were the number of samples around which the schemes 
were designed, a focus on convicted and sentenced offenders, a tendency to 
concentrate on a limited category of offenders, aspects of validity and reliability and 
the complexity involved in applying and administering such schemes. All this led the 
authors to believe that none of the schemes were appropriate for use in a criminal 
justice setting (Fisher and Mair 1998). Similar findings have been reported more 
recently by Bickley and Beech (2001) in their review of procedures aimed at reducing 
the heterogeneity of child sexual offenders. Using as their criteria reliability, 
consistency, ease of use, pertinence to a large number of individuals, valid distinction 
between types, relevance to treatment and theoretical relevance to explanation and 
prediction, the authors concluded that none of the approaches are adequate.
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Treating Sex Offenders
Treatment approaches are restricted by the limited understanding of sexual 
offenders and the causes underlying their behaviour. Consequently, treatment of sex 
offenders is frequently considered to be inappropriate. Sex offenders are seen as 
unmotivated for change (Tierny and McCabe 2002) and treatment is perceived as an 
evasion of just deserts’ (West 1996, p 63). When treatment is considered an 
appropriate way of dealing with such offenders the question arises as to what form it 
should take.
Over time a multiplicity of different approaches to treating sex offenders has been 
used, ranging from pharmacological and surgical approaches on the one hand to 
cognitive-behavioural ones on the other, as illustrated by Table A5.2.
Independently of the precise nature of the approach taken, treatment always needs to 
address a given set of factors associated with reoffending. These factors incorporate 
both static factors, also known as fixed factors, and dynamic factors, that are 
changeable through intervention. Fixed factors include the offender’s criminal history, 
childhood maladjustment and are those associated with long-term criminal behaviour. 
While playing an important role, these static aspects do not necessarily determine the 
impact any treatment has on an offender nor the offender’s potential for re-offending. 
This is done by the dynamic factors. When these are addressed correctly they can lead 
to a decrease in recidivism. The dynamic factors consist of stable and acute 
determinants. The former can be changed eventually but are very persistent, whereas 
the latter are changing rapidly and immediately precede sexual assaults (Hanson 
1998).
The majority of sexual assaults appear to be preceded by some degree of planning or 
forethought rather than be committed on the spur of the moment, a behaviour which 
goes through a cyclical pattern and that might start days, weeks or months prior to the 
actual offence (CSOM 1997). One key approach therefore seems to lie in providing 
sex offenders with tools to address and deal with the different stages of this cycle.
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Table A5.2: Various Treatment Models Employed with Sex 
Offenders
• Bio-medical treatment model: primary emphasis is on the medical model, 
and disease process, with a major focus on treatment with medication.
• Central treatment model: multi-disciplinary approach to sex offender and 
sexual abuser treatment that includes all program components (e.g. clinical, 
residential, educational, etc.).
• Cognitive/behavioural treatment model: comprehensive, structured 
treatment approach based on sexual learning theory using cognitive 
restructuring methods and behavioural techniques. Behavioural methods are 
primarily directed at reducing arousal and increasing pro-social skills. The 
cognitive behavioural approach employs peer groups and educational 
classes, and uses a variety of counselling theories.
• Family systems treatment model: primary emphasis is on family therapy 
and the inclusion of family members in the treatment process. The approach 
employs a variety of counselling theories.
• Psychoanalytic treatment model: primary emphasis is on client 
understanding of the psychodynamics of sexual offending, usually through 
individual treatment sessions using psychoanalytic principles.
• Psycho-socio educational treatment model: structured program utilizing 
peer groups, educational classes, and social skills development. Although this 
approach does not use behavioural methods, it employs a variety of 
counselling theories.
• Psychotherapeutic (sexual trauma) treatment model: primary emphasis is 
on individual and/or group therapy sessions addressing the sex offender’s 
own history as a sexual abuse victim and the relationship of this abuse to the 
subsequent perpetration of others. The approach draws from a variety of 
counselling theories.
• Relapse prevention (RP) treatment model: a three dimensional, multimodal 
approach specifically designed to help sex offenders maintain behavioural 
changes by anticipating and coping with the problem of relapse. Relapse 
Prevention: 1) teaches clients internal self-management skills; 2) plans for an 
external supervisory component; and 3) provides a framework within which a 
variety of behavioural, cognitive, educational, and skill training approaches 
are prescribed in order to teach the sex offender how to recognize and 
interrupt the chain of events leading to relapse. The focus of both assessment 
and treatment procedures is on the specification and modification of the steps 
in this chain, from broad lifestyle factors and cognitive distortions to more 
circumscribed skill deficits and deviant sexual arousal patterns. The focus is 
on the relapse process itself.
• Sexual addiction treatment model: structured program using peer groups 
and an addiction model.
(CSOM 1999, p 22)
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Obstacles in Assessing Treatment-Effectiveness
A lot of the existing research on sex offender treatment effectiveness has been 
poorly designed (Craissati and McClurg 1997; Marques 1999; Maltzky and 
Steinhauser 2002). Within existing studies, samples are often very small, and differ 
widely with regard to the type of offence, sociodemographic and personal 
characteristics as well as offence severity and frequency. While some studies include 
all reoffences, others focus solely on sexual reoffences. In addition, while some forms 
of sexual offences are easier to detect or have a higher probability of being reported, 
the heterogeneity of the samples used frequently does not take these aspects into 
account (Lievore 2004). For example, child molesters, for a variety of reasons mainly 
relating to difficulties in obtaining convictions, have a relatively low rate of 
reconviction cases; others, such as indecent exposure, have a relative high one. This 
means that if combined in a single category, the probability of reconviction rate given 
for child sex offenders would be exaggerated, while the one for indecent exposure 
would be underestimated (Lievore 2004). Finally, there are problems relating to the 
transferability and generalizability of the findings. While there have been some 
studies assessing prison-based treatment in the UK, only a negligible amount of non­
prison-based work has taken place (Craissati and McClurg 1996). Evaluations of 
treatment effectiveness have been done most widely within specialist treatment 
centres in the US and Canada. While the underlying concepts of sex offender 
treatment are comparable across the Western world, socio-cultural or compositional 
differences in the characteristics of those offenders entering treatment cast doubt on 
the wider applicability of findings made within such contexts (Grubin and Thornton 
1994).
Given that the aim of most treatment approaches is the prevention of future criminal 
offences, the concept most commonly used for assessing treatment success is that of 
recidivism. In particular, from a public policy perspective, recidivism is an invaluable 
notion because it provides a guide as to the impact of various measures and 
interventions (CSOM 2001). However, despite appearing to be a straightforward idea 
and the common understanding of recidivism to be the ‘committing of a further 
offence\ there are several obstacles when trying to operationalise the idea (Lievore 
2004).
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As can be seen from Table A5.3, recidivism can be defined in a variety of ways. Most 
commonly it is defined as subsequent arrest, subsequent conviction or subsequent 
incarceration. While each of these concepts is valid in its own right and each has its 
own advantages and disadvantages, they measure different things and thereby lead to 
different results.
Table A5.3: Different Notions of Recidivism
Subsequent arrest - using new charges or arrests as determining criteria for 
recidivism. This will lead to a higher rate of recidivism given that not all arrests 
will result in a conviction
Subsequent conviction - more restrictive than subsequent arrest resulting in 
a lower rate of recidivism. It offers the advantage, however, that the involved 
process means that the person is found guilty and thereby the data might be 
more reliable
Subsequent Incarceration - While in general appearing to be the most 
restrictive measure of the three one has to bear in mind that return to prison 
might not necessarily be caused by a reoffence but could result from technical 
violations of any restrictions place upon the offender.
(Adapted from CSOM 2001, p 2)
Related to this is the question of the sort of offences taken into account. While in this 
area recidivism is usually defined as ‘ The conviction of another sexual offence during 
a specified follow-up period' (Furby et all quoted in Cann, Falshaw et al. 2004), there 
have been arguments for considering other, non-sexual, offences. The underlying 
rationale for this is that charges for sexual crimes might be dropped in court 
proceedings or through plea bargaining, and that reconviction rates frequently only 
take the first reconviction during the follow-up time into account (Lievore 2004).
On top of such fundamental definitional difficulties, one key factor in examining 
recidivism is the time of follow-up or length of supervision. In general it is assumed
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that the rate of recidivism often increases slowly but steadily over time. While 
frequently a follow-up period of five years is quoted as sufficient, a longer timeframe 
might be necessary (Hedderman and Sugg 1996; CSOM 2001; Cann, Falshaw et al. 
2004). Cann, Falshaw et al (2004) found in their study that while the majority of 
reconvictions for sexual offenders appear to take place during the first five years, a 
sole focus on five years would have resulted in missing over one third of new sexual 
reconvictions for their sample. Long follow-up times, however, present various 
problems. First of all, funding agencies are usually impatient to wait for results. 
Secondly, if research is supposed to provide feedback on various treatment 
approaches, short follow-up periods might be more suitable given that they provide 
more timely feedback. Thirdly, there is the question of how far the results of a group 
of offenders treated 20 or more years ago can inform work with sex offenders at 
present. Finally, over a long period of time some offenders might be imprisoned for 
other offences so that they are not ‘at risk’ of reoffending which again might result in 
an underestimation or distortion of numbers (CSOM 2001; Cann, Falshaw et al. 2004)
The last set of problems arises from the kind of data that is used for assessing 
treatment. Arriving at a baseline which allows for a comparison between the treatment 
group and a set of non-treated offenders is difficult (Craissati and McClurg 1997; 
Perkins, Hammond et al. 1998). As mentioned beforehand the true extent of sex 
crimes is difficult, if not impossible to arrive at and the same applies to numbers of 
reconvictions which are influenced by the same aspects previously outlined. This 
problem is compounded by the data source used. In the United Kingdom the source 
most widely used is the Offender Index which, unlike the Police National Computer, 
can be accessed by independent researchers and is not restricted to certain Home 
Office personnel. However, the Offender Index might not be the most adequate 
source. Falshaw, Friendship et al. (2003) found that when compared to the Offender 
Index the Police National Computer identified a far greater number of offenders who 
had received a sexual reconviction, 5.3 times higher, than the one given on the Index.
Research Findings on Recidivism and Treatment Effectiveness
One of the most important factors to bear in mind is that recidivism for sex 
offenders, while increasing over long periods of time, is relatively low, even in the
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absence of any treatment (Grubin 1998; Hanson 1998; Hanson and Bussiere 1998b; 
Flood, Shute et al. 2002; Loucks 2002; Friendship, Mann et al. 2003; Lievore 2004). 
While commonly reconvictions amongst sex offenders are for non-sexual offences 
(Loucks 2002), in those cases where a reconviction is for a sexual crime the offence is 
often quite severe (Hood, Shute et al. 2002).
The probability and frequency of recidivism seems to be related to the offender’s 
preferred type of victim, the victim-offender relationship, history of sexual offences 
and attitude, and the treatment package received. Demographic variables that appear 
to be related to recidivism are the age and marital status of the offender, with younger 
unmarried ones more likely to sexually reoffend (Flanson and Bussiere 1998b; Scalora 
and Garbin 2003). Other factors that appear to be linked to higher levels of recidivism 
are prior sexual offences, early onset of sexual offending and focusing on 
extrafamilial, unacquainted or male victims (Harris and Rice 1998; Hanson and 
Bussiere 1998b; Boyd, Hagan et al. 2000).
For example, in the case of child sexual abuse, heterosexual father-daughter incest 
offenders with no other victims seem to have the lowest rate of recidivism, 
heterosexual extrafamilial offenders an intermediate one, and extrafamilal 
homosexual offenders the highest rate of recidivism (Harris and Rice 1998; Hanson 
and Bussiere 1998b). While findings differ, there are indications that another 
important factor is treatment completion and the offender’s level of self-esteem prior 
to the commencement of therapy. Those who fail to complete treatment can be 
understood as being at a higher risk of reoffending than those who did not (Hanson 
and Bussiere 1998b) and there seems to be clear support for the assumption that a low 
level of self-esteem prior to treatment is associated in a linear way with higher levels 
of sexual recidivism (Thornton, Beech et al. 2004).
The question of treatment effectiveness is still hotly debated and one has to decide 
what to consider as successful treatment. As Grubin and Thornton ask, is 'treatment 
success the individual who reoffends but in a less violent manner or the offender 
whose reoffending is delayed over time'’ (Grubin and Thornton 1994, p 69)? There are 
few well-designed studies of treatment effectiveness in respect to sex offenders in 
general and even less focusing on specific categories of sex offenders. Conclusions
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drawn from meta-studies and literature reviews about the effectiveness of treatment in 
reducing recidivism are inconsistent and ambiguous (Polizzi, Layton MacKenzie et al. 
1999; Lievore 2004). One of the first reviews, done by Furby, Weinrott et al. (1989), 
found that there was no convincing evidence to assume that treatment reduced further 
sexual offending, a conclusion which was also reached by Quinsey et al (1993) as 
well as by Harris and Rice (1998). At the same time, however, other meta-analyses 
have been cautiously optimistic about treatment effects (Hall 1995; Perkins, 
Hammond et al. 1998; Grossman, Martis et al. 1999).
In general, it seems to be the case that cognitive-behavioural treatment programmes 
have a positive impact in reducing recidivism of offenders who complete such 
programmes (Hall 1995; Polizzi, Layton MacKenzie et al. 1999; Maltzky and 
Steinhauser 2002; McGrath, Cumming et al. 2003) and that over the last 25 years 
treatment has become increasingly successful (Maltzky and Steinhauser 2002). While 
the best treatment effect appears to be with low-deviance offenders, treatment also 
seems to impact on medium- and high-deviance offenders, but with a longer 
timeframe needed (Beckett, Beech et al. 1994; Beech, Erikson et al. 2001). A good 
treatment effect can also be found on those sex offenders who committed crimes 
against children (Beckett, Beech et al. 1994; Maltzky and Steinhauser 2002) and with 
circumstantial offenders rather than predatory offenders in general (Maltzky and 
Steinhauser 2002).
In conclusion, it seems safe to say that there is ‘sufficient evidence to warrant 
optimism about treatment efficacy with sexual offenders' (Abracen and Looman 
2004), a conclusion which was available at the time of the Sarah Payne case. 
However, as several authors have pointed out, more work needs to be done in this 
area. Special focus should be paid in future examination to the precise nature of 
treatment provided, such as timing, length, duration, nature and the location treatment 
(Grossman, Martis et al. 1999; Abracen and Looman 2004). Given that offenders 
might have different causes for offending, they will require different treatment 
approaches, so that applying a blanket approach is unlikely to be useful (Hanson 
1998; Seto 2003).
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Appendix 6
List of Documental References
Document _
Type of Document
Number
11 Briefing Note: ACOP and the Press Complaints Commission
A document published by ACOP, providing background 
information on the relationship between the two agencies and 
the actions taken in light of the News of the World's name-and- 
shame campaign
12 ACOP Dossier of Evidence 1998
13 Letter to the Press .Complaints Commission by ACOP/ACPO 
regarding the News of the World's name-and-shame campaign
14 Correspondence between News of the World and ACPO
15 Correspondence between Home Office and ACPO
16 Part of the Dossier of Evidence 2000 produced by 
ACOP/ACPO
17 Part of the Dossier of Evidence 2000 ACOP/ACPO
18 Draft for the Sarah's Law Campaign that was forwarded from 
ACPO to the News of the World
19 News release by ACOP regarding the dossier of evidence
22 Home Office strategy document assessing the circumstances, 
outlining the approach to be taken and highlighting various 
options in light of the News of the World's campaigning
23 Home Office Mental Health Unit document assessing aspects 
regarding the disclosure of information on sex offenders to the 
public
29 Correspondence between News of the World and the Home 
Office following the meetings with Home Office 
representatives
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31 Outline of proposed legislative measures that could be called 
Sarah's Law by members of the alliance of organisation
36 Open Letter from representatives of the alliance of organisation 
to Rebekah Wade, editor of the News of the World, highlighting 
the problems arising from the name-and-shame campaign and 
asking for the opportunity to discuss potential ways of 
improving child protection
37 Correspondence between ACOP and the Press Complaints 
Commission
40 Correspondence between ACOP and the News of the World
41 News release by NACRO stating that Megan's Law could be 
counter-productive in fighting child abuse
42 Correspondence between the Home Office and members of the 
alliance of organisations
43 Statement on the meeting with the News of the World issued by 
representatives of the alliance of organisations
44 News release by the News of the World
45 The News of the World initial draft for its Sarah's Law 
Campaign
46 Documentation handed out by the News of the World at the 
meeting on 2 August 2000
51 The News of the World's official Sarah's Law Campaign leaflet
52 Correspondence between the NSPCC and ACOP
53 Correspondence between the NSPCC and the Home Office
54 Correspondence between the Home Office and ACOP
55 Correspondence between the Home Office and ACOP and 
ACPO
57 Correspondence between the News of the World and ACOP
65 ACOP internal correspondence
67 Correspondence between the NSPCC and ACPO
69 Correspondence from ACOP to its members
71 ACOP Memorandum on sex offender disclosure and
notification seminar
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72 ACOP internal correspondence
82 Public Affairs briefing by DeHavilland
83 ACOP internal correspondence
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